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PART I: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Introductory Remarks on this Thesis 
Refugees and their escape from violent conflicts or environmental disasters play a considera-
ble role in international politics and are a key concern in social science research. At the be-
ginning of 2013, around 10.4 million people
1
 around the globe were forced to live in exile. 
Photos of refugees on their escape or of refugee camps and their often disastrous conditions 
go around the world every day. Only very few will return to their place of origin during their 
lifetime. Amongst other things, social science research focuses on questions of citizenship, 
violence within refugee communities, and deportation. However, protracted refugee situations 
are often not considered in connection with the three durable solutions for their whereabouts, 
which are (1) the return to the home state, (2) integration into the host state, or (3) resettle-
ment to a third state. The durable solutions remain largely neglected in the social sciences. In 
1991, Sadako Ogata, the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees famously declared the 
1990s as the “Decade of Repatriation.” As a consequence, questions related to return and re-
patriation
2
 gained more political attention and also scholarly acknowledgement. In 2000, the 
decade came to an end and refugee return vanished almost completely from the literature. In 
order to countervail its disappearance, this thesis addresses return as the preferred solution for 
protracted refugee situations. Over and above, the last decade was characterized by several 
new conflicts, which forced many people to leave their homes, e.g. in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syr-
ia, and Libya. 
 
When refugees leave their home country, they surely do not do this without the wish to return 
one day. Dolan even supposes, “[t]heir yearning to return is not reduced by the time they 
spend away.” (Dolan 1999: 94) However, returning is not always a feasible option, especially 
when the home state still struggles for peace and freedom. On that account, stakeholders and 
scholars agree that a return process must occur under certain conditions. At best a refugee 
return to their home country needs to be “sustainable.” However, the adjective “sustainable” 
is often quite meaningless and insufficiently defined. A very small minority of stakeholders 
and scholars made attempts to define what it means if a return is sustainable. Thereby, most of 
them confuse the meaning of sustainability with a certain time period, i.e. that a return process 
is sustainable when the returnee stays in their return area for three, five, or ten years. (Cf. 
MCR 2009: 14) However, their approach seems to be flawed, as it does not consider the liv-
ing conditions the returnees have upon their return. For instance, the refugees’ living condi-
tions may be equally poor in the host and in the home country, but they may decide to return 
because they wish to be reunited with their family and friends and to reconnect to their home-
land. It is very likely that these refugees would stay in their return area for a longer time peri-
                                                 
1
  This figure stems from the UNHCR webpage: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c1d.html, last retrieved 
on 20.12.2013. 
2
  The terms “return” and “repatriation” are often used with a similar meaning. However, in a narrow sense, 
return refers to the spontaneous movement of refugees to their homes. Repatriation, in contrast, means the 
organized process of returning to one’s home, usually with the help of the UNHCR. This thesis uses the term 
“return” to address all forms of refugee movements to their homes. 
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od simply for the reasons mentioned above, although their living conditions are far beyond 
satisfactory. In this case, return cannot be classified as sustainable.  
 
The thesis at hand gives a more appropriate and more precise definition of a sustainable re-
turn, which focuses on sustainable livelihoods, good living conditions, and integration. In the 
process of defining sustainability it further identifies seven criteria that have to be met in or-
der to ensure a sustainable return in the home country. It does not stop at this point, but also 
tests the definition and criteria of a sustainable return practically by analyzing six minority 
communities (the Roma, the Ashkali, the Egyptians, the Serbs, the Bosniaks, and the Goranis) 
in post-conflict Kosovo and using qualitative methods to examine whether or not their return 
is sustainable according to the new definition. The choice for the empirical analysis fell on 
Kosovo, because it is a very special and interesting case due to its unsolved legal status.
3
 Be-
yond that, the international community strives for the establishment of a multi-ethnic society 
in Kosovo and tries to avoid the separation in two mono-ethnic entities, which was the result 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ethnic conflict in 1995. The return of refugees, who belong to 
ethnic minority communities, is one of the main preconditions to establish a multi-ethnic so-
ciety. At the moment, the public perception prevails that almost no minority communities 
return to Kosovo. The first step is therefore to discover how many minorities returned to their 
homes in Kosovo. Subsequently, this thesis analyzes the return conditions of each minority 
community. The more sustainable the return conditions are, the more refugees who belong to 
an ethnic minority community may return to their homes in Kosovo. In order to test this as-
sumption, a final comparative analysis is conducted, which shows that the concept of sustain-
ability needs to be reviewed thoroughly again. While Kosovo and the analysis of the six mi-
nority communities provide a good example, the author finds that a post-conflict country can-
not guarantee the conditions of all criteria and based on the empirical analysis in Kosovo re-
vises her concept of a sustainable return. It can be concluded, while not all conditions must be 
fulfilled, minimum conditions of a sustainable return can be identified that must be met before 
a sustainable return can take place. 
 
The thesis’ contributions are threefold: 
 It improves the definition of sustainability in refugee return research and comes up with 
seven criteria to be met in order to classify a return as sustainable. 
 It tests the definition and the criteria empirically looking at Kosovo and six ethnic minori-
ties within Kosovo employing qualitative methods. 
 It critically revises the conceptual framework of sustainable return following discrepan-
cies found between theory and practice and it gives focused policy recommendations to 
improve return to Kosovo and other post-conflict societies. 
 
In order to achieve this, there are four core questions that lead this research: 
Research Question 1: In theory, what makes a refugee return sustainable? 
                                                 
3
  Even though several states, including Germany, already recognized Kosovo as an independent state, Kosovo 
is not an independent state according to international law. It lacks the recognition of the United Nations Or-
ganization. As a consequence, the author does not refer to the terms “state,” “citizen,” or “border.” This does 
not reflect a lack of recognition, but follows the legal decision.  
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Research Question 2: Why is the return of some ethnic minority communities to Kosovo 
more sustainable than others?  
Research Question 3: Do more refugees return if the return conditions are sustainable? 
Research Question 4: What are the minimum conditions that need to be met before a sus-
tainable refugee return can take place? 
 
The study is structured as follows: Part I constitutes the INTRODUCTION. Chapter 1 and 2 
introduce the research at hand and discuss the previous literature with regard to refugee re-
turn. The literature review depicts the main advantages and disadvantages of refugee return 
and identifies it as the preferred durable solution to protracted refugee situations.  
Part II gives an overview of the METHODOLOGY. This research is based on a qualitative 
content analysis of six cases, which are ethnic minorities that return to Kosovo. Subsequently, 
the results of the six cases will be compared with each other and will be examined using the 
SWOT analysis. Both methods help to generate hypotheses, which may be tested by future 
research that may also apply large-N (statistical) analysis. It further presents the research 
questions. 
Part III deals with the CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK. Chapter 3 and 4 present a new theo-
retical framework for the definition of and the preconditions for a sustainable return. It offers 
different meanings of a sustainable return and presents a bespoke and new definition of the 
concept. In Chapter 4, this thesis identifies seven criteria that are necessary to ensure a sus-
tainable return. 
Part IV conducts the EMPIRICAL ANALYSES. Chapters 5 to 11 specifically discuss the 
case of Kosovo. It begins with a brief introduction into the pre-war history of the country, the 
role of the minority communities during the war, and the post-conflict reconstruction efforts 
(Chapter 5). It further identifies the main stakeholders in the return process to Kosovo. In the 
following, Chapter 6 analyzes the return conditions of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyp-
tian communities. Chapter 7 deals with the Serbian returnees and Chapter 8 with the Bosniak 
and the Gorani communities. The results of the empirical analyses are subsequently compared 
with each other (Chapter 9). Furthermore, this thesis summarizes the strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats of refugee return to Kosovo in a SWOT analysis and generates poli-
cy recommendations that aim at improving the situation of minority returnees in Kosovo 
(Chapter 10). Chapter 11 takes a final critical look at the theoretical framework and practical 
implications and wraps up the empirical findings with regard to the conceptual framework. It 
revises the initial assumptions based on discrepancies found between the set-out conceptual 
framework and the empirical analyses. 
Part V concludes the final results of this thesis, demonstrates its limitations, and presents hy-
potheses for further research on the topic.  
 
This thesis has several real world implications. In particular, the policy recommendations de-
duced from the analyses provide advice to international stakeholders on how to make the re-
turn conditions of these communities more sustainable. In addition, they focus on ways to 
attract more refugees to return to Kosovo. Although the analysis concentrates on the case of 
six ethnic minority communities in Kosovo, the results are transferable to other countries wel-
coming returnees. 
PART I – INTRODUCTION 
4 
1.2 Literature Review on Refugee Return 
“Refugees are outside the state-centered concept of international law. Indeed ‘refugee’ 
is a concept, a label, which has been created to serve the purposes and interests of states. 
Refugees have been defined as non-citizens and those who have been captured by the 
state – sponsored assistance programmes have been frozen in a permanent state of mar-
ginality in their host societies. As non-persons they are not consulted in the develop-
ment of policies which affect their futures.” (Emphasis added, Harrell-Bond 1988 as 
quoted in Harrell-Bond 1989: 59) 
To begin the discussion on refugee return, Harrell-Bond’s definition emphasizes the severe 
situation refugees are facing once they crossed the border to another state. They neither be-
long to their home state nor to any other state anymore: According to Harrell-Bond, these 
people are defined as non-citizens and even more non-persons; perceived as stateless persons. 
As a logical consequence, refugees have to gain citizenship to end the refugee cycle. (Cf. Ki-
breab 1996a: 11) By becoming citizen of a state – either their home state or any other state – 
they have full rights and access to social services. (Cf. Ghanem 2005: 127) Durable solutions 
intend to restore the lost relationship between the citizen and the state and include the return-
ees’ opportunity to exercise power and control over their own fate, which was lost during the 
displacement. (Cf. Walsh, Black, Koser 1999: 113) The three durable solutions for refugees 
are integration into the host country, resettlement to a third country, and the return to their 
home country. Because of their earmarked objective, the three durable solutions are mutually 
exclusive: Promoting one solution means excluding the other two options. The reason is that 
one cannot gain multiple citizenships. (Cf. Harrell-Bond 1989: 44)
  
Integration into the host state means that the refugees are admitted to a wider range of rights 
and duties that correspond to those granted to local citizens. These rights include amongst 
others: the freedom of movement, access to education and to the labor market, access to pub-
lic services and assistance, the ability to travel with identity documents, and family unity. In-
tegration means gaining a permanent residence status in and acquiring citizenship of the host 
country. It is important to keep in mind that “… the process of local integration becomes a 
durable solution only at the point when a refugee becomes a naturalized citizen of his or her 
asylum country.” (Crisp 2004: 2) Otherwise, the refugee could be deported at any time and 
would not have the same rights and duties other citizens have.
4
 
Resettlement to a third country is the least common method to achieve a durable solution for 
refugees. It mostly applies when the options for voluntary repatriation or local integration do 
not exist or do not seem feasible. In that case, refugees are resettled to a third country that is 
                                                 
4
  Due to the limited scope of this dissertation, integration as a durable solution cannot be discussed in further 
detail. It should be noted that integration can be a successful durable solution in some protracted refugee situ-
ation. For instance, integration can be a safer option for the refugees as the home country often needs a con-
siderable amount of time to grow as a peaceful society. For a detailed discussion on integration into the host 
state, its challenges and opportunities, please see the following articles:  
Crisp, Jeff (2004): The local integration and local settlement of refugees: a conceptual and historical analysis, 
in: New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 102. Geneva: UNHCR, pp. 1-8. 
Dryden-Peterson, Sarah and Lucy Hovil (2003): Local Integration as a Durable Solution: Refugees, Host 
Populations and Education in Uganda, in: New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 93. Geneva: 
UNHCR, pp. 1-27.  
Jacobsen, Karen (2001): The forgotten solution: local integration for refugees in developing countries, in: 
New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 45. Geneva: UNHCR, pp. 1-42. 
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not involved in any conflict and, therefore, provides a “safe haven”5 for the refugees. Thus, in 
the majority of the cases, resettlement is designated as an instrument of protection rather than 
a durable solution. Often, resettlement is “the last resort” and thereby “… for many refugees 
… the best – or perhaps the only alternative” (Emphasis in original, Troeller 2002: 87).6 
 
Return
7
 – in contrast to integration and resettlement – has several advantages: The interna-
tional community, home and host states, as well as refugees themselves often choose this du-
rable solution over the other two. In the following paragraphs, the idea of refugee return is 
introduced.  
Returning home has three meanings: returning to (a) the refugee’s country of origin, (b) the 
refugee’s region/town/village of origin, or in a narrow sense (c) the refugee’s own 
home/house. Refugees most likely decide to return if returning means to go back to their orig-
inal homes. That would include the reconstruction of destroyed houses, which often poses an 
insurmountable challenge to the home country that just moved into the post-war era.  
Black and Gent differentiate between two types of return: a reactive and a proactive return. A 
reactive return process happens in response to a crisis or changes in the conditions in the host 
country. In a proactive return, refugees decide consciously to return by gathering free and 
reliable information on their home country. In practice, “[m]ost organized schemes for reha-
bilitation of return migrants tend to be a spontaneous response to emergency situations and 
are largely donor driven” (Arowolo 2000: 60). 
 
Return is not a process that finishes at a particular point in time. It involves taking time as 
well as the social integration of former refugees into a changed, new home society. Moreover, 
return processes can include going back and forth between the host country and the home 
country. Nyborg Sørensen (2004) distinguishes between staggered and revolving returns. (cf. 
Nyborg Sørensen 2004: 15) A staggered return involves splitting families where usually the 
male family members return first and leave their wife and children behind until the conditions 
in the home country improve. In the case of Afghanistan, for instance, “… some ‘hedged their 
bets’ by retaining a presence at home and abroad, keeping some family members working in 
Pakistan while others started to rebuild homes and reinvest in the land in Afghanistan.” 
(Marsden 1999: 62) By contrast, a revolving return means that refugees intended to return 
permanently but end up re-migrating for economic and/or security reasons. (Cf. Black, Gent 
2006: 22) 
                                                 
5
  The term ‘safe haven’ refers to an invention from the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the beginning of the 
1990s. In 1993, the United Nations declared six cities, amongst them Srebrenica, as safe zones for civilians to 
protect them from a violent conflict between Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. 
6
  Resettlement cannot be discussed in further detail either. However, as explained earlier, resettlement is 
viewed as a durable solution that should not be neglected as it often functions as a last resort for refugees in 
protracted situations. Therefore, I suggest the following articles for a more comprehensive understanding of 
resettlement as a durable solution:  
Bach, Robert L. (1989): Third Country Resettlement, in: Loescher, Gil and Laila Monahan (eds.): Refugees 
and International Relations. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 313-331, Stein, Barry N. 
(1983): The commitment to refugee resettlement, in: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 467:1, pp. 187-201, and Troeller, Gary (2002): UNHCR resettlement: evolution and future direction, 
in: International Journal of Refugee Law 14:1, pp. 85-95. 
7
  The term return stands for refugees that go home, either with or without international assistance. It is the 
umbrella term for the process. Repatriation, instead, only describes the process of a national or international 
planned and implemented repatriation scheme and is often used for the forced return of refugees.  
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Most scholars agree on the fact that the state is responsible for dealing with the refugees it 
once produced. Gasarasi argues that the state should, if capable, be responsible for the re-
integration of the refugees through repatriation programs. (Cf. Gasarasi 1996: 11) This stems 
from the assumption that “… a product (the refugee phenomenon) cannot be more causally 
related to another product (development) than it is to the producer of both (the state).” (Gasar-
asi 1996: 11) Moreover, “… no actor, other than the state, is equipped to implement these 
measures.” (Gasarasi 1996: 11) Gasarasi proposes a polity primacy approach that focuses on 
the role of the state and the responsibilities of the state in dealing with the returning refugees 
and, by the same token, with the reconstruction of the entire country. Harrell-Bond agrees and 
clearly sees the responsibility to create conditions that are conducive to return at the state lev-
el: “Therefore, if states want their people to return, they [the states] must create conditions 
which are conducive.” (Harrell-Bond 1989: 61) 
An open question is whether the countries of origin are able to care for the refugees they once 
produced. Usually, countries with the lowest Human Development Index
8
 (HDI) have the 
highest propensity to generate large movements of refugees and displaced persons. (Cf. 
Chimni 2004: 8) Because there is a causal coherence between the country’s poverty and its 
propensity to produce refugee movements, it can be noticed that these countries are unlikely 
to be able to cover the returnees’ special needs after their physical return was accomplished. 
According to Chimni, the minimum economic and political standards an accountable state has 
to take care of to guarantee a successful return process are, that it must be “… able to fulfill 
rudimentary functions such as control over territory, maintenance of law and order, and sup-
ply of basic services.” (Chimni 2004: 71) A severe dilemma for poor countries emerges from 
this connection: “On the one hand it needs the human capital of the refugees … On the other 
hand, without international assistance, the sudden repatriation of refugees could be disastrous” 
(Kibreab 1996b: 59) because the state alone often provides the indispensable basic conditions. 
 
It is out of question that refugee return has certain advantages over integration and re-
settlement, which are explored next. On the personal level, the satisfaction of belonging to a 
community and to the homeland is one of the most prominent advantages of return. Voluntary 
return means that refugees “… discover their social and cultural roots, which give them the 
comforting feeling of belonging.” (Emphasis in original, Ghanem 2005: 105) Belonging, how-
ever, does not only mean belonging to a people, as described with Ghanem’s words, but as 
well to a land. Terms such as “motherland,” “fatherland,” or the land of one’s ancestors were 
dropped. (Cf. Kibreab 1996b: 53) In addition, return can create the chance for family reunion, 
which is another emotional need.  
In addition, one has to consider that those, who regain citizenship rights by returning to their 
own home state, adopt a sense of justice: The relationship between the citizen and the state 
was disrupted, because of the displacement, but it is now reestablished. Through the return to 
their own country, refugees can claim back those rights that were denied to them since their 
                                                 
8
  The Human Development Index (HDI) is a tool that measures social and economic development by combin-
ing indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment, and income. It is measured on a continuous scale 
from 0 to 1, where each country can take any value on this continuum. Higher values indicate a better out-
come on the HDI scale and thus better social and economic conditions. For more information, please see the 
informative website of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which created the HDI: 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/, last retrieved on 25.11.2013. 
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displacement and in exile. (Cf. Chimni 2002: 163) The process of return – if it is successful – 
creates a sense of justice for returnees, which is unique to this particular durable solution. On 
that account, it involves the absolute meaning of home, but it is, for the same reason, the most 
difficult durable solution. (Cf. Bradley 2005: 74) 
In most cases, returnees live on the subsistence level and are dependent on farming to fend for 
them. Through the return to their home country, most refugees have the opportunity to claim 
their lost property and can retain/regain land rights. (Cf. Arowolo 2000: 64; see also Peil 
1995) Often, they did not have the opportunity to own land in the host country, as they are 
restricted to live in camps or in organized settlements. 
On the national level, the re-establishment of normality is the most important factor in favor 
of return. The refugee return has an ideological significance. It allows the re-establishment of 
the natural or national order in the home country. Then, citizens are, where they belong to, 
and host countries do not have to define measures to integrate them. Thus, there is no need for 
the host countries to give them citizenship rights and to grant them access to public services. 
(Black, Gent 2006: 19f.) 
Furthermore, refugee return is the cheaper option for the host countries and other donor states. 
They put a lot of effort in reducing their costs for refugees. Integration, however, would in-
volve a long-term financial burden on host countries. Hence, especially host countries are 
promoting voluntary return instead of integrating refugees into their own societies. In sum, 
return is a “pragmatic” response of the international community in order to save money and to 
lose the burden of refugees in the host countries. (Cf. Dolan 1999: 89) 
 
Although refugee return is the preferred durable solution to solve the refugee problem, there 
are significant disadvantages the refugees are facing upon return. First of all, the life in their 
home country has changed over the time period that the refugees spent in exile. It is widely 
accepted that repatriation is a return to a way of life that is familiar to the refugees. However, 
this does not take into accounts that, on the one hand, the society and, on the other hand, the 
individual have changed during the time in exile. (Cf. Harrell-Bond 1989: 42) Therefore, 
some scholars question whether the right term concerning returnees is integration or re-
integration into the home society. Integration can be defined as a mix of persons that have 
been previously segregated. Re-integration, instead, is a process of integrating someone back 
into a well-known society. (Cf. Arowolo 2000: 62) When these terms are applied to the return 
of refugees, they do not relate to the same processes. According to Preston (1993), the term 
re-integration is difficult as it implies that the society has not changed since the refugees were 
displaced. Yet, Arowolo argues that integration as well as re-integration can take place after a 
change and conditions do not always have to stay the same. The fact that the society has 
changed leads to a so-called reverse culture shock. In the scientific literature, scholars also 
refer to the group of “re-”words, such as re-habilitation or re-conciliation, but totally neglect 
the fact that after a civil war and after years spent in exile, the refugee returns to a society, a 
place called “home” that they do not know anymore. (Cf. Ghanem 2005: 111) Hammond ar-
gues: 
“The implication of these terms is that returnees should seek to move backward in time, 
to recapture a quality of life that they are assumed to have enjoyed before becoming 
refugees or that those who remained behind currently enjoy.” (Hammond 1999: 230) 
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Warner summarizes this difficulty nicely: Returning home includes the geographical notion of 
going back to the country of origin, but it denies the matter of time. The individual citizen, as 
well as the country of origin, has changed during exile. Thus, “[t]here is no going back to the 
situation as it was before the crisis that caused exile.” (Warner 1994: 171) There is no re-
anything; a refugee cannot re-integrate into the society because they were never integrated in 
this specific type of society that they find when they return home. “We can go back to a place, 
but we cannot go back in time.” (Warner 1994: 171) From the author’s point of view, every 
war-torn society changes during and after the war. Refugees return to a society and country 
that has changed and they have to integrate themselves within these new circumstances. In 
this thesis, the term integration is used to describe the process every returnee has to go 
through after the physical return to their home. 
The second major disadvantage concerns the possible conflict between returnees and the so-
called stayees (the people that stayed during the conflict), which can emerge.  
“Whatever the case may be, what all returnees share is the impossibility to recreate the 
times which preceded the events that led them to flee, as the changes that have occurred 
among returnees and stayees are irreversible.” (Ghanem 2005: 135) 
The relationship between returnees and stayees often interferes with the competition for al-
ready scarce resources. On top of that, former refugees are often perceived as the “lucky 
ones” who got free food and health care in the host country while the stayees dealt with de-
humanizing conditions during a violent conflict. When a refugee comes back, “[h]is arrival 
will affect the market, fields will be further divided, he may be looked on as a traitor” (Har-
rell-Bond 1989: 58). Because of the competition for scarce resources – particularly houses or 
other dwellings and job opportunities – returnees may be perceived as a potential threat to the 
inner security and stability of the home country and its population. (Cf. Ghanem 2005: 132) 
Opondo indicates that focusing on returnees only does not promote the development of the 
entire society, but it creates further problems between returnees and stayees: “Isolating the 
returning refugees from the rest of their home societies and thereby setting them apart for spe-
cial treatment even though some of the ‘stayees’ may be in similar, if not worse predica-
ments.” (Opondo 1996: 25) 
 
The integration that follows the physical relocation from point A to point B is far more im-
portant, but it seems to be neglected in worldwide repatriation programs. Typical repatriation 
programs have three dimensions: 
 
(1) Logistics 
(2) Direct assistance on arrival 
(3) Help with integration Long-term approach 
 
According to experience from Cambodia, the logistics of repatriation received the strongest 
financial and organizational emphasis. In contrast, the integration, despite being the most 
challenging task, attracted comparatively less attention. (Cf. Eastmond, Öjendal 1999: 42) 
Arowolo supports this idea by referring to repatriation programs in general: “The focus of 
such schemes … is on the repatriation process, and success is measured in terms of timely 
provision of physical transportation and relocation of exiles rather than the subsequent pro-
Short-term approach 
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cess of reintegrating them into civil society.” (Emphasis added, Arowolo 2000: 60) This is 
true for most of the return processes worldwide. However, as it will be pointed out later in 
Chapter 3.3, the integration process is the most important and most difficult dimension of the 
return process, especially when it comes to the question of making it sustainable. “Under-
standably then, the scope of returnee aid has been confined to achieving the objective of es-
tablishing minimum material and social conditions in which the return of refugees can be 
promoted.” (Chimni 2002: 172)  
 
The goal of the returnee’s integration into their home society is that they are not dependent on 
development aid anymore and able to feed themselves and their family. However, in the first 
months after their return, refugees need a minimum level of support to rebuild their own lives. 
“By its very nature, the reintegration of returnees into their homeland required a developmen-
tal approach.” (Kibreab 1996b: 55) Considering the experience in Cambodia, Eastmond and 
Öjendal describe the situation as follows:  
“Preliminary survey data of the situation of returnees at the time the four hundred days 
of rice rations ended showed that many had not yet begun to farm, and were still waiting 
for land to be allocated.” (Eastmond, Öjendal 1999: 45)  
Consequently, people should not be settled and receive support with food and medical aid, but 
they should rather receive help to help themselves. (Cf. Kibreab 1996b: 59) Development aid 
is supposed to support returnees to build their own lives and to be self-reliant. Besides, devel-
opment aid should also support the locals and “stayees” rebuilding their own lives since their 
lives changed during the past, too. (Cf. Kibreab 1996b: 55) Kibreab explains the reason for 
his argument: “… populations in the receiving areas will also have undergone changes, and a 
balance needs to be struck by drawing insights from both experiences.” (Kibreab 1996b: 60) 
Thus, a holistic development approach for both – the returnees and the receiving communities 
– must apply.  
“For solutions to last, assistance to refugees and returnees must aim at their participa-
tion, productivity and durable self-reliance; it should be development-orientated as soon 
as possible and, in least developed countries, it should take into account the needs of lo-
cal people as well.” (Quoted in Kibreab 1996b: 55) 
The applicability of a development approach addresses two main problems: 
(a) Home countries are often not well developed before hostilities and violent conflicts arise. 
Thus, “[i]t required not only the rebuilding or replacing of what had once existed, but in 
many respects actually initiating the development process for the first time.” (Salih 1996: 
165) Donor countries, hence, have to expand their development strategies to the needs of 
the returnees, which is often problematic, because they are not in the focus of the interna-
tional community’s attention.  
(b) There is a tendency of dependency on external assistance: “The families interviewed 
seemed to have high expectations of outside assistance which had reduced personal initia-
tive.” (Eastmond, Öjendal 1999: 48) As it is the case in other contexts, “[a]ny displaced 
people in northeast Africa who become genuinely dependent on relief agencies are unlike-
ly to survive long.” (Allen, Turton 1996: 9) Allen and Turton figured out that the relief aid 
itself is not the only factor entailing dependency but that it is, in fact, the loss of control 
over the refugees’ own lives. (Cf. Allen, Turton 1996: 10) Instead of asking them what 
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they want others to do for them, refugees and returnees should be given as much control 
over their own lives as possible. 
Furthermore, one has to consider informal strategies of development and reconstruction. For 
instance, remittances help to reconstruct a country on an informal basis. However, a cut of 
remittances as a consequence of return would stop the informal reconstruction processes, 
which might be of paramount importance for the home country to develop. (Cf. Dolan 1999: 
104, 106) Dolan argues that “… informal strategies of reconstruction and development … 
need to be seriously considered …” (Dolan 1999: 108) in a holistic development approach. 
 
Concisely, it was explored that return is not a durable solution in itself. It is necessary to sup-
port a sustainable integration of the returnees into their home country’s society and not to in-
volve the receiving community and the returnees’ special integration needs. (Cf. Dolan 1999: 
89)  
In addition, the international community assumed that refugee return is the most desirable and 
most uncomplicated solution to end the refugee cycle in the past. Recently, however, it falls 
into place that this assumption is false and that the integration of returnees into the home soci-
ety can be more difficult than the integration into the host society or the resettlement into a 
third country. (Cf. Allen, Turton 1996: 1, Ghanem 2005: 110) “Even if repatriation is the end 
of one cycle, it is also usually the beginning of a new cycle which can challenge and expose 
some returnees to vulnerability.” (Black, Koser 1999: 3) 
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PART II: METHODOLOGY 
 
2. Methodological Approach 
The ideal methodological approach for this dissertation would be to gather information from 
the primary and secondary literature on refugee return first and, then, to conduct interviews 
with national and international stakeholders as well as returnees from the selected ethnic mi-
nority communities. Through interviews, one could gain detailed insights into the stakehold-
ers’ understanding of sustainable return, including their support of and their opposition 
against the implementation of return processes, and institutional reforms in Kosovo. In addi-
tion, and even more important, one could gain information about the refugees’ and the return-
ees’ individual motivations for their decision to return or not to return to their home country. 
Furthermore, the preferences of the refugees with regard to the place of return could be de-
termined. Without conducting interviews, this thesis cannot make a statement about the refu-
gees’ personal motivation, which plays an important role in every migration process. Never-
theless, conducting interviews per se is no guarantee that refugees and returnees really tell the 
truth about their personal motives. Moreover, in order to conduct interviews with refu-
gees/returnees who belong to minority communities in an ethnic conflict, the interviewer 
needs a confidential access to the interviewees. This can very often only be achieved through 
other members of the same communities. It is also ethically difficult since the interviewees 
could be traumatized. Furthermore, it is likely that they give socially desirable answers or lie 
because of the fear of reprisals from the other ethnic communities. Thus, conducting inter-
views in this setting would require high costs and a lot of time, which was unattainble consid-
ering the scope of this work.  
In addition, interviewing representatives of the different minority communities may be chal-
lenging in terms of language and translation. For these reasons, the author had to abstain from 
conducting qualitative interviews and relies on content analysis only. 
 
The case studies’ first contextual variables are presented by analyzing the conflict that al-
lowed the displacement of Kosovo residents. Every post-conflict situation is characterized by 
the grievances that enabled the outbreak of a violent conflict. These grievances need to be 
taken into consideration in the reconstruction and in the refugee return processes. Thus, it is 
very important to assess the conflict and to set the scene before analyzing the refugee returns 
of each ethnic minority community.  
Refugee return also plays a crucial role in the post-conflict reconstruction as it supports the 
legitimacy of new institutions. Furthermore, as the integration of refugees is one of the most 
important goals in a transitional state, their well-being serves as an indicator of how well 
these new institutions manage the development goals in the post-conflict period. 
 
After setting the scene on the conflict assessment, post-conflict reconstruction, and providing 
some general remarks on refugee return to Kosovo, this study analyzes the refugee returns of 
six different ethnic communities to Kosovo. It gives a brief overview of the actors in the re-
patriation process, the time frame, as well as the relevant determinants of this specific refugee 
return, the sustainability of the refugee return is then reassessed for each ethnic community. 
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This is conducted with the help of seven criteria: physical security, economic opportunities, 
reparation/property restitution, education, health care, infrastructure, and legal security.  
During the course of researching and writing, the question how these criteria can be analyzed 
and related to each other arose. At the beginning, the author sought to analyze one criterion 
after the other for each of the six ethnic communities and their return to Kosovo. However, 
the sections are interrelated and cannot be regarded separately. For instance, the access to the 
employment market of one ethnic community cannot be regarded separately from the educa-
tional level, as this is one important prerequisite to acquire employment. This leaves the au-
thor with three alternative ways of analyzing whether a sustainable return takes place: 
 
(1) A systematic analysis could be conducted according to each criterion with the trade-off 
that the relation between the criteria could only be established after each chapter. One ad-
vantage is that dealing with one criterion after the other is a very structured approach. 
However, not every criterion is relevant to the return of every ethnic community. In addi-
tion, the correlations between two or more criteria cannot be analyzed appropriately by 
describing the interrelation in the summary only.  
(2) Analysis could be conducted, which does not distinguish between the different criteria, 
but between the opportunities and the challenges that come with it. This way, there is a 
risk that one criterion is analyzed at a time within the opportunities and the challenges sec-
tion, but the approach is less structured and it would severely interrupt the reading flow of 
this thesis. 
(3) Analysis could be conducted according to clusters of criteria, which are interrelated. For 
instance, the lack of adequate education of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians leads 
to unemployment and poverty. Consequently, the two criteria education and economic 
opportunities could be analyzed together. Following this approach would be most benefi-
cial as it is semi-structured and does not neglect the interrelation between the criteria, 
which is why the author chose the third option. 
 
The conditions of a sustainable return are analyzed in three steps. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, countries often have insufficient capabilities to provide public services even before 
the conflict. Thus, the first part explores the status quo of the post-conflict state. This includes 
analyzing the preconditions in the respective country, which are: 
 What was destroyed during the conflict?  
 What are the current circumstances in each specific field with particular reference to the 
members of each ethnic minority community? 
 
This study further seeks to identify the returnees’ experience with regard to horizontal ine-
qualities. “Horizontal inequalities (HIs) are inequalities between groups with shared identi-
ties.” (Stewart 2005: 6)9 Most conflicts nowadays can be characterized as ethnic conflicts, in 
which two or more ethnic communities (groups with shared identifies) fight against each oth-
er. Often, the returnees belong to one of the main conflict parties. Following the general anal-
ysis of the preconditions within the country, it is important to explore whether or not returnees 
                                                 
9
  For further information on Horizontal Inequalities, please see Stewart, Frances (2005): Policies towards Hor-
izontal Inequalities in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, in: CRISE Working Paper, 7. Oxford: Centre for Re-
search on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity.  
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Strengths
 Characteristics, which contribute 
to the development of sustainable 
livelihoods and foster the integra-
tion of the minority returnees into 
the society.
Opportunities
 Chances to improve the situation 
of minority returnees in the fu-
ture.
Weaknesses
 Characteristics that constrain 
sustainable livelihoods and pre-
vent a successful integration of 
the minority returnees into the 
society.
Threats
 Elements that could cause 
problems for the future return of 
minority refugees to their homes 
in Kosovo.
Definition of SWOT regarding the
Analysis of the Return of Minority Refugees
Internal
External
are worse off than their counterparts who stayed in Kosovo. Furthermore, this study identifies 
whether the national institutions are able to serve the returnees’ special needs, especially with 
regard to their experiences in exile, primarily: legal safety. Returnees should not be treated 
differently before the law and they need to have their home country’s citizenship, which is 
indispensable to claim public services. In addition, also special educational conditions, psy-
chological assistance, and the treatment of illnesses must be considered.  
 
Finally, this study compares the conditions of the six communities returning to Kosovo with 
each other by identifying the differences between them.  
Subsequently, a SWOT analysis will uncover the main general characteristics of the return of 
minority refugees to Kosovo. The SWOT Analysis tool is a strategic planning method to 
evaluate the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats involved in a project or in a 
business venture. It helps to specify the objective of a small project or of an entire company 
and to identify the internal and external factors, which are conducive or unfavorable to meet 
that objective. (Cf. UNDP 2012: 147) In the field of political science, SWOT analysis is a 
frequently used tool to describe the characteristics of a political phenomenon, such as the re-
turn of refugees. In case of the return of minority refugees to Kosovo, the following defini-
tions are used: 
Figure 1:  Definition of SWOT regarding the Analysis of the Return of Minority Refugees 
Source:  Own compilation 
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This inquiry answers the question: What are the reasons for the similarities and/or differences 
in the return process of the six cases? Eventually, it uncovers minimum criteria to ensure a 
sustainable return and it generates empirically testable hypotheses for future research. 
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2.1 Case Studies and the Comparative Method 
This study is consequently based on two complementary methods of qualitative research, 
which are combined with each other. The first method is case study research. The cases of six 
ethnic minority communities are analysed in depth, because “… the number of cases it deals 
with is too small to permit systematic control by means of partial correlations.” (Lijphart 
1971: 684) Case studies also have the advantage of depth and uniqueness, but it seems that 
this method was largely neglected in the past. The informational value of case studies was 
underestimated. A case study can be defined as “… an intensive study of a single unit for the 
purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units.” (Gerring 2004: 342) In general, 
case studies can serve to understand causal relationships between variables. (Cf. Leuffen 
2007: 206) Bennett and Elman argue that our life becomes more and more complex. Yet, case 
studies can unravel this kind of complexity because they allow for a detailed and holistic 
analysis; they facilitate the search for omitted variables, which might be hidden, and “… they 
allow for the study of interaction effects within one or a few cases.” (Bennett, Elman 2006: 
259) Since the social sciences often examine complex phenomena, case studies have a signifi-
cant advantage vis à vis quantitative methods, because they do not reduce causal relations to 
numbers. In summary, 
“[c]ase studies can utilize within-case analysis and/or cross-case comparison of the de-
tailed sequential events within one or a few cases to provide inferential leverage on 
complex causation even when only a few relevant cases are available for analysis.” (Cf. 
Bennett, Elman 2006: 259)  
 
Lijphart distinguishes between six types of case studies: 
(1) atheoretical case studies, 
(2) interpretative case studies, 
(3) hypothesis-generating case studies, 
(4) theory-confirming case studies,  
(5) theory-infirming case studies, and 
(6) deviant case studies.10 (Cf. Lijphart 1971: 691ff.)  
 
The dissertation at hand employs a hypothesis-generating approach, which begins “… with a 
more or less vague notion of possible hypotheses, and attempt[s] to formulate definite hy-
potheses to be tested subsequently among a larger number of cases. Their objective is to de-
velop theoretical generalizations in areas where [almost] no theory exists yet. Such case stud-
ies are of great theoretical value.” (Lijphart 1971: 692) The research method employed is a 
content analysis of six cases, which is based on the existing literature. Thereby, a thematic 
analysis of the text is conducted. This focuses in particular on the identification of major ideas 
in a given set of documents. One challenge of content analysis is a possible bias in the exist-
ing literature. As a consequence, researchers have to be very wary with the sampling in order 
to diminish the sources of bias.  
In the paper at hand, the author followed two approaches to ensure that the literature was 
largely unbiased by the conflict parties: (1) literature neutral in tone such as official docu-
                                                 
10
  Please see Lijphart, Arend (1971): Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method, in: The American 
Political Science Review 65(3), pp. 691ff. for a detailed explanation of every case study type. 
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ments provided by the UN or the OSCE was chosen for analysis to ensure objective report.
11
 
(2) Biased or polemic literature by the conflict parties was read and analyzed by taking a dis-
tance strategy. Biased literature is defined as literature that showed clear elements of polemic 
language, over-emphasized the achievements of the conflict party, or over-emphasized the 
cruelty of other conflict parties. For instance, 
“However, history has played a cruel trick on Gora, making it ever the loser.” (Ah-
metović 2002: 56) 
In this example, polemics are indicated by the phrase “cruel trick”, which suggests that the 
other party intentionally did some bad. 
“When ethnic Albanians fled Opolje for Albania, Goranies did all in their power to pro-
tect Opolje against destruction and possible torching. And they succeeded. Opolje was 
the bestprotected area in Kosovo and Metohia precisely thanks to Goranies. Goranies 
have always wanted a multiethnic and multireligious Kosovo and Metohia, and good re-
lations with ethnic Albanians in neighbouring Opolje and in all of Kosovo and Metohia. 
Through their long history, tradition and practice, they have adhered to the principle of 
multiethnic coexistence, working all over the world, Europe and Yugoslavia.” (Ah-
metović 2002: 57) 
Here, the whole paragraph indicates that the good and peaceful characteristics of the Gorani 
were over-emphasized, whereas the negative traits of the other groups are stressed at the same 
time.  
Furterhmore, literature is likely to be biased when the author uses the first person and de-
scribes own experiences and wishes: 
“In the final analysis of our origin, we have never subscribed to the notion that our peo-
ple – Goranies – should be obliged to change their nation or creed, but only to the idea 
that we should know and remember our roots.” (Emphasis added, Ahmetović 2002: 55) 
Sentences that were biased, polemic, and/or positively or negatively discriminating were not 
included in the text analysis. The analysis focused on neutral and objective phrases, which 
could be evaluated on factual information and not on emotional statements. 
 
The second method is a qualitative comparison. After the detailed analysis of six cases of ref-
ugee return to Kosovo, they are compared with each other. In order to this, the return figures 
of the six ethnic minority communities and the sustainability of their return are analyzed. The 
aim of the comparison is to identify similarities and differences and to show whether there are 
combining criteria that help to guarantee a sustainable return process. At the same token, the 
comparison enables the author to determine obstacles to a sustainable return. 
Both methods help generating hypotheses, which may be the basis for further research on re-
turn movements to other countries or other settings as well as for large-N statistical analysis.  
 
                                                 
11
  The author acknowledges that these institutions are predominantly informed by Western and industrial values 
and maybe even interests. With regard to this particular conflict, the author is confident that the reports were 
carefully documented and at least unbiased with regard to the conflict parties as none of them was involved 
in producing and distributing these reports. 
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2.2 The Selection of the Case Studies 
There is no comprehensive list of case-selection methods. Thus, van Evera developed an own 
list of selection criteria. Among others, he recognizes data richness, extreme values of the 
relevant dependent, independent, or conditioning variable, appropriateness for controlled 
comparisons with other cases, or the resemblance of case background conditions to the condi-
tions of current policy problems. (Cf. Van Evera 1997: 77f.) These selection criteria can also 
be applied to the study at hand and translate into three main selection criteria:  
 recent return movements (2000 – present), 
 a Human Development Index above 0.700, and 
 data richness and/or high accessibility of data. 
The first criterion selects countries (units) with a large population that was displaced relative 
to the total population and with a return movement of refugees within the recent past (2000 – 
present). This criterion stems from the presence of several studies on return movements and 
their conditions, which occurred in the 1980s and 1990s and from a lack of qualitative com-
parative analyses of return movements in the 2000s. Most return movements occurred in Afri-
ca, in the Middle East, and in the Western Balkans. This criterion limits the selection to 24 
countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Kosovo (Serbia), Lebanon, Li-
beria, Macedonia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Tajikistan, and Tanzania.  
Figure 2:  Geographical Distribution of Recent Return Movements 
Source:  Own compilation 
The Human Development Index (HDI) measures the life expectancy, literacy, education, 
standard of living, and quality of life in a comparative perspective. It is measured on a contin-
uous scale that ranges from 0.000 (very low) to 1.000 (very high standard of living). Sustain-
able return requires a certain standard of living and level of economic development (see the 
Chapters 3.3 and 4). Thus, a HDI of 0.700 is selected as the reference for the next selection, 
which describes a medium high level in the standard of living. When this criterion is applied, 
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the possible cases for investigation can be narrowed down to five: Iran (0.742), Kosovo (Ser-
bia) (0.700), Lebanon (0.745), Macedonia (0.740), and Sri Lanka (0.715).12 
 
The third criterion helps selecting one of these five options according to the data richness and 
the high accessibility of data. Due to a lack of and/or limited access to quantitative data, this 
research is based on qualitative primary and secondary literature. Data richness, therefore, 
refers to the availability and accessibility of qualitative reports by state and non-state organi-
zations, to legal texts, and to the academic literature. With regard to the data richness, a suffi-
cient number of reports and policy papers exist on refugee return to Kosovo, because there are 
plenty of international governmental and non-governmental organizations in Kosovo (Serbia) 
that publish on this case. Beyond that, Kosovo has a special relevance as it has an unsolved 
status in international politics and shows a lack of returns of refugees that belong to minority 
communities. This makes Kosovo a very special and a very interesting case to study and 
which is reason why Kosovo (Serbia) was selected as a subject for analysis. 
 
This dissertation explores the conditions for returning refugees from six different ethnic mi-
nority communities, which leads to the question how these minority communities were select-
ed. 
Kosovo is a multi-ethnic region, where ten different ethnic communities are represented with 
an Albanian majority of approximately 90 % share of the total population. The Albanians are 
not the focus of this analysis, because the majority of the displaced Albanians returned to their 
homes in Kosovo immediately after the end of the violent conflict in the summer of 1999. 
Briefly, the ethnic majority community largely returned whereas the minority communities 
continue to be displaced.  
This study does not take into account the Croats, the Montenegrins, and the Turks, because 
there is almost no record of refugee returns of these three communities: Only two Turks, three 
Croats, and twelve Montenegrins returned to Kosovo to date (Cf. UNHCR February 2013: 4). 
This is predominantly because the members of these three minorities never left Kosovo. Con-
sequently, the study focuses on the remaining six ethnic minority communities: the Roma, the 
Ashkali, the Egyptians, the Serbs, the Bosniaks, and the Goranis. A significant proportion of 
these communities was displaced to Western European countries or neighboring countries of 
Kosovo because they feared revenge attacks from the Albanians
13
. 
 
                                                 
12
  The other countries with recent return movements have the following Human Development Indices: Afghani-
stan (0.374), Angola (0.508), Burundi (0.355), Central African Republic (0.352), Chad (0.340), Côte d’Ivoire 
(0.432), Democratic Republic of the Congo (0.304), Ghana (0.558), Iraq (0.590), Kenya (0.519), Liberia 
(0.388), Mauritania (0.467), Nigeria (0.471), Rwanda (0.434), Sierra Leone (0.359), Somalia (0.364), Sudan 
(0.414), Tajikistan (0.622), and Tanzania (0.476). For a full list of countries and their ratings, please see 
UNDP (2013): The 2013 Human Development Report – “The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Di-
verse World” in various languages, online available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2013/, last 
retrieved on 03.12.2013.  
13
  As will be explained later on, the members of ethnic minority communities feared attacks from the Albanian 
majority, who wanted to take revenge on those communities who committed the atrocities against the Alba-
nians during the 1990s and those, who collaborated with the perpetrators. 
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2.3 Research Questions and Outline of the Study 
The overall objectives of this inquiry are threefold: First, this study clarifies what a sustaina-
ble refugee return really stands for. More precisely, it defines sustainable return theoretically, 
identifies the conditions in the home country that allow a sustainable return, and works out 
how each of these affects sustainability in detail.  
Research Question 1: In theory, what makes a refugee return sustainable? 
 
A second focus lies on the policy context: This thesis analyzes the return of refugees to Koso-
vo. Within this context, the author compares the success rate of returns across six ethnic mi-
nority communities and investigates why the return of some ethnic minority communities to 
Kosovo is more sustainable than the return of others. Finally, this examination gives policy 
recommendations to local, national, and international stakeholders in Kosovo with regard to 
the different conditions within the six communities and their general requirements. The policy 
recommendations aim at: 
 identifying the general requirements that have to be met in Kosovo before a sustainable 
refugee return of any ethnic community can take place,  
 proposing how to improve the conditions for the returnees of the six communities, and at 
 providing a guideline on how to choose safe return areas. 
Research Question 2: Why is the return of some ethnic minority communities to Kosovo 
more sustainable than others?  
 
Third, this thesis links the theoretical concept of sustainable return to the practical implemen-
tation thereof. Although the question is primarily of a theoretical and conceptual nature, the 
motivation is to improve the practical applicability of the theoretical framework of sustainable 
return in ongoing and future return movements. The goal is to check whether more refugees 
return if the conditions are sustainable and to define general minimum conditions of sustaina-
ble return. These are set out in Chapter 4. 
Research Question 3: Do more refugees return if the return conditions are sustainable? 
Research Question 4: What are the minimum conditions that need to be met before a sus-
tainable refugee return can take place? 
 
In order to achieve these goals, the study is divided into three main parts: the conceptual 
framework, the empirical analyses, and the conclusion.  
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2.4 Definition of Variables 
The dependent variable or the phenomenon that is explained is the sustainability of refugee 
return of six ethnic communities. It is analyzed according to the characteristics outlined in 
Chapter 3.3.1. Sustainable refugee return can be defined as a process, in which returnees can 
establish sustainable livelihoods and are integrated into the home society. (Cf. Black, Gent 
2006: 28; Macrae 1999: 3) In addition, a sustainable return should not create an outbreak of 
new violence between the returnees and the rest of the society. Also, the returnees should nei-
ther be displaced again within their home country nor to another country.  
The conditions given within the return country are the independent or the explanatory varia-
bles: These can be summarized as physical security, economic opportunities, repara-
tion/property restitution, education, health care, infrastructure, and legal security. Guided by 
the general post-conflict reconstruction process, the conditions for the returnees are scruti-
nized under the consideration that the returnees have special needs and that the institutional 
capacities within the home country are limited. 
 
Several conditioning effects have to be taken into consideration, especially with regard to the 
context:  
 The ethnic conflict, which lasted a decade and culminated in the war in 1999, and the sub-
sequent ethnic cleansing of members of the minority communities, caused the displace-
ment of the refugees. As a consequence, their return cannot be regarded separately from 
those events and the general role of the refugees during the conflict.  
 Kosovo does not exist in an isolated environment, but needs to be looked at in the wider 
European context. Many voluntary and forced returns occur from Western European 
countries, such as Germany, Switzerland, Norway, and Denmark. Among others, these 
countries signed readmission agreements with Kosovo, but pursue different repatriation 
policies. Beyond that, the host countries often implement donor programs for Kosovar 
refugees, who return to Kosovo from exile. This can be helpful in creating conditions that 
are conducive to a sustainable return. 
 Some ethnic minority communities have a specific status in Europe, which prevents a suc-
cessful integration into the host countries. Often, those communities have no other choice 
than to return to their homes in Kosovo. 
 Political arrangements in the Western Balkans play a crucial role in the analysis of refugee 
return to Kosovo. In particular, the relationship between the Republic of Serbia and its 
province Kosovo is important, as there is still no definite solution to the status of Kosovo 
despite the declaration of independence in 2008. The unsolved status question and the dif-
ficult relationship between Serbia and Kosovo influence the return of refugees from dif-
ferent ethnic minority communities, particularly the return of the Kosovo-Serbs. In addi-
tion, the situation is further influenced by the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
may be viewed as a kin state for the Kosovo-Bosniaks.  
 Furthermore, it plays an important role that members of ethnic minorities emigrate from 
Kosovo to neighboring or Western European countries. The reason for this is that emigra-
tion works against a successful return, and depopulates and destabilizes certain regions 
within Kosovo. 
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PART III: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3. Conceptual Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Sustainable Return 
Post-conflict reconstruction and refugee return are intrinsically linked to each other. In a post-
conflict society, refugee return can give rise to ethnic tensions and renewed violence because 
the returnees frequently compete with the locals and the so-called stayees for already scarce 
resources, especially if the national economic level remains marginal. Contrariwise, return 
can contribute positively to the reconstruction and peace process in a post-conflict society, 
especially in view of needed skills and personnel, if certain requirements are met.  
This chapter aims at giving the theoretical background for a detailed discussion of the refugee 
return to the post-conflict society of Kosovo. It defines post-conflict reconstruction and the 
concept of sustainable return. The third chapter then explains the requirements that have to be 
met to guarantee a sustainable return in a post-conflict society.  
 
3.1 Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
When dealing with post-conflict reconstruction, one has to identify what needs to be recon-
structed first: in this case, the state. A state is defined as a political entity with a clearly de-
fined territory, a population that belongs to the state, and sovereign institutions of governance 
that exercise power. (Inter alia Hague, Harrop 2013: 21) Modern states fulfill three key func-
tions: They protect the country and ensure that citizens can live peacefully and secure, they 
represent the people within their political institutions, and they provide some kind of welfare, 
at least since the introduction of welfare states by the end of the 19
th
 century. During conflict, 
these elements of a state are challenged in various ways: (1) the previously defined territory 
may be in flux (e.g. paramilitary organizations or liberation fronts may challenge the power 
over the entire or a part of the entire territory), (2) the relationship between citizens and the 
state may change (e.g. citizens may be displaced to another territory and thus have left the 
clearly defined territory of a state), and (3) government institutions and infrastructure may be 
destroyed (hence, there are no sovereign institutions who can exercise power any longer). (Cf. 
Petrin 2002: 2) Milliken and Krause argue that the “… failure to perform these functions is a 
failure of the state.” (Milliken, Krause 2002: 756) During or after a conflict or due to other 
causes, states that fail to perform their major tasks are called “weak states”, “transitional 
states”, “emerging states”, or most commonly “failing/failed states”14. According to Petrin, 
the extreme case is that “… there may be no state at all” (Petrin 2002: 2) post-conflict. If this 
is the case, security, politics, the economy and other social circumstances are in disorder. Ta-
                                                 
14
  Milliken and Krause developed an interesting point of view: States do not actually fail, but they never really 
existed. “One (somewhat ironic) way to think about the contemporary anguish over state collapse is to note 
that what has collapsed is more the vision (or dream) of the progressive, developmental state that sustained 
generations of academics, activists and policy-makers, than any real existing state.” (Emphasis in original, 
Milliken, Krause 2002: 762) The logic consequence for such pseudo- or quasi-states is their failure. Thus, the 
question is not how and why they may fail but rather how and why they exist. (Cf. Milliken, Krause 2002: 
763) Due to the limited scope of this thesis, the formation of states and the differences between states that 
emerged from the Westphalian peace and those that claimed independence after a long history of colonial de-
pendence cannot be explored in detail. For further reading please see Milliken, Jennifer and Keith Krause 
(2002): State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction. In: Development and Change 33:5, pp. 753-
774. 
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Economic Circumstances Economic Circumstances
Security Circumstances Political Circumstances
1
3
2
4
Outcomes of Conflict 
 “Civil life is replaced by widespread militarization.” 
(Holtzman, Elwan, Scott 1998: 16)
 Illegal Paramilitary Organizations
 Trafficking in Drugs, Women, and Weapons
 Land Mines Preventing Access 
to Land
 Organized Crime
 (Semi-)Authoritarian Systems
 Executive Power Concentration
 Strong Reliance on Security 
Forces for Power Preservation
 Weak Civil Society
 Parties Organized Along Ethnic 
Affiliation
 Damaged Infrastructure
 Reduced Productivity
 Devastated Government 
Revenue Base
 Erosion of Human Capital
 Population Displacement
 Erosion of Social Capital
 Increased Proportion of 
Population Needing Assistance
ble 1 specifies the outcomes of a conflict and helps to identify the major areas where recon-
struction must apply.  
Table 1:  Outcomes of Conflict 
Source:  Own compilation according to Brzoska 2006: 4ff. and Holtzman, Elwan, Scott 1998: 15 
When law and order break down, state institutions lose the monopoly of the use of force, the 
government has a weakened or disintegrated capacity to respond to citizens’ needs, and inter-
national assistance is often absolutely necessary. (Cf. Brinkerhoff 2005: 2) However, the di-
rection and the goal of post-conflict reconstruction are often not very well defined. This large-
ly depends on the definition of state failure or collapse which can either be perceived as the 
end of state institutions or as a “… devastating birth of a genuinely post-colonial order.” 
(Mazrui 1995: 22) Conflict transforms the society and the state itself to a large extent. Recon-
struction is not and should not be the mere rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework that 
existed prior to the conflict. Reconstruction does not equate with construction of the past. Ra-
ther, it supports the transition from conflict to peace in an affected country. According to 
Coyne, the “… ultimate success in the reconstruction process is defined as the achievement of 
a self-sustaining liberal democratic, economic and social order that does not rely on outside 
assistance in terms of monetary and/or military support.” (Coyne 2005: 3) 
 
Post-conflict reconstruction mainly works in four areas, within which priority activities can be 
identified.  
(1) Re-establishing security is indispensable because it is a “… necessary precursor to stabili-
sation and progress towards a return to something approaching ‘normal’ economic and po-
litical activity.” (Brinkerhoff 2005: 4) Reestablishing security often involves an interna-
tional peacekeeping operation and a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration strat-
egy (DDR). The latter helps to limit and to diminish the possibility of banditry and the re-
emergence of conflict. (Cf. Brinkerhoff 2005: 4) Furthermore, it requires dealing with the 
police, military and paramilitary, civil rights, the judicial system, and the operation of 
courts and prisons. The lack of security, however, impedes the recreation of basic ser-
vices, which is another essential part of post-conflict reconstruction.  
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(2) The reparation of important physical and social infrastructure, such as public transporta-
tion, communications, utility networks, education, and health care, is the second priority 
area of reconstruction because 
“[c]onﬂict and wars destroy basic infrastructure, disrupt the delivery of core services 
(e.g. health, education, electricity, water, sanitation) and impede the day-to-day routines 
associated with making a living.” (Brinkerhoff 2005: 4) 
(3) The framework of governance must be reconstructed and, hence, legitimacy reconstituted. 
Strengthening government institutions creates acceptance and trust among the people. The 
strengthening involves reducing inequality, combating corruption, delivering services, the 
capacity to respond to citizens’ needs, the reestablishment of the rule of law, and the de-
velopment of a civil society. (Cf. Brinkerhoff 2005: 3) It also involves (re-)constructing 
state institutions. One should take into account that institutions and their orientation de-
pend on the political culture of a country. First, the international community should identi-
fy what kind of institutions fit the circumstances of the post-conflict state and what will 
best suit the process of reconstruction. (Cf. Brinkerhoff 2005: 4) Thereby, it is useless to 
focus solely on a Western democratic model, as this tends to create more challenges for 
the government than benefits.  
(4) The last priority activity in a typical reconstruction process is the jump-start of the econ-
omy through investment, resumption of trade, savings, and domestic and foreign invest-
ment, economic stabilization, the rehabilitation of financial institutions, the restitution of 
legal frameworks, and functioning markets. (Cf. Holtzman, Elwan, Scott 1998: 25f.) A 
stable and flourishing economy is also acknowledged by democratization theory as a cata-
lyst for the development of a democratic society and a democratic state. (Cf. Lipset 1959) 
 
While implementing these activities, it is of paramount importance to give special attention to 
the areas and groups of people that are most affected by the war. The most vulnerable groups, 
e.g. female-headed households, should receive a more reasonable share and a fairer distribu-
tion of resources. Furthermore, the first and foremost goal in the reconstruction of a state 
should be the restoration of the relation between the state and the society, which was disrupt-
ed during war. 
 
Reconstruction depends largely on the political will of the government and the society. “By 
and large, donor agencies have cited a lack of political will as a major – if not the major – 
factor.” (Weiss Fagen 2003: 211)15 The lack of the political will of the parties involved is one 
                                                 
15
  A good example for the positive impact of political will in the process of post-conflict reconstruction is El 
Salvador. (Cf. Weiss Fagen 2003: 204ff.) Weiss Fagen argues that the peace agreement in El Salvador came 
about thanks to the political will of both the government and the opposition forces of the Frente Farabundo 
Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). Both knew that no one could win this war and fostered peace ne-
gotiations at the beginning of the 1990s. In addition, “[c]entral American political leaders and opposition 
groups sought a comprehensive plan for regional reconstruction that envisioned peace and development.” 
(Weiss Fagen 2003: 204) The program CIREFCA stands for the “International Conference on Central Amer-
ican Refugees” and was initiated after severe conflicts in seven Latin American countries during the 1970s 
and 1980s. There was the need for a regional solution to help the uprooted 2 million people. CIREFCA was 
jointly operated by UNHCR and UNDP and aimed at finding a durable solution for the refugees and IDPs, by 
promoting return as the ideal solution to end the refugee cycle, and by encouraging refugees to interact more 
with the local population in host countries where refugee return would not be a safe option. The return of the 
refugees to El Salvador and to other Latin American countries was part of a wider strategy of post-conflict 
reconstruction and was operated successfully, because of the political will of the parties involved: “The re-
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challenge that should be addressed as soon as possible, at best at the beginning of the recon-
struction itself. A lack of this makes the reconstruction process more difficult, when the key 
political actors refrain from participating in any new constitutional government, and causes it 
to fail right from the start. This is because the key stakeholders fear a loss of their power, lev-
erage, and privileges within the state. A common feature to minimize this risk is to disperse 
constitutional authority across federal or autonomous units, who can exercise control over a 
rather weak central authority. The international community often creates weak structures to 
reduce the risk that the state will fail altogether. (Cf. Cox 2001: 6) However, this often results 
in a state failure to perform its major functions.  
Ethnic conflicts pose another specific challenge to post-conflict reconstruction, that is, to pro-
vide a solution to diminish former inequalities in rebuilding the infrastructure and the socio-
economic framework. “Reconstruction itself must take into account the dynamics of conflict 
and the inequities and schisms that led to breakdown in the first place.” (Holtzman, Elwan, 
Scott 1998: 18) If former inequalities are not addressed, new violence over old disputes may 
break out and may hamper peace and development at the same time. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
turnees had achieved the security of full citizen rights, and reestablished themselves as political and econom-
ic participants in the nation.” (Emphasis added, Weiss Fagen 2003: 205) 
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3.2 Where Do Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Refugee Return Meet? 
Refugee return is one element of post-conflict reconstruction aiming at restoring some kind of 
“normality” for the society and the relationship between the state and the society. One priority 
activity is the well-directed assistance to the war-affected population: the integration of dis-
placed populations, the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, the revitalization 
of local communities that are most affected by war through support (e.g. credit lines for sub-
sistence agriculture, microenterprises, and the like), and the support of vulnerable groups 
should be enhanced.  
Since the increase of refugees signifies a breakdown in the state-citizen relationship, the fact 
that refugees decide to return means that they re-avail themselves of their state’s protection. 
(Petrin 2002: 5-9) Hence, refugee return supports the legitimacy of the state with its new gov-
ernment institutions. Furthermore, as the integration of refugees is one of the most important 
goals in a transitional state, their well-being serves as an indicator of how well the govern-
ment institutions manage development goals in the post-conflict period. Refugees often return 
to devastated areas: If a state manages to provide services to the returnees and to the rest of 
the society, it proves that it is able to function without external support. It also shows that it 
takes the next step in the period of the transition from war to peace. In addition, returnees can 
be viewed as human resources, who can foster economic development. They often arrive in 
mostly destroyed areas and they work very hard to rebuild their lives in the new communities. 
This is due to their capacity to adapt quickly to new and unknown situations. These efforts 
can have a positive impact on the community’s development as a whole.  
Yet, a proper management and planning of the return has to be fulfilled so that returning com-
plements the state reconstruction rather than contradicting it and causing secondary displace-
ment. Petrin argues that “Stein’s claim that people who are physically home but are not partic-
ipating in the economic and political life of their country are still uprooted persons is true” 
(Petrin 2002: 8). Refugee return has to meet certain criteria so that the returnees are integrated 
in their communities and participate in the ordinary everyday life: Otherwise, they compete 
with locals over scarce resources and are, in the worst case, forced to go back into exile. To 
sum up, “… the return of refugees is an integral aspect of state reconstruction that provides 
substantial benefits and poses significant challenges to the state.” (Petrin 2002: 18) To dimin-
ish the challenges and to foster the positive contribution of refugee return to the state’s recon-
struction, refugee return has to be managed and planned properly. In this thesis, refugee return 
that occurs under certain positive conditions is called sustainable and is defined next. 
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3.3 Sustainable Return 
Sustainability has recently become a buzz word, used for different political, social, and eco-
nomic processes that intend to improve the living standards of the present generation without 
putting any future generations’ at risk to meet their own needs. Originally, the word emerged 
in environmental studies to describe durable cultivation to use land most efficiently. 
“… [S]ustainable development requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all the 
opportunity to satisfy their aspirations for a better life.” (WCED 1987: Page not available) 
Referring to the return of refugees, the criterion of “sustainability” was not properly defined 
by most stakeholders and researchers. In the following section, the question is addressed what 
“sustainable return” actually means and how international and national stakeholders can act 
accordingly. 
 
3.3.1 Definition of Sustainable Return 
Black and Gent provide one of the most cited studies on sustainable return. Their first ap-
proach to define a sustainable return involves the measurement of the actual levels of re-
emigration, onward displacement, and/or the returnees’ desire to leave. According to them, 
this definition is most suitable if it is compared with the rest of the population and their levels 
of emigration, displacement, and/or desire to leave the home country. However, the complex 
decision-making process, which either leads to return or to the decision to re-emigrate again, 
need to be considered as well. These decisions are mainly driven by so-called push and pull 
factors.  
Push factors are the circumstances in the host country that might motivate the refugees to 
leave the country and return home. In most situations, refugees are secluded in camps where 
dehumanizing or dangerous conditions prevail. Furthermore, the refugees often feel that 
“… they were languishing in a limbo that held a past and a present, but presented no future.” 
(Ortega, Acevedo 1991: 24) In addition to this, refugees often do not have any opportunities 
with regard to education or sufficient health care in many host societies. They live isolated 
from the rest of the society and fully depend on external assistance. Frequently, the host gov-
ernment even pushes the refugees to leave.
16
 (Cf. Cuny, Cuny 1992: 61) By contrast, pull fac-
tors attract refugees to a particular stay or to move to a particular country. Pull factors influ-
ence the decision to return as well, as they refer to the conditions prevailing in the home coun-
try that attract refugees to leave their current situation in the host society behind and to go 
back home. The pull factor identified as the most important one in the context of refugee re-
turn is the wish to belong to their own home country and to reconnect with their land and an-
cestry. In most return contexts, it can be observed that meeting this emotional need is more 
important than assessing the conditions in the host and in the home country: Most refugees 
worldwide return to their home country, even though the circumstances and reasons for their 
displacement were not fully rectified. They return under conditions of conflict where infra-
structure is minimal and they are in danger of getting involved in the conflict.
17
 In that case, 
                                                 
16
  One prominent example, written down by Cuny and Cuny (1992: 61), are the Tamil refugees in India. The 
Indian government told them that they have to leave the camps and return home. 
17
  For various case studies on refugee return to conditions of conflict and violence, please see Stein, Barry N. 
and Frederick C. Cuny (eds.) (1992): Refugee Return During Conflict in Africa and Asia. Dallas: The Center 
for the Study of Societies in Crisis; and Larkin, Mary Ann, Frederick C. Cuny, and Barry N. Stein (eds.) 
(1991): Repatriation Under Conflict in Central America. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University. 
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refugees return to a situation, in which they lack the ability to make decisions on their own. 
They return to areas which were neglected and affected by long violent conflicts and lack 
schools, health care, and overall economic stability. They find themselves to be dependent on 
relief aid, and food and clothes’ donations, and they lack the opportunity to support their fam-
ilies on their own. The question remains if such a situation can be defined as sustainable. No, 
it cannot. The definition clearly fits the concept of durability, but not of sustainability. A re-
turn process is durable, when the returnee is not emigrating again. However, the sole decision 
to re-emigrate does not tell us anything about the returnees’ conditions and comprehensive 
decision-making processes. The return process needs to occur under certain criteria to be dig-
nified and sustainable. Sustainable return includes durability and adds criteria that have to be 
met in order to re-establish the returnees’ decision-making capacity and self-esteem.  
 
In the context of refugee return, sustainability mainly embraces two elements: the re-
establishment of an own life that was lost during the time in exile and the integration into the 
receiving community
18
. The establishment of an own life works through the development of 
livelihood strategies. The following definition of sustainable livelihoods by the Department 
for International Development (DFID) helps to approach the first part of the definition of a 
sustainable return: 
“Livelihoods are considered ‘sustainable’ if they can be maintained without external in-
puts, and are sufficiently robust to withstand external shocks.” (Emphasis added, Black, 
Gent 2006: 28) 
The typical situation of a returnee is characterized by initial humanitarian aid to help the re-
turnee regaining their life immediately after the physical return. Such humanitarian assistance 
is often crucial since the returnees do not have access to financial resources. Nonetheless, it 
should be ideally limited to a short time frame so that the returnees’ self-reliance can be re-
established and long-term dependency is avoided. The long-term goal should be to help the 
returnees to re-establish their own lives, which means they need to be able to live inde-
pendently without any external inputs. This certainly does not exclude “normal” governmen-
tal support. “… [P]eople should not be settled, but helped to settle themselves … .” (Kibreab 
1996b: 59) Returnees should also be sufficiently stable to withstand external shocks. For in-
stance, if a returnee cultivates a farm and the harvest holds off, this should not put their entire 
existence into question.  
According to Macrae, the second element of sustainable return – integration – is 
“… equated with the achievement of a sustainable return – in other words the ability of 
returning refugees to secure the political, economic, and social conditions needed to 
maintain life, livelihood and dignity.” (Macrae 1999: Note 2, p. 3)  
In most contexts, integration that follows the physical relocation to the home area is neglected 
by policy makers and other stakeholders in the field. The focus remains in the organization 
and implementation of the physical relocation of people from their host to their home country; 
this is also true financially. This thesis concentrates on the integration process that takes place 
years after the physical relocation occurred. The long-term integration into the home society 
                                                 
18
  The term ‘receiving community’ refers to the part of the society that lives in the geographical area of return. 
Mostly, the receiving community is the population in a particular return village or a neighborhood in a larger 
city. 
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includes equal access to public goods and services as well as an interethnic dialogue in the 
case of a previous or an ongoing ethnic conflict. Returnees, particularly those of ethnic minor-
ities, should not be forced or encouraged to establish a parallel, detached society that exists 
next to the remaining and often dominant home society. Instead, returnees and the receiving 
community should have access to the same resources and institutions and should be able to 
rely on these on an equal basis. Furthermore, the refugees’ ability to rely on social networks 
should not be underestimated.  
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3.3.2 Why to Promote Sustainable Return? 
Sustainability as a concept seems persuasive in moral terms: It is a good way of protecting 
and promoting refugees and their skills and of helping them to re-establish the relationship 
between the state and themselves, which they lost during their displacement. Admittedly, it 
may be argued that a sustainable return is a too idealistic approach that cannot be fulfilled in 
most countries that have a large proportion of refugees. The reason for this is that it is too 
cost-intensive and barely implementable as most return areas were neglected and destroyed 
through the last years (or even decades) of violence and war. The effect of a sustainable return 
on a post-conflict society is explained by the disastrous outcomes of non-sustainable return on 
the home country and the returnees. 
 
Black and Gent review: “If access to basic necessities is not available, the failings of reinte-
gration can have ramifications for the wider society.” (Black, Gent 2006: 31) Facing the cir-
cumstances in a post-conflict society, resources are generally scarce and the receiving com-
munity’s economic situation suffers even more in the case of large return movements if the 
society does not have the capacity to absorb returnees. If this is the case, the returnees are 
forced to compete for already scarce resources with the stayees and other locals. (Cf. Petrin 
2002: 3f.) This includes houses and other dwellings, and employment opportunities, which 
are the resources that pose the most significant challenges to the community. (Cf. Ghanem 
2005: 132) Often, the houses of refugees were destroyed or occupied by Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) or confiscated during the war. If the returnees’ houses are not reconstructed or 
returned to them, it may threaten the local peace and intimidate the locals that occupied the 
refugees’ former houses at the moment of the returnees’ arrival.  
If the labor market is not able to absorb the new arriving returnees, this can have fatal conse-
quences for the community as well. “Where unemployment is already high and problematic, 
returning migrants in search of jobs exacerbate the problem.” (Arowolo 2000: 69) Thus, refu-
gee return might be delayed while economic scarcities prevail. There is no guarantee of con-
tinued peace either in the homeland or the surrounding region. 
The competition over scarce resources can have severe consequences for the receiving com-
munity in general and for the returnees in particular. Due to the competition between them, 
returnees are perceived as a burden, or even worse, as a threat to the community’s economy 
and security. As a result, this may either create new violence between the returnees and the 
stayees, who were involved in the conflict and often belong to different social or ethnic 
groups, or it may lead to a geographical and social separation between them. According to 
García Rodicio, returnees assess different options when dealing with the lack of integration 
they face once they return home: 
“Conflict resolution strategies developed by returnees include attitudes of keeping silent 
and patience, attitudes of separation and lack of interrelation with locals and migration 
to returnee settlements.” (Emphasis added, García Rodicio 2006: 227)  
In some cases, as García Rodicio argues, returnees have to flee again and become IDPs within 
their home country or they become refugees abroad for a second time. Stein goes beyond that 
definition of a secondary displacement and explains that the returnees’ marginalization on the 
edge of the society can already be classified as a form of secondary displacement: 
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“People who are physically home but are not participating in the economic and political 
life of their country are still uprooted persons. In many cases they may be back in their 
homeland but far from their own communities. The danger exists that repatriation alone 
is a relocation that converts refugees into internally displaced persons.” (Stein 1997: 8) 
One could also assume whenever refugees return during conflict and fail to be socially inte-
grated, they face a lack of alternatives that can lead to precarious consequences. They may 
engage in criminal or paramilitary actions in order to earn money. Adelman summarizes that 
“… the result is the creation of a breeding ground for future violence and even recruits for a 
new violent uprising.” (Adelman 2002: 294) 
In summary, non-sustainable refugee return can lead to a competition over scarce resources, 
new violence between the former conflict parties, and secondary displacement for the return-
ees. In order to promote a positive peace and stabilize a war-torn country, refugee return 
should occur under certain circumstances that provide the returnees with the necessary tools 
and skills, and prepare the receiving community for the integration of the returnees. 
 
Apart from the fact that an unsustainable return may have a devastating effect on the commu-
nity, a sustainable return has a positive effect. As it was pointed out earlier, refugees are risk-
averse. Especially in protracted refugee situations
19
, they fear going back home since they 
were acclimatized to the circumstances in the host society and do not know what they have to 
expect in their home country. If a return process proves to be sustainable, new refugees will 
be attracted to return as well and bring their, often unsatisfactory, situation to an end.  
After having returned to their home country, neither the host society nor most of the donor 
countries are responsible for the returnees anymore. Through sustainable return, a long-term 
dependency on external aid is avoided and affected institutions have less financial burden to 
deal with. In addition, the returnees learn to help themselves under the framework of a sus-
tainable return and thus are not helpless.  
 
                                                 
19
  “… [R]efugees can be regarded as being in a protracted situation when they have lived in exile for more than 
five years, and when they still have no immediate prospect of finding a durable solution to their plight by 
means of voluntary repatriation, local integration, or resettlement.” (Crisp 2003: 1) 
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4. Criteria for Sustainable Return 
As sustainable return is a buzz word that appears in almost every policy paper on return, the 
adjective “sustainable” is indeed applied, but it lacks a precise definition, especially in terms 
of conditions of a sustainable return. Although the goal might be clearly defined, such as the 
full integration of the returnees into the society or their full ability to maintain their own live-
lihoods without external support – the way how to achieve the goal remains in the shadow. 
Consequently, based on a detailed literature review, the conditions that are indispensable for 
(1) the full integration of returnees in their society and (2) the ability of returnees to maintain 
sustainable livelihoods without external support are set out. This is how this chapter aims at 
answering the first research question. 
Research Question 1: In theory, what makes a refugee return sustainable? 
Seven criteria are identified keeping in mind that they serve the two aspects of the definition 
of a sustainable return. These criteria are always dependent on the state’s general ability, es-
pecially in a post-war reconstruction process, and on the external donor support. Following 
the theoretical outline, the inalienability of each criterion is checked based on the real condi-
tions for each of the six communities in Kosovo. 
 
First of all, physical safety
20
 and economic opportunities
21
 can be identified as the two main 
conditions that almost every scholar and stakeholder in the field of refugee return identifies as 
crucial for sustainability. Physical safety, economic opportunities, property restitution, and 
legal security are mainly developed in the Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation (UNHCR 
1996: 11). Property restitution is further described as necessary for returnees in: Leckie 
(2003): Returning Home: Housing and Property Restitution Rights of Refugees and Displaced 
Persons. In addition, appropriate access and a high quality of education, health care, and in-
frastructure were added by the author according to the important role they play in general. 
They are thus inalienable for returnees, too. 
 
The seven criteria at hand are based on the first and second level of Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs (Cf. Maslow 1943). The first level refers to the physiological needs, such as food and 
water. The second level includes safety needs, such as the security of the body, of employ-
ment, or of other resources.  
                                                 
20
  Here are some of the most important sources for the inclusion of physical safety as one of the main criteria 
for sustainable return: Barbero, Julie (1993): Refugee Repatriation During Conflict: A New Conventional 
Wisdom; Opondo, Enoch O. (1992): Refugee Repatriation During Conflict: Grounds for Scepticism; Cuny, 
Frederick C., and Barry N. Stein (1992): NGOs and Repatriation During Conflict; Scott-Villiers, Alastair, 
Patta Scott-Villiers, and Cole P. Dodge (1993): Repatriation of 150,000 Sudanese Refugees from Ethiopia: 
The Manipulation of Civilians in a Situation of Civil Conflict; Stein, Barry N. and Frederick C. Cuny (eds.) 
(1992): Refugee Return During Conflict in Africa and Asia; Larkin, Mary Ann, Frederick C. Cuny, and Barry 
N. Stein (eds.) (1991): Repatriation Under Conflict in Central America. 
21
  Economic opportunities are best described as being crucial to the sustainability of refugee return in Arowolo, 
Oladele O. (2000): Return Migration and the Problem of Reintegration, in: International Migration 38:5, pp. 
59-82. 
PART III – CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
32 
 
Figure 3: Maslow’s hierarchy of needs 
Source: http://physicalspace.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/maslows-hierarchy.jpg 
As resources are generally scarce in post-conflict societies, the author assumes that the first 
two levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs necessarily have to be implicit in a conceptual 
framework of sustainable return in the first instance. A long-term framework for sustainable 
return should also include post-materialistic criteria such as political participation, equal par-
ticipation in all public spheres, gender equality and empowerment of women, freedom of as-
sembly as well as political education. Summing up, when developing the conceptual frame-
work of sustainable return. The author focused on the most basic and most essential needs for 
survival in the home country.  
 
The following criteria do not consider the so-called push factors, which refer to the conditions 
in the host country. They only take into account the conditions in the home country that the 
returnees have to face once they changed their place of residence. For instance, the conceptual 
framework at hand neglects the impact of the failure to grant or to terminate the residence 
status, work bans, or deportations based on the decision to return. Nevertheless, the push-
factors and their effects were analyzed in different sections in this thesis. For instance, in 
Chapter 2.4 the forced repatriation (deportation) of Kosovar refugees from Western European 
countries is listed as a conditioning effect on the sustainability of refugee return. In addition, 
the deportation of RAE and its effects is analyzed in more detail in Chapter 6.6.2. 
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4.1 Physical Security 
The first step in a return process is the physical relocation to the home area, which is followed 
by the integration into the home area. In the majority of worldwide return processes, the con-
flict that caused the displacement has not been solved yet. Thus, the route for the physical 
relocation needs to be chosen very carefully: Routes should be free of mines, rebels should 
not control the affected area, and a transport without military escort should be possible in the 
ideal case. If the latter is not possible, a military escort – most likely provided by the respon-
sible United Nations mission – should be made available for the repatriation process. In addi-
tion, the mean by which transportation is chosen should fulfill basic criteria such as safety and 
availability – most likely, return processes happen by bus, car, boat, or occasionally by air-
plane.  
The safest circumstances during the relocation and the entire return process are provided 
when the conflict that caused the displacement was solved and the country is now peaceful
22
. 
Evidence for this is the presence of armistice or a peace agreement. However, a peace accord 
is not always a trustworthy sign for the end of violence, as the 1987 Accord in Sri Lanka 
proved.
23
 (Cf. Cuny, Cuny 1992: 59) Nevertheless, an armistice is often a good starting point 
for further discussion whether or not physical safety is guaranteed. Subsequently, it should be 
investigated, whether there are attacks, or a potential threat thereof in the entire country. In 
most return contexts, it is only measured whether there is physical safety in the particular area 
of return, but not in the entire country. Therein lays a particular problem which is explained 
next.  
Hogan defines the return into a safe area as “… an expansion or opening of living space” 
(Hogan 1992: 385). According to his definition, refugees might only repatriate if they see a 
space for themselves in their country of origin. Free living space can be understood as a geo-
graphical area and a social space, that is safe and where refugees can find opportunities to 
build their individual, new life. One good example is the case of displaced persons returning 
to Northern Bahr el Ghazal in southern Sudan in early 1991. The return area was clearly de-
fined and occupied by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Although the term occu-
                                                 
22
  In this thesis, ‘peaceful’ should be understood in the sense of negative peace. The concept of negative peace 
traces back to Johan Galtung, a Norwegian peace researcher who founded the Peace Research Institute Oslo 
in 1959. Negative peace refers to a climate in which there is no “direct violence,” such as a fight with weap-
ons. When someone’s own means of realization are destroyed – either through a physical attack or the de-
struction of means of living – direct violence occurs. (Cf. Galtung 1969: 169) According to Galtung (1969: 
169, 174), direct violence can be divided into physical and psychological forms. (1) Physical violence con-
cerns the human’s body and reduces somatic capabilities through all kinds of armed attacks, including the use 
of nuclear, biological, or chemical (ABC)-weapons. Moreover, direct violence can entail the constraint of 
human movements, such as imprisonment or access to public transportation. This form of violence can be ei-
ther structurally damaging, which refers to the human’s anatomy (e.g. piercing or burning), or functionally 
damaging, which refers to the human’s physiology through the denial of food, clean air, clean water, or any 
other bodily constraints. (2) Psychological direct violence occurs against a human’s mental well-being 
through lies, brainwashing, threats, or indoctrination. In addition, Galtung argues that the threat of violence 
equals violence. (Cf. Galtung 1996: 197) 
23
  The accord between Sri Lanka and India aimed at restoring peace in Sri Lanka and at preventing the Tamil 
separatists from establishing their own state within Sri Lanka. However, the majority of Tamils, who were af-
fected most by this agreement, opposed the accord and Tamil separatists started to fight against the Indian 
occupation after the accord had been agreed upon in 1987. Indians were not familiar with the Sri Lankan 
landscape and urban guerrilla warfare. Within three months, Tamil separatists killed some 2,000 civilians, 
damaged 50,000 buildings, and sent 200,000 refugees searching for shelter. For an extensive explanation of 
the peace accord’s impact on the Tamils and Sri Lanka in general, please see Hennayake, Shantha K. (1989): 
The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka, in: Asian Survey 29:4, pp. 401-415. 
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pation may give the impression that minorities are oppressed and do not have secure living 
conditions, the opposite was true. There was freedom of movement and available food sup-
plies, land was prepared for cultivation, and the security situation had improved over time. 
(Cf. Hogan 1992: 413f.) Hogan explains that this was a sound scenario for refugees to use the 
open living space and to return home. Nevertheless, he points to the continued uncertainty 
regarding stable peace:  
“The volatility of the overall political and military situation in the South, however, is 
such that favorable conditions prevailing at any one time in a localized context, as in 
present-day Northern Bahr el Ghazal, can quickly change for the worse and result, once 
again, in displacement to the North.” (Hogan 1992: 426) 
Opondo supports this idea by explaining that due to the fluidity of any conflict, this open 
space can quickly become a non-space and, consequently, be a danger rather than a safe haven 
for the returnees. (Cf. Opondo 1992: 360) 
Repatriation projects from Pakistan to Afghanistan are a good case to illustrate this aspect of 
return during conflict. They took place in the aftermath of the Geneva Accords in April 1988. 
“Projects to assist returning refugees were to be carried out in ‘zones of tranquility,’ those 
areas that were not the site of continuing combat.” (Sorensen 1992: 254) Although this may 
be a good strategy according to international development agencies, the risk lies, once again, 
in the fluidity of the conflict: Areas that are now identified as “zones of tranquility” can turn 
into conflict areas very quickly, and returnees may be in the center of this risk. Even if there is 
a peace agreement, this space can close quickly. Numerous conflicts, particularly the civil 
wars that occurred in the 1990s, ended without a victory for either opponent.  
“Rather, exhausted by years of inconclusive conflict and prodded by patrons whose pa-
tience and support eroded with the end of Cold War, a deal has been made by opponents 
who still possess formidable firepower.” (Cuny, Stein 1992: 9) 
This argument aggravates the risk for the returnees because the underlying causes for the con-
flict were not eliminated. Therefore, there is a high possibility that the absence of violence 
reverts to violent conflict. Even though the particular area of return might be safe in a specific 
period, this does not mean that the space will be open indefinitely. Rather, if violence still 
occurs in some parts of the country, it can spread into the return areas easily and close the 
open living space for refugees accordingly.  
 
Physical safety entails the absence of attacks and harassment, including sexual violence, ab-
ductions, and the destruction of property. Apart from the general level of violence in the home 
country, direct violence against returnees is investigated in particular. Often, the return itself 
tends to breed new violence between the returning and the receiving community who most 
likely belong to different social or ethnic groups that were involved in the conflict causing the 
displacement. Although the general situation in the affected country may be calm, returnees 
may feel insecure and refrain from returning because of a lack of physical safety. This is es-
pecially the case when the receiving does not welcome the returning community.  
 
Furthermore, physical safety includes ensuring full freedom of movement which is incorpo-
rated in Article 13(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right 
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to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.” For now, freedom of 
movement appears to be an objective criterion. It includes:  
 The legal permission for every citizen – no matter what race, ethnicity, gender, or age – to 
go to every place in the country without any restrictions by the government, 
 Access to transportation, and 
 Unrestricted access to public buildings. 
Beyond that, freedom of movement is predominantly a subjective criterion: Whether a person 
feels free to move wherever they want to move to is a subjective perception that can stand in 
the way of objective facts. The following statement highlights this well: “They believe their 
freedom of movement would be restricted in the place of origin.” (Emphasis added, DRC 
2009: 30) The presence or absence of objective and subjective freedom of movement has an 
impact on the access of returnees to public services. Without the freedom of movement from 
municipality to municipality and even within these, it is not possible to guarantee access to 
education, employment, health care, and other services which are the cornerstones of a sus-
tainable return. 
 
The question remains: What if physical safety is not guaranteed in the home country of the 
affected refugees? Two main arguments are explored. 
First, returnees become involved in an ongoing violent conflict. “As the violence increased, it 
was difficult for many to avoid being drawn into the fight.” (Cuny, Cuny 1992: 71) Returnees 
can be dragged into a conflict after their physical movement to the area of their origin. Partic-
ularly returnees from minority ethnic communities can become a fresh target for insurgent 
groups in an ethnic conflict. (Cf. Cuny, Cuny 1992: 86) They can be prevented access to relief 
aid or food, as they do not belong to the favored ethnic group in the conflict-prone country. In 
some cases, returnees are used for the insurgents’ or government’s purposes. An example is 
the return of refugees from Thailand to Cambodia in 1989. “The Khmer Rouge needs return-
ees to clear land, set up logistical bases, build roads, and clear the mine fields.” (Rogge 1992: 
202) The Khmer Rouge, involved in armed resistance against the intervening Vietnamese 
forces, manipulated the returnees and used them for their own purposes instead of strengthen-
ing their position in the society and constructively including them into development projects.  
 
The second argument is that the state institutions in the affected country are not capable of 
dealing with the returnees. Primarily, refugee return puts a burden on the home country’s in-
stitutions, as there is an increase of the needy population. Apart from sheer numbers, returnees 
often have special needs such as medical and psychological treatments. Institutions in a con-
flict-torn country, even in a post-war situation, are predominantly engaged with the conflict, 
however, and are neither capable of absorbing returnees nor to meet those needs. For instance, 
when Tamils returned to Sri Lanka they were promised to get cash rewards that they never 
received. There were delays with the payment, the cash was given to the wrong recipients, 
and accountability was often lax. (Cf. Cuny, Cuny 1992: 72) 
“Middle-income families appear to have been hit hardest, since they were ineligible for 
the grants and were required to borrow money. This would not have been a problem, 
except that few of the banks were open, and most of the national banks were reluctant to 
lend money in the prevailing climate of violence in the north and east.” (Cuny, Cuny 
1992: 72) 
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Often it is hard to provide the returnees with the necessary goods for their survival in the first 
weeks and months after the arrival to their home country, especially under continued threaten-
ing conditions.  
 
The returnees can be forced to undergo the trauma of displacement a second time, which is a 
violation of the assumption about the return durability. Quantitative data to show how many 
returnees were forced to flee a second time are difficult to collect. Yet, Sri Lanka is one prom-
inent example, where secondary displacements were quantifiable: There, many returnees – not 
only spontaneous returnees but also people who returned under a UNHCR-sponsored repatria-
tion program – fled when fighting resumed on a massive scale in the summer of 1990. Two 
out of five former Sri Lankan returnees fled a second time.
24
 (Cf. Cuny, Stein 1992: 30) An-
other way of dealing with renewed violence after return is described by Cuny and Cuny: 
“Most returnees were reluctant to become refugees again, and, in those areas where re-
construction activities were delayed, there were few job opportunities. Thus, some 
joined the ranks of the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam], which gradually re-
turned to the pre-Accord levels, and by 1989, were even larger than before.” (Cuny, 
Cuny 1992: 71) 
Concisely, it can be argued that a return during a conflict may increase the risk for returnees 
to be re-involved in the conflict and to be manipulated by the conflicting parties. Moreover, 
returnees often live isolated in a country that is prone to conflict as humanitarian agencies and 
national institutions either cannot reach the refugees or they do not have the capacities to care 
for the returnees’ needs. The example of Ethiopia accurately summarizes these threats:  
“The first and most obvious conclusion is that the people who became refugees at Itang 
[town in Ethiopia] and subsequently returnees to Sudan were undermined by war, ma-
nipulated by the conflicting parties and inadequately protected and assisted by the in-
ternational community.” (Emphasis added, Scott-Villiers, Scott-Villiers, Dodge 1993: 
213) 
As a result, it may be feasible for the refugees to return under conditions of partial or geo-
graphically segmented negative peace, but it appears to significantly diminish their prospects 
of durable return. The lack of security as a consequence of ongoing hostilities and the lack of 
food, medical aid, and other goods, can cause secondary displacement and not sustainable 
return. Figure 4 summarizes this graphically. 
                                                 
24
  Others argue that once people have returned, they are reluctant to leave again and often seek other ways of 
dealing with the threat of renewed violence against them. Usually, they will move to other areas within the 
country and, this time, become IDPs. 
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Peace Agreement
Preventive Actions to Avoid Conflict Between the Returning 
and the Receiving Community
Route for relocation is safe and free of mines
Freedom of Movement
CHECKLIST Security for Returnees
Absence of Attacks and the Threat Thereof, Harassment, and 
the Destruction of Property, Particularly in Return Areas
Figure 4:  Checklist for Security of Returnees 
Source:  Own compilation 
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4.2 Economic Opportunities 
Providing economic opportunities for the returnees is crucial for the refugees’ decision mak-
ing process in the country of asylum. Black argues: “If there are no jobs or economic oppor-
tunities, the incentive to return will remain low.” (Black 2001: 192) This is because the refu-
gees aim at improving their current living conditions in the country of asylum by returning to 
their country of origin. Without any employment opportunities they are not capable of feeding 
their families and regaining independence from external support, however. Furthermore, em-
ployment certainly facilitates the integration of the returnees into their home society. Conse-
quently, most scholars and stakeholders agree that employment opportunities are essential for 
the success and the sustainability of any repatriation program. 
Before any return program can be implemented, the local economy should have the absorptive 
capacity to receive and integrate arriving returnees. (Cf. Arowolo 2000: 68) Therein, two very 
different return contexts have to be considered: the return of refugees to urban settlements 
where the service sector provides most of the jobs and the return to rural settlements where 
agriculture is the main income producing sector. 
 
In urban settings, the most important factor of economic integration is the availability of jobs: 
“Where unemployment is already high and problematic, returning migrants in search of jobs 
exacerbate the problem.” (Arowolo 2000: 69) Thus, it is of utmost importance that jobs are 
available and that the returnees do not find themselves in a situation of unemployment and 
poverty once they return to their country of origin. In addition, available jobs must fit the re-
turnees’ skills. To be aware of this constellation, their individual characteristics, such as age, 
sex, education/skills acquired need to be analyzed. In addition, it is important to look at the 
reasons for the decision to return, the host country or place of residence, the type of work 
done while away, family characteristics, amount of money repatriated, the access to property 
at home, while finding the best strategy to integrate them into the existing labor market. If 
jobs are available, returnees should have access to job openings through available newspapers 
or other media. In some contexts, returnees may have another native language than the ma-
jority of the home society. For instance, they were born abroad or belonged to a different eth-
nic community. Thus, job openings should be available in the languages of the majority of the 
society and the languages of the returnees. Further, in order to be able to attend job interviews 
and to perform in the job, transportation means and freedom of movement have to be guaran-
teed. While working in a job, returnees should neither be discriminated by their employer nor 
by other employees because of their background as refugees, returnees, or because of their 
ethnic origins.  
Another alternative is the creation of small businesses by the returnees. Often, they have 
learned the necessary skills in the refugee camps. However, in most cases, the returnees do 
not have the financial capability to open their own business, which requires a considerable 
amount of capital. Therefore, governments and non-governmental organizations should ideal-
ly support returnees financially by providing them with a loan to start their own business. 
With the financial support, they are able to buy or rent a room and the necessary tools. Small 
businesses are a good way to support the local economy and to strengthen consumption in the 
same area as well. 
“For some returnees, their acquired skills may not match existing job opportunities at their 
home location.” (Arowolo 2000: 69) On that account, returnees should have access to voca-
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tional training, wherever it is available, in order to further develop their skills and to match 
them with the current requirements of the local employment market. 
 
If returnees move to rural areas, they are effectively excluded from potential labor opportuni-
ties in the service sector. (Cf. Arowolo 2000: 68) Salih identified major reasons for a refugee 
return process to be successful in rural areas. One of them is the availability of fertile land in 
the home country to enable returnees to do agricultural work. (Cf. Salih 1996: 168) The re-
turnees should have the necessary farming skills either because of their long-term working 
experience before or during exile, or through vocational training obtained in refugee camps or 
after their return. Furthermore, they have to be provided with agricultural tools, seeds, and 
cattle to start a farming business. This can be achieved through a donation by international 
organizations or through loans by the government or other stakeholders. (Cf. Arowolo 2000: 
68) One good example is the Republic of Yemen Cooperative Agricultural Credit Bank, 
which gave 2,600 loans to returnees as an incentive to engage in farming in 1990. (Cf. Van 
Hear 1994: 30) Although only around 25 % of the 11,000 returnees, who applied for the loan, 
received the money, the loan program by the Yemeni government was a starting point to sup-
port returnees in their efforts to gain independence. 
 
Employment directly influences the returnees’ living conditions, ensures that they are able to 
feed their families, and avoids long-term dependency on the government or international or-
ganizations.  
 
By providing the returnees with employment opportunities, it is ensured that they can support 
the reconstruction process of the entire post-war society. A program in Vietnam serves as a 
good example: The Comprehensive Plan of Action by the Geneva Conference on Indo-
Chinese refugees intended to “… improve the living conditions … and infrastructure … in the 
communities with high returnee concentration through micro projects which also provided 
temporary jobs for the returnees.” (Duong, Morgan 2001: 104) For this reason, returnees 
could be integrated into reconstruction efforts and were able to support general economic de-
velopment. This possible contribution is often neglected because refugees and returnees are 
popularly perceived as victims of the war. Adelman supports this idea: “The key issue in 
maintaining the peace, then, is stopping the perpetrators of violence, not assisting the vic-
tims … .” (Adelman 2002: 278) If, however, one assumes that returnees have certain skills 
and resources, the following argument can be justified: It is assumed that if there are econom-
ic opportunities for returnees, they are able to help to improve the economic conditions and 
the overall quality of life for the entire post-conflict country. It is widely accepted that the 
“… reconstructtion of war-torn economies is a sine qua non for successful reintegration of 
returnees …” (Kibreab 1996a: 183). If those conditions are created and returnees have em-
ployment opportunities, such as e.g. farming or working in the service sector, they should not 
be seen as a burden to the home economy any longer, but as a resource within the reconstruc-
tion process. McSpadden supports this by adding that  
“[t]he evidence shows that there is a strong relationship between the refugees’ possibil-
ity to return home (under the existing conditions of security and political stability) and 
national reconstruction.” (As quoted by McSpadden 1999: 82)  
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Given that returnees are equipped with the necessary agricultural skills and tools, they can 
contribute to the food security of a region or an entire country. A lack of food and overall 
economic development are two factors many post-war societies suffer from. Returnees have 
often gained important skills during their displacement, either through training by internation-
al relief agencies or due to their capacities to adapt quickly to new situations; they are able to 
help entire communities to reestablish their livelihoods. (Cf. Petrin 2002: 6) Amongst other 
things, the training programs are likely to include metalworking, medical and educational 
training, sewing, and carpentry. Once the refugees return to their homes, whether in rural or 
urban settings, with the help of humanitarian agencies they can start small businesses to help 
boosting the economy. 
Furthermore, in most cases, returnees arrive in largely destroyed areas and, hence, 
“[r]epatriation is perceived … as an opportunity for the development of previously neglected 
and war-torn areas.” (Kibreab 1996a: 128) Refugee return to rural areas can have the effect 
that these areas become targets of development aid and thus develop faster than they would 
without the work force of the returnees and the additional development aid they bring with 
them.  
Apart from the general economic contribution the returnees can make, Barbero assumes that 
the return of qualified nationals can have a stabilizing effect on the overall development of 
any post-war society:  
“Likewise, there will be inadequate medical care in Angola without the return of Ango-
lan doctors to a country devastated by sixteen years of conflict and the University of 
Asmara will be insufficiently staffed without the return of Eritrean professors to their 
newly emerging nation.” (Barbero 1993: 8)  
She also refers to the case of Mozambican professionals who further assist in facilitating the 
return and integration of the remaining refugees. Repatriation has been perceived as a peace-
making initiative in which qualified nationals “… will be able to form a ‘zone of safety’” 
(Barbero 1993: 9). Additionally, the qualified nationals can serve as important role models for 
the returnees that have difficulties in regaining their lives and in establishing new income op-
portunities. Figure 5 illustrates this. 
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Optional: Micro-loans to Support the Establishment of 
Small Businesses and/or Farming
Optional: Vocational Training
In Rural Areas: Fertile Land, Tools, and Seeds Available
No Discrimination at Work
Public Transportation and Freedom of Movement Available
Access to Job Openings, Provided in Returnees’ Language
CHECKLIST Economic Opportunities for Returnees
Availability of Employment, Particularly in Return Areas
Availability of jobs
Access to job openings; if necessary 
provided in the returnees’ language
 Public transportation available, freedom 
of movement
No discrimination at work because of 
being a returnee or belonging to a 
different ethnic community
 In rural settings: fertile land, tools, and 
seeds available for returnees
Vocational training
 Small loans to support the 
establishment of small businesses 
and/or farming
Figure 5:  Checklist for Economic Opportunities for Returnees 
Source:  Own compilation 
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4.3 Reparation and Housing 
To begin with, Chimni defines sustainable return as the situation where “… a constructive 
relationship between returnees, civil society and the state is consolidated.” (Chimni 2002: 
168) This means, it is the state’s responsibility to reestablish the broken relationship between 
the three actors in post-war societies and the important mean is reparation. The legal basis for 
state reparations is the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts that were enacted in August 2001 by the International Law Commission. 
Therein, Article 31, paragraph 1 on Reparations is of importance: “The responsible State is 
under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrong-
ful act.” Although this document is known as the only international basis for reparations, it 
does not solve all problems and questions. For instance, it does not address why and how to 
make reparations. Furthermore, the purpose of reparations is not fully defined. Scholars and 
policymakers do not agree on the purpose either. “One widely accepted purpose is remedial 
justice, to rectify the wrong done [sic] an injured party and correct injustice by restoring the 
status quo ante.” (Emphasis added, Shelton 2002: 844) According to the literature, this argu-
ment is widely supported by scholars and policy makers, because it focuses on the injured 
party and tries to balance the internationally wrongful act with the damage the injured party 
had. Another argument says that reparations could be perceived as a means to punish or to 
deter wrongdoings. By increasing the costs for a breach of law, states are then likely to refrain 
from doing so. A third group claims that reparations could be perceived as restorative justice 
that can foster a reconciliation process and induce positive future behavior. (Cf. Shelton 2002: 
844) This last understanding of reparation envisages three forms: (1) restitution, (2) compen-
sation, or (3) satisfaction. In the following, each kind is briefly explained.  
Restitution aims at restoring conditions that existed prior to the violations of human rights. It 
includes the reconstruction or return of homes, artifacts, and/or land. Restitution 
“… represents the historical bridging of animosity between enemies.” (Barkan 2001: xii-xvii) 
The reestablishment of conditions can have two separate meanings: Restitution can either 
refer to the reestablishment of the status quo ante: Therein, the normative baseline is Restitu-
tio in integrum (restoration to the original condition) (Cf. Bradley 2005: 83). Alternatively, it 
refers to the situation that would have existed if the wrongful act was not committed:  
“Reparation must, so far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and 
re-establish the situation that would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not 
been committed.” (Shelton 2002: 835; quoted from the Chorzów Factory Judgment of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice)
25
 
If restitution is impossible or the burden is out of proportion to the benefit of restitution, com-
pensation is required, e.g. in the form of monetary payment. Compensation is limited to dam-
ages of provable and proximate losses to avoid excessive recoveries. (Cf. Shelton 2002: 838) 
According to the Draft Articles,  
                                                 
25
  To wipe out all the consequences as the act had not been committed is nearly impossible “since the counter-
factuals allow for too many alternatives.” (Barkan 2001: 327) This essentially means that the value and use of 
land have often changed and nobody can ever predict what would have happened without the committed act. 
Barkan shows in his book “The Guilt of Nations” that we cannot predict, for instance, if the Indians in the 
United States of America would have kept their land and used it as the US-Americans did after their annexa-
tion. (Cf. Barkan 2001: 327) 
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“… awards of compensation encompass material losses (loss of earnings, pensions, 
medical expenses, etc.) and non-material damage (pain and suffering, mental anguish, 
humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of companionship or consortium), the lat-
ter usually quantified on the basis of an equitable assessment.” (Draft Articles 2001; 
Commentaries, Art. 36, para. 19) 
In detail, property compensation includes the financial trade-off for capital value, loss of prof-
its, and incidental expenses.  
Satisfaction is the least common type of reparation. It addresses non-material injuries and may 
involve official apologies and judicial proceedings as it could be observed in Rwanda in the 
Gacaca proceedings. Satisfaction is defined as a rather exceptional remedy because of its 
former punitive purpose. Moreover, Barkan remarks that apologies can be a form of white-
washing the injustice. This is because no side at the negotiation table has to bargain anything. 
According to Barkan, the  
“… recognition of past injustices constitutes the core of restitution. It is a recognition 
that transforms the trauma of victimization into a process of mourning and allows for 
rebuilding.” (Barkan 2001: 323)  
Apologies do not comply with this sense of reparations.  
 
Based on the general understanding of reparation, and restitution in particular, there is a spe-
cial importance for the returnees in receiving reparations. It is “… particularly crucial because 
restitution helps create just conditions of return and therefore has important implications for 
fostering security and development in post-conflict states.” (Bradley 2005: 77) One of the 
most important aims in a return process is the reestablishment of the relationship between the 
citizen – in this case a former refugee – and the state that was destroyed in times of war. 
Without any acknowledgement of the injustice by the state, the bond between the refugee and 
the state cannot be repaired. It is the country of origin that has to make these reparations. (Cf. 
Bradley 2005: 83) However, whenever reparations are made, proportionality should be taken 
into account: The returnees are one injured party that had to leave their home country due to a 
violent conflict or for other reasons. Nevertheless, they are not the only party that suffered 
from injustice and other atrocities. Nevertheless, many refugees were denied restitution be-
cause it is a challenging process for states, which is time-consuming and politically conten-
tious. The returnees also do not have a lobby to fight for their rights and are reliant on external 
support to receive restitution. One particular area of restitution that is indispensable for re-
turnees is the reconstruction of immovable property and the compensation thereof. 
 
4.3.1 Restitution of Immovable Property and Compensation Thereof 
“The recognition of restitution rights often provides the first official pronouncement that 
whatever may have taken place in the past which is responsible for people being forced 
to vacate their homes was wrong and should not be allowed to occur again in the fu-
ture.” (Leckie 2003: 8)  
Leckie also acknowledges that returning home does not have any positive effect for the re-
turnees unless they have somewhere to return to. (Cf. Leckie 2003: 50) If they neither own 
property in their country of origin nor have anywhere else to live in, the returnees will com-
pete for already scarce housing options in most post-conflict contexts. This creates tensions 
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with the receiving community and tends to create new violence, however. Moreover, the lack 
of housing options for the returnees probably creates further problems since the returnees are 
likely to occupy vacant houses that belong to other refugees or IDPs. The lack of adequate 
housing then deters refugees from returning home, while they are still in exile.  
 
Property restitution is built upon the legal foundation of restoration in general. As already 
mentioned, the Draft Articles on State Responsibility are the main framework for reparation 
based on internationally wrongful acts or significant human rights violations. Many other le-
gal documents grant the right to an effective restitution for victims of human rights violations, 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and the International Covenant on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination. The “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Repara-
tion for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Viola-
tions of International Humanitarian Law” (2005: Art. 19) explains restitutions as the restora-
tion of liberty, the enjoyment of human rights, identity, family life and citizenship, the return 
to one’s place of residence, the restoration of employment, and the return of property. The 
document refers only very broadly to housing and property restitution. Recently, more docu-
ments and institutions make a more direct link between refugee return and housing and prop-
erty restitution, especially in UN documents, such as General Assembly and Security Council 
resolutions. Furthermore, since the 1990s – the decade of voluntary repatriation – peace 
agreements and voluntary repatriation agreements (often in the form of tripartite agreements) 
acknowledge the refugees’ and IDPs’ rights to adequate housing.  
“In fact, it is clear that restitution programs in post-conflict environments stand a far 
greater chance of success when the government in question also takes the housing rights 
of those in need seriously.” (Leckie 2003: 33)  
Property restitution should also reaffirm the fact that refugees and IDPs should never be made 
responsible for their displacement. It is an unofficial amnesty for refugees and IDPs that they 
are not treated differently because of their displacement and their return. In the following sec-
tion, the most important challenges in the property restitution process are explained.  
 
4.3.2 Challenges in the Property Restitution Process 
4.3.2.1 Abandonment Laws 
Abandonment laws work strictly against refugees’ and IDPs’ rights. They claim that property 
that was abandoned for too long cannot be repossessed by its original owners. Following this 
claim, houses can be allocated to different citizens other than the original owners of the prop-
erty.
26
 Especially during ethnic wars, abandonment laws and the allocation of vacant houses 
play a significant role, as both are further possibilities to foster ethnic cleansing and to find 
legal mechanisms to dominate a territory and to enlarge that territory by occupying abandoned 
houses. The Balkans is one good example: the Republika Srpska, for instance, passed an 
                                                 
26
  For instance, Ossetians fleeing the war in Georgia between 1990-1992 have been hindered from returning 
because of the lack of access to their property. Courts have argued that the abandonment of an apartment be-
cause of the displacement of a refugee is not a valid reason to claim property afterwards. On that account, 
many abandoned apartments belonging to Ossetians were allocated to the dominant group of ethnic Geor-
gians. (Cf. Leckie 2003: 45) 
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Abandonment Law in 1996 after the end of violent hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Ownership rights were revoked if the owner had not used the property. It is conceivable that 
this law mainly applied to displace Bosnian Muslims and Croats and to establish a majority of 
Bosnian Serbs in the Republika Srpska. (Cf. Leckie 2003: 46) To sum up, abandonment laws 
prevented several ten thousands of refugees worldwide from returning to their homes because 
houses and apartments were allocated to other individuals or families that now legally own 
that property. 
 
4.3.2.2 Secondary Occupation 
One major problem in property restitution is secondary occupation, which can be understood 
in two different ways. The first kind is a form of occupation by individuals or families that 
occurs spontaneously and most likely because the new occupiers are Internally Displaced Per-
sons themselves and had to leave their home as well. They find shelter in a vacant house and 
stay there because of a lack of alternative housing options. Potential problems with this kind 
of secondary occupations can be solved by providing adequate housing to the new occupiers. 
If their housing problem is solved, they are likely to vacate from the illegally occupied alien 
property.  
The other form of occupation is directed and organized by the government. Once again, this 
form can also be used for ethnic cleansing. Often, governments organize the occupation of 
abandoned homes to occupy the territory with their most preferred ethnic community in this 
area. This form of secondary occupation is undesirable and must be avoided by law and im-
plemented by authorities in order to prevent the creation of further property conflicts between 
the returning and the receiving community. 
 
4.3.2.3 Damaged and Destroyed Houses 
The most worrying issue is the number of houses that were destroyed during and in the after-
math of a violent conflict. Unless houses are completely destroyed, it should be in the gov-
ernment’s interest to reconstruct them to provide the population with adequate housing. If 
houses are completely destroyed, solutions for the citizens’ and notably the returnees’ housing 
situation must be found. This form of restitution should include compensation for the loss of 
the dwelling so that the returnees are able to construct a new house on their own land. If both 
– the house and the land – are not available anymore, an alternative adequate housing should 
be found.
27
 How can the term “adequate housing” be understood? The Committee on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights provides in its General Comment No. 4 on the Right to 
Adequate Housing (1991) a checklist including seven criteria for adequate housing (Cf. Leck-
ie 2003: 33): 
 security of tenure,  
 habitability,  
 affordability,  
 accessibility,  
 availability of materials,  
 location, and  
                                                 
27
 One possible case could be if a residential place is now used for a well-established business. 
PART III – CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
46 
 cultural adequacy.  
The alternative residential place should be chosen according to these criteria. In addition, the 
solution should be permanent instead of short term. Facing the challenge of destroyed houses, 
compensation does play a significant role. Often, there is no other alternative than compensa-
tion, especially if houses are completely destroyed. Although one should not underestimate 
the power and importance of compensation, it should not be used to justify ethnic cleansing 
by “… paying off the displaced to leave for good.” (Leckie 2003: 51) The reconstruction of 
the returnee’s former house should ideally be the first priority. 
 
4.3.2.4 Loss or Destruction of Property Records 
The loss or destruction of property records plays a major role in ethnic conflicts, when records 
were destroyed on purpose or confiscated by the dominant ethnic community to prevent refu-
gees and IDPs from returning to their property. Often, property records are destroyed or got 
lost during the war. Over the last two decades, some alternative types of evidence emerged to 
solve property claim cases, including the following:  
“… verified sale contracts, verified gift contracts, inheritance decisions with legal valid-
ity, court decisions on ownership, valid decisions made in administrative procedures, 
building permits, mortgages or credit agreements, property taxes or income taxes, con-
struction licenses or building permits, usage permits, contracts on use of an apartment, 
excerpts from official records, decisions on the allocation of an apartment, decisions on 
apartment rent or rent levels, apartment rent slips, decisions by which apartments are 
declared abandoned, certificates of place of residence, bills (utility, phone, gas, etc.), 
eyewitnesses, personal identity cards, car registration, census records, personal con-
tracts, dismissal records and others.” (Leckie 2003: 52) 
 
In summary, there are numerous challenges that prevent a successful property restitution pro-
cess in many ways. As Leckie puts it: “The restitution story, thus, is far from over.” (Leckie 
2003: 56) However, reparation plays an important role in the context of return and, if success-
ful, fosters the reconciliation process of the post-war society. This is explained in the follow-
ing. 
 
4.3.3 Consequences of the Presence or the Lack of Reparation 
By providing reparation, returnees can have a remarkable impact on the development of posi-
tive peace through a national reconciliation process. As García Rodicio (2006: 209) claims: 
“Voluntary repatriation should be understood as an integral part of the reconciliation process 
in the country of origin of refugees.”  
While a post-conflict society might survive and progress without full refugee return, especial-
ly if remittances are provided by those living abroad, any national reconciliation process in a 
post-conflict society can only be achieved with the return of the displaced refugees. Particu-
larly in ethnic conflicts, refugees mostly belong to one of the warring ethnic communities. 
Hence, refugees are part of the conflict itself and cannot be considered as being detached from 
the conflict and the reconciliation process. If a society is re-established without an ethnic 
community that was previously present, negative peace may be created, but the conditions for 
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positive peace would not be met since external groups will carry on national grievances (e.g. 
the Palestinian diaspora).  
Either the returnees are perceived as “the lucky ones,” because they did not have to suffer 
from the immediate consequences of the war, or as “the enemy,” because they are part of one 
social/ethnic group that fought in the violent conflict. The returnees are an integral part of the 
post-conflict society and must be considered when contemplating national reconciliation or 
even cross-border agreements as in the case of Israel-Palestine.  
Reconciliation can be defined as “… the high end of the stability-of-peace spectrum, symp-
tomized by coexistence and later collaboration, cooperation and finally integration between 
segments of society.” (Purdekova 2008: 8) The returnees can have a significant impact in any 
reconciliation process if their destroyed houses are reconstructed, and ownership claims are 
solved. On that account, the returnees and the stayees do not compete over immovable proper-
ty, such as habitable houses and commercial/agricultural land. This gives them the opportuni-
ty to live in the neighborhood, in which they lived before the war. They are part of the restora-
tion process of local communities that García Rodicio identifies as the key concept in the rec-
onciliation context of post-war societies. According to her, the involvement of local leaders, 
the existence of shared social space, the active involvement of local populations, and common 
activities are the main components to approach reconciliation. (Cf. García Rodicio 2006: 
226f.) The mere fact that refugees return to their home country proves that they are willing to 
reconcile and to live in a cooperative and integrated way in this society, in which parts of the 
population committed severe human rights violations. In most cases, refugee return takes 
place to rural areas where small neighborhoods prevail. If they are provided with the right 
means, they do not have to compete over immovable property and have a home to return to, 
they can successfully integrate into their communities and promote reconciliation.  
 
In contrast, the absence of property restitution can lead to new violence or secondary dis-
placement. Houses and other dwellings are resources that pose significant challenges in case 
of scarcity. In several cases, the houses of the refugees were destroyed through war, occupied 
by IDPs, or commandeered during the war. (Cf. Ghanem 2005: 132) If refugees cannot return 
to their former houses, they may be perceived as a burden to the local community because 
they challenge the current order. This either tends to breed new violence between the return-
ees and the stayees who often belong to different social or ethnic groups, or it leads to a geo-
graphical and social separation between them. The lack of appropriate housing options can 
also lead to a secondary displacement for those who have just returned. Even if they return, 
but they are unable to live in their former houses, returnees’ marginalization can already be 
classified as a form of secondary displacement. (Cf. Stein 1997: 8) Figure 6 illustrates this. 
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Optional: Official Apologies and Judicial Proceedings
Absence of Abandonment Laws
Provision of Adequate Housing Solutions 
for Secondary Occupants
Provision of Solutions of Property Disputes
Compensation for the Loss of Property, Profits, and 
Incidental Expenses
CHECKLIST Reparation for Returnees
Restitution of Destroyed Property Where Possible
Restitution of destroyed property where 
possible
Compensation for the loss of property, 
of profits, and incidental expenses
 Provision of solutions to property 
disputes
 Provision of adequate housing solutions 
for secondary occupants
Absence of abandonment laws
Official apologies and judicial 
proceedings
Figure 6:  Checklist for Reparation for Returnees 
Source:  Own compilation 
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4.4 Availability and Quality of Social Services 
Another condition for a sustainable return is unlimited and non-restrictive access to social 
services. Besides education and health care, the returnees must also have access to social se-
curity services, energy and water supply, as well as transportation. Therein, it is of great im-
portance that returnees and the rest of the society use the same institutions and do not estab-
lish parallel societies. A return process might be durable if parallel societies and institutions 
such as separate schools exist (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina), but a long-term sustainable re-
turn is impossible. A long-term sustainable return means that the returnees are confident that 
violent uprisings are impossible and where at least some positive interaction and cross-cutting 
allegiances and memberships between the respective population groups occur. Apart from the 
usage of the same institutions, social services should be adequate and affordable, especially 
considering the low economic status returnees often have. 
 
4.4.1 Education 
It is widely agreed that conflict affects education. Clark identifies three possible ways how 
this effect takes place. (Cf. Clark 2009: 20)  
First, conflict affects children through physical violence, including torture, the loss of rela-
tives, and forced displacement. Physical violence as well as torture in turn affect the learning 
attitude of children who are less capable of dealing with their situation if they have to suffer 
from physical violence. The loss of relatives further prevents children to attend school and 
they often become the heads of households as a consequence. Their first priority as the head 
of the household is then to earn money and to feed their families’ mouths, it is not education, 
which is why children miss several years of schooling. Forced displacement leads to a very 
different situation: Children find themselves either in a new country or in a different part of 
their own country as an IDP. Especially in a new country, refugees are forced to adapt to new 
circumstances. Often, schooling is not available for the refugees’ children, who live in en-
closed camps. If they do have access to the educational system in the host country, classes are 
often taught in a different language than their own native language and there are most certain-
ly also cultural differences. Because of language barriers and a different curriculum, the refu-
gee children often have to go back to a grade they had already completed in their home coun-
try. This causes feeling disadvantaged and frustrated. Admittedly, the situation is worse if 
they do not have any access to education at all.  
 
Secondly, the attendance drops because of a lack of security in the conflict zones and because 
of the worsened economic situation of most families during war. Because of the lack of ap-
propriate jobs in times of violent conflicts, families have less income to live off. Education is 
in most cases the last priority and is not considered a good thing to spend money on. On that 
account, children do not have any chance to go to school because of financial concerns; most 
of the time girls are affected more severely by this attitude.  
 
Thirdly, violent conflicts and wars often destroy the infrastructure of education and its institu-
tions. However, 
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“… while education does not cause wars, nor end them, every education system has the 
potential either to exacerbate or to mitigate the conditions that contribute to violent con-
flict.” (Buckland 2005: 7) 
Education should enable every citizen to participate in any post-conflict society and strength-
en the respect for human and civil rights. (Cf. UNIJA-Union 2008: 44) In concrete terms, this 
means that through education the returnees and the stayees alike can develop peaceful means 
of conflict resolution which prevent anew uprisings in the post-conflict society. In the case of 
positive interactions between students, this positive relationship could possibly shift the 
community as a whole. (Cf. Coles 2011: 43) Reconciliation, especially in the case of ethnic 
conflicts, requires the development of a shared history, which as a first step should be taught 
in schools. Schools are the places that must overcome ethnic divisions and hatred because the 
children’s socialization begins in an early stage of childhood. This means that potential preju-
dices amongst the members of a society could be avoided if people at young age learn to live 
in a shared community. The divisions could be overcome by the means of mixed schools in-
stead of separated schools for children with different religious, cultural, or ethnic back-
grounds.  
In addition, high-quality education helps to create an educated workforce and an elite capable 
of supporting economic recovery and democratization.  
 
The lack of education opportunities or the desolate quality of an educational system in a post-
war society, by contrast, can aggravate the situation and oppose positive peace and sustainable 
reconstruction of the country. For instance, separate schools for different societal groups en-
hance differences and heighten inter-group antagonism, which need to be avoided in a post-
conflict context to reduce tensions and create mutual understanding. (Cf. Coles 2011: 44) One 
good example that illustrates the consequences of separate and desolate education is Sri 
Lanka: Many Tamil returnees sent their children to schools in Europe because there were bet-
ter conditions and higher educational quality, which led to a mini-“brain drain.” The Tamil 
elite are very unlikely to return to Sri Lanka after finishing their education, although they 
could have a positive effect on reconstruction and peace in Sri Lanka. (Cf. Cuny, Cuny 1992: 
64f.)  
 
In most post-conflict contexts, education is also a low priority because government structures 
are weak and economic resources scarce. Consequently, the state and international organiza-
tions focus on the general reconstruction of the country, but neglect the education sector and 
its importance for rebuilding the society and the country as a whole. According to Coles, the 
reform of the educational sector in post-conflict societies should proceed as follows: The ini-
tial step is the physical reconstruction of schools and the identification of teachers and other 
school staff. Afterwards, the ideological dimension of the development of education should 
take place – this includes democratization, peace education, and training for teachers, how to 
teach children a shared history, respect for diversity, and human rights. In a third step, the loss 
of trust and students’ concerns with regard to mental health care should be addressed. (Cf. 
Coles 2011: 41) Buckland identifies one major problem in the educational sector reform, 
namely the “access first-quality later-approach.” Evidence from his study suggests that it is a 
better strategy to focus on quality from the beginning onwards rather than solely on access. 
(Cf. Buckland 2005: 57) 
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A special challenge for education in post-conflict societies and in returnee areas in particular 
is the shortage of teachers. “Shortage of qualified teachers is often accompanied by oversup-
ply of underqualified or unqualified teachers in early reconstruction.” (Buckland 2005: 50) To 
compensate for this challenge, Sinclair proposes the following: “In general, however, school-
ing in returnee locations will require hiring educated local persons who have no previous 
teaching experience, and provision of in-service training.” (Sinclair 2002: 93) She further 
describes that it would be more effective to hire female staff although they might have a lower 
educational level than their male counterparts. Women are more likely to stay in a particular 
area than men as men have the status as the breadwinner of the family. In addition, the return 
of teachers, who were displaced during the conflict should be promoted and facilitated as they 
experienced exile and may better understand the problems of returnees.  
Summing up, governments, international, and local organizations should provide teachers 
with remuneration and further incentives to attract them to teach in returnee areas, which are 
often one of the most neglected areas in the affected country. (Cf. Sinclair 2002: 93) Remu-
neration should occur at a level that allows the teachers to subsist without any supplement to 
their income to avoid corrupt practices such as charging irregular fees for examinations. Fur-
thermore, “ghost teachers” that only exist on the paper to embezzle money from the govern-
ment must be avoided or convicted. In some countries, there are even reports of entire ghost 
schools, which are severely counterproductive to the re-development of the country itself. (Cf. 
Baxter, Bethke 2009: 4) 
Another important challenge in the reconstruction of a destroyed educational system in the 
aftermath of a violent conflict is the re-development and adaptation of a consistent curricu-
lum. The curriculum is at the heart of every educational system, and at the same time it often 
generates most problems in a post-conflict context. (Cf. Buckland 2005: 52) A good curricu-
lum creates greater mutual understanding for diversity and cultural differences. A poor curric-
ulum entails different stories about the same history, neglects similarities, and emphasizes 
differences between the former conflicting parties. Hence, it creates victims and perpetrators 
instead of explaining facts about the past objectively. To reform the curriculum in a post-
conflict country and to adapt it to the new circumstances, a review of the textbooks is usually 
a good starting point for change, particularly when books reflect bias, prejudices, or distorted 
accounts.  
 
When reforming the educational sector, particular disadvantaged groups must be taken into 
account. One of these groups is the returnees. They need rapid access to primary, secondary, 
and tertiary education
28
 without any discrimination in order to guarantee the best possible 
integration into the receiving community. Therein, the inclusion of disabled children and ex-
combatants as well as gender equality must be promoted. (Cf. Sinclair 2002: 92) Although 
families may be poor and not willing to send their children to school, they should be encour-
aged to do so. This is especially problematic for girls. The encouragement could be done by 
reducing the household costs of schooling through guaranteed free enrollment and free text-
books. “Schooling choices are highly shaped by economics.” (Kirk 2009: 71) Refugee fami-
lies often have less financial resources, mobility, and opportunities which make the cost-
                                                 
28
  Primary education refers to the elementary school. Secondary education means education in high schools that 
can lead to tertiary education in colleges and at universities.  
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benefit calculations for education even more critical. (Cf. Kirk 2009: 71) Reducing the costs 
of schooling can have a positive effect on gender equality too. If parents do not have to spend 
their money on uniforms, textbooks, tuition fees, or lunches, they are more willing even to 
send girls and boys to schools and to provide them with education. This method was success-
ful in Timor-Leste: By reducing the household costs of schooling, a higher enrolment of girls 
and among rural and poorer households was reached. (Cf. Buckland 2005: 57) 
The children of returnees often face particular challenges when it comes to schooling. Older 
children, who missed primary education due to a lack of access to education in their host 
country, are more likely to go to school after they return, but usually afraid of sharing the 
classroom with younger children. (Cf. Baxter, Bethke 2009: 1) Moreover, refugee return often 
occurs to rural areas, where the access to a school is difficult and children have to walk sever-
al kilometers to reach the closest school district. In these cases, alternative access programs 
provide an effective possibility to include children that were formerly excluded from the for-
mal school system because of their age, gender, or geographical location. These programs 
refer to home-based or community-based schools that are often geared to follow the state cur-
riculum. Other alternative programs focus on behavioral change and include classes about 
mine awareness or HIV/Aids. (Cf. Baxter, Bethke 2009: 2) These programs are especially 
important, where government structures are weak, or the government does not have control 
over parts of the country as in Somalia or in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Buckland 
nicely summarizes the advantages of alternative education programs: 
“Significant, rapid and unpredictable population movement frequently outpaces conven-
tional planning and school mapping techniques, and calls for more flexible approaches 
to planning and greater reliance on local initiative.” (Buckland 2005: 58) 
 
Another challenge in the context of refugee return is the accreditation and validation for the 
returnee children’s education in exile because 
“… the long-term impact of even the best education programmes for refugee or dis-
placed students is compromised when students are unable to officially ‘prove’ their 
competencies with acceptable certificates and documentation.” (Kirk 2009: 41) 
Certification for any completed grades, examinations, and ongoing education is required to 
move on to the next phase within the education cycle or to obtain employment in the home 
country. (Cf. Kirk 2009: 41) Frustration and disappointment evolves when schooling is not 
accredited by the institutions in the home country. Eventually, classes have to be repeated and 
children and teenagers are held back in their education. No matter what quality education has 
in general, the perceived quality decreases enormously when accreditation is not guaranteed. 
Home governments often present various reasons why they cannot acknowledge children’s 
educational level achieved in a host country. One bureaucratic barrier that is often quoted is 
the language difference between the home and the host country.  
 
To sum up, it can be argued that education is necessary to reconstruct a post-conflict state and 
proper education for returnees is one major part of it. “If education is successful in reducing 
inter-ethnic tensions, then security is enhanced and there is less chance of a return to conflict. 
This should encourage IDP and Refugee [sic] return.” (Coles 2011: 43) Figure 7 provides a 
checklist that focuses on the specific needs of returnees’ education.  
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Optional: Access to Tertiary Education
Optional: Alternative Education Programs Where Needed
If Possible, Free Enrolment and Free Textbooks
Reduction of Household Costs for Education
Existence of Mixed Schools
Appropriate Curriculum, incl. Non-biased Textbooks
Qualified, Adequately Paid Teachers in Return Areas
CHECKLIST Education for Returnees
Rapid, Non-discriminatory Access to 
Primary and Secondary Education
Rapid, non-discriminatory access to 
primary and secondary education
Qualified teachers in return areas, paid 
with an adequate salary
Appropriate curriculum; incl. non-
biased textbooks
 Existence of mixed schools
Reduction of Household Costs for 
Education
 If Possible, Free Enrolment and Free 
Textbooks
Alternative education programs where 
needed – either because of a lack of 
access or special awareness
Access to tertiary education
Figure 7:  Checklist for Education of Returnees 
Source:  Own compilation 
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4.4.2 Health Care 
“In many cases, conflict exacerbates poor health conditions present before the conflict.” (Wa-
ters et al. 2007: 2) Therefore, the impact of conflicts on the society’s health and the health 
care system is serious and needs to be well explored in order to rehabilitate the system and 
provide the civil population with basic health care. 
 
4.4.2.1 Impact of Conflicts on Health and Health Systems 
Violent conflicts influence a population’s health and the health care system in the country 
itself in various manners. The following analysis is based upon the differentiation between 
direct effects on the population’s health and on the health system29 itself. In the first part, the 
direct effects on the population’s health are explored. Examples demonstrate the severity of 
the consequences of conflict on health. 
 
The extent to which civil populations are exposed to conditions that increase the risk of death, 
disease, and disability grows significantly during violent conflict. One of these conditions is 
the decrease in people’s life expectancy. Ghobarah, Huth, and Russet attend to this by giving 
an the example of severe military conflict in sub-Saharan Africa that cut life expectancy by 
more than two years and raised infant mortality by 12 per 1000. (Cf. Ghobarah, Huth, Russett 
2004: 2) Injuries caused by landmines and other weapons increase considerably, too. During 
conflict the government is often not able to protect its citizens from mortality and morbidity 
anymore. Apart from these direct consequences of war, general violence is likely to increase 
after the end of a conflict too. Homicide and other crime rates grow; also because of the avail-
ability of small arms and other weapons as well as a higher inclination towards violence. (Cf. 
Ghobarah, Huth, Russett 2004: 7f.) 
Civil wars induce refugee movements and “displaced populations are particularly susceptible 
to communicable diseases – including respiratory infections, malaria, and measles.” (Waters 
et al. 2007: 2) In addition, the transmission of HIV/AIDS increases when people move and 
sex-trade performs as a regular form of employment. Although the phenomenon is not well 
documented, scholars find that refugees, returnees, and soldiers heavily implicated in the 
spread of AIDS. (Cf. Waters et al. 2007: 3) A lack of appropriate and safe sanitation, clean 
water, and food exacerbates the fact that refugees are often exposed to communicable diseas-
es, malnourishment, and mental diseases, because of the trauma they experience during their 
displacement, in refugee camps, and on their way back home.
30
 
 
Analyzing the effects of civil war on health systems, the most important consequences are the 
lack of financial and human resources. In times of civil war, economic growth is significantly 
reduced. This means that tax revenues are lowered; governments increase their military 
spending and consequently their dependency on foreign aid. The government has less money 
to spend on public health care services. Due to weakened policy-making structures (Cf. Wa-
                                                 
29  
Health systems – as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) – comprise the institutions, organiza-
tions, and resources to improve health. This includes formal and informal health services as well as specific 
health-related education. (Cf. WHO 2000: 5ff.) 
30 
 Mental health is of particular importance for refugees and returnees. This thesis will identify the main rea-
sons and consequences of displacement on the mental health status of refugees and returnees respectively in 
the subchapter on returnees’ health. 
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ters et al. 2007: 5), which are caused by instability and upheaval in a war-torn society, post-
conflict governments often face several challenges that they are neither able to overcome po-
litically nor financially. One of these fundamental questions is whether or not a government 
should spend the available resources for military purposes or other domains such as public 
health. Although scholars may argue that a post-conflict society needs public health care and 
education to rehabilitate itself, governments are often torn between interior instability (rebel 
groups that question sovereignty) and exterior insecurity. Therefore, post-conflict govern-
ments often decide to focus on military spending instead of health, education, or social securi-
ty investments. (Cf. Ghobarah, Huth, Russett 2004: 8f.) 
Besides, civil wars induce a substantial displacement of highly trained medical professionals; 
this can be referred to as the “loss of human capital.” (Cf. Ghobarah, Huth, Russett 2004: 8) 
Apart from the displacement, trained medical staff is often kidnapped or killed during con-
flict. (Cf. Waters et al. 2007: 4) To emphasize the lack of medical staff, the example of East 
Timor is a good one: “In East Timor, only 20-30 of the 160 doctors working in the country 
before the conflict remained afterwards.” (Waters et al. 2007: 8) The remaining doctors have 
poor training, are underpaid, or are not paid at all. 
Additionally, the health care infrastructure is often either damaged or destroyed. Ruptures in 
the water and power system are common. Clinics, hospitals, laboratories, and health care cen-
ters are either subverted to military political use, or they are not usable anymore. Moreover, 
the drug and medical material supply is affected (Cf. Roberts et al. 2008: 57). Hospitals nei-
ther have enough beds nor are they equipped enough to treat their patients. Because of there 
appears to be a lack of everything, health care is concentrated in urban centers for a small part 
of the society. In most post-conflict countries, transportation systems have been destroyed and 
the efficient use of resources cannot be guaranteed anymore. (Cf. Ghobarah, Huth, Russett 
2004: 8) Therefore, health care becomes a public good which is not publicly available, but 
restricted to a small part of the population, who lives in urban centers and is able to pay for 
the all so limited health care resources, such as medication, materials, and treatment itself. 
Figure 8 demonstrates the effects of conflict on the population’s health and on the health sys-
tem itself.  
Figure 8:  Impact of Health Care on the Population and on the Health System 
Source:  Own figure 
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4.4.2.2 Rehabilitation of the Health System 
In a post-conflict country, the rehabilitation of the health system and the protection of the civil 
population’s health is one of the main tasks the government has to fulfill. Post-conflict reha-
bilitation of the health systems means: 
(1) Initial response to immediate health needs, 
(2) Restoration or establishment of a package of essential health services, and 
(3) Rehabilitation of the health system itself. (Cf. Waters et al. 2007: 6) 
Meeting the immediate needs includes ensuring health in refugee camps, immunization cam-
paigns, and regular health screenings to identify the most vulnerable people. Furthermore, it is 
essential that communicable diseases are contained, particularly in refugee camps, rural areas, 
and areas where the infrastructure collapsed, e.g. ruptures in the delivery of clean and safe 
water or a breakdown of the sanitation system.  
The second step in the rehabilitation process of health care systems is the establishment of a 
package of essential health services, the so-called Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS).  
“The aim is to rapidly scale-up health services with proven, affordable health interven-
tions and replace the fragmented, uncoordinated, vertically-dominant services character-
istic in many post-conflict settings.” (Roberts et al. 2008: 58) 
They include service delivery through health posts, health centers, and district hospitals, sev-
eral interventions such as maternal and newborn health, reproductive health, children’s health 
and immunization, communicable diseases, and nutrition. Additional services can be includ-
ed, such as special health care for disabled persons as provided in Afghanistan, because the 
people, who got injured as a consequence of land mines and other weapons. (Cf. Roberts et al. 
2008: 58) The main logistical approach of Basic Packages of Health Care is the decrease in 
the number of NGOs that provide health care services instead of the government itself. The 
government, however, functions as a supervisor of the contracting and evaluates the NGOs’ 
success in the provision of primary health care services. (Cf. Roberts et al. 2008: 58f.) In the 
long term, the provision of health care services must shift from the NGOs back to the gov-
ernment.  
Long-term rehabilitation includes the allocation of financial resources, the strengthening of 
government structures, especially in the National Ministry of Health, the training of manage-
ment staff, and the reconstruction of the infrastructure. In addition, a special focus has to be 
on human resources. Inputs should account for training needs at different levels, management 
skills, sufficient compensation, and hardship compensation for medical personnel relocating 
to rural, disadvantaged, and dangerous areas. (Cf. Waters et al. 2007: 8) One of the most sig-
nificant challenges in the rehabilitation of health systems in post-conflict settings is the con-
sideration of long-term sustainability. Therein, it is important to contemplate whether or not 
the government and local authorities do have the financial resources, not only to reconstruct 
the service delivery infrastructure, but also to maintain new hospitals and primary health care 
centers in the long-term perspective. (Cf. Waters et al. 2007: 16)
31
 
                                                 
31
  Another challenging task in a post-conflict setting can be the collaboration with remaining national authori-
ties and/or rebel groups to provide basic health care for the population. Often, health planners cannot ignore 
illegal authorities because of their influence on the infrastructure and the population of the affected country. 
(Cf. Bornemisza, Sondorp 2006: 5) The hunger crisis in East Africa in August 2011 is a good case in point to 
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The long-term provision of health care is essential to ensure basic services, but also to address 
the health status of the society comprehensively, including the status of the most vulnerable 
groups. One of these vulnerable groups is the one of refugees and returnees, respectively.  
 
4.4.2.3 Health Care for Returnees 
“The repatriation of refugees involves moving an already vulnerable, possibly trauma-
tized population back to a place of distressing memories and still-unsettled conditions.” 
(Sabin et al. 2006: 170) 
In most of the cases, refugees end up in refugee camps with insufficient primary health care, 
little access to clean water and medication, as well as to food and appropriate sanitation. 
When the refugees return to their home country, they often suffer from various diseases or 
illness as a result. 
Moreover, the refugees experience traumatic events, such as active participation in combat, 
accidental exposure to danger, captivity, torture, personal injury, and incapacitation and if 
they are not affected directly they may witness murder or torture. (Cf. Jović et al. 2005: 149) 
The refugees’ mental health may be seriously affected, which is often a consequence of these 
traumas, violence, and economic ruin. (Cf. Fu, Van Landingham 2010: 163) The following 
quote nicely demonstrates the effect of repatriation:  
“Repatriation is often regarded as the end point of a refugee’s exile and suffering. How-
ever, our findings reveal that the stresses and hardships associated with repatriation 
have significant health consequences among Vietnamese returnees.” (Fu, Van 
Landingham 2010: 177)
32
 
Studies on the refugees’ mental status worldwide demonstrated very high rates of prevalence 
of mental disorders, especially posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and other 
anxiety disorders. The main reasons for the refugees to suffer from mental disorders, and later 
also the returnees, are “acculturative stress,”33 low self-esteem, inefficient social support, lack 
of control over personal choices, and the shift from the rural to the urban way of life and back 
in the case of return. (Cf. Jović et al. 2005: 156) Furthermore, mental disorders are further-
more indirectly affected by poor physical health and by nutrition, poor perinatal care, and an 
increased risk of birth injuries. (Cf. Jović et al. 2005: 152) One good example to illustrate the 
mental health problems of the refugees and the returnees is provided by Sabin et al. (2006) in 
a study about mental health of the Mayan refugees after their return to Guatemala. They dis-
covered that on average the returnees directly experienced 5.5 traumatic events and observed 
7.3 traumatic events during the civil strife in Guatemala (before fleeing to Mexico), during 
their displacement, or in the refugee camps. (Cf. Sabin et al. 2006: 166) Additionally, the Ma-
                                                                                                                                                        
illustrate the problem: Somalia’s rebel group Al-Shabaab controlled part of the country, including transporta-
tion routes. Hence, they had the authority to control the access of NGOs to the most vulnerable population. If 
the international community wants to guarantee a minimum access to food, water, and medical care, they 
have to collaborate and integrate the rebel group in their health planning. 
32
  For a very detailed and culturally specific study on the health of Vietnamese returnees, please see Fu, 
Hongyun, and Mark J. Van Landingham (2010): Mental and Physical Health Consequences of Repatriation 
for Vietnamese Returnees: A Natural Experiment Approach, in: Journal of Refugee Studies 23:2, pp. 160-
182. 
33
  “Acculturative stress occurs when individuals experience problems arising from the acculturation pro-
cess … . It can stem from incongruent cultural values and practices, language difficulties, and discrimina-
tion … . Immigrants are most likely to experience this form of stress … .” (Crocket et al. 2007: 347) 
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yan refugees suffered from language barriers in their host country, a lack of legal status, and 
the dependence on individuals or organizations they did not know. With the return to their 
home country, the distress did not automatically end. In fact, it was the beginning of another 
phase in their lives that was mainly dominated by external dependencies and limited freedom 
of choice. Therefore, health care for returnees has to address the returnees’ specific needs also 
with regard to their mental health, ideally before the repatriation process begins. 
 
4.4.2.4 Health Care in the Return Process 
It can be distinguished between three phases of the return process. In each phase, health issues 
of the returning population must be monitored and carefully addressed. 
According to Médecins sans Frontières, “medical services must be available until every refu-
gee has left.” (MSF 1999: 300) In most of the cases, the last persons to leave are usually those 
with the greatest health needs. Special attention must be given to the health conditions that 
could prevent the return of refugees, such as epidemics or communicable diseases with high 
mortality, and to high risk groups such as pregnant women close to delivery, tuberculosis pa-
tients, very sick patients, malnourished children, and other vulnerable groups for example 
disabled people and persons with chronic illnesses. These groups should not leave the refugee 
camps until they are recovered and/or stable enough to survive the journey home. It is often 
the journey that puts these groups at risk, for instance it includes a long walk that may last for 
several days and carrying heavy luggage. In addition, “… immunization campaigns can be 
organized to maximize coverage before departure” (MSF 1999: 301). A health screening of 
all refugees, who are willing to return, should be implemented to identify the most vulnerable 
groups and malnourished children, to inform them about their health status, and to advise 
them whether or not it is risky to leave.  
At the same time, contact with the National Ministry of Health in the country of origin should 
be established in order to provide the refugees with information about the organization of the 
national health care system (e.g. immunization schedules, tuberculosis treatment, etc.). It also 
provides an opportunity to discuss the integration of refugees, who are trained in health care 
into the national services. (Cf. MSF 1999: 302) Then, the refugees should also be provided 
with information about the health care system’s benefits in their home country, for example 
possible treatments and the location of facilities. The latter can be a necessary pull-factor, 
which may help to make a decision where to return to. 
If the repatriation is organized through an UNHCR convoy, medical staff with basic equip-
ment should accompany it in order to support pregnant women, children, and the elderly. Fur-
thermore, a health screening may be directly organized when returnees arrive (e.g. in recep-
tion or transit centers) at their destinations in order to identify sick or wounded people and 
special cases of diseases that require a referral to special programs (e.g. trypanosomiasis
34
), to 
administer compulsory vaccinations (e.g. yellow fever), and to facilitate the contact between 
the returnees and their nearest health care center. (Cf. MSF 1999: 303) 
Return often occurs to previously neglected areas. Therefore, it is essential that the initial re-
habilitation process of the health system begins before any repatriation plan is implemented. 
This includes that a basic infrastructure is reconstructed and some medical resources are 
                                                 
34
  Trypanosomiasis is also called African sleeping sickness and is a disease, which can cause fever, swollen 
lymph glands, aching muscles and joints, headaches and irritability. If not treated, the disease can lead to 
death. 
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Psychological Assistance
Medical Support During Journey
Drugs/Treatment Available at Little or No Cost
Access to Health Centers in Return Areas
Reconstruction of Basic Infrastructure
Health Screening Before/After the Repatriation Process
CHECKLIST Health Care for Returnees
Establishment of Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS)
available, such as the guaranteed supply of medication, medical materials, and basic medical 
equipment.  
“In any situation where there is a large and sudden influx of returnees, everyone (both 
residents and returnees) may be exposed to higher risks of malnutrition and transmis-
sion of infectious diseases.” (MSF 1999: 304)  
This can be explained by the limited availability of drinking water, food, and sanitation. Espe-
cially during the so-called “hungry seasons,” there is an increased need for specific nutrition 
programs until agriculture is revived and the returnees are able to care for themselves. While 
providing basic health care to the returnees, it is important to take equality into account. The 
population affected by the war needs assistance and the large influx of the returnees poses a 
threat to the rest of the population, because the resources are scarce. Therefore, the returnees 
and the stayees alike must have access to primary and secondary health care. This also means 
that health care centers and hospitals can be accessed by public transport and patients do not 
have to walk for days and hours to see a doctor. Medication and treatment should also be 
available at no or little cost. Particularly in the direct aftermath of the physical relocation, re-
turnees often depend on international organizations or governmental support and do not have 
the financial capacities to pay intensive or long-term treatments.  
Because of poor mental health, special attention must be directed towards psychological assis-
tance for the returnees. Ideally, primary health care centers should offer or refer returnees to 
psychologists who support them in their way back to normality. Figure 9 provides a checklist 
for health care requirements. 
Figure 9:  Checklist for Health Care for Returnees 
Source:  Own compilation 
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4.4.3 Infrastructure 
“Infrastructure reconstruction is perhaps the most costly and time consuming element of any 
conflict resolution.” (Cross 2010: 1) However, infrastructure, such as energy, water, and 
transportation, is important in almost every production process and almost every industrial 
sector and is a basic requirement for economic growth, which is a main concern in post-
conflict settings. Nevertheless, infrastructure must be coupled with good economic policies 
such as low barriers to trade and non-corrupt services. Otherwise, the input into infrastructure 
reconstruction may be wasted. (Cf. Hoeffler 1998: 9) Moreover, access to water and energy 
increases the productivity of households and small- and medium-sized businesses. With ade-
quate access to safe water and electricity, people spend less time on the collection of fuel 
goods and could potentially act day and night. In contrast, blackouts and a time-restricted ac-
cess to water have negative effects on the productivity of factories and agricultural businesses. 
 
During a conflict, a country’s infrastructure can be directly damaged severely as it is often 
one key target during conflict and a mean to weaken the authority. It is often the infrastructure 
that can also be indirectly destroyed as a collateral damage. (Cf. Anand 2005: 3) Post-conflict 
reconstruction also needs to address infrastructure that was damaged before the conflict, 
which may be due to the lack of maintenance as resources were diverted to war efforts and 
infrastructure that did not exist before. In most post-conflict settings that take place in low-
income countries, it is rather about the first time establishment of a well-functioning infra-
structure instead of the reconstruction of pre-existing services. Weak states do not have the 
capacity to provide basic essential services to the population, such as the unrestricted access 
to safe and clean water. (Cf. Cross 2010: 12) When assessing whether or not projects can be 
referred to as construction or reconstruction projects, it is necessary to keep in mind that both 
can be money and time consuming. (Cf. Cross 2010: 12) Not only must the scope of the dam-
age be taken into account when planning reconstruction projects, but also the type of infra-
structure. The destruction of important infrastructure such as power plants or transportation 
networks, for example, can require more money and more time to reconstruct than other. (Cf. 
Cross 2010: 15) 
 
After the (re-)construction of essential services is finished, there must be a shift from free 
service delivery to normal cost recovery. Taking this step means increasing the risk of social 
and political instability, as it is an unpopular decision for any government, but especially for 
governments in an unstable post-conflict environment. (Cf. Anand 2005: 13) The shift from 
free services to a normal cost service delivery increases the sustainability of any (re-
)constructed infrastructure, however. In general, donors should enhance sustainability by ef-
fectively transferring any infrastructure system to the local population. Yet, withdrawing aid 
too early may create unstable conditions that the society is not ready for. Providing aid too 
long may create long-term dependency and helplessness. For instance, 62 % of health re-
sources in Uganda were financed by external aid in 1990. Eight years afterwards, numbers 
remained unchanged. (Cf. Vaux, Visman 2005: 24) 
Furthermore, infrastructure programs should address the grievances that were expressed be-
fore and during the conflict, such as an unequal distribution of power or water. One question 
to be addressed is: Are public services available for the poor and most vulnerable? Service 
delivery in a post-conflict setting can either prevent or exacerbate the conflict. “The provision 
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of water and sanitation to one community could lead to tensions and resentments in another.” 
(Vaux, Visman 2005: 13)
35
 Also, when water or power supplies are planned, sites must take 
into account cultural and social divisions, especially for women and girls. If the location of 
water points, for example, is well planned, this can contribute to equality within the society. 
However, it means taking sides: empowering the poor and thereby helping to eliminate the 
reasons that caused the conflict.  
Infrastructure projects must be planned carefully: Too much effort with too much money may 
swamp a post-conflict government and even worsen the problem of corruption. Often, large-
scale projects are in the center of reconstruction plans, but smaller projects that involve repair-
ing existing structures or rapidly creating new ones are neglected. However, ideally they 
should be taken into consideration as a short-term solution. (Cf. Cross 2010: 16)  
“Some large water supply projects in Afghanistan, put in by agencies such as USAID, 
fall into this category. These large supply lines were constructed but never got connect-
ed to local residents due to inadequate local infrastructure.” (Cross 2010: 16) 
The government as well as locals must be involved in the planning and decision-making to 
increase the positive impacts of these projects. Frequently, post-conflict governments and 
ministries had a low absorptive capacity that led to a lack of efficient decision-making and 
hampered the process of infrastructure reconstruction. Cross identifies the presence of a func-
tioning government as one of the most important criteria to shape reconstruction successfully. 
A functioning bureaucracy is needed to process funding for construction, repair, and mainte-
nance of infrastructure projects. If it is not maintained properly, any reconstruction effort is 
wasted.  
In the following section, three infrastructure sectors are explored: the access to safe and clean 
water and sanitation, electricity supply, and transportation. After setting the scene, the infra-
structural needs of the returnees are explained. 
 
4.4.3.1 Access to Clean Water and Sanitation 
Clean water refers to treated surface water and untreated but uncontaminated water, such as 
from springs, sanitary wells, and protected boreholes. In urban areas, the water source may be 
a public fountain or standpipe no more than 200 meters away. “In rural areas the definition 
implies that members of the household do not have to spend a disproportionate part of the day 
fetching water.” (Hoeffler 1998: 14) The adequate amount of water implies enough water to 
satisfy metabolic, hygienic, and domestic requirements which is around 100 liter per person 
per day. Access to clean and safe water as well as to sanitation reduces mortality and illness-
es. Moreover, a large part of the population in poor countries lives in rural areas and their only 
basis for survival is subsistence agriculture. Yield and crop diversification can be increased 
through irrigation. (Hoeffler 1998: 10) 
Sanitation can be defined as the share of the population “… with at least adequate excreta 
disposal facilities that can effectively prevent human, animal, and insect contact with excre-
ta.” (Hoeffler 1998: 14) Sanitation facilities have to be constructed and maintained properly. 
                                                 
35
  International Alert has documented a particularly stark example from Burundi where aid for education has 
benefited one group, creating grievances among the others and, thereby, fueling the ongoing conflict. For fur-
ther details, see Jackson, Tony (2000): Equal Access to Education – a Peace Imperative for Burundi. Lon-
don: International Alert. 
PART III – CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
62 
Because water and sanitation represent fundamental needs in times of peace and war, water 
supply is extremely vulnerable during conflicts as it is destroyed in order to weaken the ene-
my. (Cf. MacDonald 2005: 9) Hence, the water supply network in most war-affected coun-
tries is either damaged or poorly maintained. One major problem is leakages. Construction 
workers have to deal with possible cross-contamination between sewers and water distribu-
tors, as well as mined pumping stations and other installations. Temporary storage tanks are 
needed to temporarily provide the population with water.  
 
4.4.3.2 Electricity 
Electricity is essential for medical needs, security, and for the reconstruction of other sectors 
such as schools, health care centers, roads, and water supply systems. (Cf. MacDonald 2005: 
9)  
During a conflict, much of the electricity-generating capacity and the distribution system were 
destroyed by direct attacks and looting has removed much of the distribution system. (Cf. 
Hoeffler 1998: 32) Before any reconstruction of the energy supply sector can begin, back-
ground information is needed. This includes energy network information, spatial distribution, 
records of output, performance, loads, seasonal variations of load, and whether or not appor-
tionment of power provision along political lines exists. The latter refers to a situation in 
which the government discriminates a particular part of the society in the distribution of pow-
er because of their ethnic or political background. 
The reconstruction of the power system often starts with the reconstruction of the main gener-
ators, as they are the main energy providers in a post-conflict country. (Cf. MacDonald 2005: 
25) 
 
A particular problem is the access to electricity in rural areas where the electricity grid is un-
derdeveloped or non-existent. (Cf. Hoeffler 1998: 32) The majority of energy consumption in 
rural households is for cooking, but rural residents rarely cook with electricity. Instead, they 
use biofuels, such as wood, crop residues, and animal dung. The main advantages of biomass 
fuels are that they are available in great quantities and at no cash costs. Admittedly, there are 
some disadvantages: Biomass fuels cause high ecological damages, as well as indoor pollu-
tion which can lead to respiratory diseases and in the worst case to heart failure. They have 
very low energy efficiency and the rural population often has to spend several hours per day 
to collect biofuels. (Cf. Hoeffler 1998: 38f.) Poor households are deprived of a share of mod-
ern services such as electric lighting and refrigeration. “For areas in which the population is 
widely dispersed and the load density is low extension of the electricity grid is likely to be too 
expensive.” (Hoeffler 1998: 37) Consequently, other, cheaper alternatives have to be found. 
Hoeffler analyzes three different alternative methods of an electricity grid. In micro-grids, 
primary sources of energy would be diesel, hydro, solar, or wind energy. Maintenance is often 
difficult because of the remote location and the fact that spare parts have to be imported for 
high prices. In micro-hydro schemes, the communities provide labor to construct the channel, 
install the pipe, and build the powerhouse. Costs of electricity are mainly low in these 
schemes. A last alternative are photo-voltaic systems (PV). They are expensive in the con-
struction, but cheap in maintenance. One good example is Kenya, where “… about 20,000 
households in rural areas had purchased PV systems by 1994.” (Hoeffler 1998: 38) Neverthe-
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less, the average income in any post-conflict economies is much lower than in Kenya and 
most rural households cannot afford PV systems.
36
 
 
4.4.3.3 Transportation Systems 
In the area of transportation systems, not only the mechanical equipment and accessibility of 
vehicles or public transportation means must be considered, but also land mines and unex-
ploded ordnance, as well as factions resistant to reinstatement of transportation into the terri-
tory under their control. Transportation includes roads, railways, ports, and airports.  
“Paved roads are defined as concrete or bitumen surfaced roads.” (Hoeffler 1998: 20) In many 
countries, most roads are unpaved and not accessible, especially during the rainy season or 
during civil wars for safety reasons. During the war, roads are either damaged by direct hits or 
due to the neglect of routine maintenance. (Cf. Hoeffler 1998: 20) The extremely poor state of 
roads severely reduces the timeliness and quantities of agricultural in- and outputs that are 
moved from and to the farming communities. In addition, paved and accessible roads could 
encourage farmers to produce a surplus. 
In most war-affected countries, railways as well as air transportation do not have a great in-
fluence on economic growth. In Africa, for instance, sea and lake ports are far more important 
for trade. (Cf. Hoeffler 1998: 22) 
“However, international airports are important for business travellers and for the revival 
or development of tourism, which could become a major earner of foreign exchange in 
some countries.” (Hoeffler 1998: 22) 
Reconstruction planners have to analyze the countries’ main ways of trade in order to identify 
those infrastructure projects that are most important for the reestablishment of a functioning 
economy. 
 
4.4.3.4 The Returnees and Infrastructure 
The returnees should have equal access to infrastructure and public services as the rest of the 
society. Primarily, this means access to clean and safe water, to sanitation, to electricity, to 
roads, railways, and to public buildings. People should have access to public transportation 
because personal vehicles are rare.  
Moreover, the returnees have special characteristics that have to be taken into account while 
implementing infrastructure projects, especially in return areas. First of all, return often occurs 
to rural and formerly neglected areas. Return areas are often characterized by a lack of infra-
structure; this means that water, sanitation, and energy are scarce, and roads and railways are 
underdeveloped, destroyed, or poorly maintained. Therefore, infrastructure reconstruction is 
particularly important in return areas, because of the low standards found before, during, and 
after the conflict.  
Furthermore, return is likely to occur to rural areas where returnees live from subsistence 
economy. This can be improved by an unrestricted access to water because irrigation supports 
                                                 
36
  For a more detailed analysis, please see Hoeffler, Anke (1998): Challenges of Infrastructure Rehabili-
tation and Reconstruction in War-affected Economies, in: Economic Research Papers No. 48, African 
Development Bank, and World Bank (1996): Rural Energy and Development for Two Billion People . 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
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the production of agricultural products and may even encourage farmers to increase their pro-
duction and sell products on local markets.  
It was argued earlier that infrastructure projects should focus on encouraging the poor. Most 
of the time, the returnees lost everything during their displacement and the time in exile. They 
are a very vulnerable part of the society and should, therefore, be in the center of infrastruc-
ture reconstruction. Moreover, the returnees often belong to an ethnic minority group. Infra-
structure reconstruction should address the grievances of the conflict and balance the access to 
infrastructure between all political, ethnic, and social groups. The returnees should not be 
discriminated in any way.  
 
In general, it can be argued that the  
“… access to water, sanitation and power, can encourage the return of both internally 
displaced people and refugees, lessening the strain and potential for conflict in border-
ing nations.” (MacDonald 2005: 29) 
The return areas should be in the focus of the infrastructure reconstruction projects so that 
refugees see that sustainable conditions were created in the area they want to return to. Often, 
these areas are rural and many development efforts are required before a sustainable return 
can occur.  
In the urban centers, however, the flow of the returnees can create conflict since “… existing 
water and sanitation facilities are now used by more people, i.e. one result of the conflicts was 
a deterioration of the water and sanitation access for the urban population.” (Hoeffler 1998: 
56) Repatriation has to be planned carefully and infrastructure must be enhanced before a 
sustainable return can occur to the major cities. 
Figure 10 summarizes the infrastructural needs to guarantee a sustainable return. 
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Access to Public Transportation
Access to Roads, Railways, and Public Buildings
Optional: Availability of Generators to Solve Temporary 
Energy Scarcity
Access to Electricity
Optional: Availability of Storage Tanks to Solve Temporary 
Water Scarcity
Unrestricted, Non-discriminatory Access to Sanitation
CHECKLIST Infrastructure for Returnees
Unrestricted, Non-discriminatory Access to Water: Approx. 
100 Liters per Day and Person
Unrestricted, nondiscriminatory access 
to water: approx. 20 liters per day/per 
person
Unrestricted, nondiscriminatory access 
to sanitation
Availability of storage tanks to solve 
temporary scarcity
Availability of generators
Access to roads, railways, and public 
buildings
Development of alternative options to 
biomass fuels in rural areas
Access to electricity
Access to public transportation
Figure 10:  Checklist on Infrastructure for Returnees 
Source:  Own compilation 
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4.5 Legal Security for the Returnees within a Strengthened Rule of Law 
Conflicts often arise from a failure of the judicial system and a missing or weak rule of law 
(ROL). Corruption, abuse, and discrimination in the justice system can worsen pre-existing 
tensions and give rise to violence.  
“Injustice, literally, drives people to take up arms.” (OHCHR 2006: 1)  
The establishment of a functioning justice sector and rule of law in the aftermath of a conflict 
can help to balance former disparities and acts of revenge, which were committed during the 
war. The rule of law may prevent a post-conflict country from re-entering a violent conflict 
and being trapped in a vicious cycle of war and oppression. 
The rule of law is:  
“A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and 
private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with interna-
tional human rights norms and standards.” (Secretary General 2004: para. 6) 
Scholars agree on the distinction between institutional goals and social goods: Social goods 
are the end-goals of the rule of law that can be achieved through institutional goals. Social 
goods may be missed because of an excessive concentration on the institutional goals. (Cf. 
Samuels 2006: 2) Kleinfeld Belton (2005: 27) identifies five elements of social goods that can 
be achieved through rule of law reforms: 
 government bound by law, 
 law and order, 
 equality before the law, 
 predictable and efficient governance, and 
 human rights. 
 
The first aspect refers to the government and its role within the justice system. A state in 
which law and order are at a high level, but the government does not commit to this law, is 
defined as a state that is dominated by the rule by law. A state in which citizens and the gov-
ernment are subject to the law, and therefore legally bound by law, is considered as a state 
with a high level of rule of law. (Cf. Samuels 2006: 2f.)  
Law and order are often either barely or not at all existent at all in post-conflict countries. Key 
institutions can be characterized as dysfunctional and underdeveloped. Staff members of the 
judiciary have either left the country, or were been killed, and the remaining members are 
weak and/or biased and are not trusted by the national population. The police is often part of 
the conflict and has also lost trust by the population. Prisons are overcrowded, conditions are 
inhumane, and corruption and organized crime are prevalent. (Cf. OHCHR 2006: 5; Samuels 
2006: 7f.) Additionally, the societies are highly traumatized and divided as a consequence of 
the war and the level of violence remains high.  
Equality before the law refers to circumstances in which “… all persons are entitled to the 
protection of their rights by state organs, particularly the judiciary, concerned with the en-
forcement of the law.” (Ghai, Cottrell 2009: 3) Where different ethnic or confessional groups 
fought against each other during the war, questions of judicial bias remain in the post-conflict 
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era. Frequently, marginalized groups do not have the same access to justice
37
 and are disad-
vantaged before the law. 
Stable rights and obligations may help to cut transaction costs and reduce political risks of 
investors. Through predictable and efficient governance, economic growth can be enhanced. 
Therein, particularly property rights have to be taken into account. (Anderson 1999: 2) One 
main feature of wars, especially civil wars, is the enormous violation of human rights. In the 
post-conflict period, people want justice and seek to punish the perpetrators. Often, human 
rights are still neglected in the post-conflict period: Particularly women, children, the elderly, 
prisoners, and marginalized groups live under inhumane conditions.  
 
One main element Kleinfeld Belton did not cover is the access to justice: “Access to justice is 
central to the ROL.” (Ghai, Cottrell 2009: 3) It can be defined in three ways: a narrow, an 
intermediate, and a broader sense. Table 2 illustrates its nuances. 
Table 2:  Different Concepts of Access to Justice 
Source:  Own compilation according to Ghai, Cottrell 2009: 3. 
Even under the consideration of the narrow concept of access to justice, some groups are ex-
cluded from the justice system and have no opportunities to claim compensation for any vio-
lations of the law, not even for the severe human rights violations.  
“Bringing the courts to the people, especially marginalized groups (based on gender, 
ethnicity, geography, religion, race, income), so that disputes are resolved quickly, fair-
ly and cheaply, will be a needed and revolutionary change. It will also help ensure that 
conflict does not reignite.” (OHCHR 2006: 8) 
This can occur within the framework of two different kinds of reforms of the access to the 
justice system. The first one is the so-called “supply side.” Therein, reform projects are be-
lieved to strengthen the administrative machinery of justice, to improve the skills of judges 
and their working conditions, to provide them with the necessary technology, to build court 
houses, and to assist bar associations and law schools. Courts, the police, and prison admin-
istration are regarded separately in the following section.  
                                                 
37
  Access to justice will be further explained with a special reference to remote groups, such as returnees, in the 
section below. 
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To be able to run courts properly in a post-conflict setting, adequately trained personnel with 
the required qualifications and personal integrity has to be found. Judges and lawyers ideally 
should not have taken part in any human rights violations during the conflict. (Cf. OHCHR 
2006: 6) The majority of post-conflict justice systems concentrate on criminal justice to clari-
fy the human rights violations committed during the war and to lower the level of violence, 
which usually remains high even if hostile actions have officially come to an end. (Cf. 
OHCHR 2006: 8) Nevertheless, civil justice has to play a major role too. Property issues af-
fect most people’s everyday life; because records were lost or destroyed during the conflict; 
people now need new birth, marriage, or death certificates as 
“… much hinges on these records: ability to go to school, health care, especially vac-
cinations and status of communicable diseases in a district, eligibility to vote, access to 
social welfare programmes and inheritance.” (OHCHR 2006: 13) 
In addition, issues of citizenship have to be solved, as it can be difficult to prove that people 
are citizens if their records got lost or were destroyed.  
During conflict, police officers use to work more like military forces than regular police units. 
Therefore, “… such police forces have proved difficult to transform into rights-respecting 
organizations that simultaneously provide protection and fight crime.” (OHCHR 2006: 15) 
The experiences of most citizens with the police during war were negative. This is the reason 
why most people do not trust the police even after a cease fire was established. The presence 
of the police reminds the population of war, violence, and terror. The transition to a trustwor-
thy relationship with regard to the police may consequently take years. (Cf. OHCHR 2006: 
16) 
Another aspect of reform towards the rule of law is the administration of prisons. They are 
either totally ignored or, if it is recognized, underfunded and understaffed. The most serious 
problems concern prisoners and their access to lawyers, family, and doctors. They are often 
imprisoned under the risk of torture and mistreatment, which are constantly present. (Cf. 
OHCHR 2006: 18f.) The following example illustrates this: “Yet the prison situation […] was 
a real emergency, with hundreds of prisoners at immediate risk of dying due to overcrowding, 
lack of food or mistreatment.”38 (OHCHR 2006: 19) 
 
The second form of access to justice projects refers to the “demand side:” Therein, the use of 
courts and other complaint mechanisms by the people must be facilitated.  
“Strengthening the rule of law is not only a question of the supply side of institutions, 
but also depends crucially on the demand side: addressing the needs and aspirations of 
ordinary people, reaching out to them, giving them a stake in the law, and helping to 
create institutions that are responsive to their concerns and worthy of their trust and 
confidence.” (Stromseth 2009: 416) 
The ordinary population perceives the courts as a foreign institution, which often uses a lan-
guage they do not speak or understand, and consider the courts as untrustworthy institutions, 
                                                 
38
  In his report, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights provides rule of law 
tools for post-conflict states. In one example, he explains that every sector has to be taken into account. He 
provides an example of Afghanistan where Italy took the leading role in reconstructing the judiciary and 
Germany was responsible for the police reform. However, nobody took care of the prisons although they 
were of poor quality and in bad conditions. Please see OHCHR (2006): Rule-Of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict 
Countries: Mapping the Justice Sector. New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
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because of their connection to the old regime and the atrocities of the war. Anderson refers to 
three languages as common examples for court languages, which are usually not spoken by 
the ordinary people: Firstly, English is the official language of the law in India, Kenya, and 
the Solomon Islands although only a small percentage of the population can speak English. 
Secondly, the same is true for French in Niger. Finally, in Mozambique only a small part of 
the population speaks Portuguese even though this is the judicial language. (Cf. Anderson 
1999: 21) The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights refers to 
the case of Haiti where French is the language that is used in courts although the vast majority 
of people speaks Creole. (Cf. OHCHR 2006: 7f.) In these cases, reconstruction efforts should 
be directed toward the most commonly spoken language, but at the same time it should attend 
to minority languages and their importance for the returnees and similar vulnerable groups. 
 
In general, it can be argued that the poor in most post-conflict countries are the victims of 
lawlessness: They are limited in their abilities to defend themselves and to use the judicial 
system. According to Anderson, poor people have less access to justice for three reasons.  
(1) The lack of financial resources restricts them to hire lawyers and to use legal institutions. 
In addition, the time spent at a court is time away from income-generating activities.  
(2) Due to the lack of institutional skills, poor and marginalized groups are not able to under-
stand and use the system for their purposes.  
(3) Because most people in post-conflict countries do not have the ability to communicate 
appropriately, people in rural areas are especially disadvantaged as they have even less 
access to laws and legal texts. Often, it is even difficult for judges and lawyers to access 
new laws due to a lack of academic resources and efficient management. (Cf. Anderson 
1999: 18ff.) 
 
Reforms must increase the use of interpreters and introduce common languages into the jus-
tice system. In addition, simple matters like traveling to a hearing or obtaining legal advice or 
legal books become a major barrier to accessing justice. (Cf. Samuels 2006: 12) Legal infor-
mation must be made available to the entire society, including versions in languages, which 
are spoken by the native peoples. Furthermore, charges for proceedings of public interest and 
human rights issues should be waived. (Cf. Ghai, Cottrell 2009: 4f.) Ghai and Cottrell argue 
that access to justice also means “… approach[ing], entry into; accessible includes the idea of 
being able to influence.” (Ghai, Cottrell 2009: 3) This is because justice institutions also regu-
late the access to resources such as social security and they underpin the forms and functions 
of other institutions that deliver public services. Legal education, and in particular human 
rights education, is one means to empower marginalized people by explaining to them what 
their rights and duties are and by giving them the opportunities to use the judicial system for 
their own purposes. (Cf. Stromseth 2009: 421f.) 
All these measures aim at empowering the poor and the marginalized and at taking away their 
fear of the law. The OHCHR summarizes: 
“Access to justice is often limited to the wealthy, the politically connected and the urban 
dweller. In many post-conflict settings, the great majority of the population has never 
had meaningful access to the courts.” (OHCHR 2006: 7) 
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“It is commonly noted that in many cultures there is a reluctance, particularly among the poor, 
to become entangled with the courts.” (Anderson 1999: 20) The reasons for this were men-
tioned previously: foreign language, the lack of resources to use courts, and a lack of 
knowledge how to approach courts. If reluctance is present, international agencies and nation-
al stakeholders should refrain from sticking to their plan of establishing effective courts if 
nobody will approach them. Rather, the development of alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nisms should be encouraged. Ghai and Cottrell refer to alternative dispute resolution by intro-
ducing the concept of “community justice” that describes a range of mechanisms from infor-
mal settlements, traditional or formal community tribunals, and the application of customary 
or religious laws to the point of hybrid tribunals, drawing on traditional systems, but ex-
pressed and modified through state mechanisms. (Ghai, Cottrell 2009: 5) Community justice 
is a form that the poor and uneducated feel comfortable with, it is quick and easy to access, 
and the primary focus is mediation and resolution through restitution. Yet, the rules are often 
not clearly determined, human rights issues are neglected, punishments are harsh or cruel, and 
the rights of some groups, particularly women and children, are disregarded. (Cf. Ghai, Cot-
trell 2009: 5f.) On that account, community justice mechanisms can be used complementary 
to the rule of law, but not as a replacement.  
 
The returnees often belong to the group of the poor and the marginalized: They have lost most 
of their property due to their displacement and the time in exile. The return to their home area 
often occurs to rural and remote neighborhoods that are far away from bigger cities or the 
capital of their home country. In the analysis at hand, it is examined whether or not returnees 
are de jure and/or de facto discriminated either because of their status as returnees or because 
of the remote location of their place of return and other disadvantages. According to the Unit-
ed Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, principle 20 §1, “Every human being 
has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.” The returnees should 
have equal access to institutions. In addition, the returnees should be treated equally before 
the law. The returnees should also be able to approach courts in their own native language 
although this might not be the majority language of the society. 
Because of their time abroad, the returnees face another issue in the framework of legal secu-
rity: They bring documents from a foreign country that need to be recognized in their home 
country so that they are entitled to public services. In particular, it is necessary that school 
certificates are recognized so that children do not have to repeat school years. Figure 11 
summarizes the checklist for the returnees’ legal security. 
PART III – CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
71 
Optional: Consideration or Development of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
Recognition of Documents Issued in a Foreign Country
Non-discriminatory Access to Legal Information
Non-discriminatory Access to Courts, incl. Nearby Location, 
Language, and Availability of Lawyers
Non-discriminatory Dismissal of Identification Documents 
CHECKLIST Legal Security for Returnees
No Discrimination Before the Law
No discimination before the law
Nondiscriminatory dismissal of 
identification documents
Nondiscriminatory access to courts: 
nearby location, language, availability 
of lawyers
Nondiscriminatory access to legal 
information
Recognition of documents issued in a 
foreign country
Consideration and/or development of 
alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nisms
 
Figure 11:  Checklist for Returnees’ Legal Security 
Source:  Own compilation 
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PART IV: EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
5. Kosovo – Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Refugee Return 
This introductory chapter intends to explain basic background information on the ethnic ten-
sions in the 1990s that climaxed in the violent conflict from 1998 until 1999 between the Ko-
sovo-Albanian Liberation Army UÇK (Albanian: Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës), the NATO, 
and the Serbian forces. It is not possible to discuss the reasons, the stakeholders, and the ef-
fects of the conflict thoroughly. Nevertheless, this chapter aims at explaining: 
 the conflict constellations, 
 the role of the ethnic Albanians, the Kosovo-Serbs, and the ethnic minority communities, 
 the reasons for the displacement of the members of minority communities, 
 general refugee return aspects, including the relevant stakeholders and the legal docu-
ments, and  
 Kosovo’s general socio-economic situation by taking a look at the economic conditions, 
the educational system, and the health care system. 
The correlations are not necessarily illustrated chronically, because these paragraphs aim at 
giving an introduction to the information, which is important to understand the analysis part 
of this thesis. Furthermore, the history of Kosovo cannot be explored in detail. In particular, 
the time before the rule of Josip Broz Tito is not essential to understand the conflict, which is 
the reason for the displacement of members of Kosovo minority communities and their sub-
sequent return, which is at the heart of this thesis. 
 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
73 
5.1 Kosovo – A Brief Overview 
From a legal perspective, Kosovo belongs to the Republic of Serbia. It is located in Southeast 
Europe between Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania. It covers an area of 10,908 km
2
, which 
almost equals half of the size of the German federal state of Rhineland-Palatinate. According 
to estimations of the World Bank, Kosovo has a total population of 1,806 million (2012).
39
  
 
The following table demonstrates the distribution of the ethnic minority communities in Ko-
sovo, including their total population figures, the percentage relative to Kosovo’s total popu-
lation, and their main agglomerations. 
Ethnic Community 
Total 
population 
Relative 
Population 
Main Agglomerations 
Albanian minority
40
 19,911 1.1 % Northern three municipalities,  
Serbian enclaves Serbs 106,527 5.91 % 
Bosniaks 41,316 2.29 % Prizren and Pejë/Peć region 
Turks 16,168 0.9 % Mamuşa/Mamushë/Mamuša 
Roma 14,813 0.82 % 
Kosovo-wide, predominantly  
in Serbian dominated areas 
Ashkali 14,072 0.78 % Kosovo’s East 
Goranis 12,006 0.66 % Dragash/Dragaš municipality 
Egyptians 3,655 0.2 % Kosovo’s West 
Croats 350 0.02 % Gjilan/Gnjilane region 
Table 3:  The Ethnic Distribution in Kosovo 
Source:  Own compilation according to OSCE 2010 and OSCE municipal profiles (2013) 
Apart from representing the majority community in Kosovo, the Albanians also constitute a 
minority in nine municipalities of Kosovo, which are predominantly populated by the Koso-
vo-Serbs: Štrpce/Shtërpcë, Novo Brdo/Novobërdë, Ranilug/Ranillug, and Klokot/Kllokot 
(Gjilan/Gnjilane region); Leposavić/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok and Zvečan/Zveçan (Mi-
trovicë/Mitrovica region); Gračanica/Gracanicë (Prishtinë/Priština region); and 
Mamuşa/Mamushë/Mamuša (Prizren region), which is a “Turkish municipality”. (Cf. OSCE 
2010: 12)  
The Serbs are the second largest ethnic community in Kosovo. Statistical data is difficult to 
derive, because most reliable national and international sources do not have secure data from 
the northern municipalities of Leposavić/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok, and Zvečan/Zveçan, and 
the northern part of the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica municipality.
41
 Precise figures of the Montene-
grins are not available. Hence, they are not included in the table above. 
                                                 
39
  Source: World Bank (2013): Databank. Kosovo, online available at: http://data.worldbank.org/coun-
try/kosovo, last retrieved on 30.09.2013. 
40
  Albanians also constitute a minority in areas, which are predominantly inhabited by Kosovo-Serbs. 
41
  For OSCE estimations of the amount of Serbian residents in the North, please consult their OSCE municipal 
profiles (2013), which can be downloaded here: http://www.osce.org/kosovo/43753, last retrieved on 
22.11.2013. 
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The following map shows Kosovo’s current distribution in 37 municipalities. 
Figure 12:  Kosovo’s Administrative Division in 37 Municipalities 
Source:  Population Statistics of Eastern Europe, online at: http://pop-stat.mashke.org/kosovo.png, last re-
trieved on 22.11.2013.  
The subsequent chapters provide a brief overview of the historical and current circumstances 
in Kosovo that are relevant to the discourse on return. 
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5.2 From Tito’s Equality Concept to Milošević’ Rule 
Josip Broz Tito founded the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) in 1945, which 
was “… undeniably based on a concept of multi-ethnic coexistence” (Várady 1992: 263). On 
the one hand, minorities were protected and their diversity supported. For instance, Tito facili-
tated the publication of newspapers in different languages. “At the same time, most serious 
consequences awaited those who would sing a song considered as a ‘nationalist song’ by the 
Party, or by the police, or who would merely emphasize their national affiliation by words or 
symbols.” (Várady 1992: 264) Recapitulatory, during Tito’s Yugoslavia, the ideologies of 
nationalism and communism were classified as opposed to each other. The most important 
concept between this dualism was equality: Every nation or nationality
42
 had an equal status. 
This increased to an enforced conformity of the atrocities committed during the Second World 
War when it was announced that “… all ethnic groups had about an equal share in the distri-
bution of victims and villains” (Várady 1992: 265).  
“This not-too-subtle concept of equality performed the role of a civilization-shield 
against open animosities, and it also served the protection of ethnic minorities. With the 
collapse of the social system that mandated this notion, the concept of postulated equali-
ty also disappeared; and so did the confines halting the escalation of ethnic hatred, dis-
crimination, and violence.” (Várady 1992: 265) 
After Tito’s death in 1980, the Yugoslavian system of equality collapsed. In Kosovo, the first 
consequence was the Albanian separatist idea of founding its own republic with self-
determination rights and duties. Their main argument was the population distribution with 
over 90 % belonging to the ethnic Albanians and less than 10 % to the Serbian minority. The 
Albanians strived for the replacement of the Serbian heteronomy with their own state. In 
1981, the ethnic Albanians protested for their rights in Kosovo and Macedonia. The protests 
were curtailed by around 30,000 Serbian soldiers, who were transferred from Serbia proper to 
Kosovo. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 297) The Kosovo-Albanian diaspora, which mostly lived in 
Western Europe, supported these separatist thoughts to a large extent. In addition, during the 
ethnic tensions and the violent conflict at the end of the last century, the diaspora was often 
more radical and in favor of an armed conflict than the population at home.  
At the end of the 1980s, the protests culminated in a hunger strike of 4,000 Albanian mine 
workers in the Trepča/Trepçë mine in North Mitrovica/Mitrovicë. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 309) 
These protests and the following events in the 1990s paved the way to the Kosovar war from 
1998 until 1999 and are illustrated in the subsequent figure.  
                                                 
42
  In the 1974 constitution of Yugoslavia, one differentiated between “nations” (narodi), which were Slavic 
nations who founded the Yugo-Slav state (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Mos-
lem-Slavs – today known as Bosniaks and Goranis), and “nationalities” (narodnosti), which were those eth-
nic groups possessing a kin-state outside of Yugoslavia (Albanians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians, and 
Italians = also called minorities). (Cf. Várady 1992: 265f.)  
 For further information about the differentiation between “nations” and “nationalities”, please see Várady, 
Tibor (1997): Minorities, majorities, law, and ethnicity: Reflections of the Yugoslav case, in: Human Rights 
Quarterly 19(1), pp. 10ff. 
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1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
2000
Foundation of the 
Democratic League 
of Kosovo (LDK)
Declaration of 
Independence = 
Republik Kosova
Abolition of 
Kosovoʼs Autonomy
Most Relevant Events in Kosovo’s History
Presidential and 
Parliamentary 
Elections in Kosovo
First UÇK
Attacks 
1998
First Major 
Serbian Offensive
1999
Rambouillet 
Conference 
NATO Intervention
March – June 1999
Adoption of the UN 
Security Council 
Resolution 1244Time Bar I  (1989 – 2000)
Figure 13:  Kosovo’s Most Relevant Events from 1989 until 2000 
Source:  Own illustration according to Elsie 2011: Historical Dictionary of Kosovo, xxix ff. 
In 1989, mass arrests of Albanian protesters dominated the inter-ethnic relations between the 
Serbian minority and the Albanian majority. In the same year, the Democratic League of Ko-
sovo (Albanian: Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës, LDK) was founded and Ibrahim Rugova
43
 
appointed as its president. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 317) Grievances between the Serbs and the Al-
banians increased at the beginning of the 1990s and ended in the abolition of Kosovo’s auton-
omy, enforced by the Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević. He suspended the Kosovar Parlia-
ment, the Presidium, and the Kosovar Government and subsequently declared a state of “spe-
cial circumstances.” “This gave way to ‘reorganizations’ and firings without regard to the 
opinion of the local majority.” (Vádary 1997: 24) After the abolition of all self-determination 
rights that Kosovo possessed due to the 1974 constitution, which declared Kosovo a province, 
Albanian uprisings started again immediately. The Albanians continuously asked for inde-
pendence and legal rights. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 310) On 2 July 1990, the Kosovo-Albanians 
declared the independent Republik Kosova. The only country, which recognized the Kosovar 
Republic as an independent state, was Albania. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 313f.; Elsie 2011: xli) Ru-
gova became the President of the newly established republic after local elections, which had 
been organized and implemented illegally. Yet, since the Serbian government prevented the 
newly elected parliament from convening, political actions had to be undertaken abroad – 
usually in Germany and Switzerland.
44
 
                                                 
43
  Ibrahim Rugova (1944-2006) was a Kosovo-Albanian writer und politician. He became the chairperson of 
the LDK in 1989 and the president of the first self-proclaimed Republik Kosova. Furthermore, Rugova was 
the president of the Kosovo-Albanian people before and during the war. In early May 1999, he had to go into 
exile to Rome, but he returned after the war to resume his functions as president of Kosovo until his diagno-
sis of lung cancer in 2005. (Cf. Elsie 2011: 245ff.) Ibrahim Rugova is still one of the most important Kosovo-
Albanians – his man-sized picture is painted on a house wall in the center of Prishtinë/Priština on the Bule-
vardi Nënë Tereza. 
44
  Bujar Bukoshi was one of the founders and secretary-general of the LDK. In 1991, he was elected to the post 
of prime minister of the self-proclaimed Republik Kosova. Because he was denounced as a separatist by the 
Serbian government, “… he was forced to lead his government from exile, initially from Ljubljana in Slove-
nia and, from May 1992, in Bad Godesberg near Bonn in Germany.” (Elsie 2011: 53) 
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During the following years, a process called Serbianization, Serbification, or Serbization be-
gan. “The Serbianization affected all areas of social life.”45 (Schmitt 2008: 314) One of the 
most affected parts of life was the educational system: At the beginning of the 1990s, the Ser-
bian curriculum was introduced into primary and secondary schools area-wide in Kosovo. 
Any Albanian content and the Albanian language disappeared from schools and from text-
books. Not only teachers and students, but also other employees of public institutions and 
companies had to publicly confirm their compliance with the Serbian state. The majority of 
them refused to do so. As a consequence, around 90 % of the Albanian public workers lost 
their jobs. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 314; Vádary 1997: 24) Some other consequences of the Serbi-
anization included the following:  
 The bilingual street signs were replaced by Serbian, monolingual street signs at the begin-
ning of the 1990s.  
 The Yugoslavian government introduced a quota for public companies: For every newly 
hired Albanian, the company had to employ a South-Slav.  
 Beyond that, the government offered incentives to Kosovo Albanians to leave Kosovo 
and, at the same time, to Serbs to move from Serbia proper to Kosovo.
46
  
 The regional media was forced into line, too. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 314f.)  
As a consequence of the Serbianization, the Albanians created parallel institutions to preserve 
their identity and fulfill necessary basic services such as education and health care. Schmitt 
argues that the Kosovo-Albanian society did not create parallel institutions to the Yugoslavian 
state institutions, but it was rather the re-activation of barely lost societal structures that were 
never really integrated into state structures. The Albanian extended families played a signifi-
cant role in creating livelihoods and supporting each other, especially under these new cir-
cumstances where almost no Albanian had employment and children could not participate in 
Albanian schools anymore. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 316) The parallel institutions, such as schools 
and health care centers, were largely financed by the voluntary 3 % tax of the Kosovo-
Albanian diaspora in Western Europe. Nevertheless, a decline of the quality of the educational 
and the health care system could be identified during the times of oppression. For instance, 
tuberculosis, polio, and dysentery recurred in the 1990s in Kosovo. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 317) 
 
Due to the oppression, the Albanians were forced to integrate into the private economy. This 
led to an increase of small (family) businesses from 1,700 in 1989 to 18,000 in 1995. (Cf. 
Schmitt 2008: 319) Since Serbs were predominantly dependent on the Serbian state economy 
and the Socially Owned Enterprises (SOEs), Kosovo as a whole suffered from economic 
stagnation in the 1990s. As a result, more and more Kosovo Albanians, but also Kosovo Serbs 
and members of other minority communities left Kosovo for socio-economic reasons. For 
instance, around 400,000 young Albanian men left Kosovo at the beginning of the 1990s be-
cause of the lack of a perspective and the threat to perform services in the Serbian military. 
(Cf. Schmitt 2008: 317) 
                                                 
45
  Original quote in German: “Die Serbisierung erfasste alle Bereiche des gesellschaftlichen Lebens.” Transla-
tion made by the author. 
46
  For instance, the Serbian government launched a “Program for the Attainment of Peace, Freedom and Pros-
perity in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo” to provide financial support to the Kosovo Serbs 
and to encourage the Albanians to emigrate out of Kosovo. This corresponds to typical means of ethnic 
cleansing. (Cf. Elsie 2011: xli) 
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Simultaneously, the Albanian resistance began operating. Their first years were characterized 
by “… the decision to clarify the legality of the Kosovo-Albanian concerns through peaceful, 
non-violent resistance”47 (Schmitt 2008: 316). The parallel institutions were one means of 
peaceful resistance as well as non-violent protest marches and strikes. Yet, at the end of 1995, 
“[t]he Dayton Agreement[48] changed the attitude of the Kosovo Albanians fundamentally”49 
(Schmitt 2008: 321). The Muslim population in Yugoslavia perceived the Dayton Agreement 
as a victory of Slobodan Milošević and his regime. From the perspective of the Kosovo Alba-
nians, their resistance towards the Serbian government was not supported by the international 
community. “Thus, the way into armed resistance was determined.”50 (Schmitt 2008: 321) 
The rural population in Kosovo was more willing to fight than the urban elite. This also re-
sults from Albanian traditions, where almost every Albanian man in rural areas has a gun. 
Their fight was further supported by the diaspora.  
Despite the fact that the Kosovo Liberation Army UÇK (Albanian: Ushtria Çlirimtare e Ko-
sovës) was already founded in 1990, they became visible first in February 1996. One of the 
most important political preconditions for a successful fight of the UÇK was the disintegra-
tion of Albania in 1997. Then, around one million guns were transferred from the Albanian 
military to the Kosovo-Albanian UÇK. The first phase of violent attacks of the UÇK began in 
the second half of 1997 when they started attacking several Albanian members of Miošević’ 
party and Serbian police officers. Furthermore, they launched attacks against Serbian security 
agencies while sparing the civil population Kosovo-wide. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 322f.) Until au-
tumn 1998, the UÇK’s fight against Serbia was more a guerilla fight than a regular fight of 
two armies. In the second phase, the UÇK was challenging Serbian security agencies without 
considering the civil population that suffered tremendously from these attacks. The Serbian 
government reacted with a massive air combat. This resulted in the fact that “… in autumn 
1998, the UÇK was largely defeated …”51 (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 325). 
During the winter of 1998 and 1999, the UÇK formed new commando structures and received 
better weapons than before. The fight between the UÇK and the Serbian armed forces for the 
control of several villages and towns began in 1998 and continued in 1999.
52
 The situation 
came to a point when another estimated 300,000 Albanians had to leave their homes. (Cf. 
Elsie 2011: xliv) 
 
                                                 
47
  Original quote in German: “… der Entschluss, durch friedlichen, gewaltfreien Widerstand die Rechtmäßig-
keit der Kosovo-albanischen Anliegen zu verdeutlichen.” Translation made by the author. 
48
  The Dayton Peace Agreement ended the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The agreement included a terri-
torial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Bosnian-Croatian Federation with 51 % of the territory and 
the Republika Srpska with 49 % of the Bosnian territory. The Brčko district received a special self-governing 
status within Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
49
  Original quote in German: “Das Abkommen von Dayton veränderte die Haltung der Kosovo-Albaner grund-
legend.” Translation made by the author. 
50
  Original quote in German: “Damit war der Weg in den bewaffneten Widerstand vorgegeben.” Translation 
made by the author. 
51
  Original quote in German: “… im Herbst 1998 war die UÇK weitgehend besiegt … .” Translation made by 
the author. 
52
  Serbia started massive offensives. Some examples are the following: an offensive in the Drenicë/Drenica 
region in March 1998; an offensive near Prishtinë/Priština in June 1998; during the summer of 1998, Serbian 
forces recaptured several towns and villages such as the town of Rahovec/Orahovac; an offensive in Poduje-
vë/Podujevo in December 1998. (Cf. Elsie 2011: xliv) 
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5.3 From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Resolution 
Until 1997, the “Kosovo case” was discussed several times in international organizations such 
as the United Nations or NATO, but without any practical consequences. The People’s Re-
public of China (China) and the Russian Federation (Russia) made clear that they fully sup-
ported Serbia and would block any resolution condemning the Serbian actions in Kosovo. In 
addition, both states prevented a UN Security Council Resolution, which would enable NATO 
to intervene into Kosovo. Both states struggled with their own minority issues and separatist 
movements, which gave and still give them a profound reason to oppose the Kosovar inde-
pendence. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 328)  
 
“The Rambouillet Conference was a last-ditch attempt to put an end to the war that broke out 
in Kosovo in 1998.” (Elsie 2011: 235f.) The conference took place in a castle called Ram-
bouillet close to Paris and the negotiations were led by the contact group, consisting of the 
EU, Russia, and the USA. It is worth mentioning that the Yugoslavian delegation did not only 
include Serbian delegates, but further members of minority communities that enjoyed a spe-
cial status. Although Milošević oppressed the Albanian minority in Kosovo, he supported 
other minorities such as the Goranis and Kosovo-Egyptians. The proposed solution of the 
final agreement included the following aspects:  
 the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo, 
 the establishment of a NATO Peace Corps in Kosovo, 
 the development of democratic structures, and 
 a final decision on the status of Kosovo to be made within the next three years. 
 
The Albanian delegation signed the Rambouillet agreement while the Yugoslavian delegation 
refused to do so. The contact group realized that both parties had mutually exclusive, non-
negotiable principles. Due to the failure of this last attempt to convince the Yugoslavian forc-
es to withdraw from Kosovo and to bring an end to the unsolved status of Kosovo, NATO 
decided on 24 March 1999 to intervene in Kosovo and Serbia without a UN mandate. It start-
ed a massive bombing campaign of main Serbian sites in Kosovo and Serbia proper.  
The Albanians expected the Serbian forces to immediately withdraw their troops from Koso-
vo after the NATO air combat had begun. Instead, fighting intensified and the civil population 
was caught in between. During the times of war, around 800,000 Kosovo Albanians, includ-
ing some members of the minority communities, were forced to leave their homes and fled to 
Albania or Macedonia. (Cf. IOM 2008: 61) 
 
5.3.1 The Political Developments under the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) 
On 10 June 1999, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 was adopted, which 
designated the end of the war in Kosovo and led to the full withdrawal of the Serbian troops 
from Kosovo. The Resolution 1244 confirmed the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and 
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awarded Kosovo substantial autonomy. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 332) The Resolution 1244 was 
also the first document calling upon the return of all refugees.
53
  
The Resolution also established the basis for the international civil presence, the United Na-
tions Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which assumed the legislative, executive, and judicial 
power in Kosovo. In the subsequent years, UNMIK was every now and then perceived as “co-
lonial rule.” The reasons are manifold:  
 short terms of international workers (e.g., the Special Representative of the United Na-
tions changed every six months),  
 little knowledge of Kosovo, Serbia, and the Western Balkans in general, and  
 the imbalance between the amount of money spent for reconstruction and the few results 
that could be achieved during the first years of UNMIK’s history. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 
336f.)  
The high presence of UNMIK, the NATO corps called KFOR (Kosovo Force), the European 
Union (EU), and the OSCE also created a high dependency on international decisions and 
decision makers. The reconstruction process under UNMIK’s auspices was structured as fol-
lows: 
Figure 14:  The UNMIK Structure 
Source:  Own illustration according to Schlechter, Jürgen and David Maleninsky (n.d.): Zivile & Militarische 
Krisenpravention, p. 15, available online at: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/gernot.stimmer/php/Ziv 
MilKriPraevent.pdf, last retrieved on 22.11.2013.  
Until the end of June 2000, the first pillar was dedicated to immediate humanitarian assistance 
and was performed by the UNHCR. After this specific task was phased out, the first pillar was 
replaced by the police and justice.  
The main tasks of UNMIK were to perform basic civilian administrative functions and to 
maintain civil law and order. Subsequently, it should gradually establish substantial autonomy 
                                                 
53
  The preamble declares: “… to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to 
their home, …” (UNSC Resolution 1244, p. 1). In addition, it reads: “… 9. Decides that the responsibilities 
of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include: … (c) Establishing a 
secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety …” (UNSC Resolu-
tion 1244, p. 3). 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
81 
and self-government in Kosovo. Therefore, the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
(PISG) were established. (Brand 2003: 8f.) In the following years, the rights and duties of 
UNMIK were little by little transferred to the PISG. For instance, on 28 May 2003, UNMIK 
transferred 19 of the 44 competencies to Kosovar institutions, including agriculture and jus-
tice. (Cf. Elsie 2011: lii) The final transfer of all competencies, including the very relevant 
rule of law functions, occurred in December 2008 – ten months after the Kosovar unilateral 
declaration of independence. (Cf. Elsie 2011: lv) “It was initially foreseen that UNMIK would 
withdraw from Kosovo upon the arrival of EULEX, but Russia, acting on Serbia’s behalf, 
opposed this. As such, it remains in Kosovo at the moment in a primarily formal capacity.” 
(Elsie 2011: 281) UNMIK’s role and performance was always challenged as there was no 
blueprint for the development of institutions in Kosovo and the Serbian parallel structures 
prevented UNMIK from maintaining law and order in the entire territory. (Cf. Brand 2003: 
52) Chapter 5.4.3 provides a more thorough overview of the institution-building process in 
Kosovo, including the challenges UNMIK faced. 
 
The following time bar illustrates the most relevant events in Kosovo’s history after the with-
drawal of Yugoslavian troops from Kosovo in June 1999. 
 
Figure 15:  Kosovo’s Most Relevant Events from 2000 until 2013  
Source:  Own illustration 
On 30 July 1999, a new Serbian national assembly was founded in Zvečan/Zveçan to defend 
the rights of the Kosovo-Serbs. Three months later, a 49-member Serbian National Council 
was founded. These developments laid to the foundation of the Serbian parallel structures. 
(Cf. Elsie 2011: xlvii) At the same time, the first free local elections were held in Kosovo. 
Ibrahim Rugova’s party, the LDK, won 58 % of all delivered votes. Around one year later, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) organized the first free parlia-
mentary elections in Kosovo. (Cf. Elsie 2011: l) Despite these favorable political develop-
ments, the first months after June 1999 were characterized by severe tensions between the 
Albanian majority and the minority communities. 
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5.3.2 Revenge Attacks against Minorities 
By August 1999, “[n]early 90 percent of the more than 850,000 Kosovar [Albanian] refugees 
abroad have returned to Kosovo” (Elsie 2011: xlvi). 
“In need of immediate housing and material support, an increasing number of returnees 
resorted to violence and intimidation as a means of retrieving some semblance of their 
previous lives.” (Strohmeyer 2001: 48) 
This violence was directed against the Serbian and the other minorities, basically the Roma, 
the Goranis, and to some extent also the Bosniaks. The revenge attacks ended in the dis-
placement of more than 200,000 members of ethnic minorities. During the summer of 1999, 
the UÇK moved quickly forward to central Kosovo and started on their part with the ethnic 
cleansing of these ethnic communities. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 333) For instance, on 23 July 1999, 
14 Serbian farmers were murdered in Lipljan/Lipjan by the Albanian extremists. Even the 
Albanians, who were supposed to have collaborated with the Serbs, were attacked. “Many 
flee to Serbia and Montenegro or towards mono-ethnic enclaves in the province.” (IDMC 
2007: 52) The attacks included killings, rape, torture, house-burnings and abductions, and 
denied access to public services and employment. (Cf. IDMC 2007: 52) The Albanians were 
convinced of the collective guilt of the Serbs, who had committed the atrocities against their 
people, and prosecuted every minority, who was supposed to have collaborated with the 
Serbs.  
 
In consequence, around 250,000 members of the ethnic minority communities were displaced, 
and churches and other Serbian and Christian cultural monuments were destroyed. (Cf. 
Schmitt 2008: 333) Beyond that, around 1,000 Serbs and other members of minorities were 
killed and staying Serbs were dispersed throughout Kosovo’s North and the Southern en-
claves. Some Serbian cultural/religious sites are still watched by KFOR troops such as the 
monastery in Gračanica/Graçanicë or Visoki Dečani in Deçan/Dečani. The entire Kosovar 
territory was shaken by civil unrests during the years after the NATO campaign. The civil 
unrests basically occurred in the divided city of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and around the closed 
Trepča/Trepçë mine, but they broadened to Macedonia (around Tetovo) and the Preše-
vo/Preshevë Valley in South Serbia, where Albanians and South Slavs fought against each 
other, too. On that account, some ethnic Albanians from Macedonia and South Serbia even 
sought refuge in Kosovo. (Cf. Elsie 2011: xlix) 
 
The ethnic tensions and violent attacks against minorities in Kosovo ended in the unrests of 
March 2004. The alleged murder of three Albanian children by the Kosovo Serbs on 17 
March 2004 led to unpredictable mass attacks against the minorities. In the following three 
days, around 50,000 Albanians attacked Serbian villages and other minorities’ houses and 
cultural sites. The so-called “March 2004 riots” were a major setback in the inter-ethnic rela-
tions. “Deliberate targeting of Kosovo Serbs sent strong message of denial of right to return.” 
(IDMC 2007: 60) More importantly, more members of minority communities were actually 
displaced in 2004 than were able to successfully return to their homes. (Cf. IDMC 2007: 268) 
 
Since the end of the war, the Serbian minority and other minority communities, in particular 
the Roma and the Goranis, did not feel safe in Kosovo anymore. They perceived the Kosovar 
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institutions as exclusively Albanian institutions. Some minorities wanted to receive education 
in the Serbian language and according to the Serbian curriculum, and they did not trust the 
Albanian health care staff, the judges, and other administrative personnel. On that account, 
most of the old infrastructure (such as health care institutions and schools) in the three north-
ern municipalities Leposavić/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok, and Zvečan/Zveçan and the northern 
part of the divided city of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica were kept under the Serbian administration. 
Belgrade maintains and controls the parallel institutions. In addition, the parallel institutions 
were maintained or newly established in some southern enclaves such as Štrpce/Shtërpcë or 
Gračanica/Graçanicë municipality. These municipalities in the South of Kosovo often even 
have two different mayors – one Albanian and one Serbian. The Serbian parallel institutions 
significantly affect the level of integration of the Serbian community – and to a lesser extent 
of other communities – in Kosovo. Therefore, please consult Chapter 7.3.2. 
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5.4 The Reconstruction Process in Kosovo 
At the beginning of UNMIK’s mandate, there was no panacea for the administration of Koso-
vo as there was not one single case where the UN assumed responsibility for the entire legis-
lative, executive, and judiciary of a post-conflict territory. As a consequence, the international 
community dealt with two main challenges in the reconstruction process in Kosovo: First, it 
had difficulties to recruit personnel, especially experienced personnel able and willing to stay 
on a long-term basis. Beyond that, it was complicated to make decisions through complex and 
inefficient bureaucracies. (Cf. Del Castillo 2008: 148) Secondly, “… international agencies 
are working in parallel on the same issues and at the same time working in different areas 
without involving the local community” (Earnest 2011: 31). 
Nonetheless, “[i]nternational assistance for Kosovo’s reconstruction proved more generous 
than for any earlier post-conflict response or any since.” (Dobbins et al. 2003: 125) The inter-
national community spent 1.5 billion US$ on financial assistance to Kosovo in the two first 
years only. Moreover, one should not underestimate the financial capabilities of the communi-
ty in exile, which sent around 350 million US$ to Kosovo in 1999 and 2000.  
 
The next subchapters describe the early reconstruction efforts in the four previously men-
tioned reconstruction areas: re-establishing security, the restoration of basic infrastructure and 
social services, the reconstruction of the framework of governance, and the jump-start of the 
economy.  
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5.4.1 Re-establishing Security 
In Chapter 3.1, the author identified five main aspects of the re-establishment of security in a 
post-conflict environment. This includes an international peacekeeping operation, a disarma-
ment, demobilization, and reintegration strategy (DDR), dealing adequately with the police, 
the judicial system, and the operation of courts and prisons.  
 
“The establishment of a functioning governmental structure, including the re-creation of the 
judicial branch, from ‘ground zero’ is a daunting task.” (Strohmeyer 2001: 59) In Kosovo, 
this task was further complicated by several security challenges, such as: 
 organized crime, including drug and human trafficking, organ theft, and banditry, 
 corruption, which is anchored in administrative institutions, where high-ranking officials 
take bribes and engage in other unethical behavior, 
 ethnic conflict, (Cf. Wilson 2006: 154) 
 demilitarizing and demobilizing the Kosovo Liberation Army UÇK, and 
 building a local capacity for civil policing. (Cf. Cockell 2002: 492) 
These challenges were answered by the establishment of a military and a civilian international 
administration.  
“With the one exception of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Ti-
mor (UNTAET), no other UN mission has ever had a mandate as extensive as this.” 
(Bernabéu 2007: 73) 
The mandates of the military international presence under the auspices of the NATO, called 
KFOR (Kosovo Forces), and of the civilian international presence under the auspices of the 
United Nations Organization, called UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo), as well as 
the relationship between the two are set out in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1244. UNMIK was responsible for the provision of a wide range of essential administrative 
functions and services covering areas such as law and order, health and education, banking 
and finance, and post and telecommunications. (Cf. Bernabéu 2007: 77) The KFOR was 
charged with ensuring “… public safety and order until the international civil presence can 
take responsibility for this task” (UNSC Resolution 1244: paragraph 9d). 
 
The main mechanism to face the security challenges is the implementation of a Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration Strategy (DDR). In Kosovo, UNMIK established the Ko-
sovo Protection Corps (Albanian: Trupat e Mbrojtjes së Kosovës, KPC), a civilian emergency 
services organization in order to transfer the ex-UÇK fighters into a new organization with 
clear structures, but without the military element. (Cf. Cockell 2002: 492) It was a compro-
mise between the required demobilization of the UÇK fighters and their rejection to dissolve 
the UÇK.  
The KPC was a joint initiative of UNMIK and KFOR: UNMIK was responsible for making 
all planning decisions concerning the KPC funding, the policies, and priority functions. 
KFOR, in turn, was responsible for the day-to-day supervision of the KPC. The International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) was in charge of screening and interviewing at least 20,000 
ex-combatants of the UÇK. Furthermore, the IOM provided vocational training and emergen-
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cy and disaster preparedness tasks. (Cf. Cockell 2002: 493) The UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 
assigned the following tasks to the KPC: 
 provide a disaster response capability to deal with major fires, industrial accidents, or tox-
ic spills, 
 conduct search and rescue operations, 
 provide humanitarian assistance, 
 assist in de-mining, and 
 contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and communities. 
The original aim of the KPC was to diminish the possibility of new violence. However, 
“… the KPC command structure openly regard[s] the Corps as a foundation for the future 
army of an independent Kosovo.” (Cockell 2002: 494) Beyond that, some commanders of the 
KPC were directly involved in armed actions of the liberation armies in Macedonia and South 
Serbia.  
“This brings home the lesson that demobilizing the apparent ‘public’ structure and 
membership of a militia may well leave the preexisting political forces that fostered its 
creation untouched. Political and legal sectors must therefore address the potential for 
continuing organized political (and criminal) support for armed militancy.” (Cockell 
2002: 494f.) 
The Kosovo Protection Corps was dissolved in 2009.  
 
Many demobilized ex-combatants of the UÇK applied for the Kosovo Police Service School 
(KPSS) and integrated into the Kosovo Police subsequently. The Kosovo Police Service 
(KPS)
54
 was built from scratch. (Cf. Cockell 2002: 495) It is being run by the OSCE, and the 
UNMIK was in charge of running the police stations Kosovo-wide. As a consequence, the co-
operation between these two organizations was necessary to provide adequate training to the 
new police officers. The Kosovo Police faced some challenges at the beginning of its service, 
in particular the high amount of new police officers: Every four to five weeks around 250 new 
police officers left the KPSS and had to be trained in practice. In addition, police officers re-
ceived a low salary of around 350 DM
55
. This implicated the danger of corruption within the 
police. 
 
When the first members of the international presences arrived in Kosovo, the security situa-
tion was very tense. The returning Albanians conducted revenge attacks against the Serbian 
and other minorities. Hence, the KFOR carried out large-scale arrests: In the first weeks after 
the peace agreement, it arrested around 200 residents, who were charged for violent assaults, 
murder, arson, but also grave violations of human rights. Consequently, UNMIK 
“… considered it particularly important to observe fair-trial standards to the maximum extent 
possible.” (Strohmeyer 2001: 49) The international civilian presence intended to accord initial 
hearings to detainees within 72 hours. 
 
                                                 
54
  The Kosovo Police Service was later renamed into Kosovo Police (KP). 
55
  Until 2002, Kosovo used the Deutsche Mark = DM as their currency. In January 2002, they introduced the 
Euro = EUR. The conversion ratio is approximately 2 DM = 1 EUR. 
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To ensure fair trials, the functions of the Kosovar judiciary had to be re-established. This ci-
vilian task was not easy: Virtually no Kosovo-Albanian was left in the civil service. Only 30 
out of 756 judges were Albanian. (Cf. Strohmeyer 2001: 50) 
“In view of the political and symbolic significance of such appointments in a postcrisis 
situation and the United Nations’ desire to act in sharp contrast to the flagrant politiciza-
tion of judicial appointments that had characterized the previous regimes, it was essen-
tial to proceed in a transparent and professional manner that would give legitimacy to 
the undertaking.” (Strohmeyer 2001: 51) 
UNMIK aimed at creating a political and ethnic balance between the new judges and prosecu-
tors. To accomplish this, an independent judicial commission was set up only two weeks after 
the first UNMIK staff members arrived in Kosovo. Their first result was a compromise of 
seven lawyers, three of which were international, two Albanian, one Serbian, and one Bosni-
ak. (Cf. Strohmeyer 2001: 51) Immediately after the selection of these lawyers, criticism 
against all candidates emerged: One Albanian was criticized with being too connected with 
the old regime, the Serbian lawyer was soon evicted from his apartment and was even forced 
to flee to Serbia proper and “… was threatened to death if he returned” (Strohmeyer 2001: 
52), and the Bosniak was accused of having collaborated with the Serbian regime during the 
1990s.  
In general, the search for independent lawyers was very difficult: All Kosovo-Albanians who 
were still in office were supposed to have collaborated with the Serbs and “[e]ven an immedi-
ate cross-organizational effort in neighboring Macedonia and Albania to screen refugee camps 
for lawyers did not yield the hoped-for results” (Strohmeyer 2001: 53). Nevertheless, at the 
end of June 1999, UNMIK was able to appoint nine judges and prosecutors, including three 
Serbs. They worked as mobile units with jurisdiction throughout the territory of Kosovo. At 
the end of July 1999, the team grew to 28 lawyers: 21 Albanians, 4 Serbs, 1 Roma, 1 Turk, 
and 1 Bosniak. (Cf. Strohmeyer 2001: 53) 
 
One crucial question for the work of the new lawyers was if the legal framework that existed 
prior to the war, under the Yugoslavian rule, continued to exist. Usually, the United Nations 
tries to keep the legal framework that existed prior to the war if it is not in conflict with inter-
nationally recognized human rights standards or other legal contexts. (Cf. Strohmeyer 2001: 
58) This has two practical reasons: 
(1) to avoid a legal vacuum and 
(2) to avoid training the new legal staff in a very new system. 
In Kosovo, the maintenance of the old legal framework was answered with protests by local 
politicians and the legal community.  
“The Yugoslav criminal laws, in particular, were considered to have been one of the 
most potent tools of a decade-long policy of discrimination against and repression of the 
Kosovar Albanian population.” (Strohmeyer 2001: 58f.) 
The new Albanian lawyers also opposed to legal training because of this law: They feared 
they were disadvantaged because of their education and/or practical experiences during the 
time of the parallel institutions. In addition, they feared a privilege for those, who collaborated 
with the Serbian regime. Due to this opposition, UNMIK changed the applicable law to the 
status before the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989. In effect, this was a political deci-
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sion, since the law prior to 22 March 1999 was not any more democratic than the one after the 
abolition of autonomy. (Cf. Strohmeyer 2001: 59)  
 
Another challenge remained in the reconstruction of the physical infrastructure: In Kosovo, all 
courts and other public buildings had to be cleared of mines and booby traps. Moreover, files 
were dislocated, official forms destroyed, and valuable office equipment was appropriated by 
the withdrawing Serbian security forces. (Cf. Strohmeyer 2001: 57) “The situation was so 
grave that the first UN-appointed judges and prosecutors had to bring their own dated type-
writers to the initial hearings to be able to draft decisions and court records.” (Strohmeyer 
2001: 57) Over and above, many prisons were damaged or totally destroyed, and the Serbian 
withdrawing forces transferred the inmates to unknown places in Serbia proper. Consequent-
ly, the detainees were kept in military camps and the personnel did not know how to deal with 
prisoners. 
 
Despite these efforts in re-establishing security and law of order in Kosovo,  
“… the poor record in respect for the rule of law is the main problem in Kosovo. It af-
fects ordinary individuals in their everyday life, irrespective of the community they be-
long to. It also has an impact on governance, the functioning of the political system and 
the administration and people’s trust in the institutions and the private sector. It is a hin-
drance to economic development, as foreign and local investors are reluctant to commit 
resources in these circumstances.” (Von Sydow 2010: 12) 
 
 
 
 
 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
89 
5.4.2 The Restoration of Basic Infrastructure and Social Services 
“Restoring adequate telecommunications services, energy supply, and transport capacity 
is a pre-requisite for economic recovery.” (EU, World Bank, UNMIK 1999: 27) 
At the same token, the rehabilitation of the educational and the health care system were a fo-
cus of post-conflict reconstruction initiatives in Kosovo. The reconstruction of key infrastruc-
ture was set out in paragraph 11(g) of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244/1999. The 
activities were subsumed under the fourth pillar of the UNMIK structure and included the 
modernization and incorporation of public utilities, such as Kosovo Railways, two district 
heating enterprises, the Prishtinë/Priština International Airport, Post and Telecommunications 
of Kosovo, and the Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEK). (Cf. Naegele 2010: 206)  
During the five months after the end of the conflict, several institutions assessed the extent of 
the human and infrastructural damage in Kosovo. “It also took into account the need to undo a 
decade of neglect of human rights and public institutions.” (EAR 2008) As a consequence, the 
European Union, being responsible for the implementation of pillar IV, provided 127 million 
EUR for reconstruction programs in Kosovo in 1999 aimed at restoring adequate living condi-
tions before the winter, implementing urgent repairs of essential infrastructure, restarting pub-
lic administration, and clearing mines. (Cf. EAR 2008) In February 2000, it further created 
the European Agency for Reconstruction as the implementing agency.  
 
“With the exception of telecommunications (and some road bridges), infrastructure 
networks suffered relatively little direct conflict-related damage.” (EU, World Bank, 
UNMIK 1999: 26) 
Nonetheless, the key infrastructure in Kosovo suffered from negligence during the 1990s and 
the emigration of large portions of qualified staff. Consequently, technical institutions and 
utilities were not functioning properly. UNMIK aimed at reaching the following goals:  
 provide an uninterrupted supply of electric power and of clean water (around 100 liters 
per day per person) to all households, 
 develop a primary wastewater treatment scheme in the Greater Prishtinë/Priština area, 
 organize a proper garbage collection and disposal in all major cities, and 
 guarantee an adequate road access to all villages in Kosovo. (Cf. EU, World Bank, UN-
MIK 1999: 21) 
Beyond that, the management of infrastructure companies and utilities should be restructured 
and transferred to Kosovars, the private sector delivery supported, and a sustainable financing 
system developed. (Cf. EU, World Bank, UNMIK 1999: 27) The subsequent paragraphs focus 
on each sector of infrastructure and social services.  
 
5.4.2.1 Energy Supply 
“Energy supply is key for the restart of economic activity in Kosovo – as well as for the 
Kosovars to get through the cold winter months.” (EU, World Bank, UNMIK 1999: 29) 
In 1999, Kosovo’s energy sector was characterized as follows: Two thermal power plants 
suffered from a lack of maintenance; Kosovo B (providing 600 MW) was not in operation and 
required substantial repair and Kosovo A (providing 800 MW) was, and still is, environmen-
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tally-hazardous and only one or two units out of five operated at reduced capacity. The small-
er Gazivoda/Gazivodë hydro power plant was able to operate at full capacity. Around 30 % of 
the distribution network suffered from war-related damage. The distribution companies lacked 
tools, equipment, and vehicles to guarantee a proper maintenance of the distribution network. 
(Cf. EU, World Bank, UNMIK 1999: 29) Furthermore, the pre-conflict district heating sys-
tems were not operating due to a lack of maintenance before and during the war. Beyond that, 
“[t]here is no adequate institutional framework for efficient operation of either the power and 
district heating systems or the coal mines: no company structure, no business culture, and no 
functioning billing and collection service.” (EU, World Bank, UNMIK 1999: 29) According 
to EU, World Bank, and UNMIK’s estimations, a donor support of around 410 million US$ 
was expected to be needed to support a medium-term rehabilitation of the energy sector. (Cf. 
EU, World Bank, UNMIK 1999: 30) 
 
The assistance of the European Agency for Reconstruction from July 1999 onwards was con-
centrated on emergency repairs and the supply of spare parts and consumables to keep the 
generating systems going. Moreover, an international team supported the Kosovar team in 
managing the electricity provider KEK. The goal was to get the power system operational, 
especially for the hard winter as 50 % of the heating is produced by electricity. On that ac-
count, “[t]he support of the Agency to the energy sector in Kosovo in 2000 has focussed [sic] 
on the production system, the coal mines, the Kosovo B power plant, imports of electricity, 
and – to a lesser extent – the transmission system.” (EAR 2008) In detail, the EAR partially 
overhauled the unit Kosovo B2 for a total cost of about 40 million EUR. The unit was suc-
cessfully reconnected to the grid on 5 December 2000. For a period of twelve months, the 
European Union supported electricity imports of power to Kosovo for an amount of about 
25 million EUR covering the partial unavailability of local production. (Cf. EAR 2008) In 
addition, the EAR supplied specialized vehicles, repaired excavators, and rehabilitated me-
chanical and electrical workshops for around 18 million EUR. 
 
“The programme to rehabilitate the energy sector is the largest component in the Agency’s 
budget.” (EAR 2008) In conclusion, the supply of energy has stabilized over the last years. 
Nevertheless, even in 2011, Sinani and Demi state “… power outages, an everyday occur-
rence in Kosovo since 1999, are one of the main obstacles to the country’s economic devel-
opment …” (Sinani, Demi 2011: 8). Beyond that, the management of the electricity provider 
KEK is not effective yet. Their main problems are the persistent low revenue collection and 
high commercial losses due to the theft of electricity. Consequently, the KEK is also not able 
to finance critical investments. (EAR 2004)
56
 On that account, the general economy, busi-
nesses, and private persons are still affected by power insecurity. 
 
5.4.2.2 Transport Networks 
The conflict-related damage to the road network was relatively limited; only around a dozen 
bridges were destroyed on the main highways. However, the transport networks in general 
lacked maintenance during the 1990s and had to be rehabilitated in a significant manner. The 
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  The information stems from the Kosovo Annual Program of 2004 and the sector called “Energy”. The pro-
gram is online available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/ear/kosovo/main/kos-annual_ 
programme_2004_energy.htm, last retrieved on 22.11.2013. 
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EU, the World Bank, and the UNMIK estimated that substantial donor assistance of 165 mil-
lion US$ is required. Besides, there was no functioning public transport system in Kosovo. It 
was partly replaced by private operators, but did not work properly in 1999. (Cf. EU, World 
Bank, UNMIK 1999: 30) The Agency’s focus was to upgrade the road infrastructure through 
the repair of surfaces to guarantee free movement between the main towns of Kosovo and 
between Kosovo and its neighbors. The program resurfaced three of the main routes in Koso-
vo: the highway between Prishtinë/Priština and Skopje, the one between Doganović/Doganaj 
and Globočica in Macedonia, and the one between Prishtinë/Priština and Pejë/Peć for around 
10 million EUR. (Cf. EAR 2008) 
“Significant progress has been achieved in the transport sector since 1999. The main 
roads have been resurfaced, bridges strengthened, air and rail networks have received 
assistance, and the capacity of the Ministry of Transport and Communications to fulfil 
its mandate has gradually improved.” (EAR 2006b: 6)57 
As a consequence, the Agency could reduce travel times between the urban centers of Kosovo 
and to the neighboring countries and, thereby, also decrease the amount of delays and the risk 
of accidents. Nevertheless, the management of the road network is not yet satisfactory. (Cf. 
EAR 2006b: 6) Further assistance in the management sphere is necessary. 
 
5.4.2.3 Telecommunications 
“During the conflict, a number of key facilities were destroyed (including the main exchange 
to the rest of FRY and to the international network, the two transmission stations, and a local 
exchange in Prishtine).” (EU, World Bank, UNMIK 1999: 28) In 1999, Kosovo had the low-
est telephone penetration rate in Europe with only 130,000 telephone lines in service. In addi-
tion, international access was not available on the fixed network. Furthermore, there was no 
mobile service in Kosovo except in Prishtinë/Priština. UNMIK drafted five goals for the post-
conflict reconstruction of the telecommunications sector: 
 repairing damage to the existing network, including the restitution of long distance mi-
crowave network and the repair of the local distribution network, 
 providing spares, tools, test equipment, and maintenance vehicles, 
 carrying out a limited modernization and expansion of the network, in particular by estab-
lishing international access for Kosovo, 
 ensuring adequate mobile coverage throughout the region, and 
 providing technical support to the telecommunications operating entity, whose staff has 
little experience of modern technology. (Cf. EU, World Bank, UNMIK 1999: 28f.) 
On an interim basis, UNMIK gave all telecommunications services to the PTK authority. The 
Agency and its predecessor supported the PTK in re-establishing itself, by assisting in mine 
clearance around the various facilities, by purchasing new equipment, which was missing in 
order to maintain the facilities properly, and by providing technical advice. In summary, the 
situation of telecommunications improved over the last years: subscriber numbers of fixed 
telephone lines, mobile services, and internet increased lately. However, power outages and 
the lack of an adequate management of the PTK remain the most important challenges. 
                                                 
57
  http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/ear/kosovo/main/documents/2006Energy.pdf, last retrieved on 
26.12.2013. 
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5.4.2.4 Housing 
During the war of 1999, around 120,000 houses were damaged or completely destroyed. In 
detail, 41,000 houses were partially damaged, 32,000 were seriously damaged (walls standing 
but without roofs or burnt out), and 47,000 were completely destroyed, which means down to 
or even below the foundations. (Cf. EAR 2008) Since the winter was approaching fast, the EU 
Humanitarian Agency ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection) 
provided shelter for the most affected families so that they could cope with the winter condi-
tions in 1999/2000. (Cf. Del Castillo 2008: 146) Most likely, the most affected families’ 
houses were completely destroyed and they had no possibility to move in with their relatives 
or friends. “They were housed in partially repaired houses, temporary tents, pre-fabricated 
units, and collective centres.” (EAR 2008) More importantly, grant-aided reconstruction was 
undertaken in 23 of 30 municipalities of Kosovo. During 2000, the Agency completed the 
reconstruction of 8,170 houses, which benefited around 100,000 Kosovar residents, including 
Albanian and other returnees. (Cf. EAR 2008)  
Nonetheless, the reconstruction of houses remains one of the main challenges in Kosovo. The 
responsibility for the reconstruction of destroyed houses lies with the Kosovar municipalities, 
but these often lack financial resources and expertise in order to apply to the central institu-
tions to get financial support for reconstruction. (Cf. OIK 2007: 8f.) The Agency and other 
organizations, such as the UNDP, are still actively engaged in the reconstruction of houses, a 
process that is still going on. 
 
5.4.2.5 Water 
In 1999, around half of the Kosovar population had access to piped water and only 20 to 30 % 
were connected to sewage systems. (Cf. EAR 2008) Besides, water losses in the piped sys-
tems were at around 50 % and cost recovery of delivered water was less than 15 %. (Cf. EAR 
2008) The focus of assistance was emergency repairs to urban water supply systems. “Tech-
nical assistance has been provided to 13 municipalities to start a programme of water supply 
and wastewater system rehabilitation covering more than half of Kosovo.” (EAR 2008) The 
EAR started to improve the management of the water systems and could reduce lengthy stop-
pages in water supplies because of equipment failures. (Cf. EAR 2008) 
 
5.4.2.6 Reconstructing the Educational and the Health Care System 
Post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) of the educational system and the health care system went 
hand in hand. Consequently, the following PCR goals of the EU, the World Bank, and the 
UNMIK included both systems: 
 mainstream the parallel systems, 
 finance operating costs (such as wages and pensions), 
 restore damaged facilities and replace lost equipment,  
 assist in designing and implementing specific remedial programs, and 
 support the transition to modern educational and health care systems. (Cf. EU, World 
Bank, UNMIK 1999: 24) 
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The greatest need in both systems was the payment of salaries. Most donors, however, fo-
cused on the reconstruction of the facilities instead of paying salaries to professionals, which 
was urgently needed. (Cf. EU, World Bank, UNMIK 1999: 24) In addition, other non-wage 
recurrent costs such as pharmaceuticals or heating were also necessary. UNMIK decided that 
primary education and primary health care should be operated at the local, i.e. the municipal 
level, whereas the central authorities should ensure universal coverage and quality standards. 
(Cf. EU, World Bank, UNMIK 1999: 25) The higher level of education and of health care 
should be financed through central revenues, but with a higher degree of user fees for services 
such as drugs or dormitories for students.  
Another emphasis of reconstruction activities in both systems was the rehabilitation of dam-
aged facilities: While reconstructing them, it has to be analyzed whether or not the current 
facilities are still consistent with the systems’ needs, especially because the furnishing and 
equipment of these facilities often date back to the pre-1989 period.  
 
5.4.2.6.1 Education 
The main focus of post-conflict reconstruction of the educational system was to restore ade-
quate funding mechanisms, to redefine the roles of the central and the local administrations as 
well as of the teachers, and to ensure quality throughout the entire system at all levels. (Cf. 
EU, World Bank, UNMIK 1999: 24) Substantial support was also required towards the invis-
ible damage, which resulted from the Serbian oppression of the Albanian population during 
the 1990s.  
“Because there were no innovations in schooling during the nineties, outmoded curricu-
la and antiquated teaching methods have discouraged critical thinking, creativity and 
openness to cultural differences in education.” (Melissen 2010: 32) 
Above, young people did not have adequate access to education at the secondary and the ter-
tiary level. The support should therefore include:  
 basic literacy, skills, and job training for young people, who did not have adequate access 
to education and who constitute a potential source of civil unrest, 
 skills upgrading for those who could not benefit from higher education, and 
 the development of new skills, in particular in economic fields such as management, fi-
nance, accounting, controlling, etc. (Cf. EU, World Bank, UNMIK 1999: 25) 
In order to rehabilitate and adapt the educational system to new realities, 85 million US$ were 
required as can be seen in Table 4. 
External Financing Requirements for the Educational Sector (in million US$) 
 
Activity 
First Phase 
(until 12/2000) 
Second Phase 
(2001-2003) 
Total 
INVESTMENTS 
Primary schools reconstruction & refurnishing 21.0 14.0 35.0 
Secondary schools reconstruction & equipping 6.0 7.0 13.0 
Repair and re-equipping of university facilities 4.0 1.0 5.0 
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Printing of existing core books in 1999/2000 2.5 0.0 2.5 
Publishing of new core books in 2001-2003 0.0 5.0 5.0 
Emergency re-training funds 13.0 7.0 20.0 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 2.5 2.0 4.5 
TOTAL 49.0 36.0 85.0 
Table 4:  External Financing Requirements for the Education Sector 
Source:  Own illustration according to EU, World Bank, UNMIK 1999: p. 107 
In 2013, Kosovo’s educational system is still a parallelism of two separate institutions: the 
Kosovar Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST), which runs the Kosovo 
Albanian schools where lessons are held in Albanian, Bosnian, and Turkish and the Serbian 
Ministry of Education and Sports (SMES), which finances and organizes parallel Serbian 
schools and educational institutions for members of the Serbian, Roma and Gorani communi-
ties. (Cf. EAR 2006a: 102; OSCE 2009a: 4) In the tertiary education, a parallel institution 
emerged, namely the Serbian University in northern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica.
58
 
So far, all attempts to establish multi-ethnic schools failed in the past. For instance, the multi-
ethnic school Sveti Sava in Bresje (Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje municipality) was founded in 
September 2004. However, the students, the teachers, and the school administrators did not 
engage in a multi-ethnic dialogue: Both school systems operate side by side, but not with each 
other. (Cf. OSCE 2009a: 15f.) It is a fact that “… in the period after the conflict, the isolation 
in schooling between the Serb and the Albanian community continued.” (Melissen 2010: 31) 
Moreover, the other communities are involved in this conflict either on the one or the other 
side. 
 
Despite the high investments in the reconstruction of the educational system, the Kosovar 
system still faces several challenges, such as:  
 the fact that Kosovar school diplomas are not recognized in neighboring countries, 
 the loss or disappearance of educational money because of governmental corruption, (cf. 
Melissen 2010: 32) 
 the scarcity of school buildings and materials, 
 the fact that low salaries of teachers cause poor motivation, and 
 the low standard of education and the low quality of teachers. 
 
Another main challenge concerns the integration of members of minority communities in Ko-
sovo’s educational system, which could not be properly dealt with post-1999.  
“Kosovo faces the challenge of having many but relatively small minority communities, 
all accorded equal rights in education and language.” (Božić 2010: 286) 
Consequently, most ethnic communities want their children to be taught in their native lan-
guage and not in the dominant Albanian or Serbian language.  
                                                 
58
  Additionally to the university in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica there is also “… a Consultative Centre of a private 
Faculty from Novi Sad (“Fakultet za Usluzni Biznis”) operating in Štrpce/Shtërpcë. […] This Faculty offers 
studies in the fields of Business Management, Economics, Tourism and Public Management.” (OSCE 2007: 
43) 
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The Kosovar educational system differentiates between general subjects, such as physical 
education, math, and sciences, and national subjects, such as language, history, art, and music. 
The national subjects change according to the ethnic community – meaning that their specific 
historical background, traditions, and language shall be taught. However, the Kosovar system 
lacks adequate resources to fully implement these minority rights. For this reason, the quality 
of education for minority communities is below the Albanian level and substandard compared 
internationally. The low level of education of members of minority communities further en-
hances their exclusion from the wider society. (Cf. Božić 2010: 294)  
 
The Serbian system, however, features a much higher quality. This is mainly due to the con-
tinued support from the government in Belgrade. Teachers within the Serbian system earn 
three to four times more than their colleagues in the Kosovar system; the salaries for the Ser-
bian teachers in Kosovo are even higher than in Serbia proper. Belgrade aims at attracting as 
many good teachers as possible to move to Kosovo and teach there. Beyond that, the Serbian 
teachers have permanent contracts whereas the Kosovar teachers often only have temporary 
contracts. (Cf. Božić 2010: 294) Despite integrating some minority communities into the Ser-
bian educational system in Kosovo, there are no specific subjects for any of them.  
 
In conclusion, despite some post-conflict reconstruction of the educational system, including 
the reconstruction and refurnishing of primary and secondary schools, some major challenges 
have still not been resolved at this time. It is particularly devastating that there is a major 
quality gap between the Kosovar and the Serbian system: This gap prevents a sustainable uni-
fication of both systems.  
 
5.4.2.6.2 Health Care 
As is true for all other systems in Kosovo, the health care system is characterized by a lack of 
maintenance and a chronic shortage investment in new equipment, especially during the 
1990s. Beyond that, the system was over-reliant on expensive hospital care rather than prima-
ry health care in community-based health clinics. (Cf. EAR 2008) This situation became even 
more challenging as the parallel Albanian health care system almost collapsed in June 1999. 
Most health care staff working for the parallel Mother Theresa’s Society tried to return to the 
hospitals where they worked before 1990. As a consequence, the Mother Theresa’s Society 
was almost not functioning anymore, in particular in rural areas. (Cf. EU, World Bank, UN-
MIK 1999: 24) “This problem has been compounded by a lack of primary health care skills 
amongst both doctors and nurses.” (EAR 2008) A primary focus of post-conflict reconstruc-
tion in the health care sector was to provide doctors, nurses, and other health care staff with 
incentives to continue working in the rural areas and in primary health care clinics instead of 
returning to their old workplaces in over-staffed hospitals. All medical staff should receive 
skills training and new investments in the primary health care sector should be made, thereby 
establishing a better balance between primary and hospital-based health care. Besides, phar-
maceuticals were urgently needed, especially at the local level. (Cf. EAR 2008) 
 
In total, the European Agency for Reconstruction supported 350 state pharmacies to create a 
self-sustaining pharmacy system. Three hundred fifty family doctors and specialists as well as 
service managers were trained through a WHO program. In addition to that, “[t]he blood 
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transfusion service has been modernised through a central facility based in Pristina …” (EAR 
2008). Table 5 summarizes the external financial requirements for the health sector.  
External Financing Requirements for the Health Sector (in million US$) 
Activity 
First Phase 
(until 12/2000) 
Second Phase 
(2001-2003) 
Total 
INVESTMENTS 
Civil Works 
Damaged Primary Health Care (PHC) Clinics 7.0 1.0 8.0 
Hospitals and other PHC Clinics 5.0 13.0 18.0 
Other (Health Insurance Fund, Training Sites) 2.0 0.0 2.0 
Equipment 
Damaged PHC Clinics 2.0 2.0 4.0 
Hospital Equipment 14.0 13.0 27.0 
Ambulance System 2.0 3.0 5.0 
Priority Health Programs 3.0 6.5 9.5 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 5.0 6.5 11.5 
TOTAL 40.0 45.0 85.0 
Table 5:  External Financing Requirements for the Health Care Sector 
Source:  EU, World Bank, UNMIK 1999: p. 121 
The EAR’s main achievement was that in 2008, around 50 % of the patients’ first contact with 
the health care system was at the local level. Above all, the general health conditions of the 
population increased, but are still unsatisfactory. The following health indicators provide an 
image of the current health situation in Kosovo. The life expectancy is with 70 years (2011)
59
 
below all neighboring countries
60
. The Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) is considered the 
highest in the region: Recent research of facility-based data estimates the MMR in Kosovo at 
21 per 1,000 births. The Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) is estimated at 44 per 1,000 live births, 
while the “under the age of 5” mortality rate is estimated at 69 per 1,000 live births. (Cf. Cari-
tas International 2010: 96) One main reason for these low indicators is the ongoing low quali-
ty of health care institutions. 
 
The health system in Kosovo is organized in three levels: There are primary health care cen-
ters
61
 (FHC), hospitals, and a few specialized health care facilities such as the University 
Hospital in Prishtinë/Priština. (Cf. Mattern 2007: 3) The system is, again, divided into a Ko-
sovar system and a Serbian system, which is maintained by the Republic of Serbia. The main 
                                                 
59
  Source for all data on life expectancy: World Bank (2013): Databank. Kosovo, online available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/kosovo, last retrieved on 08.10.2013. 
60
  Serbia proper has a life expectancy of 75 years. The same applies to Macedonia and Montenegro. Albania 
has even a life expectancy of 77 years. 
61
  Due to the extremely high maternal and infant mortality, primary health care centers were renamed as Family 
Health Centers (FHC). They offer full-time first consultation and treatment of general practitioners. (Cf. 
Mattern 2007: 4) 
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difference between the two systems is the fact that health care services, pharmaceuticals, and 
treatment can be accessed free of charge in the Serbian system. (Cf. HLC 2008: 190) Within 
the Kosovar system, treatment, pharmaceuticals
62
, and transportation have to be paid directly 
because Kosovo has not yet established public health insurance. (Cf. Mattern 2007: 1) 
 
Both systems face one common challenge, which is the lack of qualified human resources: 
“… 1000 inhabitants are served by only 0.94 doctors, 2.61 nurses and 0.06 dentists” (Caritas 
International 2010: 97f.). 
Notably, the Kosovar health care system still struggles to overcome the educational gap of 
their health care personnel during the 1990s under the Serbian oppression. Although the Al-
banian physicians could receive theoretical education during these times, they suffered from a 
lack of practical experiences due to the restricted access to patients in hospitals.  
 
Despite the fact that health care in the Serbian parallel institutions is superior because 
“… these facilities are very well supplied with drugs and other materials …” (CRIP 2009: 
59), they face some critical challenges, too. The Serbian health care system in Kosovo lacks 
secondary and tertiary health care institutions in general and primary health care institutions 
in remote areas in the South of the three northern Serbian municipalities. For surgeries and 
difficult treatments, the Serbs and members of other ethnic minority communities, such as the 
Roma and the Goranis, tend to drive to Serbia rather than to use the Albanian institutions in 
their own area. The following table illustrates several challenges of both systems. 
Table 6:  Challenges of both Health Care Systems in Comparison 
Source:  Own compilation according to OSCE (2007): 49 and UNKT (2007): 1. 
Another factor significantly influencing the health conditions of Kosovar residents is the pol-
luted environment. The regions with the most polluted environments are Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 
– lead and zinc mines and related industry, Obiliq/Obilić – lignite mines and power plants, 
Gllogovc/Glogovac – ferro-nickel mines and metallurgical industry, and Hani i Elezit/Đeneral 
Janković – limestone quarries and cement factory. The Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians 
                                                 
62
  Even the pharmaceuticals on the Essential Drug List that was established in 2002 by the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) cannot be provided free of charge due to the chronic underfunding of Kosovo’s health 
care system. (Cf. Mattern 2007: 15) 
Challenges of the Serbian System
 Unsufficient amount of secondary and 
tertiary health care institu-tions,
 inadequate geographical network of 
facilities, particularly in remote areas,
 inadequate transportation to the health 
facilities,
 lack of adequate and modern medical 
equipment, and
 inadequate facilities to deal with 
emergencies.
Challenges of the Kosovar System
 Underfunding,
 poor infrastructure,
 low wages,
 lack of qualified medical personnel,
 outdated medical equipment, 
 inadequate supplies of 
pharmaceuticals, and
 poor management.
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particularly suffer from the environmental pollution in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, where they live 
in shacks close to the old Trepča/Trepçë mine complex.63 (Cf. Caritas International 2010: 
101) 
 
                                                 
63
  The Chapter 6.4 explains their situation and shows how the pollution of the environment affects their lives 
and even leads to the death.  
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5.4.3 Reconstruction of the Framework of Governance 
“The first and foremost challenge for the UN was the need to exercise government func-
tions that are normally the responsibility of national authorities.” (Del Castillo 2008: 
144)
64
 
This challenge could only be dealt with given that the Kosovar society would participate in 
the democratization and institution-building process. However, the discussion and content-
related input was and still is to a large extent confined to the Kosovo-Albanian population as 
the majority of the ethnic minority communities that was displaced to foreign countries or 
Serbia proper. (Cf. Del Castillo 2008: 145) “An ethnically homogenized Kosovo was certain-
ly an easier place to govern” (Ernst 2011: 123), but also excludes a significant part of the 
population, especially because one conflict party was ignored most of the time in any state-
building processes.  
 
After UNMIK’s establishment in 1999, the international organization was gradually transfer-
ring administrative tasks and functions to interim institutions. (Cf. Del Castillo 2008: 141) In 
February 2000, the Joint Interim Administrative Structures (JIAS) were established. One ma-
jor precondition for the JIAS to exist was that the Kosovar leaders had to officially dissolve 
all parallel executive, legislative, and judicial structures by the end of January 2001, i.e. all 
institutions, which were established by the non-recognized Republik Kosova. (Cf. Brand 
2003: 13) As demanded, the Republik Kosova ceased to exist on 1 February 2001. The partic-
ipation of the Serbs was an integral element of the JIAS agreement. Nevertheless, the Serbs 
never formally recognized the agreement or the structures. (Cf. Brand 2003: 14) The JIAS 
resumed several administrative tasks, responsibilities, and functions, but “[n]o Kosovar within 
JIAS could take a valid decision without the approval of an international counterpart of su-
pervisor. … [S]ome UNMIK officials merely received ‘a second hat’ in their function as JIAS 
Co-Heads.” (Brand 2003: 15) The JIAS and the UNMIK existed parallel to each other, but the 
decision-making authority was clearly confined to the UNMIK. (Cf. Del Castillo 2008: 141) 
In October 2000, the first municipal elections
65
 were held in 27 out of 30 municipalities. 
“Technically, elections were also held in the Serb dominated northern three municipalities. … 
Due to insignificant turnout in these municipalities, the results there were not certified by the 
Central Election Commission.” (Brand 2003: 29) On that account, municipal assemblies 
could be established in 27 municipalities, which were perceived as a first step into democratic 
institutions.  
 
In May 2001, the UNMIK created the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Institutions 
of Self-Government (PISG) in Kosovo. The framework outlined the establishment and func-
tioning of institutions following the November 2001 parliamentary elections and recognized 
Kosovo’s legal subjectivity, which became the basis for the declaration of independence in 
2008. (Cf. Brand 2003: 33) The PISG included (1) the Assembly, which is the highest repre-
sentative and legislative of the PISG, (2) the President of Kosovo, (3) the Government, (4) the 
                                                 
64
  The only governing experience of the UN prior to Kosovo was that of running the central bank of Cambodia, 
which cannot be compared to the holistic governing task in Kosovo. (Cf. Del Castillo 2003: 17) 
65
  Parliamentary elections were not possible yet, as there were no provisional institutions set in place. Beyond 
that, it was believed that parliamentary elections could be beneficial to radical groups such as the UÇK. (Cf. 
Cogen, De Brabandere 2007: 678) 
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Courts, and (5) other minor relevant bodies and institutions. As was true for the JIAS, the ul-
timate authority for decision-making was still reserved expressively for UNMIK alone. UN-
MIK could practically override every single decision of the elected institutions.  
“It was clear from the beginning of this post-JIAS phase that UNMIK would transfer its 
‘administrative (not political) responsibilities’ or ‘functions’, but not ‘authority.’” 
(Brand 2003: 40) 
As a consequence, a dual system emerged, in which locals and internationals drifted apart 
from each other and aimed at reaching different goals. (Cf. Ernst 2011: 136) 
On 17 November 2001, the first parliamentary elections could be held, but were boycotted by 
the Kosovo-Serbs. (Cf. Del Castillo 2008: 143) The LDK was the strongest party with 45.7 % 
of all valid votes and the PDK won 25.7 %. Several minority parties received seats, such as 
the Serbian Koalicija Povratak with 11.3 % of the final votes.  
 
One challenging task for UNMIK was to find a solution to the status question. Although the 
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 did not foresee a specific solution, the search went on 
continuously after the end of the war. As a consequence, a first decentralization plan was 
submitted in 2002, which would provide the Serbs with their own administrative units. (Cf. 
Elsie 2011: li)  
On 20 February 2006, status negotiations between Prishtinë/Priština (PISG) and Belgrade 
started in Vienna. These talks were facilitated by Martti Ahtisaari (Finnish diplomat), who 
had submitted the Ahtisaari proposal on the solution of the status question earlier on. It in-
cluded proposals for the decentralization of the local institutions, the special protection of the 
Serbian and the other non-Albanian communities, and an international civilian and military 
presence – the so-called “internationally supervised independence.” The EU, the NATO, and 
the United States were in favor of this plan. The Ahtisaari proposal was “… initially de-
nounced by the Serb government as illegitimate and unacceptable, but were welcomed cau-
tiously by the Kosovar leadership.” (Elsie 2011: 20) Since the status negotiations and several 
attempts for a new UN Security Council Resolution, which could replace the UNSC Resolu-
tion 1244 and bring an end to the unsolved status of Kosovo, failed in the following years, the 
Kosovar Parliament declared the independent Republic of Kosovo on 17 February 2008.  
In September 2008, the Kosovar Parliament passed the Kosovo Constitution, which is largely 
based on several European constitutions. In December 2008, UNMIK transferred all remain-
ing competencies and authority to the new Kosovar institutions. However, despite these facts, 
Kosovo is from a legal perspective not an independent state because the United Nations Secu-
rity Council did not confirm this independence. For a thorough discussion on the status ques-
tion and the effects of the unresolved status of Kosovo on the return of the Serbian refugees, 
please see Chapter 7.4. 
 
Having a look at the current status of the institutions in Kosovo, Ernst argues that “[t]he state-
building effort, which started in 1999 and took an additional dimension with independence, 
has failed to achieve some basic standards.” (Ernst 2011: 127) According to him, Kosovo 
cannot be classified as a fully functioning state. The institution-building process was compli-
cated by two major facts: 
 
(1) “Too many cooks spoil the broth.” 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
101 
Three main stakeholders were present in Kosovo and influenced the process in different ways: 
the international community (UNMIK), the local Kosovo-Albanian elite and society, and the 
Serbian government in Belgrade. Later on, the Kosovo-Serbs in the South became stakehold-
ers themselves, “… as they have gradually started to develop a somewhat independent agenda 
from Belgrade’s and cooperate to some extent with Pristina.” (Ernst 2011: 126) Both the Ko-
sovo-Albanian local stakeholders and UNMIK aimed at reaching completely different goals: 
The international community wanted to create stability whereas the local elite aimed at getting 
rid of the international presence and at gaining independence as soon as possible. (Cf. Ernst 
2011: 128) The institution-building process was always a negotiation between different par-
ties and was more of a political than of a technical nature. The sovereignty in Kosovo is 
shared among different stakeholders. This fact supports the statement that Kosovo is not an 
independent, sovereign state yet. Due to this shared sovereignty over years, organizations ran 
and still run the risk of overlapping activities in some sectors and of gaps in other. (Cf. Ernst 
2011: 126) 
 
(2) Parallel structures prevented UNMIK from establishing institutions in the North. 
In Kosovo’s North, competing administrative-political authorities were always present. For 
instance, in some municipalities, three different mayors claimed rule over the same municipal 
administration – one mayor was implemented by the international community, one was Alba-
nian, and one was Serbian. The Serbian authorities, particularly in the North, were recognized 
by the Serbs and still benefit from significant moral and financial support from Belgrade. In 
reality, UNMIK did not have any executive, legislative, or judicial power over the three 
northern municipalities. They were absolutely excluded from any political decision-making 
and any institution-building process. Concluding, nation-building cannot be successful with-
out including all members of the society, especially in the case of an ethnic conflict when one 
party is excluded from the process.  
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5.4.4 Jump-start of the Economy 
“What remained of the economy was essentially a post-conflict service-based economy, 
with a legacy of a centrally planned socialist economy modified in the 1990s by ethnic 
segregation, the banishment of the majority population from the public sector and ques-
tionable transfers of assets undertaken by the Milošević regime.” (Naegele 2010: 201) 
During the 1990s, Kosovo’s economy was severely weakened because of the emigration of 
highly qualified workers and due to the fact that “[o]thers returned to rural areas within family 
and clan, and developed a large informal economy.” (EAR 2008) After the war, the Kosovar 
economy was built on three main components: (1) a large number of family farms, (2) a rela-
tively large number of privately-owned small businesses, and (3) some 300 Socially Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) and 124 public or state-owned companies
66
. (Cf. EAR 2008) UNMIK’s 
policy towards the economic reconstruction of Kosovo was a “jump-start” of the rural econo-
my, the provision of employment, and the increase of food production, the encouragement of 
private enterprises, and the restart of viable public enterprises. (Cf. EAR) In general, one can 
claim that all economic activities were directed to support one or several of the previously 
mentioned three components.  
 
(1) Agriculture 
Before the conflict, around 65 % of Kosovo’s population lived in rural areas and approximate-
ly 90 % of them were engaged in agricultural activities. During the conflict, many families 
lost their crop and livestock “… and this resulted in mere subsistence levels of farm produc-
tion in 1999” (EAR 2008). Above that, many Albanians lost their urban jobs and had no other 
choice than to return to rural areas. The EAR provided these small family farms with essential 
farm inputs, such as seeds and fertilizer, and repaired necessary machines. In total, the EAR 
imported 37,500 tons of fertilizer (9.0 million EUR) to Kosovo and established a rural credit 
scheme for farmers (2.0 million EUR). “Interviews with dealers and farmers suggests [sic] 
that the project has helped to establish a normalised market structure and price mechanisms in 
Kosovo, and the credit has helped the financing and importation of other essential farm ser-
vices and supplies.” (EAR 2008) Today, the agricultural sector needs a lot of input to be sus-
tainable and to increase Kosovo’s food supplies. As a consequence, the Kosovar institutions 
implemented an Agriculture and Rural Development Plan (ARDP) to address this sector. (Cf. 
World Bank 2013
67
)  
 
(2) Enterprise Development 
The EAR’s overall strategy was to develop Kosovo towards a market economy “… by provid-
ing and expanding credit facilities and hands-on management advice for the private sector …” 
(EAR 2008). If one could not get a credit through their family network, there were few other 
credit facilities. As a consequence, the UNMIK and the EAR offered micro-loans to private 
people and already existing small businesses to enhance the private sector. (Cf. Del Castillo 
2008: 149) The EAR extended the loans to 123 micro-enterprises from 2000 until 2008. (Cf. 
EAR 2008) 
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  Figures are from October 2000. 
67
  Source: World Bank (2013): Databank. Kosovo Overview, online available at: http://www.worldbank. 
org/en/country/kosovo/overview, last retrieved on 10.10.2013. 
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(3) Administration of the Socially Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
UNMIK was also responsible for the administration and the regulation of all publicly and 
socially owned enterprises. This task was included into the fourth pillar of the UNMIK struc-
ture. The fate of the SOEs was supposed to be resolved through privatization. (Cf. Naegele 
2010: 202f.) Although UNMIK feared that the privatization of the SOEs would exceed their 
mandate, they dealt with this challenge. “Following a somewhat false start in 2003-04 due to 
inadequate legislation, privatization finally picked up momentum in 2005. All told, KTA [Ko-
sovo Trust Agency] launched 30 waves of privatization involving 551 New Companies deriv-
ing from 313 SOEs.” (Naegele 2010: 203) The KTA thereby enabled continuous production.  
 
Beyond that, Kosovo could not administer its own customs in 1999 because it was legally a 
province of Serbia. As a consequence, UNMIK established the first customs administration in 
its history, including revenue collection to finance the province’s budget since there were no 
other taxes paid at that time. (Cf. Del Castillo 2008: 148) Within the first year, a service tax 
on hotels, food, and beverages was introduced. On that account, Kosovo’s budget was not 
relying solely on imports anymore. “Because of the absence of a banking system, Kosovo 
became a purely cash-based economy as of June 1999.” (Del Castillo 2008: 149) UNMIK, 
with assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), worked on a modern banking sys-
tem during the first years after the end of hostilities in Kosovo. 
 
Today, the economic situation in Kosovo is very challenging. The European Commission 
(EC) describes it very well:  
“The economy provides few employment opportunities. External imbalances are high 
and economic activities are predominantly concentrated in the services sector, in partic-
ular retail and wholesale trade. Reliance on remittances[
68
] and direct or indirect support 
of donors has been declining but remains significant.” (EC 2012: 15)  
Although the economy has expanded on average by 4 % during the last three years, the start-
ing point was very low. (Cf. EC 2012: 15) The reasons for the slow development of Kosovo’s 
economy are manifold. Subsequently, this paper refers to some of them: There are almost no 
Kosovo based productions; the manufacturing is limited to the extraction of raw materials, 
which dominate the export goods. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 352; EC 2012: 15) In addition, energy 
shortages still prevent a constant economic development. Furthermore, there were very few 
foreign investments due to the unsolved status question of Kosovo and unsolved land tenures. 
(Cf. Schmitt 2008: 352)  
 
It is also striking that Kosovo’s economy is heavily dependent on the public sector despite the 
privatization of many SOEs. In 2009, the public investment increased by 194 % whereas the 
private sector investment declined by 10.2 %. This decline results from the international eco-
nomic crisis and the lack of integration of Kosovo into the global economy. (Cf. Caritas In-
ternational 2010: 61) This dependency is also reflected in the sources of income. The most 
important incomes are – in the order of their value: public wages, private wages and business-
                                                 
68
  Remittances are transfers of money by a foreign worker to his or her home country. Remittances are a major 
financial income for many developing countries, especially those in a transition phase. 
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es, and one-tenth stems from remittances sent from abroad. (Cf. Caritas International 2010: 
63) Remittances remain the largest source of external financing in Kosovo. They were equiva-
lent to just below 13 % of the GDP in 2010. (Cf. World Bank 2012: 8) “The monthly amount 
of remittances per household is close to the monthly average gross salary in Kosovo … and in 
net terms is lower than average remittances per household.” (World Bank 2012: 10) In Koso-
vo, remittances are used to buy food and clothes, to construct or repair houses, and to invest in 
businesses. (Cf. World Bank 2012: 10) 
Beyond that, organized crime has a significant influence on the economic development. In 
2007, the earnings derived from organized crime are estimated to be at 550 million EUR. (Cf. 
Schmitt 2008: 352) In 1999, Kosovo’s economy had to start from the scratch because the 
precedent 1990s had destroyed all socio-economic reforms from the 1960s and the 1970s. 
 
One of the major challenges of Kosovo’s economy is unemployment. Figures vary signifi-
cantly and sources are often unreliable. The European Commission estimates that “… only 
about a quarter of the working age population have a job and only one woman out of eight is 
employed. Unemployment is above 40% and especially pronounced among the youth – more 
than 70% of whom are without a job.” (EC 2012: 16) Under the UN rule, an illusory boom 
developed because of the increase of jobs in the diverse international organizations and the 
“inflated government.” Although these jobs are better paid than regular jobs in the public ad-
ministration or in private businesses, they are not sustainable because of a regular change of 
staff in international governmental and non-governmental organizations. Despite these new 
jobs, “[a] real improvement in the economic situation did not occur”69 (Schmitt 2008: 352). 
Furthermore, the economic structure is based on low-skilled workers without any vocational 
education or training. (Cf. EC 2012: 16) One can conclude that the labor market conditions 
did not change over the last decade despite many efforts and projects implemented by local 
and international institutions. 
 
The big picture clarifies that Kosovo’s economy is very weak, based on the public sector and 
remittances from abroad; it lacks foreign investments and a broad export portfolio. Kosovo’s 
population suffers expressively from high unemployment rates. Notwithstanding that all eth-
nic communities, including the Albanian majority, are affected comparably by these inherent 
socio-economic challenges. Nonetheless, there are some small differences regarding the ac-
cess to employment, the conditions when performing jobs, and the general socio-economic 
status of members of the different ethnic communities in Kosovo, which will be included in 
the subsequent analysis.  
*** 
These four areas of reconstruction can also be found in the four pillars of the UNMIK struc-
ture. Despite being organized differently, these four areas were sufficiently covered by all 
involved international organizations.  
 
                                                 
69
  Original quote in German: “Eine tatsächliche Verbesserung der Wirtschaftslage trat nicht ein.” Translation 
made by the author. 
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5.5 Refugee Return to Kosovo 
Refugee return is one element of post-conflict reconstruction, which aims at restoring some 
sort of “normality” for the society and the state-society relationship. In particular, the return 
of refugees belonging to minority communities, which were also involved in the war that 
caused their displacement, should be enforced to enable a reconciliation process and a process 
of coming to terms with the past. Refugee returns can occur spontaneously or in an organized 
manner. Organized returns follow certain rules, which are determined by national and interna-
tional stakeholders. In the following chapter, the author presents the institutional framework 
conditions, the main documents, with a special focus on the Strategy for Communities and 
Return, enabling the return of refugees, and typical circumstances of the return of a refugee to 
Kosovo. 
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Steering Group
Functions: Policy Guidance Body 
for reviewing the return process, 
support the CRM, and ensure 
inter-ministerial coordination.
Composition: Composed of all 
relevant ministries in the return 
process, the KP, UNDP, UNMIK, 
UNHCR, KFOR, OSCE.
International 
Stakeholders
UNHCR
 Capacity building
 Supervision of 
return related 
activities
 Collect, maintain, 
and disseminate 
relevant 
information and 
statistics
Kosovo National  
Institutions
MCR
Coordination role to 
ensure a proper and 
timely implementation 
of the policies
UNMIK
Develop and monitor
return policies and 
guidance for the 
Kosovar institutions
UNDP
Responsible for the 
management of the 
SPARK IR Facility.
Central Review Mechanism
Functions: responsible for the 
review of Municipal Return 
Strategies and all voluntary 
return projects.
Composition: Chaired by 
MCR.
Local Institutions Municipal Offices for 
Communities and Returns
 Assessing the needs of 
returnees
 Conducting outreach activities
 Facilitating access to public 
services
 Providing returnees with 
information on their rights
5.5.1 Responsible Stakeholders 
Voluntary returns are managed by local institutions, notably the Ministry for Communities 
and Return (MCR), and supervised by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). (Cf. OSCE 2012b: 5) All stakeholders, which are responsible for the successful 
management of the return process of members of minority communities in Kosovo, are illus-
trated in the following figure. Subsequently, each of the relevant stakeholders illustrated in the 
figure, their role, and their competencies will be explained individually. 
Figure 16: Structure of Return-related Stakeholders 
Source:  Own illustration, updated version of OSCE (2007): Minority returns, p. 17. 
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The Steering Group and the Central Review Mechanism 
The two most important organs, which were created, are the Steering Group and the Central 
Review Mechanism. The Steering Group is a “… policy guidance body that reviews the return 
process and related policies, from a macro and multi-sectoral perspective.” (IOM 2008: 75) 
Beyond that, the group is responsible for reviewing whether or not the general guidelines on 
return are adhered to. Furthermore, it combines all relevant ministries in the return process 
and ensures an inter-ministerial co-operation. 
The Steering Group controls and supports the Central Review Mechanism, which in turn, 
must report back to the Steering Group. The mechanism is responsible for the control of all 
return projects and the Municipal Return Strategies, implemented by the Municipal Offices 
for Communities and Returns (MOCRs). In addition, this body takes account of the relation-
ship to the donor community. (Cf. UNMIK 2006: 17ff.; IOM 2008: 77ff.) 
 
Municipal Offices for Communities and Returns (MOCR) 
Since the municipalities are supposed to have the best and the most direct access to the re-
turnees and the receiving community, they play a major role in the organization and imple-
mentation of return projects, the provision of information to returnees, and small-scale infra-
structure projects aimed at improving the returnees’ living conditions. The MOCRs replace 
the former Municipal Return Officers (MROs) and are responsible for: 
 assessing the needs of the returnees and the repatriated persons, 
 conducting outreach activities, 
 facilitating the access to public services, 
 developing, implementing, and monitoring projects and activities for the protection of the 
rights of the communities, the returnees, and the repatriated persons, and 
 providing the returnees with information about their rights and available support struc-
tures and assistance. (Cf. OSCE 2012b: 9) 
“The MOCR Regulation is a comparatively recent development and its full and effective im-
plementation is still some way off.” (OSCE 2012b: 10) Out of the five municipalities, which 
were analyzed by the OSCE in 2012, three did not implement the MOCR regulations yet.
70
 
However, unlike their predecessors – the MROs –, the MOCRs have significant advantages, 
such as the provision with comprehensive guidance for their operation, including harmonized 
terms of reference and job descriptions, and regional outreach activities by central institutions 
for awareness raising among the MOCR staff. (Cf. OSCE 2012b: 10)  
 
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
UNMIK was mainly involved in the return process through the Office of Returns and Com-
munities (ORC), which was operational until 2006. UNMIK’s main task within the return 
process was to develop and monitor return policies and guidance for the Kosovar institutions. 
As the legitimate legislative and executive power in Kosovo, UNMIK was responsible for 
                                                 
70
  In August 2012, MOCRs have not been established in the municipalities of Junik, Malishevë/Mališevo and 
Mamuşa/Mamushë/Mamuša. (Cf. OSCE 2012b: 11) 
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training the Kosovar institutions to fulfill their tasks. UNMIK set three key guiding principles 
for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo:  
(1) The refugees’ individual rights need to be protected, an equal access to public services 
needs to be guaranteed, and freedom of movement ensured, 
(2) the return to the place of origin should receive priority, and 
(3) “… there can be no political or other conditionalities placed on return by receiving com-
munities.” (ICG 2002: 26) 
In 2005, the Ministry for Communities and Return resumed the tasks and responsibilities of 
the ORC. 
 
Ministry for Communities and Return (MCR)
71
 
The MCR is responsible for the development of policies and the promotion of the application 
of legal regulations for the promotion and protection of community rights, including the right 
to return. It further promotes the establishment of favorable conditions for returns and pro-
vides access based on rights. In addition, the MCR ensures guidelines for confidence building 
and reconciliation. It “… enables sustainable return of displaced persons and refugees …” 
(MCR 2009: 7). Moreover, it protects community rights and the interests of returnees, includ-
ing freedom of movement, language use, and freedom of expression, representation, educa-
tion, employment, equal access to the judiciary, housing, and public utility services. (Cf. 
MCR 2009: 6f.)  
 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
The UNHCR is dedicated to the supervision of the return process. It was originally integrated 
into the UNMIK structure, within the first pillar, but excluded in 2001. UNHCR coordinates 
go-and-see and go-and-inform visits of refugees and the receiving community
72
 to prepare 
voluntary returns and to facilitate the relations between the receiving and the returning com-
munity. It further provides spontaneous returnees with humanitarian assistance, such as food 
and non-food assistance packages. The UNHCR possesses offices in all neighboring countries 
to provide information to the displaced persons abroad and to facilitate their return, including 
the bureaucratic processes between the host countries and Kosovo. (Cf. UNMIK 2006: 22)  
 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
The UNDP supports the long-term rehabilitation and recovery of the IDPs and the returnees 
through housing assistance, socio-economic support, and community development. It further 
organizes and implements housing reconstruction projects. (Cf. UNMIK 2006: 24) 
 
*** 
Since 1999, there are several hundreds of governmental and non-governmental organizations 
that help reconstructing the war-torn territory of Kosovo. The same is true for the little area of 
refugee return – the previously mentioned institutions are complemented by several non-
                                                 
71
  The fact that one single ministry is dedicated to the rights and interests of communities and returnees high-
lights the relevance of minority returns to Kosovo. 
72
  Please find the definition of go-and-see and go-and-inform visits in Chapter 5.5.3.1. 
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governmental organizations such as the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) or the Civil Rights 
Program-Kosovo (CRP/K). There is a significant danger that too many stakeholders in the 
return process can be cumbersome towards sustainable conditions and integration prospects if 
responsibilities are not clearly defined and the communication between international donors, 
the Ministry, and municipal stakeholders is not well organized. In addition, it is of utmost 
importance that financial means are allocated wisely and not spread too thinly.  
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5.5.2 The Strategy for Communities and Returns (2009-2013) 
The primary source calling upon the indispensable necessity of all refugees and displaced 
persons belonging to minority communities to return to their homes is the UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1244 (1999). Apart from that, the 2006 Protocol on Voluntary and Sustainable 
Return
73
, the Revised Manual on Sustainable Return, and the Strategy for Communities and 
Returns (2009-2013) provide substantial guidelines to the successful organization and imple-
mentation of returns processes to Kosovo. The thesis at hand basically explains the Strategy 
for Communities and Returns (2009-2013) in detail because it is the newest policy guideline 
on refugee return.  
 
Interestingly, this strategy begins with a thorough SWOT Analysis on communities, returns, 
and the position of the Ministry for Communities and Return (MCR), the author thereof. The 
next figure
74
 illustrates the main results of this analysis. 
Table 7:  Shortened SWOT Analysis of Communities, Returns, and the MCR’s Position 
Source:  MCR (2009): Strategy for Communities and Returns (2009-2013), p. 7f. 
                                                 
73
  The Protocol on Voluntary and Sustainable Return is the tripartite agreement between UNMIK, the PISG, 
and the Government of Serbia on the return of refugees from Serbia proper to Kosovo. Please download the 
full document here: http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/5991 
01B6A5D50CB1C1257225005D45D9/$file/Protocol+on+return+Serbia+2006.pdf, last retrieved on 
23.11.2013. 
74
  Bold words show the most relevant results from the SWOT analysis.  
Strengths
 Good co-operation with domestic and 
international institutions,
 Possession of information on the 
return process to Kosovo, and
 Decentralization.
Opportunities
 Stabilization of communities through 
MCR projects and
 Increased number of sustainable 
returns.
Weaknesses
 Insufficient measures for the 
advancement of sustainability and 
reintegration of returnees,
 Inability to return for displaced 
persons and refugees,
 Insufficient readiness for cooperation 
from some municipalities,
 Access to legal services.
Threats
 Increased unemployment rate,
 Decrease of funds, and
 Long period of time for return 
implementation.
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It is striking that two of the most important weaknesses identified by the MCR are the inabil-
ity to return for displaced persons and refugees and insufficient measures for the advancement 
of the sustainability
75
 and integration of returnees. The MCR argues that: “Thus, out of a po-
tential total figure of 250,000 no institution responsible can claim any particular success in 
the minority communities’ returns process.” (Emphasis added, MCR 2009: 14) For this rea-
son, the strategy aims at reaching the following three goals to realize their main vision “… to 
contribute towards the development of a multi ethnic prosperous, democratic society with 
equal opportunities” (MCR 2009: 10). 
(1) Through this strategy, the MCR aims at strengthening all communities in Kosovo, in par-
ticular through social participation and access to all public services.  
(2) At the core of this strategy is the goal to realize sustainable returns of displaced persons 
and refugees through ensuring adequate conditions in the place of return, which are favor-
able to sustainability and integration.  
(3) The strategy further envisages the support for economic development of communities as 
the main precondition for the well-being of all communities and returnees.  
 
This results in five priority areas: 
(1) The establishment of an improved and simplified mechanism for returns.  
(2) The introduction of a new mechanism for return and information about the conditions in 
Kosovo communicated to displaced persons and potential returnees. 
(3) All housing and assistance for returns is delivered to the accepted standards. This includes 
the reconstruction of houses and the construction of new dwellings.
76
 
(4) The provision of priority for the returns to urban areas: This priority should not be dealt 
with as contrary to the right to return to the place of origin but rather as a preferable op-
tion because urban areas often provide better infrastructure in terms of schools, health care 
institutions, and employment opportunities.  
(5) The provision of support mechanisms for IDPs and IIDPs77 who wish to return to their 
place of origin where their property is located. This included the closure of all collective 
centers in Kosovo. 
 
Despite or just because of these ambitious goals, there has not been any significant progress: 
There is no increase in return figures and the return process itself is not any more sustainable 
than before. The Ministry for Communities and Return is not capable of fulfilling its task. 
                                                 
75
  The MCR equalizes sustainable return with durable return: “The research also found that individual return is 
the most sustainable return: 94.0% of individual returnees still live in places they have returned back.” (Em-
phasis added, MCR 2009: 14) Furthermore, it does not refer to sustainable livelihoods or integration as major 
aspects of sustainable return. 
76
  The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights provides in its General Comment No. 4 on the 
Right to Adequate Housing (1991) a checklist including seven criteria for adequate housing: security of ten-
ure, habitability, affordability, accessibility, availability of materials, location, and cultural adequacy. (Cf. 
Leckie 2003: 33) 
77
  Some stakeholders or scholars define Kosovars displaced in Serbia as “IDPs” because Kosovo technically 
belongs to Serbia and they define Kosovars displaced within Kosovo “IIDPs”, which stands for Internal In-
ternally Displaced People. The latter abbreviation mainly exists to make a difference between the displace-
ment to Serbia proper and within Kosovo despite belonging to the same internationally recognized state, 
which is the Republic of Serbia.  
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5.5.3 A Sample Return Process to Kosovo 
This subchapter shows a sample return process to Kosovo according to the previously men-
tioned three dimensions of international assistance. These dimensions can be transferred to the 
general course of action of an organized returns process to Kosovo. The first dimension refers 
to the logistics of the return, including go-and-see and go-and-inform visits organized by the 
UNHCR, and the physical relocation to the home country. The second dimension encom-
passes the direct assistance upon arrival, including temporary shelter, financial aid, and food 
and non-food packages. The third dimension refers to the long-term integration of returnees 
into the society.  
 
The long-term integration into the society largely depends on the geographical location of the 
return. In Kosovo, integration projects are often confined to a certain municipality or to a spe-
cific community. Consequently, long-term integration into the society is supported by several 
limited projects, which cannot be dealt with comprehensively in this chapter. 
 
5.5.3.1 Logistics of an Organized Return to Kosovo 
In a first step, UNHCR needs to identify the refugees and the Internally Displaced Persons, 
who wish to return.9 
 It is necessary to discuss the wish to return thoroughly with the refugees because some just 
intend to sell their house after their return, take the money, and re-emigrate again.  
“Indeed … many refugees and IDPs have chosen not to return after regaining their 
properties; instead, they sell them, rent them, or use them only as a summer home.” 
(Black, Eastmond, Gent 2006: 10)  
This practice is contrary to the goal of the return process, determined to integrate refugees 
into their home territory, to rebuild the country together with them, and to attach them to their 
home.
 78
 In conclusion, the conversations with refugees must be done very carefully to figure 
out what are their exact motives and to avoid the difficulty outlined above. Subsequently, the 
refugees and the IDPs, who wish to return, have to be informed very carefully about the cur-
rent situation in their municipality at home. Since 1999, the UNHCR organizes regular go-
and-see and go-and-inform visits for displaced persons.  
In a go-and-inform visit, local decision makers travel from their home country to the host 
country to speak with the refugees about a possible return and to inform them about the cur-
rent situation in the home country. In a go-and-see visit, the refugees themselves have the 
opportunity to travel for a short time to their home in order to “… facilitate interaction be-
tween returnees and new communities and discuss with receiving communities …” (UNHCR 
2004a: Four-19). Through these visits, the refugees can assess the security situation, evaluate 
their property, and talk with their former neighbors and their relatives. Both visits are crucial 
for the refugees to be properly informed and to prepare for their return. 
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  However, each person is free to do with their property what they want. Accordingly, neither a state, an inter-
national governmental, nor a non-governmental institution can prevent a returnee from selling their property. 
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The route for relocation has to be chosen carefully. In Kosovo, the return most likely occurs 
via bus from the neighboring countries or via airplane from Western European countries.
79
 
Since there are no acts of war anymore, returnees do not need a military escort on their way to 
Kosovo.  
 
5.5.3.2 Direct Assistance upon Arrival 
If the returnees arrive at their home, a first humanitarian assistance is necessary to enable 
them to enter into their new life. This primarily involves the provision of a shelter if the re-
turnees have no home ownership and cannot stay with their relatives. The Ministry of Labour 
and Social Work (MLSW) provides these returnees with a temporary shelter for a maximum 
of seven days. In addition, employees of the MLSW work at the Prishtinë/Priština Airport to 
interview the returnees. If the returnee still has no place to go to after the seven days in the 
temporary shelter, the municipal social welfare authority is responsible for finding a proper 
solution for them. (Cf. Caritas International 2010: 59)  
Furthermore, the returnees need food and non-food packages to start their lives in Kosovo. 
These packages are often provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the 
Danish Refugee Council (DRC): 
“Upon return in Kosovo, mandatory returnees are offered a return package, based on the 
needs of the individual family, containing food and non-food items such as basic tools, 
firewood and furniture. The reintegration support provided by DRC also includes in-
come generation activities, support for reconstruction of housing, special language train-
ing for children and support in accessing local authorities.” (DRC 2008: 23) 
Precisely this first humanitarian aid needs to be considered two-sided: On the one hand, it is 
imperative to ensure that the returnees have a chance to survive when they return. On the oth-
er hand, this aid should not lead to a lasting dependency on humanitarian assistance. Conse-
quently, humanitarian aid must be regulated and limited to a certain time. (Cf. EC 2002: 248; 
Harrell-Bond 1989: 57) 
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  The return can occur by land through the following border points: three official border crossing points be-
tween Kosovo and the Republic of Albania, two between Kosovo and Macedonia, and five between Kosovo 
and the Republic of Serbia. For further information on the border crossing points please see Caritas Interna-
tional (2010): Country Sheet Kosovo, p. 17f. 
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6. The Communities of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians 
6.1 Introduction: The Communities 
6.1.1 RAE: One Community or Several Communities? 
In most reports, analyses, and even laws, the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians are de-
fined as one single community, which is abbreviated by RAE. In this chapter, the Roma, the 
Ashkali, and the Egyptians are introduced, and the question of whether they belong to one 
single community or several communities is answered. Therein, it is essential to distinguish 
between the external perspective “How are they perceived from other communities and stake-
holders in Kosovo?” and the internal perspective “How do they designate themselves?”. 
 
The Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians do not have a historic homeland. Instead, they cre-
ated an identity with an origin, history, and features distinguishing them from other communi-
ties and from each other. What all three communities have in common is their gypsy origin, 
which is mostly expressed by common symbols like the gypsy flag and the national anthem. 
In contrast, the Romani language – as usually argued – does not have this uniting character for 
the gypsy people in Kosovo. (Cf. Balcer 2007: 249) Rather, the Roma, the Ashkali, and the 
Egyptians speak different languages. The Roma speak a Serbian dialect whereas the Ashkali 
and the Egyptians use Albanian as their native language. The term “gypsy” is used by others 
whereas the term “Roma” or “Rroma” is used for the self-designation of communities with 
gypsy origin. (Cf. Lichnofsky 2009: 13f.)  
 
There are three subgroups of gypsies, who arrived in two main waves in the contemporary 
territory of Kosovo: 
(1) The Arlije have a close relation to the Arlii in Bulgaria, South Serbia, and Macedonia. 
They speak a South Balkan dialect and are Muslims. 
(2) The Gurbeti came to Kosovo in the 17th and 18th century fleeing from slavery in the Wal-
lachia (Romania). They are related to the Serbian and Bosnian Gurbeti and are called 
Džambasi (Turkish: horse trader). 
(3) The Burgudži speak a North Balkan dialect of Romani and were by the majority black-
smiths. They are also called Kovači (Serbian: black smith). 
Some scholars differentiate a fourth group, namely the Đorgovci who speak Serbian, have the 
Christian-orthodox religion, and are also called Srpski Cigani (Serbian: Serbian gypsies). (Cf. 
Lichnofsky 2009: 9f.) Albanian names for communities of gypsy origin are magjupi describ-
ing settled gypsies and gabeli for nomads with gypsy origin. In Serbian, gypsies are called 
cigani.  
 
Before the war in 1999, most of the communities with gypsy origin lived in urban neighbor-
hoods or in rural areas living from farming. (Cf. Mattern 2005: 3) There, they had a relatively 
good standard of living with a high degree of settledness. After Slobodan Milošević became 
President of the Republic of Yugoslavia, the situation of gypsies in Kosovo deteriorated. (Cf. 
Mattern 2005: 3) Due to the numerous changes of power positions within the territory of Ko-
sovo and the difficult circumstances for non-majority communities, minorities were forced to 
change their identities – ranging from identifying themselves with the majority community to 
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the creation of new minority identities distancing themselves from others. (Cf. Lichnofsky 
2009: 5f., Lichnofsky 2011: 26f.) This process is called “switching identities” and is very typ-
ical for the RAE communities in Kosovo. In particular, the creation of the Ashkali community 
at the end of the 1990s is one product of the precedent political tensions. Ever since, the Ro-
ma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians understood themselves to be distinct communities. This is 
shown by several differences, mainly between the Roma on the one hand and the Ashkali and 
the Egyptians on the other.  
 
One feature consulted to exemplify the distinctiveness of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the 
Egyptians is settledness
80
. It is believed that the Ashkali and the Egyptians are more settled 
than the Roma. (Cf. Lichnofsky 2009: 13) However, recent research shows that this assump-
tion is not always sound. Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians can be settled persons and nomads as 
well depending on their social and economic background. Thelen describes the economic rea-
sons for being a nomad or for settling down as follows:  
“In densely populated areas where a craftsman was likely to find many potential cus-
tomers, it may have made sense to settle down permanently … In a sparsely populated 
region customers would have been scattered over a wide area, so that it appeared wiser 
to travel around to where the customers lived. This form of economic activity is called 
service nomadism.” (Thelen 2005: 14) 
One of the most consulted characteristic for the differentiation between the three communities 
is language affiliation. Groups of gypsy origin can be distinguished by their language which 
they adopted from the language of the majority community in their neighboring region. (Cf. 
Lichnofsky 2009: 15f.) In Kosovo, the Roma mostly speak Serbian, whereas the Ashkali and 
the Egyptians speak Albanian. The Ashkali were gypsies, who settled in the region of Prizren 
and adopted the language and the religion from their Albanian neighbors.  
The differences and the related different identification are historically and politically justifia-
ble, too. During the political tensions in the 1990s, the Roma were blamed for their collabora-
tion with the Serbs “… because some Roma … have taken positions from dismissed Albani-
ans in state institutions from 1989 on and it is rumored that Roma participated in the looting 
on the Serbian side.”81 (Lichnofsky 2009: 22) Based on this perception as well as the linguis-
tic and religious affiliation, it can be claimed that the Roma are closer to the Serbs, and the 
Ashkali and the Egyptians closer to the Albanians. This is supported by the fact that the Roma 
took classes in the Serbian schools, whereas the Ashkali and the Egyptians participated in the 
Albanian parallel school system in the 1990s. (Cf. Lichnofsky 2011: 25) This perception, de-
rived from the positions during the war, continues until today. 
 
The question of self-designation is difficult, especially due to the “switching identities” and 
the creation of new identities in the 1990s. Above all, the self-designation of the RAE often 
depends on the context. When it comes to the employment, for instance, minorities have to be 
employed to fulfill a minority quota. Thus, even Albanians often declare themselves belong-
                                                 
80
  Settledness always played an important role in the characterization of gypsies. This is illustrated in the sym-
bol of the wheel on the international flag of the Roma. (Cf. Lichnofsky 2009: 13) 
81
  Original quote in German: “… da einige Roma … ab 1989 Positionen von entlassenen Albanern in staatli-
chen Institutionen übernommen hatten und sich gerüchteweise Roma an Plünderungen auf serbischer Seite 
beteiligt haben.” Translation by the author. 
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ing to an ethnic minority in order to get a permanent job. In addition, the self-designation also 
depends on the respondent person. Lichnofsky explains that if, for example, the interviewer is 
presented as being interested in the Roma in the North of Kosovo, a self-designation, as Roma 
seems more possible. (Cf. Lichnofsky 2011: 28) Lichnofsky aptly summarizes: 
“The question of whether one is defined as Bunjevac or Croat, Vlache or Romanian in 
Vojvodina, between Bosniaks or Goranis, or Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo, de-
pends on strategic considerations, places of residence, and identification opportunities 
rather than cultural differences.”82 (Lichnofsky 2012: 69) 
Furthermore, even within the groups, “… the question of whether all the three group designa-
tions are authorized and who belongs to which group is not clear”83 (Lichnofsky 2011: 27). 
Lichnofsky exemplifies these difficulties of self-designation by commenting on several situa-
tions where residents themselves did not possess a clear ethnic identification and sometimes 
even switched from one to the other within weeks or even days.
84
 
 
Legally, the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians each have a constitutional status as com-
munities, including one guaranteed seat each in the parliament. (Cf. Lichnofsky 2011: 30) 
Mattern argues that all three terms – Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian – have become a social and 
political reality. (Cf. Mattern 2005: 4) However, researchers’ hands are tied due to the availa-
ble figures for these communities. In 1991, when the last census was implemented in Kosovo, 
there was no distinction between the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians. At that time, the 
Ashkali did not exist as an own community yet and were hence subsumed under the catego-
ries “Roma,” “Albanian,” or “others.” The Egyptians, however, designated themselves as 
Egyptians but did not have an own category in the census accepted by the government of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Admittedly, most data used in social sciences is 
either based on this census or compares figures with those of 1991.  
 
The public perception of the RAE is – apart from the virtual differences between the three 
communities and their ambitions to act as three different communities – influenced by their 
common gypsy origin. The “… Albanian population does not distinguish between the Roma, 
the Ashkali and the Egyptians and all three groups are perceived as collaborators.”85 (Lich-
nofsky 2011: 23) This is supported by the fact that the ability to speak the Albanian language 
and the proximity of the Ashkali and the Egyptians to the Albanians did not help them in the 
1990s. They were, to the same extent as the Roma, expelled from their neighborhoods. (Cf. 
Mattern 2005: 4) 
 
                                                 
82 
 Original quote from German: “Auch die Frage, ob man sich als Bunjevac oder Kroate, Vlache oder Rumäne 
in der Vojvodina definiert oder zwischen Bosniaken oder Goranern, zwischen Serben oder Montenegrinern 
im Kosovo entscheidet, dürfte von strategischen Überlegungen, Wohnorten und Identifizierungsangeboten 
statt von kulturellen Unterschieden abhängen.“ Translation by the author. 
83
  Original quote from German: “… die Frage, ob alle drei Gruppenbezeichnungen eine Berechtigung haben 
und wer zu welcher Gruppe gehört, nicht geklärt.” Translation by the author. 
84
  Please see Lichnofsky, Claudia (2011): Ashkali – nur ein anderer Name für Ägypter? In: Tsiganologische 
Mitteilungen 12, p. 27f. for particular examples. 
85 
 Original quote from German: “In der albanischen Bevölkerung wird eine Unterscheidung von Roma, Ashkali 
und Ägyptern jedoch nicht vorgenommen und alle drei Gruppen als Kollaborateure wahrgenommen.” Trans-
lation by the author. 
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Summarizing this introductory chapter on the communities of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the 
Egyptians, gypsies are defined as the “… most disunited and ill-defined people, possessing a 
continuity, rather than a community … .” (Acton 1974: 54)  
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6.1.2 The Roma in Kosovo 
The Roma in Kosovo are believed to originate from India and migrated between the 8
th
 and 
10
th
 centuries to the European area. Their settlement in Kosovo took place in the 14
th
 century. 
Their native language is Romani, but most of the Roma living in Kosovo today also speak 
Serbian and some of them even Albanian.  
It is estimated that in 1991, more than 150,000 Kosovars belonged to the Roma, the Ashkali, 
and the Egyptian communities, but no reliable data is available. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 188) Before 
the conflict in 1999, many Roma lived in multi-ethnic settlements or in neighborhoods inhab-
ited by Roma only. During the conflict and the March 2004 riots, these were often destroyed 
or severely damaged: “… [O]nly few projects contributed to their complete or partial recon-
struction.” (OSCE 2010: 188) The conflict forced most Roma to leave their homes and settle 
down in other regions in Kosovo or to flee to countries in Western Europe and the Balkans.  
Researchers estimate that there are around 15,000 Roma living in Kosovo today. (Cf. OSCE 
2010: 188) By the majority, they live in the North of Kosovo, where the security situation has 
deteriorated since July 2011. In addition, they populate all regions throughout Kosovo but 
main agglomerations are in the municipalities of Pejë/Peć, Deçan/Dečani, Gjakovë/Đakovica, 
Istok/Istog, Klinë/Klina, Rahovac/Orahovac, Suharekë/Suva Reka, and the northern and cen-
tral part of Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje.  
Figure 17:  Main Agglomerations of the RAE in Kosovo (2005
86
) 
Source:  http://theredphoenix.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/kosovo_roma.png, last retrieved on 26.12.2013. 
                                                 
86
  Despite the fact that this map is from 2005, the Roma’s main agglomerations are still the same. 
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6.1.3 The Distinction between the Ashkali and the Egyptians 
This chapter aims at carving out who the Ashkali and the Egyptians in Kosovo are, how they 
define themselves, and what their specific characteristics are. 
 
The Ashkali are the newest minority in Kosovo. This is why they have never been included in 
any census so far. Hence, there is no correct data on their figures; estimations according to 
their self-designation are made (e.g. by the OSCE), although self-designations are often in-
consistent among the members of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptian communities. (Cf. 
Marušiakova et al. 2001: 23) Ashkali have a non-Romani, non-Egyptian, and non-Albanian 
identity although they share some common features with all three communities in Kosovo. It 
is worth noting that “[t]he Ashkali insisted on receiving a place in governing bodies. Over a 
relatively short period of time, the Ashkali succeed in establishing their own organizations, 
such as a political party … .” (Marušiakova et al. 2001: 24)  
Until the 1990s, one cannot speak of a distinctive Ashkali community. Their ethnic identifica-
tion evolved around the times of conflict when the Tito regime in Yugoslavia ended and eth-
nic cleansing dominated the political landscape in Kosovo.  
“With the gradual development of the Kosovo ‘parallel system’ in the 1990’s [sic], the 
Romani, Egyptian, Ashkali and other related communities were caught in a gap between 
the (Albanian) power of numbers and the (Serb) power of government, which left hardly 
any choice for them but opting for one of the two societies.” (Marušiakova et al. 2001: 
28)  
The Ashkali chose the side of the Albanians and often even designated themselves as Albani-
ans.
87
 Due to the choice they made, the Ashkali were expulsed from their office by the Serbi-
an authorities and were often even forced to leave Kosovo. The Albanians, however, did not 
integrate the Ashkali into their parallel system. The Ashkali thus became isolated from both 
systems. In conclusion, “[a]ll these factors contributed to deep transformations among Roma, 
Ashkali and Egyptians. The development of Ashkali identity was the most important phe-
nomenon.” (Balcer 2007: 259) 
 
Creating new identities often involves “rediscovering” ancient roots. (Cf. Marušiakova et al. 
2001: 5) Since 1990, there are several efforts to track the Ashkali roots to other countries be-
cause “[t]hose who are declared as strangers because of their darker skin and do not count as 
indigenous despite their presence for centuries, are in greater pressure to point to an origin 
outside of the territory of Kosovo and South Eastern Europe.”88 (Lichnofsky 2012: 68)89  
The most common explanation for the existence of the Ashkali in Kosovo is the idea that they 
came from Iran and arrived in the Balkans in the 4
th
 century. Consequently, they would have 
                                                 
87
  This process is called “ethnic mimicry”: Ethnic mimicry is understood as the hiding of ethnic minorities 
behind other communities, usually the majority. (Cf. Marušiakova et al. 2001: 4) 
88
  Original quote from German: “Diejenigen, die aufgrund ihrer dunkleren Hautfarbe zu Fremden erklärt wer-
den und trotz ihrer jahrhundertelangen Präsenz nicht als autochthon gelten, sind stärker im Zugzwang, auf ei-
ne Herkunft außerhalb des kosovarischen und südosteuropäischen Territoriums zu verweisen.” Translation by 
the author. 
89
  Lichnofsky explains the efforts specifically made by Berat Qerimi to justify the Persian roots; please see 
Lichnofsky, Claudia (2012): Identifizierungsprozesse muslimischer Nicht-Albaner im Kosovo und ihre Stra-
tegien der politischen und sozialen Verortung seit 1999. Das Beispiel der Ashkali. In: Südosteuropäische 
Hefte 1(1), p. 64. 
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been the second oldest people in the Balkans, only the Illyrians were there before them. The 
Ashkali took the Illyrian’s language and the Illyrians took the religion of the Ashkali – the 
Islam. Marušiakova explains that the religion of Islam did not appear in the Balkans until the 
7
th
 century, which would effectively counter this ethnogenesis. (Cf. Marušiakova et al. 2001: 
24) Some Ashkali are looking for Persian words within the Albanian language to justify their 
origin from King Ashkan, who reigned in Parthia (today Iran) and fought against Alexander 
the Great around 300 BC. (Cf. Lichnofsky 2011: 20) However, historical testimonies for mi-
gration from Iran to the Balkans are very rare. (Cf. Balcer 2007: 251) 
The second ethnogenesis indicates that the Ashkali are colonists from ancient Rome, who 
came from Italy to Albania and this is why the Ashkali speak Albanian. (Cf. Marušiakova et 
al. 2001: 24) According to the third explanation, the Ashkali originated in the town Askalon 
in Biblical Palestine. (Cf. Marušiakova et al. 2001: 24) These two last explanations for the 
roots of the Ashkali outside of Kosovo are not further accounted for. The real genesis, on the 
contrary, happened in the city of Prizren where gypsies worked for the Albanian majority and 
adopted their language and customs. (Cf. Balcer 2007: 253) 
 
The closeness to the Albanian majority is predominant in many spheres. For instance, accord-
ing to linguists, the term “Ashkali” comes from the Albanian word eshkë/ashkë denoting the 
charcoal used by the Ashkali in blacksmith work. (Cf. Balcer 2007: 250) In addition, the Ash-
kali are often called and perceived as “albanized Roma”. (Cf. Lichnofsky 2012: 60) There are 
also voices that declare the Ashkali to be “the second hand of the Albanians,” sometimes even 
interpreted as being less worth than the Albanians or “second class Albanians.” (Cf. Lichnof-
sky 2012: 64) Apart from that, the Ashkali, the Albanians, and the Egyptians share the same 
belief, the same native language, and other cultural and social characteristics. The Egyptians 
and the Ashkali in particular are often subsumed under one category because they share 
common characteristics and are both perceived as gypsies. “Despite those similarities the 
most recent history of Kosovo decided on the construction of separate identities.” (Balcer 
2007: 260) The Ashkali dissociate themselves from the Egyptians due to several reasons. 
When one thinks about the Egyptians, various scholars, good networking, and the organiza-
tion of international conferences and round tables as well as civil society projects and well-
organized public relations come to one’s mind. Their advantage is the identification with the 
transnational category of Egypt. The Ashkali, on the other hand, are characterized by poor 
living conditions, poverty, the lack of school education, and discrimination. They only desig-
nate themselves with a local category of Kosovars in the East with a gypsy background. (Cf. 
Lichnofsky 2011: 21) The following figure summarizes the similarities and differences be-
tween the Egyptians and the Ashkali – identified by themselves and by outsiders. 
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The Egyptians The Ashkali
Common 
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GYPSIES
+ language
+ religion
Differences Between the Egyptians and the Ashkali
 Ethnogenesis:
Origin from ancient Egypt
 Main places of residence: 
Rrafshi I Dukagjini
(West of Kosovo)
 Qerim Abazi, leader of the 
Egyptian union, took part in 
the Rambouillet conference on 
the part of the Yugoslavian 
delegation 
= collaborator of the Serbs
 Egyptian population in 
Kosovo: 3,655
 Ethnogenesis: 
Origin from Iran / Persia
 Main places of residence: 
East of Kosovo
 Strong separation from the 
Kosovo-Serbs because of the 
war atrocities
 Greater pressure on Islam as 
an element of identification
 Ashkali population in 
Kosovo: 14,072
Figure 18: Differences and Similarities between Ashkali and Egyptians 
Source:  Own compilation 
“Both sides – Ashkali and Egyptians – accused each other of artificiality, a lack of root-
edness and historical proof confirming their ethnogeneses, opportunism and the division 
of one group.” (Balcer 2007: 251)  
Notably, the Ashkali have a political reason to separate their identity from the Egyptians: 
Qerim Abazi, the leader of the Egyptian Union, took part in the Rambouillet conference on 
the part of the Yugoslavian delegation. The Egyptians were hence perceived as collaborators 
of the Serbs. (Cf. Lichnofsky 2012: 63, 67) Much more concrete: “Ashkali define Egyptians 
as ‘Yugo-Egyptians’ – a product of President Solobodan Milosevic’s regime.” (Balcer 2007: 
250) The Ashkali did not participate in the conference at all. Nonetheless, it is worth noting 
that the Egyptians maintain a very clear distinction to the Albanians, which derives from the 
Serbian-Albanian conflict in the 1990s. The Egyptians gained a dominant position during this 
time because their activities were supported by the Serbian government. The Serbs had an 
interest in promoting a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo by strengthening the small minorities 
and weakening the position of the Albanians in the society.  
 
Since the 1970s, the Egyptians identify themselves as Egyptians claiming ancestry in ancient 
Egypt. The majority of the Egyptians resides in the western part of Kosovo. Their social and 
political relevance was noted when, in the 1991 census in Kosovo, “… the authorities agreed 
to introduce an Egyptian category for the first time.” (Balcer 2007: 256) In conclusion, the 
Egyptians have a stronger self-designation than the Ashkali. Whereas the Ashkali can only 
refer to Kosovars as members of their community, the Egyptians refer to their roots in Egypt 
– outside of the Western Balkans and even Europe which gives them a bigger dimension. As a 
consequence, the Ashkali have more difficulties explaining their historical roots. (Cf. Lich-
nofsky 2011: 30) 
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6.2 Displacement and the Return of the RAE to Kosovo 
6.2.1 The Three Waves of Displacement 
The Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians, as well as most other members of minority com-
munities and to some extent also the Albanians, left – either voluntarily or forcibly – their 
homes in Kosovo during one of the following stages.  
Figure 19:  Waves of Displacement of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians 
Source:  Own compilation 
The first displacement wave describes a voluntary decision of many Albanians, Roma, Ash-
kali, Egyptians, and other minorities to leave their homes during the 1980s and 1990s in 
search of employment opportunities and better life conditions. Then, they usually migrated to 
Western Europe and stayed there as a result of the poor economic conditions in Kosovo. (Cf. 
Balcer 2007: 257) In the majority of cases, these people fled with the intention to return as 
fast as the conditions in Kosovo would change and did not aim for staying there for decades. 
 
The first real refugee wave occurred during the NATO bombing from spring until summer 
1999. The Albanian population was expelled from Kosovo to Macedonia and Albania. In this 
wave, also many Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians fled from Kosovo to the neighboring coun-
tries. “When [in the summer of 1999] Albanians began to return to Kosovo, Roms, Egyptians 
and Ashkali, fearing for their safety, refused to return.” (Marušiakova et al. 2001: 29) In fact, 
instead of returning to Kosovo, even more members of the RAE communities started to leave 
the country towards Serbia proper, Macedonia, or Montenegro. Their displacement is rea-
soned by the role they played during the war and the perception of RAE as Serbian collabora-
tors. (Cf. Marušiakova et al. 2001: 29) The Humanitarian Law Center reports that the RAE 
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often had to loot Albanian houses, and “… had to give the more valuable stolen goods [to the 
Serbs] and were able to keep the food and clothing.”90 (Mattern 2005: 4) The Roma were the 
marionettes of the Serbs during the war in 1999. However, there were times when the Serbs 
believed that the RAE collaborated with the Albanians and started to threaten the RAE, too. 
The Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians were the losers of the war and, as Mattern summa-
rizes, “[t]he Roma communities have been victims of a conflict that was not theirs.”91 (Mat-
tern 2005: 5) This displacement wave was initiated by a comprehensive ethnic cleansing by 
the RAE communities, which occurred in the form of indirect and direct violence, the looting 
of homes, and the arson of houses and entire settlements such as the Roma Mahala
92
 in South 
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica.  
“In the months of September and October 1999, the procedure showed a systematic ap-
proach driven by the long-term aim to displace all Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians from 
Kosovo.”93 (Mattern 2005: 5) 
One example is the Moravska Mahala in the municipality of Prishtinë/Priština: The neighbor-
hood with roughly 10,000 Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians was totally wiped out. In the mean-
time, the Albanians started to build houses on the site of this former RAE neighborhood. (Cf. 
Laederich 2006: 7) 
 
The third wave of displacement took place in March 2004 when more than 4,000 Serbs, Ro-
ma, Ashkali, and Egyptians were forced to leave their homes in Kosovo during the ethnic ri-
ots. In addition to their displacement, they were murdered, and their houses, cultural, and reli-
gious buildings destroyed. (Cf. Mattern 2005: 6) 
 
Between 40,000 and 50,000 RAE, mostly Roma, fled to Serbia proper during the war at the 
end of the 1990s and the riots in 2004. According to Müller and Jovanović (2010: 22), only 
22,000 of them are officially registered as Internally Displaced Persons in Kosovo or Serbia 
proper.
94
 They often live in camps for displaced persons under inhumane conditions. For 
those who are registered as IDPs, the situation is slightly better because they can access public 
services such as social welfare, health care, and education. The ones not registered in Serbia 
do not have any rights in the country. They live in a parallel world without access to social 
                                                 
90
  Original quote in German: “mussten die Roma und Ashkali in der Regel die wertvolleren Güter abgeben und 
konnten gestohlenes Essen und Kleider behalten.” Translation made by the author. 
91
  Original quote in German: “Die Roma-Gemeinschaften wurden Opfer eines Konflikts, der nicht der ihre 
war.” Translation made by the author. 
92
  The term “mahala” is used in Romani, Serbian, and Albanian for settlement/neighborhood. 
93
  Original quote in German: “In den Monaten September und Oktober 1999 zeigte das Vorgehen eine Syste-
matik, nach der längerfristig gezielt alle Roma, Ashkali und ÄgypterInnen aus Kosovo vertrieben werden 
sollten.” Translation made by the author. 
94
  Displaced persons from Kosovo are classified as Internally Displaced Persons within the Republic of Serbia 
because Kosovo is not formally recognized as a state yet. Therefore, from an international public law per-
spective, Kosovo legally belongs to the Republic of Serbia and the border between them is an internal border, 
not a border between two states that would allow displaced persons to apply for asylum in another state. Until 
2006, the same legislation applied to Montenegro which formally belonged to the Republic of Serbia until its 
declaration of independence. 
The main disadvantage for displaced persons from Kosovo not being able to claim asylum is the fact that 
they are not internationally protected as refugees. Instead, their status as citizens under the protection of their 
state does not change. As a consequence, they are not eligible for special assistance, for instance by the Unit-
ed Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  
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services and without any integration prospects into the main society. Between 5,000 and 
10,000 RAE are registered as refugees in Montenegro. (Cf. Tmava, Beha 2009: 6; Müller, 
Jovanović 2010: 23) In addition, 2,000 are seeking refugee status in Macedonia and approxi-
mately 300 Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians live under a temporary protection regime in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. (Cf. Müller, Jovanović 2010: 23) 
Another some ten thousands RAE from Kosovo live in Western Europe. They live as migrant 
workers who came during the 1980s or 1990s, refugees, rejected asylum seekers, or unregis-
tered illegal immigrants who were often deported and then took illegal methods to find their 
way back into Western European countries. (Cf. Müller, Jovanović 2010: 23) The majority of 
those fleeing to Western Europe found their new home in Germany. 
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6.2.2 The Return of the RAE to Kosovo 
According to UNHCR statistics, the majority of the RAE refugees voluntarily
95
 returns from 
Serbia and from Montenegro. In total, between the end of the violent hostilities in 1999 and 
February 2013, 3,380 Roma and 6,606 Ashkali and Egyptians
96
 returned voluntarily to their 
homes in Kosovo. (Cf. UNHCR 2013: 4) These figures must be considered in relation to the 
total number of displaced persons. Because there are no accurate data of displaced persons of 
the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptian communities, the figures were calculated based on 
figures of the census in 1991 (Cf. OSCE 2010), current population estimations (Cf. OSCE 
2010) and OSCE municipal profile estimations
97
, and return figures (UNHCR February 2013) 
according to these formulas.  
Census 1991 – Current Estimations = Current Displaced Persons 
Current Displaced Persons + Returned Persons = Total Displaced Persons 
To calculate the return percentage, the number of total displaced persons is compared with the 
number of returned persons.  
           100 x Returned Persons 
          Total Displaced Persons 
The calculations for the RAE reveal the following picture: 
 
Roma Ashkali Egyptians 
Census 1991 
(OSCE 2010: 65ff., 141f., and 214ff.) 
45,864
 
14,754
98 
5,658
 
Total Displaced Persons 34,431 3,985 5,306 
Current Displaced Persons 31,051 682 2,003 
Returned Persons 
(UNHCR February 2013: 4) 
3,380 3,303
99 
3,303
 
Current Estimations
100
 
(OSCE 2010: 65ff., 141f., and 214ff.) 
14,813 14,072 3,655 
                                                 
95
  This chapter deals with the voluntary return of Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians to Kosovo. It does not include 
the forced return of RAE refugees from Western Europe. Within the scope of this dissertation, forced returns 
of RAE from Western Europe are defined as external factors influencing the return. Therefore, Chapter 6.6.2 
is devoted solely to the forced returns. 
96
  Please note that the figure refers to the return numbers for Ashkali and Egyptians together. 
97
  There is no accurate data for the Serbian municipalities of Leposavić/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok, and 
Zvečan/Zveçan, as well as the northern part of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica municipality. These figures are derived 
from the OSCE 2013 municipal profiles, which can be downloaded here: http://www.osce. org/kosovo/43753, 
last retrieved on 26.12.2013. 
98
  Please note that the 1991 census included Roma, but not Ashkali or Egyptian, as a community category and, 
as such, the given data may include Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities. It is also possible that some 
Ashkali and Egyptians were registered as beloning to different communities or under the category “others”. 
99
  Please note that this figure derives from the return numbers for Ashkali and Egyptians together. Due to a lack 
of separated date, this number was subsequently divided by two to generate return percentages for both 
communities separately. 
100
  The current estimations are calculated as the arithmetic average of the current municipal estimations, current 
communities’ estimations, OSCE 2009 municipal profile estimations, and current OSCE field teams estima-
tions. 
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Return Percentage 10.89 % 82.89 % 62.25 % 
Table 8:  Return and Displacement Figures of the RAE 
Source: Own compilation according to OSCE (2010) and UNHCR (February 2013) data 
This is compounded by the figures for the forcibly returned Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians 
from Western European countries that will be dealt with in Chapter 6.6.2 on Forced Returns 
from Western Europe. 
Forced Returned Persons 
(HRW 2010: 32) 
1,850 250 1,300 
Table 9: Figures for Forcibly Returned Persons 
Source:  Own compilation according to data from Human Rights Watch (2010: 32) 
The Roma were the largest of the three communities before the war in 1999: around 45,000 
Roma lived in Kosovo. A large proportion was displaced during 1999 and the March 2004 
riots. However, only around 11 % returned to Kosovo until February 2013. One major reason 
is the fact that many Roma neighborhoods were completely destroyed and abandoned by their 
former residents. Nowadays, these settlements are often occupied by Albanians such as the 
Dalmatinska neighborhoods in the capital of Prishtinë/Priština. The Roma lack the ability to 
repossess their property and often have to live in inappropriate housing conditions with rela-
tives and friends, they further lack civil registration documents preventing them from access-
ing the most basic public services, and have a general poor socio-economic status. 
On the contrary, the Ashkali and the Egyptians returned in larger parts to their homeland Ko-
sovo. Around 83 % of the displaced Ashkali and 62 % of the displaced Egyptians returned 
until February 2013. Although the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians share the majority of 
their daily challenges, the Ashkali and the Egyptians have one major advantage vis-à-vis the 
Kosovo Roma: Their native language is Albanian and they believe in the Islamic faith. For 
this reason, they maintain close relations to the majority Albanian community. Consequently, 
they have less fear of revenge from their Albanian neighbors.  
 
A temporal comparison displays that the return figures for all three communities have stag-
nated within the last few years. This can be explained by the time period that has passed since 
the end of the hostilities in 1999: “The longer the displacement, the less people will be willing 
to return.” (UNIJA-Union 2008: 33) The Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians are often bet-
ter integrated into their host societies than in Kosovo and, hence, do not consider returning to 
their homeland. 
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Variation of the RAE Return Figures in Comparison to the Total Return Figures
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Figure 20:  Variation of the RAE Return Figures in Comparison to the Total Return Figures 
Source:  Own compilation based on the data presented in UNHCR February 2013: 4 
Despite these general figures, it has to be noted that the RAE are often “…reluctant to return 
to areas where few, if any, RAE remain (particularly in Western Kosovo) because they fear 
becoming a social experiment … .” (HRW 2010: 26) Human Rights Watch explains that RAE 
fear being laboratory mice who have to undergo the experience of being isolated from the 
likes of them. This is why most returns of the RAE occurred to areas/neighborhoods, which 
are exclusively populated by the RAE leading to a situation where the RAE are excluded from 
the main society.  
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6.3 Challenges and Opportunities in their Return Process 
This chapter is based on the theoretical insight at the beginning of this dissertation where cri-
teria for sustainable refugee return are defined and their relevance as well as their value ex-
plained explicitly. The subsequent analysis aims at deconstructing the specific conditions of 
the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians in Kosovo, with a special focus on the particular 
challenges and opportunities of the RAE returnees upon their arrival in Kosovo such as the 
civil registration or the recognition of school certificates from abroad.  
 
The first three subchapters illustrate the challenges the RAE returnees face in Kosovo. Anoth-
er chapter elucidates the particularly devastating situation of RAE returnees and IDPs in the 
lead-contaminated camps in North Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. Their conditions have to be men-
tioned separately, because they are unique among all residents in Kosovo and illustrate their 
low status in the Kosovo society. The Chapter 6.5 picks up a great opportunity, namely the 
“Strategy on the Integration of Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians in Kosovo.” Unfortunately, this 
opportunity has not been used as was supposed.  
 
Other factors influencing the return of the RAE refugees are dealt with in the subsequent 
chapters. The first external factor influencing the decision on return is the role of gypsies in 
other European countries and in the Western Balkan countries in particular. Roma face the 
same challenges across European borders – whether they live in Kosovo or in the United 
Kingdom – they face discrimination and segregation, especially in the areas of housing, em-
ployment, and education. The reasons and background conditions for this hardship will be 
explained in the next chapter.  
The second external factor influencing the possibility of a sustainable integration of the RAE 
returnees into Kosovo’s society is the forced repatriation of these communities from Western 
European countries to Kosovo. Forcibly returned RAE cannot make an informed decision 
about their return and cannot balance between their current situation in the host country and 
the conditions awaiting them upon their arrival in Kosovo. Their specific situation and the 
consequences of forced returns from Western Europe to Kosovo are explained in Chapter 
6.6.2. 
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6.3.1 The RAE Return to Mono-ethnic Areas 
The answer to the question of where to return to is dependent on many factors. “According to 
UNHCR, only 30 to 40 % of the (forcibly) returning persons can effectively return to their 
place of origin.”101 (Kuthan 2012: 14) One of the main reasons for the geographical decision 
is the security situation and freedom of movement in any given region. In general, the security 
situation in Kosovo, including inter-ethnic violence, has improved within the last years. This 
is, admittedly, due to the circumstances described below: 
“The … country is basically ethnically cleansed. Many cities, town [sic], and villages 
are simply devoid of any traces of their pre-war Rroma population. This is for example 
the case in Prishtina, one of the most obvious examples where the quarter in which 
Rroma had their houses was razed after the war and is now being re-settled by ethnic 
Albanians. And if there are no minorities, how can there be any attacks against them?” 
(Emphasis added, Laederich 2006: 3) 
As a consequence, there are only a few areas where the RAE and the majority or other minori-
ty communities hit each other. In these areas, threats, intimidation, and harassment as well as 
smaller incidents against the RAE are still persistent.
102
 (Cf. Mattern 2005: 6; Cf. Tmava, 
Beha 2009: 20) Among minority communities, especially the Serbs and the Roma, there is a 
permanent fear of revenge and of a repetition of the displacement that occurred in 1999 and in 
2004.  
 
There is a powerful gap between the official security image in Kosovo and the perceived inse-
curity experienced by the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians. The official security image, 
as stated above, is characterized by few ethnically motivated incidents. Dünnwald summarizes 
that “… continual and ever-present immediate threat of life and limb just because of ethnicity 
cannot be generally declared.”103 (Dünnwald 2009: 20) Yet, members of the RAE communi-
ties feel insecure, particularly outside of their neighborhoods. Examples include a renewed 
wave of attacks and harassment targeting the RAE communities: For instance, there was a 
reported physical assault of a Roma by the ethnic Albanians in Gjilan/Gnjilane and 20 Roma 
families were verbally and physically assaulted in the Halit Ibishi neighborhood in the town 
of Ferizaj/Uroševac. Although Human Rights Watch has observed an increase of police pa-
trols in both regions following the incidents, no arrests have been reported which exacerbates 
their feeling of insecurity and powerlessness. (Cf. HRW 2009a: 1) 
 
Furthermore, the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians mistrust the Albanian police officers 
and are afraid of repercussions and do not want to report incidents, even severe assaults, or 
rapes. On top of that, the police officers often do not take the incidents seriously. (Cf. Dünn-
wald 2009: 20f.) In addition to this fear, the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians are un-
derrepresented in the Kosovo police and in the Kosovo Municipal Councils on Safety in 
                                                 
101
 Original quote in French : “Selon l’UNHCR, seuls 30 à 40 % des personnes renvoyées (de force) peut effec-
tivement rentrer dans son lieu d’origine.” Translation by the author.  
102
  For an exemplary list of incidents against the Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian communities, please see Kuthan 
2012: 17. 
103
  Original quote in German: “Insbesondere ist eine jederzeitige und allgegenwärtige akute Gefährdung von 
Leib und Leben nur aufgrund der ethnischen Zugehörigkeit pauschal nicht mehr festzustellen.” Translation 
by the author. 
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Communities. Because of these reasons, the dark figure of crimes against the RAE, including 
ethnically motivated incidents, is estimated to be much higher than the reported figure.  
Admittedly, there is a clear correlation between municipal responses and the communities’ 
perceptions of their security: Where the municipality responded to serious security incidents, 
the affected community reported that their perception of security improved.
104
 (Cf. OSCE 
2011a: 26f.) 
 
The Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians often do not even have the heart to leave their di-
rect neighborhood: “Most persons with whom we spoke … described a situation of numerous 
invisible barriers which RAE are afraid to cross: people do not leave their neighbourhoods in 
the dark; do not travel alone; fear of retaliation deters many from reporting human rights vio-
lations cases to police or other authorities.” (ERRC 2005: 46; cf. Tmava, Beha 2009: 11) This 
situation is exacerbated when the minority community lives in a heavily majority-populated 
area. The Roma living in Albanian dominated areas and the Ashkali and the Egyptians living 
in areas dominated by the Serbs feel exceedingly insecure and hesitate leaving their safe 
neighborhoods, in which they are surrounded by like-minded people. If freedom of movement 
is compromised, as it is the case in several RAE-populated areas, this jeopardizes other hu-
man rights such as the access to health care and education. (Cf. OSCE 2011a: 5)  
In general, freedom of movement is still severely restricted for the RAE communities. For 
example, most of them fear going to the city of Prishtinë/Priština and almost none of them can 
imagine themselves working or living in the town although it is Kosovo’s biggest city and 
provides most of the workplaces countrywide.  
 
The Roma primarily live in the North of Kosovo – together with the Serbian minority – where 
the security situation worsened in July 2011 due to ethnic clashes. Because of the geograph-
ical proximity as well as the cultural and linguistic similarities mentioned above, their security 
situation is also dependent from the security situation of the Serbs. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 191)  
In most areas, the Roma are therefore dependent on the humanitarian bus or train transporta-
tion. The humanitarian bus connects settlements and towns inhabited by the Roma and the 
Serbs in the region of Gjilan/Gnjilane such as the city of Štrpce/Shtërpcë. In the Prizren re-
gion, the “Freedom of Movement Train” connects the minorities living in Rahovec/Orahovac 
and Zvečan/Zveçan with each other. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 191) The Roma use these means of 
transportation because of security reasons and because they are less expensive than other 
means of transportation. After Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the “Freedom of 
Movement Train” was abandoned leaving the Roma “… with more expensive transport 
choices, such as taxis, private buses owned by Serbs, or their own cars if they had them at all. 
The suspension of the ‘The Freedom of Movement Train’ also affected invalid Roma and 
those requiring regular medical treatment” (HLC 2008: 198). The effect is that Roma are 
marginalized, lack access to main public services, and cannot leave their neighborhoods at all. 
 
The Ashkali and the Egyptians, on the contrary, live mainly in Albanian dominated areas. In 
the past, several violent assaults were reported. For instance, in the Vushtrri/Vučitrn munici-
pality, some 70 houses belonging to the Ashkali were burned and destroyed. In Fushë Koso-
                                                 
104
  Please consult the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (2011a): Municipal Responses to Security Incidents Affecting 
Communities in Kosovo and the Role of Municipal Community Safety Councils for an extensive discussion. 
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vë/Kosovo Polje, a series of incidents targeting the homes of the third largest community in 
this region – the Ashkali – were reported in the village of Nakaradë/Nakarade in 2010. “The 
windows of four returnee houses were damaged during and after their reconstruction, with the 
families also reporting experiencing intimidation and pressure by Kosovo Albanian neigh-
bours to sell their properties at low prices.” (OSCE 2011a: 14) Eventually, two out of the four 
families targeted sold their property and moved away. Despite the facts that there is an Ash-
kali representative in the Municipal Council on Safety in Communities and that this incident 
was addressed by him, the windows were not replaced and the victims not compensated. 
(OSCE 2011a: 14) 
In spite of these security incidents, the freedom of movement of the Ashkali and the Egyp-
tians in Kosovo has improved in the recent past; “… greater mobility has led to increased ac-
cess to public services and towards integration with the majority community.” (OSCE 2010: 
5, 46) 
 
The international community as well as local and national stakeholders generally assume that 
the Serbian-speaking Roma are more vulnerable than the Albanian-speaking Ashkali and 
Egyptians due to their different language and cultural affiliations. However, in the summer 
1999 and during the riots in 2004, knowledge of the Albanian language did not help protect-
ing them from the Albanian-led violence. (Cf. Mattern 2006: 3) “Roma with a good 
knowledge of the Albanian in an Albanian environment may make them less likely a target of 
attacks, harassment or discrimination, but their appearance identifies them as members of the 
Roma minority.”105 (Mattern 2006: 6) The anti-gypsy sentiments among the majority are still 
widespread: Assaults on RAE individuals, verbal abuse, and dissemination of defamatory 
images are still common. (Cf. ERRC 2005: 37) In addition, there are reports of incidents of 
members of minority communities while speaking a non-majority language. (Cf. Tmava, 
Beha 2009: 10) 
 
The real threat of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians being attacked by members of 
ethnic communities, mainly Albanian, is very small. However, their situation is characterized 
by the perceived threat, which leads to the return to neighborhoods populated exclusively by 
the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians and the lack of freedom of movement shutting them 
into their settlements. This perceived uncertainty discourages the RAE in exile from returning 
to Kosovo. Dünnwald argues that due to this fear of persecution, RAE returnees choose return 
sites, where their ethnic community is present and they can rely on this ethnic network. (Cf. 
Dünnwald 2009: 21) In addition, RAE are at higher risk for experiencing violence when they 
are suspected of having collaborated with the Serbian administration during the 1990s and the 
subsequent war. They fear a backlash, violence, and even murders. Consequently, the direct 
involvement in the ethnic conflict in 1999 can also lead to the return to a different neighbor-
hood than the original home.
106
 (Cf. Mattern 2006: 7)  
                                                 
105
  Original quote in German: “Gute Albanischkenntnisse machen die Roma in einem kosovoalbanischen Um-
feld möglicherweise weniger zum Ziel von Angriffen, Bedrohung oder Diskriminierung, doch kann ihr Aus-
sehen sie als Angehörige der Roma-Minderheit identifizierbar machen.” Translation made by the author. 
106
  The example of Mr. Osma Rama shows that his employment with the Serbian police in the 1990s was a re-
pressive factor in the decision of return to his original home. Instead, he returned to Roma Mahala where he 
feels more secure and amongst his own kind. (Cf. Dünnwald 2009: 21) 
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The RAE, who do not find housing after their return to Kosovo, are more vulnerable for expe-
riencing violence, because they have to compete over scarce rental apartments and social 
housing in some regions. (Cf. Mattern 2006: 6) As a result, the possession of pre-war property 
and its possible restitution influences the choice of the return site, too.  
Frequently, the RAE are demoralized to return because they do not have any place to return 
to. It has to be mentioned that the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians do not have a tradi-
tional culture of establishing property rights. Most likely, these communities either did not 
possess any property at all before the war or they purchased their property informally and, 
now, cannot prove the ownership appropriately. The few who possessed property, in most of 
the cases residential property, lived in the so-called Mahalas that were completely destroyed 
and deserted during the revenge attacks in the aftermath of the NATO bombings in 1999. 
Their decision whether and where to return to is thus influenced by the fact that (a) their prop-
erty is damaged or destroyed, (b) their houses are now illegally occupied by the ethnic Alba-
nians, or (c) they cannot prove the ownership of their property or never possessed any at all. 
 
(a) Destroyed or damaged property 
“The recognition of restitution rights often provides the first official pronouncement that 
whatever may have taken place in the past which is responsible for people being forced 
to vacate their homes was wrong and should not be allowed to occur again in the fu-
ture.” (Leckie 2003: 8) 
Many houses, sometimes even entire neighborhoods, of the RAE communities have been 
damaged or destroyed during the revenge attacks after the NATO bombings in the summer 
1999 and in March 2004. Due to the perception of the international community that the war in 
Kosovo only took place between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, the RAE communi-
ties, their integration after return, and their protection is not a main priority of the internation-
al community itself. Hence, the reconstruction of the RAE’s destroyed houses is either not 
fully or not at all supported by the donor community. (Cf. ERRC 2005: 42) In addition, do-
nors are not willing to finance the reconstruction of minority houses because they fear vandal-
ization of the houses after or even during their expensive and time-consuming reconstruction. 
Therefore, the priority is to rebuild Albanian and, in some cases, Serbian houses in majority 
areas. In general, reconstruction is delayed due to bureaucratic processes, and some RAE 
leaders also reported the theft of construction material and corruption within the respective 
authorities:  
“RAE leaders from Gjilan/Gnjilane expressed the belief that there had been misuse of 
money and that part of the money was spent for the reconstruction of Albanian houses 
in neighbouring villages, despite the fact that the project was specifically meant for 
houses of Roma in Abdullah Presheva.” (ERRC 2005: 42)  
In several cases, the respective municipalities failed to allocate land for the reconstruction of 
houses or have other plans with the land. (Cf. ERRC 2005: 41) Nevertheless, there are posi-
tive reconstruction examples, such as the refurbishment and reconstruction for houses for ap-
proximately 160 RAE families, the delivery of support packages, and the implementation of 
small scale projects, which were partly financed by the Ministry for Communities and Return 
(MCR). Furthermore, the MCR donated 200,000 EUR for housing support in the Du-
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bravë/Dubrava neighborhood in the municipality of Ferizaj/Uroševac, which is predominantly 
inhabited by the RAE. (Cf. OSCE 2011b: 5f.) 
 
(b) Illegal occupation by ethnic Albanians  
According to the information collected for the International Roundtable on Roma, Ashkali 
and Egyptians of Kosovo, around 7,000 RAE properties were still illegally occupied in 2008 
(Cf. International Roundtable 2008: 8) and the situation has not changed considerably yet. In 
some cases, “[t]here are former neighborhoods that have been completely abandoned by their 
former inhabitants and are now occupied by Kosovo Albanians in need.”107 (Mattern 2005: 
11) Albanians in need are internally displaced persons (IDPs) who stay in these abandoned 
neighborhoods, because of a lack of alternatives. The situation is particularly difficult in the 
Abdullah Preshevë/Abdulla Preševo neighborhood: only around 10 % of the Roma families 
enjoy their property rights and approximately 60 houses remain illegally occupied. (Cf. OSCE 
2010: 200) During socialist times, Kosovo’s housing situation was characterized by social 
apartments. Social housing, however, is not available anymore, and this situation leaves IDPs 
forced to live in temporary vacant houses belonging to currently displaced tenants who can 
return at any time and displace them immediately. A definite solution for the illegal occupants 
is missing. 
 
The process for reinstating the legal owners after illegal occupation of vacant houses was or-
ganized by the Housing and Property Directorate (HPD) until 2006 and is now decided on and 
implemented by the Kosovo Property Agency (KPA). The claims under the jurisdiction of 
these two organizations are divided into three categories: claims of the category A
108
, B
109
, 
and C. The claims relevant for this section are the claims under category C which are claims 
by persons who lost their property involuntarily after 24 March 1999 – the begin of the 
NATO bombings against the Republic of Serbia and Serbian sites within the Kosovar territo-
ry. Although numerous Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians have lost their property or their proper-
ty is now illegally occupied by ethnic Albanians, only 3 % of successful claimants are mem-
bers of the RAE communities. (Cf. HRW 2010: 49) This can be explained by their lack of 
knowledge and understanding of judicial processes and the legal possibilities for property 
restitution that exist in Kosovo. This condition becomes especially apparent when claimants 
have to prove that they lost their property due to war reasons and not because of other reasons 
whatsoever. Generally, the proceedings for reinstating the legal owners after illegal occupa-
tion of vacant houses are slow and enforcement is often missing. Sometimes, the RAE return-
ees are denied access to their houses by the illegal occupants and do not know how to regain 
the right to live there. (Cf. ERRC 2005: 43) 
                                                 
107
  Original quote in German: “Es gibt ehemalige Roma-Viertel, die vollkommen von ihren früheren Bewohne-
rInnen verlassen wurden und heute von bedürftigen Kosovo-AlbanerInnen besetzt sind.” Translation made by 
the author. 
108
  Claims under the category A are claims by persons, who lost their property after 1989 due to the discrimina-
tion in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Claimants receive restitution or compensation if the 
apartment/house has been sold another time after the original purchase. (Cf. Dodson, Heiskanen 2003: 232f.) 
109
  Claims under the category B are claims by persons, who purchased property illegally and wish to formalize 
it. These claims are only considered by the KPA if the purchase would have been against a discriminatory 
law. (Cf. Dodson, Heiskanen 2003: 233) 
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In most cases, they are not able to file a claim before the KPA to repossess their property. 
Rather, they decide not to return to their homes or to return to inappropriate housing condi-
tions that will be explained below.  
 
(c) The possession of property 
The repossession of property is particularly difficult for the communities of the Roma, the 
Ashkali, and the Egyptians because they do not normally cultivate any tradition of establish-
ing and inheriting formal property rights over land and houses. (Cf. HRW 2010: 47) In fact, 
the RAE rather own property informally and do not receive any legal proof that they purchase 
land or houses. In addition, some of the RAE who left Kosovo before the conflict due to eco-
nomic reasons sold their property before their departure to be financially liquid. (Cf. Kuthan 
2012: 14) This property cannot be repossessed. 
Another major challenge for the RAE is the loss of the property titles during the war or dis-
placement. However, in the case of the Roma Mahala in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, the KPA shows 
flexibility when it comes to the proof for property ownership. They also accept pictures and 
witness testimonies as evidence material for ownership, which is not always the case, but def-
initely helps the RAE communities proving their ownership without legal papers. (Cf. HRW 
2010: 49f.)  
 
“Restoring property rights does not automatically lead to durable solutions, or even allow 
return. … It appears that many displaced persons seek to establish legal ownership of their 
former homes in order to rent or sell them.” (Poulsen 2010: 20) Frequently, the Roma, the 
Ashkali, and the Egyptian returnees have to sell their property to cover other costs or because 
they are forced to by the Albanians who do not want them to live in their neighborhoods. In 
these cases, unemployment and poverty affect the housing situation of the RAE returnees and 
can, in the long term, breed a secondary displacement of the returnees. (Cf. HRW 2010: 52) 
 
Concisely, the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians are most likely not able to prove and 
repossess the ownership of their property after their return to Kosovo. The effect is that they 
are homeless or live in inhumane conditions, often displaced within Kosovo – no matter if the 
new house/apartment is in their home municipality or somewhere else in Kosovo. This situa-
tion is exacerbated by the fact that although there are vacant apartments and houses, in most 
of the cases, this living space is not rentable by members of the RAE communities because 
they are not accepted as tenants or they pay far more than other tenants. (Cf. Dünnwald 2009: 
21) Neither international organizations nor the local or federal institutions of Kosovo help 
returnees looking for an appropriate housing solution. The majority of the returning RAE 
families have no other choice than moving in with their relatives or friends. Very often, sever-
al family members have to share one single room. An example illustrates the severe condi-
tions: “… ca. 20 people in two rooms, or in unsanitary conditions, without heating, without 
water inside, this, in spite of having had property in Kosovo prior to the war.” (Laederich 
2006: 15) With each family member returning from abroad, the housing conditions become 
less adequate. (Cf. Kuthan 2012: 14; Mattern 2005: 9; HRW 2010: 51ff.; Dünnwald 2009: 22) 
Into the bargain, in most return areas, there is no sewage system. For instance, in the munici-
pality of Klinë/Klina, the returned Egyptians use septic tanks to dispose wastewater instead of 
a proper sewage system. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 8) The lack of power and an ineffective supply of 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
135 
potable water further affect many RAE communities in other regions, often even exacerbated 
by unpaid bills by the RAE communities
110
. 
 
Certain RAE families have to live in camps for IDPs
111
 or informal settlements after their re-
turn from abroad. Informal settlements are defined as “… residential areas where a group of 
housing units has been constructed on land to which the occupants have no legal claim, or 
which they occupy illegally …”, or “[u]nplanned settlements and areas where housing is not 
in compliance with current planning and building regulations (unauthorized housing).” (HRW 
2010: 49) These RAE informal settlements are often located at the margins of towns, lack 
basic facilities, and the access to education, health care facilities, and public services is se-
verely limited. (Cf. ERRC 2005: 38) They often even live in tents or containers while steady 
houses are built. In these cases, a temporary solution often turns into a durable although con-
ditions for appropriate housing are not met. (Cf. HRW 2010: 53)  
In March 2010, the drafting process for the Strategy on Identification and Regularization of 
Informal Settlements started. (Cf. OSCE 2011b: 5) A positive example of the regularization 
of informal settlements is the project in the Ali Ibra/Kolonija settlement in the municipality of 
Gjakovë/Đakovica, which aims at improving the living conditions of 140 Egyptian, Roma, 
Ashkali, Albanian, and Serbian families living there. The beneficiaries have been resettled 
from socially owned land to 3.85 hectares of municipal land allocated by the Gja-
kovë/Đakovica municipal assembly. The total project budget is 50,000 EUR. (Cf. OSCE 
2011b: 5f.) Nonetheless, the general picture of the RAE’s housing situation, especially after 
their return to Kosovo, shows a devastating picture.  
The example of the families interviewed by the Swiss Refugee Council (SRC) can be trans-
ferred to the general sample. All of them claim that they have never received any assistance 
for housing from the Kosovo (federal or municipal) institutions or the international communi-
ty. (Cf. Kuthan 2012: 15) Living at the edge of the society, they are left alone after their return 
and have to care for themselves despite being impecunious.  
 
The housing question creates another severe problem for the returning RAE communities. 
Especially in the town of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, there is growing resentment among the Koso-
vo Albanians against the returning Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians who – to some extent – 
benefit from housing reconstruction projects and general support offered by local and interna-
tional stakeholders. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 60, 210) This conflict between the returning and the 
receiving community is another obstacle for the sustainable return from the RAE communities 
and further encourages the RAE refugees/displaced persons to return to mono-ethnic areas.  
 
Summarizing, the return to mono-ethnic areas occurs since “… they have no where [sic] to go 
because Serbs do not want them and Albanians do not care about them, they don’t think about 
them … .” (Emphasis added, Bloom, Hoxha, et al. 2006: 433) The Ashkali and the Egyptians 
share common denominators such as the language and the religion with their Albanian neigh-
bors, which enabled them to establish friendly relations with them in some regions throughout 
                                                 
110
  All residents in Kosovo must pay a fixed monthly fee of 26 EUR to get electricity by the Kosovo Electricity 
Company (KEK). If someone does not pay this fee, KEK automatically shuts off the power.  
111
  A significant number of Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians still lives in the IDP camps in northern Mitro-
vicë/Mitrovica. Chapter 6.4 deals exclusively with their housing conditions and prospects of durable solu-
tions. 
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Kosovo. For instance, in the municipality of Ferizaj/Uroševac, the municipality supports the 
Ashkali community holiday on 15 February. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 60) The Egyptian community, 
for example, plays a very important role in the promotion of inter-community dialogue in the 
region Pejë/Peć. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 136) 
Nonetheless, despite these common affinities, the Ashkali and the Egyptians live marginalized 
at the edge of towns and are still facing widespread prejudices as well as social exclusion. 
Although the Ashkali and the Egyptians communicate more with the Albanian-dominated 
society, the three communities – the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians – are all directly 
and indirectly discriminated when it comes to renting an apartment, applying for a job, or go-
ing to school. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 60, 136, 210ff.)  
The Roma live and share some common denominators with the Serbian minority. As the 
quote shows, although Serbs are also a protectable minority in Kosovo and they often share 
hurdles with the RAE communities, they do not accept the Roma as an equal community in 
their neighborhoods. The Serbs’ actions are dependent on Belgrade’s demands and their (sole) 
intention is to secure their position and power within Kosovo. This does not include the ac-
ceptance or integration of the Roma. Where the Roma and the Serbs live in the same region, 
they live next to each other without many points of contact. Rather, the Serbs exclude the 
Roma from their public life and discriminate them the same way the Albanians do it. 
 
The widely-used discrimination of the RAE in public life is reinforced by “[p]oor self-
organization and lack of effective representation in municipal bodies [that] also hampers op-
portunities to engage in formal dialogue.” (OSCE 2010: 211) In almost all regions of Kosovo, 
the RAE are not included in inter-community dialogues or initiatives nor are there many out-
reach activities aligned to the RAE communities specifically. Due to their insecurity, the re-
stricted freedom of movement, and the challenges regarding the repossession of their property 
or the search for an appropriate housing solution, the RAE returnees are often forced to live in 
mono-ethnic enclaves with their relatives or friends in inappropriate housing conditions. In 
addition, they frequently cannot return to their municipality of origin. These reasons prevent 
their sustainable integration into Kosovo’s society and further enhance their separation from 
the other communities in Kosovo. 
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6.3.2 Low Educational Levels Impede an Integration into the Employment Market 
“… education can contribute to a conflict as well as help prevent [sic] it. In Kosovo, the 
educational system lies at the heart of the conflict. … Schooling was sometimes used as 
a place to foster and spread nationalistic ideas on both sides … .” (Melissen 2010: 31)  
At this point, the separation of Kosovo’s educational system should be pointed out again. 
There are the two parallel educational systems – the Kosovo and the Serbian112 – existing next 
to each other with very few contact points between the two systems. Although the Roma, the 
Ashkali, and the Egyptians share some characteristics concerning their education, there are 
main differences between the Roma on the one hand and the Ashkali and the Egyptians on the 
other considering that they receive education in the two different systems: The Roma go pre-
dominantly to Serbian schools with the exception of Ferizaj/Uroševac and a few places in 
Kamenicë/Kamenica (OSCE 2009a: 9) and the Ashkali and the Egyptians go to Kosovar 
schools.  
 
In general, numerous RAE children returning to Kosovo from abroad are not able to pursue 
their education upon the return. According to the UNICEF, in 2011, three out of four returned 
RAE children are not attending school each day. (Cf. Kuthan 2012: 18) The societal long-
term consequences are devastating and manifold: The RAE children returning to Kosovo end 
up with a very low level of education, often illiterate, and are – in the long run – not able to 
find employment. Some figures about the RAE children and their educational level demon-
strate their status quo within the school system: Around 75 % of the RAE children are attend-
ing primary school, which is slightly worse than for the other minorities and the majority 
community. Most of the RAE children, however, drop out of school after having finished 
primary school. Consequently, only 25 % of the RAE children are attending secondary school. 
Regrettably, there are only 1.4 % of the RAE children who ever finish high school in Kosovo. 
These last two figures illustrate the low educational level of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the 
Egyptians in particular. For instance, in the Klinë/Klina municipality, only 8 out of approxi-
mately 200 Ashkali students are registered in primary school while none attends secondary or 
tertiary education. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 14) There are various reasons for these poor attendance 
rates. One of them is the fact that “[n]one of the educational systems contains curricula and 
textbooks specific or adequately tailored to the culture and history of the Roma, Ashkali, 
[and] Egyptian … communities.” (OSCE 2009a: 2) Textbooks for the Roma are available in 
Serbian, textbooks for the Ashkali and the Egyptians in Albanian. Apart from the language, 
they do not reflect the realities of these communities at all.  
Not even the OSCE takes account of their specific needs within their analysis of the Kosovo 
non-majority communities in the primary and secondary educational systems. (Cf. OSCE 
2009a: 5ff.) This illustrates their challenges in the educational systems and gives a hint on 
their low status in the Kosovar society.  
 
The Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians often either left Kosovo during the 1980s and 
1990s or were displaced in the aftermath of the hostilities in the summer of 1999. Their geo-
                                                 
112
  Calling of the two school systems – the Kosovo and the Serbian system – point to a discrimination of the 
Serbian minority. The Kosovar system should include all minorities, but excludes any contact with the Serbi-
an parallel system itself. The same occurs on the other side by Serbian decision makers who populate the 
north of Kosovo that belongs to the Republic of Serbia and thus the educational system is a Serbian, too. 
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graphical aim was most often either the neighboring countries or countries in Western Europe. 
Returning children from the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptian communities were often 
born abroad and do not speak Albanian or Serbian, which is an obligatory need to be integrat-
ed in either one or the other educational system in Kosovo. Usually, they only speak German 
or English, or any other Western European language. The problem is that language courses in 
Albanian or Serbian are not available for returnee children. In addition, if language courses 
exist, they are not free of charge and, as mentioned before, the RAE returnees lack the finan-
cial capabilities to pay for language courses when they are not even able to feed their children 
appropriately.  
 
Nevertheless, when access to school is available, the non-recognition of school certificates 
from abroad often impedes a consistent transition from the school system abroad to one in 
Kosovo. Frequently, the children returning from Western Europe have to repeat grades and 
are learning with children far younger than themselves, or they cannot go to school at all. 
Both scenarios create severe social and psychological consequences for the children: “Having 
attended schools in Western Europe, the absence of education in Kosovo hampers the acquisi-
tion of language skills, furthers their feeling of alienation, and sometimes results in psycho-
logical problems such as depression.” (HRW 2010: 56f.) The exclusion from any educational 
system means for most children a long-term exclusion from the entire society. They are not 
able to speak the official languages in Kosovo, have a very low level of education, cannot find 
permanent employment in the long term, and live among their communities marginalized 
from the rest of the society. Education itself thus becomes the key to a long-term integration 
into Kosovo’s society.  
 
Other reasons also play a significant role when it comes to the question why RAE children do 
not go to school after their return to Kosovo. Reasons are: “… traditional cultures in which 
education plays a limited role, the economic benefits accruing when young people work at an 
early age, and the lingering belief among many that education does not bring any advantage to 
children; …” (UNDP 2006: 44). The RAE girls are particularly affected by the traditional 
culture that foresees early arranged marriages for girls. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 13) 
 
One of the most challenging parts for the returning RAE families is the financial expenditure 
they have to afford for the education of their children. (Cf. ERRC 2005: 45) Although there 
are no tuition fees in the Kosovo and in the Serbian school system, additional costs such as 
textbooks, other school supplies, transportation, lunch, and sometimes even uniforms are ex-
pensive. Human Rights Watch estimated that sending a child to school in Kosovo affords 
around 50 EUR per month. (Cf. HRW 2010: 56) With an average income of 280 EUR in Ko-
sovo and an unemployment rate among the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians of close to 
100 %, the RAE families, in most cases, cannot afford sending their children to school. (Cf. 
Kuthan 2012: 19) Furthermore, a great deal of the RAE families is dependent on social wel-
fare. Access to social welfare depends on the age of the children and ends when all children 
are six years old – just at the age when they would enter school. With less financial abilities 
through the lack of social welfare, the parents are less able and less willing to send their chil-
dren to school, especially when the communities have not cultivated a tradition of education 
so far. 
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Another main reason for the RAE parents not to send their children to school is the security 
concern. (Cf. Tmava, Beha 2009: 21) Not only the question of whether to send the children to 
school, but also where to, is dependent on the general security situation but more importantly 
the particular security situation of this community in the living area. For instance, 
“[a]ccording to Ms Shpresa Agushi, Romani children in Gjilan/Gnjilane, most of whom speak 
Serbian, are reportedly afraid to attend the Serbian school in the town fearing problems with 
Albanians.” (ERRC 2005: 48) Although the Roma would easily be integrated in the few Ser-
bian schools in the region because of language similarities, they are afraid of getting into 
trouble with their Albanian neighbors, who constitute the majority in the region. The Romani 
children living outside of the Abdullah Presheva/Abdula Preševo neighborhood in the munic-
ipality of Gjilan/Gnjilane are not provided with an escort to the school. As a consequence, 
they are not able to go to school at all.
113
 In addition, the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyp-
tians face discrimination at school. For instance, some Ashkali students from Fer-
izaj/Uroševac reported that students from their community are often placed close to the win-
dow and far away from the stove during winter times, bullied, and sometimes even beaten up 
by Albanian students. (Cf. OSCE 2009a: 17) Due to severe security concerns and the lack of 
safe escorts within the last ten years, improvised education services were set up for children 
from the RAE communities operating in camps, e.g. in Gjilan/Gnjilane or in Ple-
mentinë/Plementina. There, children learn under difficult environmental conditions, the 
teachers are unqualified, and the level and the quality of teaching and learning are very low. 
Furthermore, a transfer to one of the two regular school systems in Kosovo is difficult and 
sometimes even impossible for the RAE children living in the camps. (Cf. MEST 2007: 16) 
“The fact that most Roma students in Gjilan/Gnjilane region only complete primary ed-
ucation (in either Serbian or Albanian) or drop out of school before completing their 
education is an obstacle towards the training of qualified Roma teachers.” (OSCE 
2009a: 9) 
The lack of school-aged children in secondary schools influences the number of teachers who 
are trained and work in a region populated by the RAE. In return, when there are no RAE 
teachers, the likelihood of the RAE children attending the school is further declining. In gen-
eral, only a few RAE are employed as teachers in Kosovo or Serbian schools. In addition, 
RAE are insufficiently or almost not at all represented in school management positions. (Cf. 
OSCE 2009a: 7, 10) 
 
As a consequence, within the last few years, one could observe a decline in the literacy rate of 
both RAE men and women in Kosovo. “… the literacy rate for Roma respondents (73 per 
cent) is far below these levels and lower even than the reported national averages for Kenya 
(74 per cent) … .” (UNDP 2006: 31) The literacy rate of RAE women is even lower: only 
around 25 % of the RAE women are literate. (Cf. Müller, Jovanović 2010: 21) Likewise, the 
school attendance of RAE children and particularly RAE girls has decreased. 
Reasons for this decline, briefly, lie in the poor socio-economic situation of the RAE, tradi-
tional views as well as in the constant discrimination against the Roma, the Ashkali, and the 
Egyptians in public life and in the educational systems. (Cf. Müller, Jovanović 2010: 21) The 
                                                 
113
  For further examples on security concerns among the RAE communities leading to the fact that children of 
these communities do not attend school, please see ERRC 2005: 48. 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
140 
general low educational level has several long-term consequences. The most obvious one is 
the prevention of an equal access of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians to the employ-
ment market in Kosovo. 
 
The overall economic situation in Kosovo is disastrous, in particular the unemployment situa-
tion. Especially the political and economic isolation of Kosovo during the 1980s and 1990s, 
and the thereby late transition from the socialist economic system to a free market economy, 
led to a decrease of around 50 % of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita between 
1980 and 1995. (Cf. Dobruna 2005: 8) The conflict in 1999 further deteriorated the economy. 
After the end of hostilities, Kosovo’s economy had to start from the scratch again. Not only 
were most industrial sites destroyed, but as the majority of the population died, was displaced, 
or lost during times of war, the small and medium-sized businesses were incapable of work-
ing. This poor economy has still not fully recovered.  
 
This poor economic situation affects the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptian communities 
disproportionally. (Cf. Kuthan 2012: 15) As for the entire society, the biggest challenge for 
the RAE communities is unemployment. In several municipalities, unemployment of mem-
bers of the RAE communities, however, is almost 100 %.
114
 (Cf. Mattern 2005: 14; ERRC 
2005: 44; HRW 2010: 67) The dire situation is particularly dangerous for the youth: Müller 
and Jovanović compared the youth unemployment rates in Kosovo among the different com-
munities: whereas the unemployment rate for non-Roma is 74 %, the one for Roma, Ashkali, 
and Egyptians is 86 %. (Cf. Müller, Jovanović 2010: 20) 
The problem is that “[a]part from an insignificant number of individuals in the civil service 
and the municipal offices for communities, very few other have permanent employment” 
(ERRC 2005: 44). The Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians are merely under-represented or 
absolutely absent in the public sector. The following chart illustrates the percentage of the 
RAE working in public companies such as the Kosovo Electricity Company (KEK) or the 
Post & Telecommunication Kosovo (PTK). 
 
 
 
                                                 
114
  This (approximate) figure is supported by various other sources. Please see, for instance, O’Higgins, Niall 
and Andrey Ivanov (2006): Education and Employment Opportunities for the Roma, in: Comparative Eco-
nomic Studies 48, pp. 6-19. 
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Table 10: The RAE Employees in Public Companies 
Source: Republic of Kosovo (2008): “Strategy for the Integration of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Communi-
ties in the Republic of Kosovo 2009-2011”, p. 9. 
The Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians lack access to jobs in public companies and munic-
ipal offices. Despite having a 1.8 % share of the total Kosovar population, in four out of five 
public companies, the RAE employees make about less than 1 % of the staff. One reason is 
the fact that often, positions quoted for minorities are filled with the Serbs, thereby underlin-
ing the before mentioned dominance of the two former conflict parties in the Kosovar system. 
Frequently, stakeholders and decision makers understand the multi-ethnicity of Kosovo as 
encouraging Serbs to play a more important role within politics and economics, thereby for-
getting about the other minority communities in Kosovo such as the RAE, the Bosniaks, and 
the Goranis. (Cf. ERRC 2005: 45) The major challenge for the Roma, the Ashkali, and the 
Egyptians is, however, not only the access to jobs in public companies or municipal offices 
but their employment in low level jobs such as driving or cleaning jobs. Working in these jobs 
means not earning enough money to properly feed their families. (Cf. HRW 2010: 68)  
The situation in private companies is not much better either. The International Labor Organi-
zation (ILO) conducted a survey in 2006, which shows that only around 0.1 % of the employ-
ees in 1,547 examined enterprises, mainly private, belonged to the Roma, the Ashkali, or the 
Egyptian communities. (Cf. Müller, Jovanović 2010: 69) This situation deteriorated signifi-
cantly with the privatization of many public companies
115
. In the past, many RAE worked for 
public companies in Kosovo. After the privatization waves, many of them lost their jobs. Due 
to the widespread discrimination the RAE were not hired again by the private companies and 
are now almost entirely excluded from the (private) employment market. (Cf. ERRC 2005: 
38, 44; Mattern 2005: 14; Müller, Jovanović 2010: 69) 
The sources of income of the RAE communities include daily work, physical work, the search 
for and trade with fragments of metal, and working as musicians. (Cf. Kuthan 2012: 15) In-
formal, low-income, manual, or unskilled work is prevalent among the RAE communities: 
“These jobs pay an average of €10 (US$13) per day and almost exclusively involve men.” 
                                                 
115
  “Privatization in Kosovo is the redistribution of socially owned assets to private individuals or enterprises.” 
(OSCE, UNMIK 2008: 5) There are two different processes in Kosovo meant with the term “privatization”: 
The first process was implemented between 1989 and 1999 under the rule of the Yugoslavian Republic. The 
second process took place between 1999 and 2008 when the privatization of socially owned enterprises was 
internationally managed and implemented. (Knudsen 2010: 17ff.) 
Enterprise Total Employees RAE employees in percentage
7,564 3 0.04 %
Kosovo Electricity 
Company (KEK)
2,484 14 0.56 %
Post & Telecommuni-
cation Kosovo (PTK)
389 2 0.51 %Kosovo Railroads
577 2 0.35 %Airport Prishtinë/a
912 30 3.29 %
KosovoTrans (bus 
transport company)
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(HRW 2010: 68) Hence, the absolute majority of the RAE women is completely excluded 
from any employment opportunities.  
 
Because of this widespread exclusion from the employment market, the remittances from 
family members abroad play a significant role in supporting the livelihoods of the RAE fami-
lies in Kosovo. According to the UNICEF, in November 2011, around 52 % of RAE families 
are dependent on remittances. Forced returns of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians 
from Western European countries are destroying this often lonely source of income of many 
RAE families in Kosovo.
116
 (Cf. Kuthan 2012: 16; Müller, Jovanović 2010: 69)  
Apart from the remittances, the RAE families in Kosovo are often dependent on social wel-
fare although this assistance is restricted to a small group of beneficiaries who are defined as 
follows:  
(1) families in which nobody works,  
(2) families in which one family member works and one child is under five years old,  
(3) disabled persons,  
(4) persons who take care for the aged or disabled, and 
(5) persons between 15 and 18 years old, who attend secondary school. (Cf. HRW 2010: 71) 
The most challenging hurdle for the RAE families is the age restriction for families, in which 
one family member works (2). “This creates an incentive for families to have more children, 
even though they struggle to support the ones they have.” (HRW 2010: 71) In addition, when 
children have to go to school – most likely around the age of six – social welfare ends and 
families cannot support their children financially going to school. The families often do not 
enroll their children and rather engage them to work and earn money at an early age. This is 
particularly relevant for the RAE girls, who traditionally care for the family rather than finish 
school education. (Cf. HRW 2010: 71)  
 
Several bureaucratic problems apply to the RAE returning families and the application proce-
dures for social assistance: First of all, the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians often cannot 
return to their place of origin because of several barriers.
117
 One criterion for eligibility is the 
registration in the municipality in which the family is currently living. Due to the lack of iden-
tification papers, the RAE often fail to register in the municipality they returned to. As a con-
sequence, they are not eligible for social welfare, which is urgently needed in the majority of 
cases. (Cf. HRW 2010: 71) Furthermore, the returning RAE families lack an understanding of 
the application procedures and are often affected by illiteracy.  
Even if the RAE returning families manage to apply for social assistance, the support is not 
enough to feed a family and care for their needs. (Cf. Kuthan 2012: 16) The basis of calcula-
tion of social welfare is the monthly minimum wage. The benefits then vary from around 
35 EUR for one individual to 75 EUR for the entire family. (Cf. Arastey Sahún, Rivas Vallejo 
2009: 82) 
 
                                                 
116
  See therefore also the chapter on forced returns from Western European countries: 6.6.2. 
117
  These barriers mainly comprise insecurity, the lack of property, and the poor relationship between the differ-
ent communities. For more information, please see Chapter 6.3.1 on the return to monoethnic areas. 
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All these factors lead to widespread poverty among the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians 
in Kosovo. It is estimated that around 36.7 % of the Kosovo RAE even live in extreme pov-
erty
118
.
119
 (Cf. Tmava, Beha 2009: 7) In comparison to the Albanians and other minorities, 
such as the Serbs or the Bosniaks, this percentage is extremely high. (Cf. Müller, Jovanović 
2010: 19) Mr. Berisha Hajrush, a returnee from Macedonia to Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje 
said about the situation of the RAE in Kosovo: “It is not enough to have a house to live nor-
mal [sic]. You cannot eat the house.” (Quoted in ERRC 2005: 45) All three communities are 
largely dependent on humanitarian assistance, e.g. from the Kosovo Force (KFOR) or the 
Kosovo Red Cross. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 4; Singer 2010: 19) 
 
The consequences for returnees are multifaceted: The RAE returnees have – more than the 
Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians who stayed during the war and afterwards – no reason-
able chance in finding a job. (Cf. Tmava, Beha 2009: 16) The most obvious challenge is that 
returnees have a smaller social network than stayees. Thus, “… nobody knows them, so they 
are the last ones to be hired …” in a region where social networks are essential for finding a 
job, said the founder of the Egyptian political party IRDK
120
 in Gjakovë/Đakovica. (HRW 
2010: 63) The prejudices and discrimination against the RAE in Kosovo further step up when 
it comes to hiring the RAE returnees in public or private companies. If, however, the RAE 
returnees managed to get employed “… they mostly stressed that either the Albanian employ-
ers would ‘use’ them for very hard physical work, or they were paid less money than their 
Albanian colleagues for the same work … .” (Tmava, Beha 2009: 17) Beyond that,  no em-
ployment or income-generating projects are specifically designed for the RAE returning 
communities and their needs. (Cf. HRW 2010: 67) The devastating consequence is that many 
RAE decide to leave Kosovo again due to the lack of opportunities for a sustainable liveli-
hood. (Cf. Kuthan 2012: 16) 
This chapter can be summarized with a vicious circle that exists between the education and 
the socio-economic situation of the RAE returnees in Kosovo. First, the RAE returning chil-
dren are often not sent to school or they drop out of school after a short period because of dif-
ferent reasons.  
                                                 
118
  Extreme poverty means that a person has to live from less than 1 US$ per day. 
119
  This figure is based on the UNDP Human Development Report Kosovo 2004. Despite the fact that the figure 
is not up to date anymore, national and international stakeholders still estimate the poverty rate among the 
RAE that high today. 
120
  IRDK stands for New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo (Albanian: Iniciativa e Re Demokratike e Kosovës). 
For further information, see their webpage: http://www.irdk-kosova.org/, last retrieved on 26.12.2013. 
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Vicious Circle
Education –
Economic Situation
Low educational level
Source: Complete if required
Figure 21: The Relation between Education and the Economic Situation of RAE 
Source:  Own compilation 
One of them is the poor socio-economic situation of the Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian com-
munities who are dependent on remittances, social welfare, and humanitarian aid. For the 
RAE returning parents, it is more important to engage their children to work at an early age to 
support the family’s economic situation than to go to school, which does not have a positive 
financial effect in the short run. The RAE (returning) children often only complete primary 
school; they lack secondary education as well as vocational education and training. When 
reaching the age of entering the employment market, they lack necessary skills and do not 
find employment. This leads to widespread unemployment, poverty, and dependency on out-
side assistance. Then, the RAE returnees end up in poverty and without any means to support 
their children to go to school and learn the necessary skills to find their place within the socie-
ty. 
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6.3.3 The Exclusion from Public Services 
The Kosovar legal system – as well as all other parts of the public life – is divided into a Ko-
sovar and a Serbian parallel system. The Roma rather tend to approach the Serbian parallel 
institutions whereas the Ashkali and the Egyptians the Albanian ones. Recalling the narrow 
concept of access to justice – non-discriminatory access to courts and other institutions ad-
ministering justice –, the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians have a de jure equal access to 
justice. Theoretically, these communities can approach courts and institutions administering 
justice without any legal restrictions in the same manner as all other communities in Kosovo. 
Nonetheless, there are some specific constraints derived from the social role of the RAE 
communities in Kosovo. 
 
Primarily, their access to courts is restricted by a limited freedom of movement. Most often, 
the RAE refugees return to mono-ethnic enclaves where they live among themselves with 
limited or without any contact to other Kosovar communities. Their situation is characterized 
by “… numerous invisible barriers which RAE are afraid to cross …” (ERRC 2005: 46) that 
deter the RAE from leaving their neighborhoods and traveling to major cities. Yet, courts and 
other institutions administering justice are located in major cities such as the capital Prish-
tinë/Priština. Beyond that, the RAE are not represented in courts – neither as lawyers nor as 
judges. Because of the ethnic domination of the Albanians in these institutions, the RAE often 
do not file a lawsuit in case of ethnically motivated crimes, especially not against the ethnic 
Albanians because they fear retaliation. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 205) 
Second, the RAE generally lack knowledge about their rights, the procedures in Kosovo’s (or 
Serbia’s) judicial system, and the possibility of obtaining free legal aid. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 
205)  
Third, the lack of financial resources hampers them from hiring lawyers and using legal insti-
tutions. The time spent at a court is time away from income-generating activities. Additional-
ly, because RAE most often live in rural, remote areas, they have less direct access to laws 
and legal texts preventing them from understanding the legal system of either Kosovo and/or 
Serbia. (Cf. Anderson 1999: 18ff.) Furthermore, “[the] patriarchal structure predominant in 
this community, low level of education, and lack of familiarity with the justice system, tend to 
limit women’s rights, which may affect their protection in cases of domestic violence.” 
(OSCE 2010: 205) This assumption is critical due to the traditional role women play in the 
gypsy cultures. They are mainly excluded from public life, often marry very early, stay at 
home, and care for their children. The effect of further exclusion from the judicial system in 
Kosovo supports their traditional roles and gives them little room to take an active part in 
public life. 
In summary, the RAE have access to justice – understandable in the narrow concept – with 
some considerable constraints. Ghai and Cottrell, however, argue that access to justice means 
also “… approach, entry into; accessible includes the idea of being able to influence” (Ghai, 
Cottrell 2009: 3). This wider concept of access to justice would include the possibility of 
these three communities to take part in law-making processes. The Roma, the Ashkali, and the 
Egyptians, however, are under- or not represented at all in executive, legislative, or judicial 
institutions. Therefore, they cannot shape any law or judicial process. In effect, they are pas-
sively affected by almost all laws in Kosovo but do not have any option whatsoever to influ-
ence the process before any law has been passed. 
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Apart from the question of whether the RAE have access to justice, another factor impedes 
their ability to act in the public system in Kosovo. It is estimated that around 30-40 % of the 
Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians living in Kosovo are not registered as residents. (Cf. 
Kuthan 2012: 12; HRW 2010: 40) According to Dedić,  
“… we must bear in mind that the ‘original sin’ … primarily lies with the national au-
thorities, which have failed to recognize the unique position of European Roma as a ‘na-
tion without a state’ and have overlooked the negative ‘side’ effects of the conflation of 
the citizenship status and of ethnic belonging.” (Dedić 2007: 3)  
They lack identification documents, such as birth certificates, residence or citizenship certifi-
cates, national identity cards, or passports. Personal documents were often lost or destroyed 
because of the war and/or the displacement to another country or within Kosovo itself. After 
having lived in a foreign country and having returned to Kosovo, many documents from for-
eign countries are not recognized by Kosovar institutions. Those RAE refugees/IDPs who 
return via organized return schemes have a significant advantage: They find it often easier to 
obtain an ID card. For instance, “… in four out of five organized RAE return sites that Human 
Rights Watch visited, returnees had obtained their ID cards … within a few weeks of apply-
ing.” (HRW 2010: 40) Nonetheless, the majority of refugees and IDPs – no matter if belong-
ing to the RAE communities or other majority or minority communities all over the world – 
returns spontaneously, not being integrated in an organized return scheme of UNHCR. If, 
however, the necessary documentation to prove citizenship is available and the fee paid, issu-
ing an ID card only needs a couple of days. The problem is the financial capability of the 
RAE returnees, who have to pay 10 EUR for a Kosovo ID card and between 15 and 25 EUR 
for a Kosovo passport. This equals a significant amount for members of the RAE communi-
ties who get an average monthly income of approximately 40 EUR. (Cf. HRW 2010: 41) 
Apart from this, some RAE returnees are even unaware of the importance of personal docu-
ments, ignoring the devastating effects the lack of personal documents can cause:  
 
(1) Unregistered RAE children cannot be enrolled in schools. This happens often because 
many RAE women – registered and unregistered – give birth outside of hospitals. As a 
consequence, their children lack birth certificates and are not registered as Kosovar resi-
dents. (Cf. HRW 2010: 41) This fact is very disastrous for the RAE communities because 
the educational level is very low. 
(2) The high unemployment is forcing the RAE to take care of other financing options such as 
social welfare. Without possessing legal residence documents, Kosovars cannot apply for 
social welfare. 
(3) Access to secondary health care is denied to them, too. Accessing primary health care is 
possible without identification papers within the Kosovar system. Yet, secondary health 
care, i.e. small surgeries and special or longer treatments are only available to residents of 
Kosovo. The lack of a financial scope further deteriorates their ability to approach private 
health care institutions and makes them dependent on the support of relatives, neighbors, 
and friends. 
(4) In addition, it limits the civil rights of the RAE members, for instance when it comes to 
the change of their civil status in case of marriages or divorces, or elections and the right 
to vote. In Gjakovë/Đakovica, for example, “… many members of the Egyptian communi-
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ty were unable to register to vote in the Kosovo November 2009 local elections due to the 
lack of personal identification.” (HRW 2010: 42; cf. Kuthan 2012: 12f.)  
 
The most serious effect of the lack of personal documents is statelessness that plays a signifi-
cant role in the successor countries of the former Yugoslavia. 
“Statelessness is an issue throughout the former Yugoslavia, where it was common for 
people in the pre-1991 state to be born at home to unregistered parents, and to live in 
republics other than those in which they were born.” (HRW 2010: 43) 
Statelessness in the case of the RAE returnees mainly affects those RAE residing in Montene-
gro and Macedonia prior to their return. Often, they do not have any Yugoslavian or Serbian 
documents establishing prior residence in Kosovo. Many spontaneous returnees from these 
two Western Balkan countries end up without valid documentation because the UNHCR-
issued refugee or IDP card expires. They could never acquire a real status within the host 
countries nor do they have any other type of documents formerly issued by Yugoslavia. 
“When back in Kosovo, they do not immediately know whom to ask for assistance, and can 
remain without valid Kosovo documents for long periods of time.” (HRW 2010: 45) State-
lessness in general means for the affected people that they are not under the protection of any 
given state in the world.
121
 This effectively means that they neither have any attendant rights 
nor any obligations as citizens. In case of human rights violations against them, they cannot 
file a lawsuit because their human rights are not protected by anybody. In addition, they are 
neither allowed to  vote in national nor in municipal elections, which restricts their ability to 
take part in and to shape public life. In the case of war, this situation further deteriorates: The 
affected people are not protected by the respective national institutions and they do not even 
have the possibility to cross the border and seek asylum in another state. The host state would 
not grant the respective person asylum because this would require the citizenship of another 
state. The refugee, hence, would live in an undefined status, illegally in any country in the 
world, breeding a situation where they do not have access to education, health care, social 
protection, or any other public service. This also applies to the Roma, the Ashkali, and the 
Egyptians in Kosovo and influences the role of the RAE in the Western Balkans and in Eu-
rope, too, as described in Chapter 6.6.1. 
 
Concisely, the RAE are de jure equal to all other communities in Kosovo before the law. Be-
cause of limited freedom of movement and the lack of knowledge as well as of the financial 
restrictions, their access to justice is de facto restricted. It is of particular note that the mem-
bers of the Roma community do not file a lawsuit in many cases because they are afraid of 
reprisals by the Albanian majority population that dominates the Kosovar legal institutions. 
Additionally, a significant proportion of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians “… live[s] 
their lives without papers, deprived of rights, dignity, everything” (HRW 2010: 40). One of 
the most important rights they have been deprived of is the right to health care because the 
only eligibility criterion to have access to secondary and tertiary health care services is the 
registration as a Kosovar resident. (Caritas International 2010: 111) As mentioned before, 30-
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  For a discussion on statelessness in international law, its presumptions and effects, please see Van Waas, 
Laura (2008): Nationality Matters – Statelessness under International Law, in: School of Human Rights Re-
search Series 29, pp. 1-504. 
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40 % of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians are not registered as residents in Kosovo 
therefore and cannot access secondary or tertiary health care services.  
 
In addition, “[d]istrust between the ethnic groups in Kosovo has seriously affected the provi-
sion of health services to the minorities” (Caritas International 2010: 114). The ethnic minori-
ty communities mostly use the Serbian health system. This is particularly true for the Roma 
minority because of their cultural and linguistic proximity to the Serbs in Kosovo. Most like-
ly, they prefer to seek health services in the 67 primary health care centers based in minority 
areas, which are organized by Belgrade. In contrast to the Kosovar system, they do not need 
to be registered in a municipality to access Serbian health care facilities. Above the 67 prima-
ry health care centers, there is one regional hospital in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and three parallel 
small hospitals in the municipality of Gračanica/Graçanicë. (Cf. Caritas International 2010: 
107f.) The distribution of the HCCs poses significant challenges to the Roma community as 
explained in the following example from the Roma in the municipality of Gjilan/Gnjilane:  
“They are about 150 meters from the (ethnic Albanian) hospital which is in the town but 
they prefer to go 6 km to one of the Serbian enclaves for their health care. So again in 
the case of emergencies it can be very complicated.” (Bloom, Hoxha, et al. 2006: 433) 
Beyond that, there is no tertiary health care within the Serbian system in Kosovo. In case of 
severe emergencies requiring tertiary health care services, the Roma have to travel to Serbia 
or to other neighboring countries in order to receive proper health care, which is expensive 
and the travel takes a long time. Yet, the Roma still prefer to seek treatment in the Serbian 
institutions, primarily because Serbian health care is free of charge presuming the possession 
of the so-called “yellow card” (health record card). In some cases, Serbian-speaking Roma 
possess a “yellow card” and do not have to pay for any treatment within the Serbian health 
care system. (Cf. HRW 2010: 61; OSCE 2010: 203)  
The Ashkali and the Egyptians, in contrast, do not have any communication problems with 
the Albanian personnel in the hospitals and in the primary health care centers. They access 
health care services in the Kosovar system, but they complain about name-calling and bad 
treatment in the health care centers. (Cf. Singer 2010: 19) Apart from this discrimination, the 
biggest obstacle for the Ashkali and the Egyptians to approach the Kosovar health care insti-
tutions is the financial barrier. Health issues are often directly related to the socio-economic 
situation for two reasons. 
 
(1) Caring for one’s own health means spending money on the treatment, the transportation, 
and pharmaceuticals. Within the Kosovar system, patients have to submit a co-payment 
fee which is approximately an average of 2 EUR depending on the service. (Cf. Caritas In-
ternational 2010: 113) With an unemployment rate of nearly 100 %, the RAE (returnees) 
frequently cannot afford health care services within the Kosovar system. Some groups are 
eligible for free health care in Kosovo. Recipients of social welfare qualify for free health 
care services. However, without identification documents, the RAE can neither apply for 
social welfare nor for free health care services within the Kosovo system. The Returnees 
are not among the groups eligible for free health care. (Cf. HRW 2010: 61; Caritas Inter-
national 2010: 112 list on special groups eligible for health care services provided free of 
charge) The RAE returnees are particularly affected due to their limited financial capabili-
ties and the lack of understanding of the Kosovar health care system. (Cf. HRW 2010: 61) 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
149 
Nonetheless, there are some positive exemptions for the RAE forced returnees coming 
home from Western European countries:  
“Some municipalities, such as northern Mitrovica/Mitrovice, central Obiliq/Obilic, 
western Gjakova/Djakovica and central Fushe Kosove/Kosovo Polje, exempt them 
from payments for medical services.” (HRW 2010: 62) 
Into the bargain, Kosovo does not possess a public health insurance system. Therefore, 
poor families are not protected: In case of emergencies or severe illnesses, families can be 
pushed into deeper poverty than before and lead them into dependencies from external fi-
nancial assistance. (Cf. Caritas International 2010: 98f.) 
 
(2) Being limited by illness can cause an inability to work. (Cf. Tmava, Beha 2009: 18) the 
Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians – being it stayees or returnees – are often engaged 
in daily or seasonal work to secure some kind of income for their families. If one family 
member becomes ill, the entire family is at severe risk. The treatment is often expensive 
and the affected family member cannot generate income anymore. 
 
The biggest health concern for the RAE communities is the lead contamination in several 
camps in North Kosovo such as Zhitkovc/Žitkovac, Česmin Lug/Çesmin Llug, and Ka-
blar/Kablare. The medical shortcomings in these camps include the lack of medicines and the 
limited presence of medical staff, especially in the neighborhood of the Roma Mahala where 
the internal displaced RAE from the camps returned to. Yet, there are some positive examples 
when in 2011, “… basic medication was provided to the ambulanta (health centre) in the Ro-
ma Mahalla in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and doctors have been made available three times per 
week.” (OSCE 2011b: 8, footnote 38) An appropriate medical treatment for the former resi-
dents, however, is still missing. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 203) Their situation in the camps is very 
devastating. Consequently, the Chapter 6.4 deals with it separately. 
 
Recapitulatory, “… Roma [and Ashkali and Egyptians] are usually only able to access the 
most basic health services …” (ERRC 2006: 15), for which they do not need any registration 
and which is usually available in their immediate physical environment. In some municipali-
ties, the RAE are deprived of any health care services as most of the Kosovar health care in-
stitutions do not exist in minority areas. Nonetheless, this does not only affect minority com-
munities. Depending on the geographical area, the majority and the other minority communi-
ties have good or bad access to health care services – in rural areas, Kosovars often have to 
travel to the next institution and, hence, need more time and financial abilities to make the 
effort to receive treatment. (Cf. Caritas International 2010: 106) 
 
Similarly, their access to social welfare is restricted by the lack of registration documents. 
Hence, the RAE returnees often do not qualify for social assistance or lose the right to it when 
their children turn six. In the case of qualifying for assistance from a return program, these 
often do not last longer than six months. Consequently, “[s]everal families have left Kosovo 
once again”122 (Kuthan 2012: 13). 
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  Original quote in French: “Plusieurs familles avaient quitté à nouveau le Kosovo.” Translation by the author. 
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6.4 Internal Displacement in Lead-contaminated Camps 
The biggest settlement of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians in Kosovo before the war 
was the Fabrička Mahala in South Mitrovicë/Mitrovica123, where around 8,000 RAE lived 
prior to the war. During the revenge in the summer of 1999, in Fabrička Mahala, the 
“… Albanians are dismantling most of the RAE homes, taking doors, windows, roof tiles and 
beams.” (KMEG 2009: 2) In total, 750 houses were destroyed. As a result, all residents of the 
Mahala fled: One half of its population fled to North Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, the other half to 
Serbia proper. From there, many found their way to Western Europe. In addition, out of the 
4,000 initially fleeing to north Mitrovicë/Mitrovica some migrated later to Serbia proper or 
Western Europe, too. (Cf. HRW 2009b: 26) A return of the RAE IDPs to their old neighbor-
hood in South Mitrovicë/Mitrovica was and still is only partly realizable since the Albanians 
do not guarantee for the safety and the survival of the RAE returnees. (Cf. KMEG 2009: 3) In 
addition to this fear, the houses of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians are almost all 
completely destroyed.  
Because of this all-embracing destruction, a long-term solution had to be found in late 1999. 
The international community, represented by the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK), designed this long-term solution for the accommodation of the homeless RAE: If 
the IDPs do not find a durable solution within Kosovo, they shall be taken abroad for reset-
tlement. (Cf. KMEG 2009: 2) Apart from that, a short-term solution had to be found regard-
less of possible long-term ideas. Since accommodation was not available for the arriving RAE 
in north Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, they first occupied the primary school building in the town of 
Zvečan/Zveçan as well as some other public buildings in the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica region. 
However, some Mitrovicë/Mitrovica officials intended to find a solution outside of the public 
buildings, especially the schools, before the new school term starts. Therefore, the interna-
tional community opened three temporary camps in northern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica to accom-
modate the RAE IDPs.  
 
The region in northern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica is characterized by the former largest lead pro-
duction in Europe which caused severe and widespread environmental pollution with heavy 
metals. The industrial center of the zinc and lead production was the Trepča/Trepçë combine, 
which started operations in 1926 and was suspended by the UNMIK due to health concerns in 
2000. (Cf. Brown et al. 2009: 288) Since then, the water, the soil, and the air show a high 
concentration of lead. (Cf. HRW 2009b: 22) A report from the World Health Organization 
(WHO) claimed in 2004 that 88.23 % of the soil in North Mitrovicë/Mitrovica is not safe for 
human habitation or farming. (Cf. ERRC 2005: 40) This map illustrates the concentration of 
lead in the region of North Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. 
                                                 
123
  The city of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica in the North of Kosovo is divided by the Ibër/Ibar river. The North is domi-
nated by the Serbs and their institutions, including schools, health care centers, and law courts. The South is 
populated by the ethnic Albanians and their respective institutions. 
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Figure 22: Spatial Distribution of Lead Concentrations in Topsoils of the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica Area 
Source:  Borgna, et al. (2009): The high contents of lead in soils of northern Kosovo, p. 142. 
Nevertheless, the UNMIK opened three camps just across the street from the Trepča/Trepçë 
mine and one camp in the northern municipality of Leposavić/Leposaviq for the RAE IDPs 
and the returnees: 
 
(1) Zhitkovc/Žitkovac 
At the end of September 1999, the UNHCR signed a contract with the local Serbian authori-
ties of Zhitkovc/Žitkovac to rent a plot of land for the duration of 45 days next to an aban-
doned lead mining site where around 800 IDPs could be housed in tents. This temporary solu-
tion was established 2 km away from the Trepča/Trepçë mine. 
 
(2) Česmin Lug/Çesmin Llug 
In November 1999, the tents in the Zhitkovc/Žitkovac camp burned down and an apartment 
building was constructed to house the IDPs. Because there were not enough apartments, the 
UNHCR contracts with the ACT (Action by Churches Working Together) to build a camp 
called Česmin Lug/Çesmin Llug. The shacks are 500 m away from the Trepča/Trepçë lead 
mines and next to railroad tracks. (Cf. KMEG 2009: 3) When these two camps were full with 
IDPs, who could not return to their homes in the Roma Mahala, the remaining IDPs fled to 
Kablar/Kablare, which is 2 km away from the lead mines. 
 
(3) Kablar/Kablare 
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“During this year [2004], many Kosovan RAE refugees return from Serbia after UNHCR says 
it is safe to return. When they find their homes have not been rebuilt in south Mi-
trovicë/Mitrovica, and that the local Albanians are still antagonistic towards them, these refu-
gees move into abandoned shacks next to Çesmin Llug/Česmin Lug, called Kablar/Kablare.” 
(KMEG 2009: 8) The shacks were abandoned by Serbian workers earlier on, because asbestos 
was discovered in the walls and roofs and high toxicity from the nearby slag heaps has been 
identified. (Cf. KMEG 2009: 8) 
 
(4) Leposavić/Leposaviq 
The fourth camp, located in Leposavić/Leposaviq, – the last resort for the remaining IDPs – is 
close to the Serbia proper, around 45 km away from the other camps in the lead-contaminated 
area. It was previously used as a storage facility for the Yugoslavian army. Another 300 IDPs 
found shelter in this camp.  
 
The following illustration shows the approximate geographical position of the two camps 
Česmin Lug/Çesmin Llug and Kablar/Kablare, the Trepča/Trepçë mine, and the separating 
Ibër/Ibar River. 
 
Figure 23:  Geographical Position of the Lead-contaminated Camps in Relation to the Smelter and the Toxic 
Waste Lands 
Source:  Translated version of the graphics in GfbV (2006): Flüchtlingslager Osterode, online at: 
http://www.gfbv.de/inhaltsDok.php?id=820&stayInsideTree=1&backlink=veroeffentlichungen_arc
hiv_liste.php?bereich=2006, last retrieved on 10.11.2013. 
In March 2004, complaints about the children’s health in the camps increased. The most com-
plaints included daily vomiting, memory loss, poor co-ordination, getting highly nervous and 
then falling into a coma for several minutes. (Cf. KMEG 2009: 6) In response to these com-
plaints, the first blood tests of the camps’ children were carried out in 2004. The results were 
devastating: “The World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe (WHO-EURO) 
assessed in 2004 that 25% of children aged 2–3 years in the general population in the area had 
elevated (≥ 10 µg/dl) BLLs[124] (WHO unpublished data).” (Brown et al. 2009: 288) These 
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  BLL is the abbreviation for blood lead levels. 
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figures were even higher for the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians who lived in the three 
camps in northern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica – Zhitkovc/Žitkovac, Česmin Lug/Çesmin Llug, and 
Kablar/Kablare. (Cf. Brown et al. 2009: 288) Every child in the camps had life-threatening 
lead levels, frequently exceeding 65 µg/dl, which is the highest value reported by the handheld 
LeadCare analyzer. (Cf. Brown et al. 2009: 289) In addition, the camp residents suffered from 
additional health affecting problems such as poor quality food, the lack of clean and potable 
water, and cramped living conditions. They live in makeshift tents, huts, and metal containers 
(shacks), often lacking access to electricity and water within the accommodations. (Cf. HRW 
2009b: 27) This increased the incidence of diseases. (Cf. KMEG 2009: 5) In 2005, hair sam-
ples of the children in the camps were taken. “Not only are some of the highest lead levels in 
medical history found in the children’s results, but so is the presence of 36 other highly toxic 
elements … .” (KMEG 2009: 10) 
The effects of lead contamination on the human body are multifaceted. Lead can cause dam-
age to the nervous and reproductive systems and kidney failure. Very high levels can even 
cause coma and subsequently death. (Cf. HRW 2009b: 19) Furthermore, it can cause neuro-
logical and physical problems: for instance, anxiety, insomnia, anemia, memory loss, sudden 
behavioral changes, concentration difficulties, headaches, abdominal pains, fatigue, depres-
sion, hearing impediments, muscle spasms, disorientation, convulsions, high blood pressure, 
and sore or bleeding gums. (Cf. HRW 2009b: 19f.) Lead is transmitted through dust and nutri-
tion and particularly dangerous for children and pregnant women because they can absorb 
lead more easily. (Cf. Mattern 2005: 13; HRW 2009b: 20) “Poor and disadvantaged popula-
tions are more vulnerable to lead poisoning because poor diet increases the amount of ingest-
ed lead the body absorbs.” (HRW 2009b: 20) A favorable diet would include fresh vegetables 
and fruits on a daily basis – a luxury that the RAE IDPs and the returnees do not have in the 
contaminated camps in northern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. Another aspect decreased the residents’ 
health: The construction of sporting facilities next to the camps was initially meant well but 
turned out to be destructive for the residents, especially the children. In 2003, the UN built 
sporting facilities between the Česmin Lug/Çesmin Llug camp and the toxic slag heaps, in-
cluding a jogging track, a basketball court, and a soccer field, called the “Alley of Health”. 
(Cf. KMEG 2009: 6) Although the “Alley of Health” meant a good opportunity to distract 
children and adults and to give them something to spend their spare time with, “… exercise 
opens the lungs, thus allowing more toxic dust to be inhaled.” (KMEG 2009: 6) 
 
Until 2004, no medical treatment was provided to the RAE camp residents at all. From then 
on, they received several services, such as environmental hotspot cleanups, ongoing BLL sur-
veillance, medical monitoring, health education campaigns on lead, improved water and sani-
tation, hygiene packs, and the distribution of specifically tailored food baskets. (Cf. Brown et 
al. 2009: 289) 
“In addition to its other benefits the education program limited the children’s access to 
lead contaminated dust and soils which they were otherwise exposed to, as it is custom-
ary for RAE children to spend large amounts of time outside, even when they are very 
young. Moreover, all housing units in Cesmin Lug. [sic] Zitkovic and Kablar camps had 
some dirt floors which were contaminated by the adjacent mine tailings, while the Os-
terode facility had wood or metal floors covered with carpeting.” (Brown et al. 2009: 
289) 
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Concisely, one can record that seven years passed without any medical treatment, especially 
for the poisoned children in the camps. Yet, in 2006, the UN added chelation therapies
125
 and 
an early childhood education enrichment program for all children. (Cf. Brown et al. 2009: 
289) In total, 40 children were treated. All these services had a positive effect on the BLL of 
the children in all three camps, later on also to the children in the Osterode camp. (Cf. Brown 
et al. 2009: 291) Admittedly, when the medical treatment began, the chelation therapy was 
stopped just after its beginning because the responsible physician explained that the chelation 
therapy on the lead-contaminated wasteland is doing more harm than good. There were no 
follow-up treatments of poisoned children or adults of the camps known until today. 
 
In 2005/2006, the international community, namely the UNHCR and the UNMIK, searched 
for a best short-term and a best long-term solution for the accommodation of the camp resi-
dents. The best short-term solution was the establishment of a new camp: Osterode. A few 
meters from the lead-contaminated camps Kablar/Kablare and Česmin Lug/Çesmin Llug, the 
KFOR had a French base at the Osterode camp. After the French KFOR troops abandoned 
their base due to health concerns, the UNMIK remodeled Osterode to house all families from 
Žitkovac/Zhitkovc, Kablar/Kablare, and Česmin Lug/Çesmin Llug. (Cf. KMEG 2009: 11) 
The Mitrovica Action Team (MAT) – a multi-stakeholder task force – developed the frame-
work for the resettlement of the camp residents to Osterode. (Cf. HRW 2009b: 15) Osterode 
was intended to be another interim solution. The challenge was to persuade the residents from 
the other three proximate camps to move to Osterode because the camp is only 150 m away 
from the Česmin Lug/Çesmin Llug camp and therefore very close to the toxic slag heaps. Be-
tween March and April 2006, the camps in Žitkovac/Zhitkovc and Kablar/Kablare were 
closed because the residents from both camps moved to Osterode “… on the promise of better 
living conditions, food aid, and medical treatment.” (HRW 2009b: 29) Another factor acceler-
ating the move from Kablar/Kablare to Osterode was the fact that the shacks in this camp 
were burnt down so that the residents did not have any choice whether to move or not. The 
residents of the Česmin Lug/Çesmin Llug camp, however, refused to move to Osterode “… 
not believing that this temporary shift to such a close location would be advantageous from 
the medical point of view or otherwise.” (HRW 2009b: 30) In addition to these health con-
cerns, there are no heating facilities in the Osterode camp – contrary to the Česmin 
Lug/Çesmin Llug camp –, because families are not allowed to have wood burning stoves in 
their accommodations. This causes many children to fall sick during the winter. (Cf. KMEG 
2009: 14)  
The first assumptions, also made by officials, to explain the necessity of the move to the Os-
terode camp, state that: (1) Osterode is “lead-safer” than the other three camps because of 
concrete surfacing in external areas of the camp which reduces the exposure to contaminated 
soil found in the other camps. (2) In addition, water inside the housing facilitates regular 
washing. (Cf. HRW 2009b: 29)  
It is quite striking that contrary to the previous assumptions, the average BLL in the Osterode 
camp is de facto higher than the average BLL in the camp in Česmin Lug/Çesmin Llug. (Cf. 
KMEG 2009: 13) 
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  Chelation therapy is used to treat acute mercury, iron, arsenic, lead and other forms of toxic metal poisoning. 
Its aim is to fully remove the toxic metals from the body by administering the chelating agent intravenously, 
intramuscularly, or orally, depending on the agent and type of poisoning.  
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The best long-term solution for the displaced Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians was and still is 
their return to the Roma Mahala in the south of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. In May 2006, the Roma 
Mahala reconstruction project begun: Two apartment buildings with 48 apartments were con-
structed for those IDPs and returnees who cannot prove the ownership of property or never 
possessed any property in Kosovo. Furthermore, the reconstruction project included the con-
struction of 54 single houses for those IDPs and returnees from the RAE communities who 
could prove the ownership of property. (Cf. HRW 2009b: 16; KMEG 2009: 13) In June 2007, 
around 90 families (ca. 450 individuals) returned to the Roma Mahala from all open camps, 
Serbia proper, and from Montenegro, but “[m]any of those who returned did not remain … .” 
(HRW 2009b: 30) This is because the returning Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians are afraid to 
live and work there. The camp and the mahala population are transient – moving among Os-
terode, Česmin Lug/Çesmin Llug, and the Roma Mahala. (Cf. Brown et al. 2009: 291) Their 
motivation is reasonable: In the camps, they have better access to food, education, health care, 
and to the Serbian institutions and public services, such as Serbian social welfare, which is 
higher and easier to receive than the Kosovar counterpart. However, all residents wish for the 
return to their old homes and to their old life which is not ruled by somebody else, as is the 
case in the camps. In addition, in the Roma Mahala, the RAE residents are no longer exposed 
to the high lead concentration anymore. 
 
Summing up, the temporary solution to accommodate hundreds of IDPs and returnees in Mi-
trovicë/Mitrovica, contemplated for 45 days only, became a durable solution for the Roma, 
the Ashkali, and the Egyptians who could not return home anymore. In 2011, the camp Čes-
min Lug/Çesmin Llug was finally closed. (Cf. OSCE 2011b: 10f.) The camp in Osterode was 
finally closed in December 2012. The remaining residents were resettled either to the Roma 
Mahala in Southern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica or to multi-ethnic neighborhoods in the northern part 
of the city. (Cf. Secretary General 2013-02: 8) 
 
Nonetheless, by the end of 2008, 78 Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians had died in the camps
126
 
“… their lives foreshortened by the severe damage caused to their health by toxic conditions 
in the camps.” (KMEG 2009: 15) 
                                                 
126
  No official data exists, there are only estimates made by Paul Polansky (representative of the Society for 
Threatened Peoples – GfbV) who advocates the camp residents since their establishment at the end of 1999. 
(Cf. KMEG 2009: 15) 
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6.5 The Strategy for Integration of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians 
Summarizing the precedent chapters, it becomes apparent that major challenges in the integra-
tion of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians, particularly after their return from abroad, 
still prevail. Yet, the Kosovar institutions realized these challenges and worked out the “Strat-
egy for the Integration of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Communities in the Republic of Ko-
sovo”. On 24 December 2008, this Strategy was approved by the Kosovar institutions, cover-
ing the period between 2009 and 2015. Its aim is to foster the integration of three of the most 
vulnerable peoples in Kosovo. The main responsibility of its implementation has the Office of 
the Prime Minister (OPM). A further responsibility has the Working Group which is meant to 
co-ordinate governmental/donor investments. The political body – the Committee – is sup-
posed to ensure the co-ordination between governmental and non-governmental activities. In 
this Strategy, the authors identified sectors, which need special attention dealing with the so-
cial, economic, and political integration of the RAE.  
Two years after its adoption, the Strategy gained support by the Action Plan that specifies the 
sectors and defines measurements and indicators to analyze the success or failure in a particu-
lar area. In 2010, however, the Action Plan could not start appropriately due to the late appli-
cation for funding and the late appointment of representatives which did not occur until mid-
2010. (Cf. OSCE 2011b: 2f.)  
The Strategy and the Action Plan are divided into eleven sectors: anti-discrimination, educa-
tion, employment and economic empowerment, health and social issues, housing and informal 
settlements, return and re-integration, registration and documents, gender issues, culture, me-
dia and information, political participation and representation, and security (policing). This 
chapter aims at showing the common grounds between the findings of the Chapters 6.3 and 
6.4, thereby focusing on selected sectors.
127
 As the return of refugees is the main topic of this 
paper, it is the first sector analyzed within the Strategy and the corresponding Action Plan. 
Afterwards, the order of the Chapter 6.3 will be followed within the analysis of the Strategy. 
 
6.5.1 Return and Re-Integration 
The first priority within the Strategy’s sector on return and re-integration is the collection and 
the procession of information on voluntarily and forcibly returned Roma, Ashkali, and Egyp-
tians. (Cf. Action Plan 2010: 78f.) According to information of the OSCE, the Ministry for 
Communities and Return (MCR) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) collect data on 
voluntary returnees and repatriated persons from these three communities. (Cf. OSCE 2012a: 
25)  
Beyond this data collection, the Action Plan foresees the establishment of a working group 
who reviews the funds allocated for returnees and ensures the accomplishment of the needs of 
repatriated individuals from the RAE communities. (Cf. Action Plan 2010: 80f.) Unfortunate-
ly, no body dedicated to the return policies and to the support of the returning RAE communi-
ties has been established so far. (Cf. OSCE 2012a: 26)  
The institutions of Kosovo want to further guarantee that refugees and IDPs can return to their 
place of origin by organizing ad-hoc reception and accommodation for forced returnees, using 
                                                 
127
  The sectors anti-discrimination, gender issues, culture, media and information, and political participation and 
representation were not analyzed thoroughly in this dissertation. These areas can be understood as back-
ground factors that play a role in each relevant sector, but cannot be explicitly discussed in this paper. 
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property of the Kosovo Property Agency (KPA). (Cf. Strategy 2008: 53) In addition, the “… 
KPA in cooperation with Kosovo Police undertakes steps to free properties, from illegal oc-
cupants, which belong to Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian families communities [sic] when these 
are illegally occupied” (Action Plan 2010: 85) so that refugees have a place to return to. So 
far, the implementation of judgments of property claims is not successful. It is not known 
whether there have been any improvements due to the Strategy or the Action Plan.  
The OSCE states that the “… lack of de facto assistance in the areas of housing, schooling, 
and economic opportunities …” (OSCE 2012a: 28) did not change within the recent past and 
still has serious consequences on the sustainable integration of the RAE refugees into Koso-
vo’s society. 
 
Regardless, there are some remarkable positive developments within this sector: The MCR 
contributed to the refurbishment and reconstruction of houses for approximately 160 RAE 
families, the delivery of support packages, and the implementation of small scale projects. 
The MCR further donated 200,000 EUR for housing support in the Dubravë/Dubrava neigh-
borhood in Ferizaj/Uroševac and provided an accommodation for a week to 47 RAE returnees 
as well as transportation to the municipality of origin to 74 RAE persons, who were forcibly 
repatriated. (Cf. OSCE 2011b: 5f.) 
 
6.5.2 Security and Police Services 
In order to increase the effectiveness of the Kosovo Police (KP) in preventing and addressing 
crime and conflict within and against the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptian communities, 
the Action Plan proposes to conduct a study on the typology of crimes and conflicts in the 
three communities as well as the percentage of crimes addressed and resolved. “While the 
OSCE is not aware of any survey undertaken to assess how crime affects Kosovo Roma, Ko-
sovo Ashkali and Kosovo Egyptian communities in particular, or any specific needs of the 
three communities in relation to addressing crime-related problems, a basis for data analysis 
does exist” (OSCE 2012a: 38), because the Kosovo Police database segregates cases by 
community and by crime.  
In 2011, the Kosovo Police adopted a new “community policing concept”, in which each po-
lice station is divided into geographical sectors to build close relationships with the communi-
ties in this area and to increase their safety and their safety perception. (Cf. OSCE 2012a: 39) 
Apart from this new concept, there are no concrete response mechanisms to violence within 
and against the RAE communities. 
The two papers further envisage the encouragement of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyp-
tians to apply to serve in the Kosovo Police, especially in the areas where a large proportion 
of the RAE lives. (Cf. Strategy 2008: 75) The number of police officers from the RAE com-
munities is currently extremely low at around 1 %. Until 2015, 3 % of the newly recruited of-
ficers should belong to these three communities. (Cf. Action Plan 2010: 111) Despite several 
information campaigns on the application procedures and the encouragement of members of 
the RAE communities, the success in hiring them as police officers remains very limited. This 
is mainly due to the lack of candidates, who graduated from secondary school, which is one of 
the most important conditions of employment. (Cf. OSCE 2012a: 40)  
Briefly, there is no remarkable progress related to the security situation of the Roma, the Ash-
kali, and the Egyptians. Refugees, hence, cannot freely decide where to return to because of-
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ten their municipalities of origin seem to be too insecure for them. If the new “community 
policing concept” will succeed in considerably changing this situation, it will only show up in 
the next years. Nonetheless, it needs stronger support from the Kosovar institutions and espe-
cially far more concrete measures that go beyond the implementation of this concept. 
 
6.5.3 Housing and Informal Settlements 
The first objective within this sector targets the housing situation of the Roma, the Ashkali, 
and the Egyptians living in collective centers and inappropriate housing conditions. The first 
priority of the Strategy and the Action Plan is to find a sustainable housing solution for fami-
lies living in the camps of Česmin Lug/Çesmin Llug, Leposavić/Leposaviq, and Osterode. 
This is consistent with the closure of all three camps until the end of 2012. According to in-
formation from the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Leposavić/Leposaviq is still open and a hand-
ful of families are still in need of a sustainable housing solution. The Action Plan further 
plans to conduct a study on the housing conditions and the socio-economic state of the Roma, 
the Ashkali, and the Egyptian communities, especially in the informal settlements. Until to-
day, no study has been conducted on this matter. 
Due to the lead-contaminated camps in the municipality of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, the construc-
tion of social housing is particularly necessary in this municipality. The municipality is re-
sponsible for the allocation of land for social housing. The Ministry for Communities and 
Return encouraged this municipality to grant a 99-year land allocation in the Roma Mahala in 
South Mitrovicë/Mitrovica to the Roma and the Ashkali in the lead-contaminated camps in 
the North. “However, the municipality failed to make the commitment.” (OSCE 2011b: 6) 
Nonetheless, there are some improvements of the housing situations of residents in informal 
settlements. In the Ali Ibra/Kolinija settlement in the Gjakovë/Đakovica municipality, 140 
Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians were resettled from socially owned land to 3.85 hectares of 
municipal land allocated by the Gjakovë/Đakovica municipal assembly worth 50,000 EUR. 
(Cf. OSCE 2011b: 5f.) 
The Strategy further intends to regulate informal settlements. In the past, activities such as a 
conference on informal settlements, a public awareness campaign, and the creation of a com-
mon “Working Group on Informal Settlements” dominated the regularization debate. Admit-
tedly, only two informal settlements in the municipalities of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and Vushtr-
ri/Vučitrn could be actually regularized in 2003. Since then, no progress could be assessed. 
The new initiative, a “Strategy on Identification and Regularization of Informal Settlements”, 
started in March 2010. (Cf. OSCE 2011b: 5) The study focuses on the regularization of set-
tlements in case where they occupy public, state, or socially-owned land. (Cf. Strategy 2008: 
40ff.) This is particularly important when the land is not hazardous and can be easily connect-
ed to the municipal infrastructure. In these cases, affirmative measures should be used to pro-
vide the residents with an appropriate housing solution. These are, among others, land use 
allocation, land swaps, de facto recognitions, and the provision of infrastructure. (Cf. Strategy 
2008: 43)  
In addition, the refugees and the IDPs, who lived in now destroyed settlements, shall be enti-
tled to some of these affirmative measures because “[c]onflict related destruction of informal 
settlements shall in no case lead to further segregation of Kosovo Roma, Ashkali and Egyp-
tian communities. … the relevant authorities shall always respect former inhabitants [sic] 
right to return home as a priority.” (Emphasis added, Strategy 2008: 43) If the reconstruction 
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of informal settlements is not possible, former residents shall be entitled to compensation or 
alternative housing. Anyway, as of September 2012, the “Strategy on Prevention and Regular-
ization of Informal Settlements has still not been approved …” (Cf. OSCE 2012a: 24). The 
Kosovar institutions did not carry out any housing needs assessments either. “At the local 
level, by the end of 2011 18 municipalities had provided positive examples of ongoing regu-
larization of informal settlements.” (OSCE 2012a: 24) Nonetheless, the other 20 Kosovar mu-
nicipalities have either not even started or are still in the drafting process of regularization 
initiatives.  
In conclusion, there is a modest progress in the field of the regularization of informal settle-
ments, particularly at the municipal level. In addition, the most inhumane and devastating 
situation of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians living in lead-contaminated camps has 
not been solved yet.  
 
6.5.4 Education 
The Kosovar institutions are well aware of the grievances related to the access to and the 
quality of education for the RAE children. In consequence, the Strategy includes an education 
component with four main objectives illustrated in this figure.  
Figure 24:  Education Objectives and Indicators of Measurement from the Strategy for the Integration of the 
RAE Communities into the Educational System 
Source:  Own compilation according to MEST (2007): Strategy for Integration of Roma, Ashkali, and Egyp-
tian Communities in Kosovo – Education Component 2007-2017, pp. 22-38. 
Scholars and stakeholders concluded that low levels of education and illiteracy among the 
RAE communities are one of the key reasons for their inadequate inclusion into the society. 
Thus, the first objective of the Strategy’s education component aims at improving the partici-
pation in and the quality of education for members of the RAE communities. One specific 
program aims at reaching a better integration of the RAE children returnees from the diaspora 
by offering different activities. These include intensive six month-courses organized for chil-
dren who have lived abroad offered in the language of instruction chosen for further education 
in Kosovo. These courses will not only serve language purposes but in fact help the children 
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getting familiar with the culture and the traditions of the country that they only know from the 
distance. According to OSCE information, five municipalities have carried out ad-hoc initia-
tives, but there is no “… systematic or widespread use of ‘catch up’ or intensive classes aimed 
at assisting Kosovo Roma, Kosovo Ashkali and Kosovo Egyptian communities children’s 
participation in the education system.” (OSCE 2012a: 12) 
The activities carried out within this special program further include the identification of the 
families, which returned from abroad, the design of integration programs, and the recognition 
of school documents. In addition, an organized system is set up for their inclusion into the 
regular schooling after the transition phase within the six month special program. Further-
more, the RAE children shall receive free textbooks and other didactic resources. (Cf. MEST 
2007: 39) According to Human Rights Watch, “[t]he pilot phase of this nationwide initiative 
began in September 2010.” (HRW 2010: 58) Until 2011, there are some observable improve-
ments, e.g. free textbooks were provided to 3,399 Ashkali, 1,067 Egyptian, and 941 Roma 
primary school pupils in the school year of 2009/2010, (Cf. OSCE 2011b: 4) but the full im-
plementation of all activities related to the integration of returnee children is still pending. 
 
One major drawback for the Roma children is the fact that there are no classes in the Romani 
language. The MEST wants to include the Romani language as a subject in primary and sec-
ondary schools. In June 2010, the MEST endorsed a Roma curriculum including selective 
classes on the Romani language (grammar), the culture of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the 
Egyptians, and their history in the school year of 2010/2011. On 2 July 2010, the MEST 
launched a tender for the development of relevant textbooks to teach these subjects and fur-
thermore identified 25 teachers for these optional subjects. Yet, they did not receive any train-
ing in preparation for the classes they are obliged to teach. (Cf. OSCE 2011b: 4) In summary, 
“… while a Romani language curriculum has been developed, children are still without these 
classes, lacking trained teachers or textbooks” (OSCE 2012a: 5). 
In addition, the Strategy aims at setting up grant schemes for the RAE children. The MEST 
currently funds books for children of the families, which are eligible for social welfare, organ-
izes catch-up classes for the RAE students in 9 out of 30 municipalities, and gives monthly 
stipends to 75 RAE primary school students and 25 high school students with good academic 
results. (Cf. HRW 2010: 59) For the school year 2009/2010, 158 students and 44 college stu-
dents from the RAE communities received scholarships in the amount of 150 EUR from a 
return project. (Cf. OSCE 2011b: 4) 
 
The second objective implies the prevention of discrimination and segregation in the system 
of education. Therein, educators and education officers will be trained to eliminate prejudices 
against the RAE in the school system.  
 
The third objective deals with the assurance of high quality and efficient cooperation between 
the relevant institutions and organizations for the benefit of better education for the RAE. One 
activity is, for instance, the engagement of the police in creating a safe environment for the 
RAE communities because the parents often hesitate sending their children to school due to a 
lack of safe conditions on their way to and from the school as well as within the school itself. 
Furthermore, various programs are offered to reduce illiteracy through institutional support.  
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The last and fourth objective is increased awareness among the RAE communities about edu-
cation. Awareness-raising is one of the municipalities’ main tasks within the education com-
ponent. As of 2011, however, only 4 out of 38 municipalities in Kosovo organized awareness-
raising meetings. They took place in the municipalities of Prizren, Ferizaj/Uroševac, Fushë 
Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, and Gjilan/Gnjilane to encourage the parents to enroll their children in 
school. (Cf. OSCE 2011b: 4) Other activities that are planned to fulfill this objective include 
the organization of extracurricular sports and cultural activities, the review and writing of 
school textbooks, and the promotion of values, heritage, and the identity of the RAE commu-
nities. Although the MEST states: “There is a positive climate for affirmation of cultural val-
ues of the communities” (MEST 2007: 38), the awareness-raising among the RAE communi-
ties is one of the most neglected challenges and leads to the fact that the RAE returnee chil-
dren often drop out of school and sometimes do not even finish the primary school.  
 
6.5.5 Employment 
The Strategy wants to “… create strong linkages between school education and employment 
possibilities for the three communities, including measures to facilitate transfer from school to 
work.” (Strategy 2008: 29) This assumption supports the Chapter 6.3.2 of this dissertation on 
the strong linkages between school education and employment. Despite creating these linkag-
es, there are no concrete suggestions within the Strategy of how to implement this objective. 
Furthermore, the Action Plan does not even pick it up anymore. 
 
The primary focus of the Strategy’s and the Action Plan’s employment component is the in-
crease of employees from the RAE communities in the private economy through different 
policies that promote employment and self-employment. Accordingly, the Strategy proposes 
to establish a framework for the integration of the RAE in the private sector. (Cf. Strategy 
2008: 30) This study on fiscal incentives for private enterprises to employ the RAE was sup-
posed to be finished in 2010. (Cf. Action Plan 2010: 46ff.) Yet, “… from the information 
available to the OSCE, none of these studies or assessments have been undertaken” (OSCE 
2012a: 18). Despite the unfinished study, the Strategy expresses some concrete measures to 
increase the number of the employed RAE in the private sector such as tax incentives, wage 
subsidies for companies employing the RAE, and contract compliance. (Cf. Strategy 2008: 
30f.) Contract compliance means that public contracts are only given to private enterprises 
that employ a fair share of members of the RAE communities. The Strategy, however, only 
refers to “a fair share” or “x-percentage” not naming a definite percentage yet. The Action 
Plan foresees a time span of five years to establish specific rules, such as this definite propor-
tion, but nothing is known about any progress yet.  
 
The Strategy and the Action Plan further suggest creating measures to facilitate the transfer 
from informal to formal work as many RAE are currently working in the informal sector 
without a contract or any other protection mechanisms. (Cf. Strategy 2008: 32; Action Plan 
2010: 51) This transition is particularly difficult since 40 % of the RAE are not registered in 
Kosovo and, for this reason, do not have a permit to officially work in Kosovo. On that ac-
count, the Action Plan asks to conduct a study on the informal economy of the RAE commu-
nities, including the review of possibilities of its transformation to the formal economy. This 
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study was supposed to be finished in 2011. According to OSCE information, no study has 
been undertaken yet.  
In fact, in July 2011, the OPM published a three-year strategy on economic development 
without referring to the different circumstances and needs of the different Kosovar communi-
ties. In addition, the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (MLSW) adopted an Action Plan 
for the implementation of its Sectoral Strategy (2011-2013) in February 2011 without ad-
dressing the communities either. (Cf. OSCE 2012a: 18) In short, the MLSW has not drafted a 
specific employment study as it was supposed to foster the economic integration of the Roma, 
the Ashkali, and the Egyptians in Kosovo. Instead, it has enacted some mitigating measures to 
facilitate the employment of RAE individuals. (Cf. SOROS 2011: 44) 
 
Another well-constructed idea is to “… support/encourage Micro Finance Institutions to cre-
ate micro-credit schemes or grant programmes specifically for Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian 
communities …” (Strategy 2008: 31) or to integrate the RAE communities into existing pro-
grams taking into account their specific needs. The Action Plan suggests undertaking concrete 
measures to decrease taxes and duties to the RAE businesses. One specific proposal is to re-
lease the RAE entrepreneurs from taxes in the initial years of business. (Action Plan 2010: 48) 
All these measures were supposed to be implemented by 2010, but there is no information on 
any progress yet. 
 
The second objective of the employment sector deals with the encouragement, preparation, 
and support of the RAE for their inclusion in agricultural activities. This objective is further 
specified in the Action Plan, proposing to “[i]dentify and select individuals from the three 
communities interested to benefit from the MAFRD [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Rural Development] project fund in the following areas: Agriculture; Livestock; Beekeeping, 
etc.” (Action Plan 2010: 51) Additionally, members of the RAE communities shall be includ-
ed in seasonal projects, forestation, or as forest guards. All these measures were supposed to 
be implemented in 2010. Yet, there are only some minor improvements such as the seasonal 
employment of 50 RAE from the Ali Ibra/Kolonija settlement in Rahovec/Orahovac. (Cf. 
OSCE 2011b: 8) 
 
The third objective aims at increasing the level of employment of some RAE individuals in 
public works. The goal is to employ no less than 3 % of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyp-
tians in public companies throughout Kosovo. In addition, exclusive employment for mem-
bers of the RAE communities such as in the construction of sewage, sanitary knots, roads, 
irrigation systems, and for the improvement of housing conditions shall be developed. (Cf. 
Action Plan 2010: 58) Positive examples are the municipalities of Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Pol-
je, Obiliq/Obilic, Novo Brdo/Novobërdë, and Istog/Istok where the Roma, the Ashkali, and 
the Egyptians are engaged in the reconstruction work of houses in the RAE settlements. In 
addition, in Prizren, some RAE are employed in a cleaning company. Some RAE are further 
employed in public utility companies where their salaries are jointly paid by the municipality 
and external donors. For instance, the public utility company “Uniteti” from Mi-
trovicë/Mitrovica employed 20 Roma and Ashkali residing in the Roma Mahala. (Cf. OSCE 
2011b: 8) 
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Summarizing, this is a small progress in some advanced municipalities, but the OSCE Mis-
sion in Kosovo claims, “… such initiatives were largely sporadic and short-term, and the ef-
forts were not concerted or sustainable.” (OSCE 2012a: 18) The MLSW did not manage to 
establish a Kosovo-wide program, which defines measurements and incentives for the Roma, 
the Ashkali, and the Egyptians as well as potential employers to integrate them into the econ-
omy. 
 
6.5.6 Registration and Documents 
The lack of registration documents is a particularly devastating problem for the RAE return-
ees. It is therefore of utmost importance to strengthen the cooperation among the institutions 
of Kosovo and the institutions of the host countries to enable an easy registration of returnees 
and repatriated persons immediately after their arrival in Kosovo. (Cf. Strategy 2008: 60) The 
Kosovar institutions commit to recognize the following documents from foreign states to fa-
cilitate the registration process: school certificates and diplomas, birth certificates, health cer-
tificates, and employment and pension certificates. (Cf. Action Plan 2010: 88) 
 
In order to improve the legal situation of the three communities, the Strategy recommends to 
introduce “flexible measures” and “windows of opportunities”, in which standard procedures 
are replaced by flexible mechanisms to help the returnees getting ad-hoc access to public ser-
vices when they need them most. (Cf. Strategy 2008: 59) Another idea to register the RAE in 
Kosovo is the use of witness procedures for identity (Cf. Strategy 2008: 59) and “home-to-
home” awareness campaigns (Cf. Strategy 2008: 60; Action Plan 2010: 90). A more prevalent 
approach is the following one: “All municipalities declare once a year the free of charge civil 
registration month, for unregistered persons and children born outside the health care system.” 
(Action Plan 2010: 89) 
A common problem within the sector of registration and documentation is that every munici-
pality within Kosovo can decide on the registration regulations and in particular the registra-
tion fees. On that account, the relevant authorities shall define “… a modest and harmonised 
range of minimum and maximum rates …” (Strategy 2008: 59) for each registration process 
such as the change of the civil status to avoid disproportionate fees in different municipalities.  
 
One can positively summarize that there are improvements in the registration sector. The Civ-
il Rights Program Kosovo (CRP/K)
128
 provides free legal assistance to the members of the 
RAE communities, who lack – more than any other community in Kosovo –personal docu-
ments because they have less contact to local authorities and face bureaucratic barriers in the 
application process. Until 2010, the CRP/K has helped over 5,000 displaced persons to regis-
ter themselves in Kosovo. (Cf. HRW 2010: 42f.) In August 2012, the UNHCR through the 
CRP/K, launched a six-month awareness campaign regarding the importance of the registra-
tion of newly born babies. A number of municipalities
129
 have further taken steps to facilitate 
                                                 
128
 The Civil Rights Program Kosovo was founded by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in 1999. It now 
functions as an independent non-governmental organization and is an implementation partner of the UNHCR. 
CRP/K provides free legal assistance and counseling for returnees, asylum seekers, displaced persons in Ko-
sovo, and persons at risk of statelessness. For further information, please see their web site: http://www.crp 
kosovo.org/, last retrieved on 26.12.2013. 
129
  These are, for instance, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, Skenderaj/Srbica, Kamenicё/Kamenica, Štrpce/Shtërpcë, Priz-
ren, Klinë/Klina, Istog/Istok, Gračanica/Graçanicë, and Lipjan/Lipljan. 
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civil registration processes, especially for the members of the RAE communities. (Cf. OSCE 
2012a: 30)  
At the national level, a positive development was the “… issuing of Circular No.123 on 15 
March 2012 by the MIA instructing the waiving of late birth or death registration fees for 
members of the Kosovo Roma, Kosovo Ashkali and Kosovo Egyptian communities for a pe-
riod of up to one year” (OSCE 2012a: 30). Nonetheless, apart from the few municipal activi-
ties
130
, which are merely sporadic and geographically restricted, and the work of the CRP/K, 
the relevant national authorities did not harmonize the municipal registration regulations yet.  
 
6.5.7 Health and Social Issues 
“In practical terms, the OSCE is not aware of any co-ordinated measures to undertake health 
care outreach for Kosovo Roma, Kosovo Ashkali and Kosovo Egyptian communities, or to 
raise awareness of health and social rights and entitlements among these communities …” 
(OSCE 2012a: 19) despite the objectives the Strategy and the Action Plan have set out.  
 
The first objective aims at assessing the health conditions of the three communities through 
the collection and the analysis of data. To reach this objective, a working group has been es-
tablished who, unfortunately, only met once since its establishment and “… none of the ac-
tivities … have been implemented, including the publication of a survey and the creation of a 
database of Kosovo Roma, Kosovo Ashkali and Kosovo Egyptian communities’ needs …” 
(OSCE 2012a: 19). However, the ongoing preparation of the Health Information System data-
base on persons in Kosovo will help cover this lack of data because it takes into account the 
different ethnic communities and their needs. This database is supposed to be completed in 
2014. (Cf. OSCE 2012a: 19)  
 
The Strategy further suggests conducting health care education about all relevant topics, in-
cluding the preparation of food and the quality of water in the settlements. (Cf. Strategy 2008: 
36f.) In the recent past, the Ministry of Health (MoH) in cooperation with UNICEF prepared 
“… two sets of educational materials containing information on healthcare in the Roma lan-
guage.” (SOROS 2011: 41) In addition, a few health and vaccination campaigns and several 
other outreach activities targeting the RAE communities were conducted at the municipal 
level.
131
 These are, again, only sporadic efforts but there is no Kosovo-wide sustainable pro-
gram that includes all members of the RAE communities as well as all relevant topics to im-
prove their health holistically.  
 
The second objective is the improvement of the quality of health services for mothers and 
children. The Action Plan suggests establishing a basic service package for pregnant women, 
which includes antenatal care, tetanus immunization, folic acid and iron treatment, treatment 
of anemia, treatment of intestinal parasites as well as supplement of vitamin A, the delivery, 
and the postnatal care. (Cf. Action Plan 2010: 62) So far, this basic service package for preg-
                                                 
130
  For an extensive list of the municipal activities, please see the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (2012c): Access to 
civil registration in Kosovo, p. 8f. 
131
  For examples please see OSCE (2012a): Contribution to the Progress Review of the Action Plan of the Strat-
egy for the Integration of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Communities in Kosovo, 2009–2015, p. 19, footnote 
58. 
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nant women has not been implemented. In fact, there are no specific activities to support 
mother and child health or reproductive health aimed specifically at the RAE women and 
children yet. The only improvement can be found regarding the registration of newly born 
infants. Through registration, the babies have access to key health care services such as vac-
cinations. (Cf. OSCE 2012a: 20) 
 
In order to create quality and sustainable hygiene and sanitary conditions and a healthy envi-
ronment in the housing of the RAE families, the RAE settlements should have access to pota-
ble drinking water, a sewage network, and waste disposal mechanisms. (Cf. Strategy 2008: 
35) Moreover, “[t]he Ministry of Health, within its competencies, shall wherever it deems to 
be necessary ensure that the land on which the settlements of the communities are located are 
not polluted and hazardous.” (Strategy 2008: 36) As mentioned above, several RAE families 
still live in lead-contaminated settlements in the North of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. The MoH 
should start an immunization campaign and periodically control the health status of the cur-
rent and the former residents of the lead-contaminated camps as well as the quality of the 
drinking water in all settlements. (Cf. Strategy 2008: 36; Action Plan 2010: 68) The “… 
OSCE is only aware of regular checks being undertaken in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, where specif-
ic challenges are faced” (OSCE 2012a: 21). In this municipality, due to the special circum-
stances, a lot has been done regarding health care. For instance, a health clinic was opened in 
the Roma Mahala in South Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and two Roma and Ashkali residents are 
trained as health facilitators to support their communities. (Cf. OSCE 2012a: 21f.) Yet, no 
specific resources were allocated to offer medical treatment to the former camp residents. (Cf. 
OSCE 2011b: 6) In addition, there were no regular checks of the quality of drinking water and 
the health status in the other RAE settlements throughout Kosovo. Hence, the goal to increase 
the number of visits of medical personnel in the RAE settlements (Cf. Strategy 2008: 37) 
could not be reached either.  
 
The last objective within this sector deals with the provision of social services and aims at 
incorporating members of the RAE communities into social services through the distribution 
of information as well as the inclusion in the social assistance scheme and other service 
schemes. The Action Plan sets the goal of 2,075 RAE families to be provided with social as-
sistance by 2015. (Cf. Action Plan 2010: 69) According to OSCE information, this goal was 
already reached in 2010: “As of July 2010, the MLSW provided social assistance support to 
2,252 Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian families, including an exemption from paying electricity 
bills up to a certain amount.” (OSCE 2011b: 5) In addition, between January and June 2010, 
20 RAE families benefited from an emergency social assistance worth 100 – 300 EUR per 
year for families living in especially deteriorating conditions. (Cf. OSCE 2011b: 5) 
Apart from the direct social assistance, the relevant authorities were asked to reconsider the 
definitions of eligibility criteria for social assistance with the objective of including the RAE 
communities more than before into the social schemes and evaluating the allocation proce-
dures. (Cf. Strategy 2008: 38) This approach has not been taken up again in the Action Plan 
and nothing has been done so far in this direction. 
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6.5.8 Summary and Preliminary Conclusion on the Strategy 
Summarizing, the Strategy and the corresponding Action Plan are a try to meet the challenges 
the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians face in their daily lives. It aims at establishing a 
multi-cultural society, where every member of the society has equal opportunities. It is out-
standing that the Strategy considers all relevant policies that have been identified in this paper 
as fundamental challenges to a sustainable integration of the RAE returnees into the Kosovar 
society. For instance, the Strategy highlights the strong correlation between school education 
and employment as carved out in Chapter 6.3.2.  
Yet, Sigona argues that the “… strategy … is essentially detached from reality.” (Sigona 
2012: 1228) Admittedly, the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians were neither included in 
the creation of the Strategy nor of the Action Plan. Nevertheless, the Strategy reveals the ma-
jor challenges such as the feeling of insecurity, the lack of property and hence appropriate 
housing solutions, especially after the return to Kosovo, the lack of interethnic relations, a low 
level of education, high unemployment and poverty, the lack of ID documents, and the lack of 
access to health and social services. These challenges actually reflect the reality of the Roma, 
the Ashkali, and the Egyptians in Kosovo. 
 
However, the Strategy and the Action Plan miss concrete goals as well as reasonable 
timeframes and budgets in order to fulfill their strategic and operative objectives. For in-
stance, a high percentage of requirements need to be fulfilled within the timeframe of the en-
tire Strategy – 2009 until 2015 – without any specific deadlines. Getting back to the strong 
linkages between school education and employment that need to be created, neither the Strat-
egy nor the Action Plan give any concrete advice on the creation of these linkages or on how 
to breathe life into these linkages. Without requesting the relevant authorities to create these 
linkages by providing them with specific tasks, no Kosovar institution will become active. 
One can even go as far as saying that no institution in Kosovo really feels responsible for the 
implementation of the Strategy and the Action Plan. The Working Group, established to su-
pervise the implementation, only met once since its establishment, and did not provide the 
necessary reports as was supposed in the Strategy. 
 
In addition, the Strategy lacks implementation on the national and the municipal level. The 
most obvious gap between a goal and its implementation can be monitored in the 15 studies 
that were planned to be conducted on different specific items. These studies were supposed to 
be the basic concept for further policies as well as initiatives for a better integration of the 
RAE. The fact that none of these studies has been conducted so far (OSCE 2012a: 41f.) – 
three years after the Strategy’s adoption and three years before the end of the timeframe – 
shows that there is no fundament for further action. The Strategy and the Action Plan provide 
the authorities with some ideas but lack concrete suggestions as to how to reach the goals. 
According to the information collected by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (2011b; 2012a) and 
SOROS (2011), there is modest progress in the sectors of return, the regularization of infor-
mal settlements, culture, and education. Anyway, there is almost no progress at all in the sec-
tors of employment, participation and representation, and security and police services. (Cf. 
OSCE 2012a: 41) Thus, Sigona therefore even argues that the Strategy “… seem[s] like ‘win-
dow-dressing exercises’ aimed at pleasing the international community” (Sigona 2012: 1225). 
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In conclusion, the Strategy and the corresponding Action Plan created hope that the relevant 
challenges are dealt with at the highest possible level since the Office of the Prime Minister 
has the main responsibility. Indeed, the main challenges are addressed within the Strategy but 
apart from sporadic, short-term, and geographically restricted activities, the goals and objec-
tives in the Strategy have not been reached yet. In general, “Kosovo institutions had fallen 
short of fulfilling their commitments, and the action of many municipalities remained margin-
al.” (OSCE 2012a: 41) The level of integration of the returned Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians 
largely depends on the municipality they return to. Some municipalities have initiated con-
tracts with enterprises to employ members of the RAE communities seasonally or have im-
plemented educational programs for the RAE such as catch-up classes. Nonetheless, the ma-
jority of the municipalities as well as the national authorities did not implement the activities 
set out in the Strategy and the Action Plan yet. 
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6.6 Other Factors Influencing the Return of the RAE 
Apart from the specific conditions existing within Kosovo, supporting or hampering a sus-
tainable integration of the RAE returnees, there are several other factors that significantly 
influence the decision on return. This decision is dependent on factors at different levels. The 
basic precondition for a rational decision on return is the comparison between the conditions 
in the home region (pull factor) – please see Chapter 6.3 on the opportunities and challenges 
within the return process to Kosovo – and the conditions in the host country (push factors).  
 
The first external factor is not directly related to the conditions in the host or home country 
influencing the decision on return: the role of the Roma and other gypsies such as the Ashkali 
and the Egyptians in Europe and in the Western Balkans in particular. The Roma face the 
same challenges across European borders: Whether they live in Kosovo or in the United 
Kingdom, they face discrimination and segregation, especially in the areas of housing, em-
ployment, and education. After they were forced to leave their homes and family members, 
they arrived in countries in Western Europe or in the Western Balkans realizing that they had 
no prospects for the granting of a wider range of rights and duties that are commensurate with 
those enjoyed by local citizens such as freedom of movement, the access to education and the 
labor market, the access to public services and assistance, and family unity, among others. 
The long-term acquisition of citizenship in any European state seems unreachable for the 
RAE refugees. The reasons and background conditions for this hardship are explained in the 
next chapter.  
The second external factor influencing the possibility of a sustainable integration of the RAE 
returnees into the Kosovar society is the forced repatriation of these communities from West-
ern European countries to Kosovo. The forcibly returned RAE cannot make an informed deci-
sion about their return and cannot balance between the push factors in the host country and 
the pull factors in Kosovo. On top of that, they often have a smaller social network they can 
rely on and do not receive social assistance from (non-)governmental institutions. Their spe-
cific situation and the consequences of forced returns from Western Europe to Kosovo are 
explained in Chapter 6.6.2. 
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6.6.1 The Role of the Roma in Europe 
The enlargement of the European Union (EU), especially the 2004 and 2007 Eastern enlarge-
ments, brought a large Romani population into the territory of the EU. Uncertainty persists 
about the current figures of the Roma living in Europe. This is because of a lack of data and 
the fact that many Roma do (and in the past did) not want to claim their ethnic origin since 
“… people are finding it wiser not to declare their membership of this minority” (Cf. Thelen 
2005: 8f.) or they even constitute new ethnic belongings due to the predominant prejudices 
against the Roma within Europe. Yet, estimates range from around 2 up to 12 million. Take 
the lowest current estimate of two million and compare this figure with the population of the 
EU member states, it is apparent that 4 out of 27 current member states have less than two 
million inhabitants.
132
 This comparison demonstrates that the Roma people accounts for a 
significant population within the European borders that cannot be ignored. A further issue is 
the high birth rate among the Roma population. Thelen claims that the birth rate is even high-
er than the birth rate of the lowest classes of the mainstream population in all European coun-
tries
133
 (Cf. Thelen 2005: 8), thereby increasing the current figures of the Romani population 
in Europe. This increase would on a long-term aggravate the current, urgent challenges the 
Roma face in Europe. 
 
Throughout the European history, the Roma lived separated from the rest of the society. Most 
likely, they were nomads, who had to travel around to look for their scattered customers in a 
sparsely populated region. (Cf. Thelen 2005: 14) Nonetheless, “… Roma’s nomadism can 
also be understood as a permanent escape from varying intensities of persecution in the vari-
ous regions.” (Emphasis in original, Thelen 2005: 15f.) The insularity of some Romani com-
munities has been a way to escape from discrimination and violence from the mainstream 
population and of preserving their Romani identity. Cultural differences between the Roma 
and the non-Roma population have prompted voluntary separation and sometimes even con-
flict. (Cf. Guglielmo, Waters 2005: 765) 
 
There is an intense discussion about the status of the Roma within the EU and the wider Eu-
ropean territory. One can differentiate between three approaches, partially complementing 
each other:  
 
(1) An ethnic minority in each European country 
Minorities within a state can be divided between national and ethnic minorities: The national 
minorities are minorities who have a kin state while living in another state where they form a 
minority, e.g. Pakistani in the United Kingdom. In contrast, the ethnic minorities do not have 
a kin state in support of the minorities’ interests, e.g. the Sorbs or Frisians in Germany. The 
Romani people is not a national minority because “[i]t has no native country which feels re-
                                                 
132
  The four member states are: Malta with 416,110, Luxembourg with 524,853, Cyprus with 862,011, and Esto-
nia with 1,339,662 inhabitants. (Cf. EuroStat 2012: Population at 1 January, online at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=1
&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1, last retrieved on 11.01.2013) 
133
  He thereby argues that there is a correlation between the birth rate and social status among the peoples in 
Europe. The less the social status is, the more children are born in these families. This correlation cannot be 
further examined within this paper. 
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sponsible for it, except for some tentative steps in that direction by India under Indira Gandhi” 
(Thelen 2005: 36). Occasionally, they tried to become a “people with Indian origin” and dis-
cussed with Indian leaders the possibility to receive an Indian passport. Although the argu-
ment of an Indian citizenship would be very tempting, the risk of being expelled from other 
states as foreign citizens would be comparably dangerous. (Cf. Marušiakova, Popov 2005: 13)  
Differences to national minorities in European countries are threefold: The Roma are present 
in all European countries, they constitute the most disadvantaged group in all countries, and 
they have no territory or kin state that might support their interests beyond their host state. 
(Cf. Thelen 2005: 12) In the past, they were always perceived as an “ethnic” rather than a 
“national” minority from the mainstream population.  
The political elite gave them a secondary minority status and treated them differently within 
the borders of their host state. (Cf. Guglielmo, Waters 2005: 765) Consequently, only a mi-
nority of the Roma outside of the borders of their country of origin could receive an official 
refugee status. Most likely, host states perceived the arriving Roma as stateless people, who 
represent a danger to their inner security. However, not possessing a legal refugee status 
means not being able to receive the most basic needs – from either the host state or the UN-
HCR, who both almost exclusively deal with recognized refugees. Thelen therefore claims 
that the Roma are a twofold minority: an ethnic minority and deprived of any rights. (Cf. The-
len 2005: 28) “In the absence of a state to protect Roma rights bilaterally, the European and 
international level has come to be particularly important for them.” (Thelen 2005: 37) This is 
where the second status option arises. 
 
(2) A transnational minority within Europe 
A transnational minority would require that the Roma in all European countries share com-
mon features and face similar challenges across borders. This is supported by the anti-
Gypsyism that the Roma experience throughout Europe. The term “anti-Gypsyism” was cre-
ated in the 1980s: that late because “… being prejudiced against the Roma has been accepted 
as normal by a large majority of the population, so that the lack of a term to cover the phe-
nomenon went unnoticed.” (Thelen 2005: 22) Thelen even argues that anti-Gypsyism – in 
contrast to anti-Semitism – is increasing within Europe. In addition, the Roma people are seg-
regated and disadvantaged in most parts of public life throughout Europe. This marginaliza-
tion is prevalent in all European countries and especially applies to education, employment, 
and housing – the same challenges the Kosovo Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians have to face. 
(Cf. Thelen 2005: 27ff.)  
For instance, the employment situation of most Roma is comparable across borders: Most 
European Roma are residents in former socialist countries and worked for public companies. 
With the break-up of the Soviet and the Yugoslav Republic, their work was no longer in de-
mand. In consequence, many Roma were moved to industrial sites (such as the Roma Mahala 
in South Mitrovicë/Mitrovica) where “… ghetto-like housing estates emerged in industrial 
population centres.” (Thelen 2005: 29) They were employed in the construction, civil engi-
neering, and in the production sector. After the privatization and industrialization, many Ro-
ma did not possess the necessary qualifications to be integrated in another economic sector 
and became unemployed.  
Another feature supporting the term “transnational minority” for the Roma is the European-
wide policies that have been promoted and implemented in the past. Policies towards the Ro-
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ma in Europe have long been defined by the majority population’s perception of Roma as 
outsiders. (Cf. Guglielmo, Waters 2005: 763) They revealed a strong security-oriented bias 
and started as a project in order to confine the migration of the Roma from Central Eastern 
Europe (CEE) to the EU member states in Western Europe. The first report on the Roma from 
the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the OSCE from 1993 claimed 
that the aim of the Roma policies should be “… to improve the ‘quality of life’ in migration-
producing countries … for the sake of such improvement, but also for the reduction in pres-
sures on international migration.” (Emphasis in original, Guglielmo, Waters 2005: 768) 
Thereby, the member states of the European Union created a reasoning to establish minority 
protection outside of their borders although a considerable Roma minority has been already 
living within the borders of the EU at that time. 
The Decade of Roma Inclusion was adopted for the time period between 2005 and 2015 “… 
to speed up the process of social inclusion and improve the economic and social situation of 
Roma.” (Thelen 2005: 57) The four top priorities therein are education, employment, health 
care, and housing. Although the rhetoric and the political measurements have improved sub-
stantially in recent years, the implementation of concrete initiatives to improve the living con-
ditions of the Roma in Europe is still falling behind. The Roma do not have a significant im-
pact on the political stakeholders and they are not efficiently equipped to change their status 
and to fight against the discrimination. Müller and Jovanović argue that the underrepresenta-
tion of an estimated ten million Roma in Europe is a serious failure of democracies and that 
the lack of implementation of Roma policies creates a “vicious circle of exclusion”, in which 
the Roma do not gain access to public services necessary to meet their basic needs. (Cf. Mül-
ler, Jovanović 2010: 25) Despite these common characteristics of the Roma in Europe and the 
common activities within European borders to change the status of the Roma and to improve 
their living conditions, the Roma themselves perceive them as a “nation without a state”. 
 
(3) A “nation without a state” 
The concept of the “nation without a state” derives from the International Romani Union 
(IRU), which has this concept in its title. (Cf. Marušiakova, Popov 2005: 12; Thelen 2005: 
42) According to Thelen and other scholars, the first criterion of a nation is the self-perception 
of its people, demonstrated by emotions, convictions, and values. A nation is an “imagined 
community”, true to the motto: What perceives itself as a nation, is a nation. The Romani 
people shares a common language, history, culture, and religion; in particular the shared expe-
rience of anti-Gypsyism including the denial of fundamental rights, persecution, and dis-
placement brought about a sense of identity and nationality among the European Roma. Ad-
mittedly, the question arises whether harmful experiences are a sufficient basis to form a na-
tion among the Roma in Europe. Is it not also necessary for other events and identity creating 
commonalities such as cultural rites before a people is connected by a national feeling? Apart 
from these shared experiences, one of the main features characterizing the Roma in Europe is 
the fact that they are widely dispersed throughout the entire continent. Therefore, it is very 
difficult for the Roma in one country to know in detail about the circumstances, lobby groups, 
and political participation of the Roma in another country. The lack of media coverage about 
the Roma and their circumstances has a supporting impact. 
In general, the goal of a nation is ultimately to form a state, except for the Roma. They never 
attempted to conquer a territory for them. This is partly because the Roma have a culture 
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without weapons
134
, partly because the Roma always migrated in small groups unable to con-
quer a territory. (Cf. Thelen 2005: 14) Yet, there were several small attempts to found a state, 
too. For instance, several ideas to create an own independent state for the Roma, either in Po-
land (Kaliningrad), in the borderland between Romania and Bulgaria, or somewhere else 
emerged at the beginning of the 1990s. The most realistic and well-formed concept is a future 
state in Macedonia, in which long-term strategies for the future geo-political development of 
the Balkans are integrated as well. Another idea – apart from the state – is to gain the status of 
a native people (aborigines) in Europe. The Roma, who developed and/or supported this con-
cept, gained much support from overseas in the USA and in Latin America. (Cf. Marušiakova, 
Popov 2005: 13f.) Nonetheless, none of these ideas has ever been thought out in all possible 
details. 
It is remarkable to note that Thelen perceives the lack of willingness to found a Roma state as 
a step into the direction of “politics without borders”. According to his assumptions, “… the 
Roma have already moved one step further, at least as far as it concerns their concept of a 
nation without a state.” (Thelen 2005: 46) He calls the Roma the most European people of all 
who overcame the concept of nation states and feel themselves as an independent people 
within the borders of Europe. In contradiction to Thelen’s assumptions, this paper argues that 
the decision not to found a Romani state was not a conscious decision made in order to over-
come the concept of nation states in Europe. In contrast, the Roma were not capable of found-
ing a Romani state because they did not have sufficient capabilities to organize themselves, 
they lack lobby groups supporting this idea among European political stakeholders, and there 
was no geographical solution where to found a Romani state without effectively changing the 
borders of any other European state. 
 
Although each approach has its place, the most convincing status of the Roma in Europe re-
lated to the circumstances they are living in and the challenges they are facing in their every-
day life is to see Roma as an ethnic minority in each European state. This becomes particular-
ly crucial when one wants to explain their status as refugees and returnees in Europe. As an 
ethnic minority, the Roma do not have a state supporting their interests or accepting them into 
their territory in case of conflict. Rather, they are treated as non-citizens excluded from the 
employment market, from appropriate housing options, and from access to education and 
health care. The Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians in Kosovo are not excluded from these 
challenges. In fact, the general economic situation and the socio-economic circumstances of 
the RAE in Kosovo are much worse than in the other Western Balkan and European coun-
tries. (Cf. Müller, Jovanović 2010: 68) In addition, the Roma fear backlash and violence be-
cause of their imagined role in the 1990s conflict. When they are living as refugees in exile, 
they have almost no prospects for full integration into their host country. The full integration 
would only be possible when a RAE refugee “… becomes a naturalized citizen of his or her 
asylum country” (Crisp 2004: 2). The lack thereof means that they can be deported at any 
time to their home region where violence and inhumane living conditions await them.  
Consequently, the RAE refugees have two different options. Their first option is to return 
home where worse socio-economic conditions than in the rest of Europe await them. In addi-
tion, they most often have no place where to return to due to the lack of property (titles) and 
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  In India, the precedents of the Roma people belonged to the third caste – the craftsmen and traders – who did 
not possess any weapons. (Cf. Thelen 2005: 12) 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
173 
the lack of further housing options such as socially owned housing. In Kosovo, the RAE and 
the Roma in particular because of their close relations to the Serbs, have to fear backlash and 
violence. The second option is to stay in exile facing severe challenges in the access to basic 
public services, not possessing any integration prospects, and fearing to be deported at any 
time. Many have chosen the second option and had to deal with the consequence of being 
forcefully deported from Western European countries, such as Germany and the United King-
dom, to Kosovo. 
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6.6.2 Forced Returns from Western Europe 
From January 2003 until September 2012, around 1,200 Roma, 1,800 Ashkali, and 250 Egyp-
tians were forcibly returned from Western Europe to Kosovo. This was made possible due to 
readmission agreements between Kosovo and 15 European states about the repatriation of the 
Kosovo RAE to their home region. (Cf. Kuthan 2012: 1; Tmava, Beha 2009: 8) The countries 
repatriating the most Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians are Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden. 
Italy, Denmark, and the Netherlands repatriated very small numbers of the RAE to Kosovo. 
(Cf. HRW 2010: 31) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: The RAE Forced Returns from January 2003 – September 2012 
Source:  Data collected from HRW (2010): Rights Displaced – Forced Returns of Roma, Ashkali and Egyp-
tians from Western Europe to Kosovo, p. 32. 
The forced returns of the RAE began in 2003, reasoning from domestic political concerns 
about asylum and immigration policies as well as a lack of voluntary returns.  
At the same time, the UNHCR issued the first “Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the Inter-
national Protection Needs of Individuals from Kosovo” stating that the Ashkali and the Egyp-
tians – in contrast to Serbian- and Romani-speaking Roma – do not need general protection in 
Kosovo. (Cf. HRW 2010: 28) Yet, each case of forced repatriation of the Ashkali and the 
Egyptians from Western Europe should be decided on after a screening of the individual cir-
cumstances and the municipality of origin. Additionally, the repatriation should only take 
place to locations mutually agreed on. The Roma, however, were and still are considered an 
ethnic community in need of protection in Kosovo. Therefore, from 1999 onwards, UNMIK 
blocked all deportations of the Roma to Kosovo despite strong pressure from Western Euro-
pean countries “… except for a limited number of Roma ‘males with a serious criminal rec-
ord’ who were allowed to be returned from 2005.” (HRW 2010: 28) The figures, however, 
show a different picture. Some countries deported the Roma despite their need for protection 
claimed in the Egibility Guidelines.  
 
From 2003 until 2008, the UNMIK screened forced returns and, to some extent, also rejected 
entire planes since the affected RAE returnees would not be safe in Kosovo. The Kosovo Pro-
visional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) adopted a readmission policy in November 
2007, namely the “Strategy for Reintegration of Repatriated Persons”. The Strategy enumer-
ated necessary steps to successfully integrate the forced returnees from Western Europe into 
Kosovo’s society. This includes assistance upon arrival, particularly temporary accommoda-
tion for up to seven days, a medical check, and the provision of further information on public 
services. Despite being a good guidance document, the initiatives and measurements proposed 
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in this Strategy have not been implemented yet due to a lack of funding and political will (Cf. 
HHRW 2010: 34) and “… local authorities are still sorely uninformed about their responsibil-
ities vis-à-vis repatriated persons …” (Emphasis in original, OSCE 2009b: 11). Consequently, 
none of Kosovo’s municipalities, which are responsible for the local implementation of the 
Strategy’s envisaged policies, has established procedures to support the repatriated persons 
upon their return in the municipalities of origin. (Cf. OSCE 2009b: 12)  
 
After the declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 and the adoption of the before 
mentioned Strategy and the corresponding Action Plan, Kosovo’s new institutions took the 
responsibility over the forced returns. Western European countries could now repatriate RAE 
individuals from Kosovo without the individual screening process despite numerous concerns 
about mass returns. Human Rights Watch speculated, “… screening and potentially excluding 
people from being return to Kosovo would … ‘give a bad image to Kosovo, which is some-
thing that the Kosovo authorities would not be happy about.’” (Cf. HRW 2010: 36) The Ko-
sovar authorities therefore simplified the repatriation of the RAE to Kosovo. 
Simultaneously, the Western European countries claimed that after the declaration of inde-
pendence, the newly established Republic is able to care on its own for its refugees and IDPs. 
As a consequence, they agreed on readmission agreements on the forced return of the RAE, 
ignoring the precarious situation of these minorities in Kosovo. The result is a vicious circle: 
On the one hand, Kosovo wants to demonstrate its sovereignty and independence and, hence, 
accepts the repatriation of the RAE refugees from Western European countries. On the other 
hand, Kosovo is not able to deal with all forcibly returned refugees and cannot support them 
to successfully integrate them into the Kosovar society. (Cf. Kuthan 2012: 4f.)  
 
Often, the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians living in Western European countries as asy-
lum claimants or under a toleration permit
135
 are well integrated into their host societies. The 
RAE children from Kosovo often do not even know their home country and attend Western 
European schools during their time in exile. When the Ashkali or the Egyptians are forcibly 
returned to Kosovo, the circumstances awaiting them are appalling: They often have neither 
access to appropriate accommodation or property nor can they rely on an expanded social 
network in Kosovo. (Cf. Tmava, Beha 2009: 7) Many repatriated RAE live in sub-standard 
housing with no running water and no electricity, which means they cannot heat their homes 
during winter times. (Cf. HRW 2010: 53) Most likely, they have less access to proper docu-
mentation than voluntary returnees who are often assisted by the UNHCR and its implement-
ing partners. In addition, the forced returnees find it difficult to find a job in Kosovo: “Human 
Rights Watch did not meet a single forced returnee in formal employment … .” (HRW 2010: 
69) 
 
The background is that the vast majority of assistance is aimed at supporting the voluntary 
returnees. The repatriated persons, on the contrary, often remain without any assistance upon 
their arrival. Neither international nor Kosovar institutions support them to find their way 
back into the home society. (Cf. OSCE 2009b: 12) Exceptions are the Roma and Ashkali 
Documentation Center (RAD), which provides some basic information and assistance with 
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  In Germany, the toleration permit is called Duldung, and refers to a temporary suspension of deportation 
according to German law.  
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contacting families, the URA 2 program
136
 from Germany, and the Employment Assistance 
Program (EAS)
137
 from Switzerland. (Cf. Tmava, Beha 2009: 28) Nevertheless, all these pro-
grams are not able to fill the gap created by the lack of governmental support for the forced 
returnees, especially due to their small budgets and limited scopes. (Cf. HRW 2010: 37) In 
addition, the “Strategy for the Integration of Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians” provides some 
financial resources for the forcibly returned RAE. However, in most of the cases, the forced 
returnees do not receive any assistance at all. The reason is that the application mechanism 
seems to be that complex that, effectively, nobody applied for financial support in 2010. 
Above all, it is estimated that only 10 % of the 3.4 million EUR designated for 2011 have 
been actually spent. (Cf. Kuthan 2012: 11) 
 
The forcibly returned Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians await worse conditions in Kosovo than 
the voluntarily returned RAE refugees. This is because at the best, the refugees or the IDPs 
who return voluntarily to their homes make an informed decision comparing the push and the 
pull factors. This means that they can balance between the conditions in the host and in the 
home country. This includes the possibility of reaching a better status in the host country as, 
for instance, an accepted asylum claim, an indefinite residence permit, or the citizenship with 
full access to all public services. Voluntary return means, over and above, that refugees “… 
discover their social and cultural roots, which give them the comforting feeling of belong-
ing.” (Emphasis in original, Ghanem 2005: 105) The return to one’s own homeland meets an 
emotional need, which comes on top of the rational comparison between the push and the pull 
factors.  
The forced returnees, in contrast, are deprived of an informed decision. The host government 
often concedes only one day to the refugees to prepare their departure. Consequently, they 
neither can contact relatives nor organize an apartment for their arrival in Kosovo. Their will 
to integrate themselves in the Kosovar society as well as the likelihood to be fully integrated 
decline substantially. The dependence on external assistance, which already determined their 
lives in exile, is reinforced, because the deported RAE returnees cannot fall back on any re-
sources.  
 
To sum up, the refugees who are forcibly returned – in this case from the Roma, the Ashkali, 
and the Egyptian communities – cannot make an informed decision about their return. They 
are not able to decide on whether the stay or the return is the better option for their future. In 
most cases, staying in exile would have been more sustainable than being repatriated to Koso-
vo where unfavorable conditions are awaiting them.  
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  The URA 2 project (ura means “bridge” in Albanian) offers comprehensive return counseling and measures 
for the integration, care, and support of Kosovar returnees in its Return Center in Prishtinë/ Priština. This 
program is particularly designed for repatriates from the Länder Baden-Wuerttemberg, Lower Saxony, North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Saxony, and Saxony-Anhalt. Since 2013, voluntary returnees from Thuringia can also ap-
proach the Return Center and receive support within the URA 2 program. For more information, please see: 
http://www.bamf.de/EN/Rueckkehrfoerderung/Projekt 
Kosovo/projektkosovo.html, last retrieved on 10.11.2013. 
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  The EAS focuses on measures to improve the economic prospects for the returnees from Switzerland but also 
for stayees. Special attention is paid to the communities of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians who 
suffer from their minority positions in the Kosovar society. For further information, please see: 
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/specials/kosovo/Returning_home_to_Kosovo_with_Swiss_ 
help_.html?cid=29527942, last retrieved on 10.11.2013. 
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“… [I]n reality, the deportees are forced to get along on their own after their arrival in 
Kosovo. Besides a reliable social network (of relatives and former neighbours/friends) 
and financial resources, they need a pragmatic sense for reality to tackle all the prob-
lems they are confronted with.” (Tmava, Beha 2009: 28)  
The forcibly returned Ashkali and Egyptians are left alone in a miserable economic and social 
situation. Most likely, they are worse off than their voluntary returning counterparts resulting 
in this: 
“Most alarming was the statistic that 90 percent of forcibly returned Roma [and Ashkali 
and Egyptians] left Kosovo shortly after their return, as reported by UNHCR.” (Interna-
tional Roundtable 2008: 12) 
The forcibly returned persons, who decide to leave Kosovo again, have to do so through orga-
nized crime networks because they cannot immigrate legally a second time into the Schengen 
area
138
. Secondary displacement absolutely contradicts the conceptual framework of a sus-
tainable return of refugees to their home country.  
 
On top of that, forced returns create a socio-economic crisis for the RAE communities in Ko-
sovo because they cannot access remittances sent by the RAE refugees abroad. (Cf. Strategy 
2008: 48) Additionally, forced returnees challenge the often already scarce resources in the 
return communities in Kosovo. Into the bargain, “[r]eturning people from western countries 
makes [sic] the situation for the domestic RAE population worse and jeopardizes the stability 
of Kosovo.” (Tmava, Beha 2009: 29) 
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  The Schengen Area comprises 26 European states. It operates as a single international travel and immigration 
area with no border controls between these states. 
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6.7 Preliminary Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
Keeping in mind the definition of sustainable return, i.e. that returnees can establish sustaina-
ble livelihoods, which can be maintained without external inputs and are sufficiently robust to 
withstand external shocks, and that returnees are well integrated into the entire society, the 
return of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians to Kosovo cannot be identified as sustain-
able. This illustrates the following figure. 
 
Figure 25:  The Relation between the Conditions and the External Factors of the RAE Return to Kosovo 
Source: Own illustration 
The first subchapter reveals that the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians by the majority 
return to mono-ethnic areas that are not their places of origin. The feeling of insecurity, the 
occupation of entire former RAE neighborhoods by ethnic Albanians, the lack of property and 
appropriate accommodations, and poor inter-ethnic relations force the RAE refugees to return 
to areas solely populated by people like them. Even if it allows them to live with their rela-
tives and friends, it excludes them from the general society and marginalizes them considera-
bly.  
The second subchapter deals with the correlation between school education and the integra-
tion into the employment market. One of the biggest obstacles to a sustainable integration of 
the RAE returnees into the society is the lack of education. Most RAE children only finish 
primary school and start working at a very early age because every hand is needed to feed the 
family and education is not traditionally anchored in the RAE communities. The severe con-
sequences are that as a consequence of their low educational level, most RAE work in low-
paying jobs such as drivers or cleaners, if they are employed at all. As a result, these families 
do not encourage their children to go to school. 
The third subchapter tackled the lack of civil registration documents that disproportionally 
applies to the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptian communities in Kosovo. Around 40 % of 
the RAE is not registered as residents in Kosovo. Consequently, the unregistered Roma, Ash-
kali, and Egyptians are deprived of the access to public goods and services such as health care 
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and education. The returning RAE are excessively deprived thereof because upon their arrival 
in Kosovo they cannot access the most basic needs.  
The situation of the RAE IDPs and returnees in the lead-contaminated camps in the North of 
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica is particularly devastating and was explored in the fourth subchapter dis-
tinctively. Their situation is characterized by the lack of self-determination: They are forced 
to live in inhumane conditions with a daily aggravation of their health conditions. This is 
mainly because they have nowhere to go to and do not feel safe in their old neighborhood in 
the Roma Mahala in the South of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. 
Due to their marginalization and the poor representation in return-related institutions, the Ko-
sovar institutions support the integration of the RAE with the Strategy for the Integration of 
Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Communities in the Republic of Kosovo. It is encouraging that 
their poor socio-economic situation has been acknowledged. However, the resulting opportu-
nities are marginal because only a few initiatives were implemented due to a lack of budget 
and of political will.  
 
The situation of the RAE returnees is further dependent on two external factors, namely the 
role of the Roma (and the Ashkali and the Egyptians) in the rest of Europe and the forced re-
turns of the RAE from Western European countries. The gypsies are marginalized in all Euro-
pean countries. As a Europe-wide ethnic minority, they have no lobby representing their 
rights. As a result, the RAE refugees have almost no possibility of being integrated into their 
host state and society respectively.  
A further issue is the forced returns of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians from West-
ern European countries to Kosovo. These forcibly returned RAE cannot make an informed 
decision about their return. They are forced to get along on their own because almost all na-
tional and international assistance is dedicated to voluntary returnees.  
 
In conclusion, the return of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians to Kosovo is not sus-
tainable. Upon their arrival in Kosovo, the RAE returnees are deprived of the most basic 
needs such as an appropriate health care. Most likely, the RAE returnees do not find perma-
nent employment due to their low level of education and the widespread prejudices against 
gypsies. This does not allow them to establish sustainable livelihoods they could maintain 
without external inputs. Rather, they are dependent on daily or seasonal work that rarely co-
vers the costs to feed their families. These conditions are equal for all three communities.  
 
Regardless, recalling the return figures of these three communities, the following picture 
emerges. Only approximately 11 % of the displaced Roma returned to their homes so far. 
Their return behavior is characterized by the relations to the Serbian community. Due to the 
shared language, religion, and to some extent cultural background, as well as their (imagined) 
role as collaborators of the Serbs during the hostilities in the 1990s, they are more vulnerable 
for ethnically motivated harassment and attacks. It seems that this fear dominates the basis for 
their decision-making. Despite the lack of integration opportunities in the host states, the ab-
solute majority of the Roma decided against a return to Kosovo.  
In contrast, despite the lack of accurate and separated data for each of the two communities, it 
can be estimated that around 83 % of the displaced Ashkali and around 62 % of the displaced 
Egyptians returned to their homes in Kosovo so far. In comparison to the Roma, this large 
figure leads to the conclusion that the discrimination and above all the fear thereof is less pre-
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dominant among Ashkali and Egyptians than among the Roma community. As Sigona sum-
marizes: 
“Within what a respondent termed ‘a planned scenario’, in which the smaller minorities 
do not seem to have the power and resources to challenge the rules of the game and 
have to play along if they want a share of the limited resources available, Albanian-
speaking Ashkali and Egyptian minorities seem better positioned and more positive than 
the Roma – traditionally closer to the Serbian community.” (Sigona 2012: 1221) 
Apart from this specific challenge for the Roma community, all three communities generally 
have a very low reputation in the society of Kosovo. 
 
At large, the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians play a predominantly passive role in Ko-
sovo. They are recipients of public services, if registered as residents, and have to accept eve-
ry law and decision that is being made about their lives. Accordingly, they cannot shape any 
law, character of an institution, or even a curriculum of a class in school. The little political 
participation they perform and the lack of a lobby cause them to be the forgotten communi-
ties. As Sigona puts it:  
“The ‘forgotten victims’ of the 1999 war … have become the forgotten citizens of the 
newly independent Kosovo.” (Sigona 2012: 1216)  
This is supported by the following argument:  
“A corollary to the compartmentalisation of RAE in a human- and minority-rights dis-
cursive and policy frame is their de facto exclusion from citizenry, with the Kosovo au-
thorities feeling legitimised in not treating RAE as Kosovo citizens and political sub-
jects, but rather as an issue for the international community to deal with.” (Sigona 2012: 
1223)  
This argument also explains the lack of implementation of the Strategy for the integration of 
the RAE.  
 
One could even argue that the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians are structurally excluded 
from the Kosovar society by applying the concept of “structural violence” that was developed 
by Johan Galtung at the end of the 1960s. Structural violence “… is built into the structure 
and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances.” (Galtung 1969: 
171) The power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed and some 
people are totally excluded from these possibilities. The extreme circumstances of the Roma, 
the Ashkali, and the Egyptians in the lead-contaminated camps in North Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 
illustrate this construct. The temporary accommodation was a humanitarian action imple-
mented by the international community so as to protect those who did not have a home to re-
turn to. The fact that this developed into a durable solution although it was known right from 
the beginning that the lead contamination causes severe health issues is a first evidence for 
structural violence against the RAE in Kosovo. The RAE camp residents did not have the 
opportunity to leave the camps because neither the Serbs nor the Albanians in North Kosovo 
created conditions conducive to their return or to resettlement. Consequently, the RAE IDPs 
and returnees live for more than a decade on soil, 88.23 % of which is not safe for human hab-
itation or farming. The lack of efforts to resettle the RAE shortened their lifespan significantly 
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and brought them into a dependent situation constantly exposed to a considerable risk to their 
health and ultimately to their lives.  
In addition, the RAE are also discriminated outside Kosovo by the international community. 
Western European countries, which are potential third countries for the reception of refugees 
from Kosovo, are increasingly unwilling to accept and to integrate members of these minority 
groups into their societies. One famous example is the so-called Abschiebungen
139
 of RAE 
from Germany
140
, where many children, who only know German schools, neither speak Alba-
nian nor Serbian, and who take part in the social life in Germany, are sent back. Please see 
also Chapter 6.6.2 on “Forced Returns from Western Europe” with regard to these issues. The 
lack of readiness to accept refugees is deeply rooted in the fact that the acceptance of the own 
population towards refugees decreases. In addition, as described in Chapter 6.6.1, the Roma 
(and also the Ashkali and the Egyptians), are discriminated and structurally disadvantaged 
throughout Europe. Refugees and returnees from these minority communities are particularly 
vulnerable, because they have even less resources and less leverage in policy-making institu-
tions than any other member of their communities. 
 
Yet, even outside the camps, the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians are the most disadvan-
taged and most vulnerable communities in Kosovo. In addition, they are sitting on the fence – 
being neither integrated in the Kosovar nor the Serbian system. The choice for one or the oth-
er system would cause tensions with the opposing community.  
“I believe neutrality does not exist. You have to take a side whether you want to or not, 
indirectly or directly. The Roma MP [Member of Parliament] took the decision to de-
clare that Kosovo Roma support the independence of Kosovo. Such a display of loyalty 
contributes to earning points for the Roma who live with the Albanians. But Kosovo is a 
mixed community; we also have Roma living with Serbs. It is an obvious question to 
ask: What will happen to those Roma who live with Serbs in the enclaves or in the north 
of Kosovo? You get the opposite position, so neutrality does not exist.” (Interview 
quoted in Sigona 2012: 1221) 
Consequently, the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians remain the forgotten communities 
that live outside of both systems. This applies equally to the remaining and to the returning 
members of the RAE communities. In 2005, the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) al-
ready argued that “[t]he answer to the question whether Kosovo is prepared to accept people 
is ‘no’” (ERRC 2005: 49). Kosovo’s institutions, as well as non-governmental and interna-
tional organizations, should first strengthen the population that is currently living in Kosovo 
and strengthen their absorption capacities before the return of more Roma, Ashkali, and Egyp-
tians is possible. This is also because “… the continuous return of RAE refugees increases the 
number of persons depending on social assistance dramatically, which is already very high 
among RAE communities in Kosovo.” (Tmava, Beha 2009: 15) The following policy recom-
mendations are intended to improve the living conditions of the already returned Roma, Ash-
kali, and Egyptians in Kosovo and directed to possible returnees. 
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  This is the German word for deportations. 
140
  For further information, please see: UNICEF Kosovo and the German Committee for UNICEF (2011): No 
place to call home. Repatriation from Germany to Kosovo as seen and experienced by Roma, Ashkali and 
Egyptian children, Pristina, pp. ff. 18, online available at: http://www.unicef.org/kosovoprogramme/No_ 
Place_to_Call_Home_English_2011.pdf, last retrieved on 07.07.2014. 
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PR 1: Expand the focus from promoting the integration of the Serbs to the integration of 
the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians into the Kosovar society. 
Addressee: Kosovar governmental institutions, in particular the government, the parlia-
ment, and the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) 
It can be observed that although (inter-)national stakeholders and organizations representing 
the Roma (and the Ashkali and the Egyptians) have different approaches to deal with the spe-
cific challenges the RAE are facing in Kosovo, the “… common element … is that both rec-
ognize the need for a specific approach towards the Gypsies, different from approach towards 
the members of the majority population and even from other minorities.” (Marušiakova, Po-
pov 2005: 15) As a result, it is critical that decision makers in Kosovo recognize this fact and 
expand their focus from promoting the integration of the Serbs to the integration of the Roma, 
the Ashkali, and the Egyptians into Kosovo’s society. This includes the expansion of the pub-
lic debate on the integration of the Serbian minority by the other minorities as well as the 
acknowledgement their needs.  
 
PR 2: Strengthen the RAE’s political position in Kosovo. 
Addressee: Kosovar governmental institutions, in particular the Kosovar parliament 
One suggestion made by an interviewee of Sigona (2012: 1222) is “… an agenda focused on 
rights and achieving ‘better living conditions’ and ‘normal standards’, rather than political 
participation, may allow RAE to maintain a certain distance from Albanian and Serbian sides, 
ensure the protective backing of the international community and bring some advantages in 
the short term.” Nonetheless, without being able to influence policies and politics in Kosovo, 
it is nearly impossible for the RAE to change their situation. The Kosovar institutions should 
undertake more initiatives to strengthen the RAE’s political position in order to codetermine 
decisions and laws that tackle their daily lives directly or indirectly. Despite the fact that all 
three ethnic communities are unified in different political parties, these do not have significant 
leverage to improve their communities’ lives. The introduction of a Qualified Majority Voting 
similar to the system applied by the Council of the European Union could be one mean by 
which this could be implemented. Decisions made by the council have to be taken by 55 % of 
member states and to represent at least 65 % of the EU’s population. 
 
PR 3: Raise the representation of the RAE communities in the Kosovo Police and in the 
Municipal Council on Safety in Communities (MCSC).  
Addressee: Kosovo Ministry for Internal Affairs 
If Kosovo wants to be a multi-ethnic society, it should create safe conditions for all ethnic 
communities so that they can freely choose where to live and where to move to. This goal can 
be reached through the raise of representation of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians in 
(1) the Kosovo Police and in (2) the Municipal Councils on Safety in Communities. More 
importantly, incidents – whether physical or psychological – should be punished by the re-
spective institutions to show that there is no place for ethnically motivated violence in Kosovo 
anymore. At the moment, the institutions are not able to pass this idea on to their residents. In 
order to raise the representation of the RAE in the Kosovo Police, the RAE have to have a 
higher level of education because in the past, RAE have failed to pass qualifying examina-
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tions due to their low educational level. Please see the policy recommendations related to ed-
ucation (PR 6 – 7). The Kosovar Ministry of Internal Affairs could enable the RAE to take the 
respective exams or courses retrospectively. This is especially relevant for those, who apply 
for a position within the Kosovoar Police.  
 
PR 4: Provide the RAE returnees with legal aid for the repossession of their property.  
Addressee: Municipalities, in particular the Municipal Offices for Communities and Re-
turns (MOCR) 
One of the main challenges in the return process of the RAE refugees and displaced persons is 
the illegal occupation of their property by displaced ethnic Albanians. By establishing the 
HPCC and its successor the KPA, there are legal mechanisms implemented that help the re-
turning refugees to regain their property rights. However, due to the RAE’s low legal educa-
tion, they lack information on how to approach this institution. Without any financial means, 
they cannot get legal support from lawyers who could file a claim before the KPA. Kosovo’s 
municipalities, i.e. the Municipal Offices for Communities and Returns (MOCR), should pro-
vide the RAE returnees with legal aid for the repossession of their property. They could fur-
ther establish a free consultation-hour for judicial questions. 
 
PR 5: Investigate cases properly when RAE returnees sell their property immediately after 
the repossession thereof.  
Addressee: Kosovo Police 
There is one particular threat for the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians whose property 
has been reconstructed or their property rights reestablished. As has been explained above, a 
few RAE returnees have to sell their property either because they have to cover other costs or 
because they are forced to by their Albanian or Serbian neighbors who intent to keep their 
neighborhoods “ethnically clean.” In order to find a solution for this imminent threat, special 
attention should be given to those RAE who recently repossessed their property and sell it 
immediately. It is indispensable to investigate these cases properly and to find out whether 
neighboring residents forced them to sell the property. Furthermore, the Kosovar Police could 
establish a sub-unit, which exclusively deals with the unlawful sale of property. 
 
PR 6: Organize free of charge language courses for the RAE returned children.  
Addressee: Municipalities 
Language is the key to education and education the key to social integration. Mattern argues 
that language affiliation is the most important feature for the (dis-)functioning of integration 
into the Kosovo society. (Cf. Mattern 2006: 3f.) 
The returning children belonging to the Roma, the Ashkali, or the Egyptian community 
should be given the opportunity to learn one or both of the official languages of Kosovo: Al-
banian and/or Serbian. It is important to preserve the heritage of the Romani language in Ko-
sovo. However, the long-term effect of not being able to speak either Albanian or Serbian 
means the exclusion from the employment market. In order to be able to work in a public or 
private enterprise in Kosovo, the RAE returnees have to be able to speak the official lan-
guage(s) depending on where they live. 
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It is the municipalities’ responsibility to develop and offer language courses for the RAE re-
turned children from abroad, especially for those returned from Western European countries. 
These language courses serve manifold purposes: First, the RAE children learn Albanian 
and/or Serbian, which is their entry ticket into the school system and into the employment 
market. Second, the courses can also be a first contact point to their origins and to their new 
lives. Children can learn about Kosovo, about their own community’s heritage and past, and 
get to know other children, who are in a comparable situation. Third, organizing the language 
courses in a public school would create first contact points to the rest of the society. The re-
turned RAE children can get to know children belonging to other communities who have 
lived their entire life in Kosovo and can learn how things work in their new home. 
 
PR 7: Launch awareness-raising meetings to teach parents about the importance of educa-
tion for their children. 
Addressee: Municipalities 
The municipalities have to get more involved in the re-integration of the Roma, the Ashkali, 
and the Egyptian returnees by implementing awareness-raising meetings to teach parents how 
important the education of their children is and to break traditions impeding the children from 
going to school and building their own prosperous future.  
 
PR 8: Launch awareness campaigns about civil registration in combination with the regis-
tration of the previously unregistered RAE in Kosovo. 
Addressee: Municipalities 
One specific and utterly devastating reason for their low and passive status in Kosovo is the 
lack of personal documentation. Without proving residency in Kosovo, they are not able to 
apply for social welfare and do not have access to education and health care. The first step to 
increase the RAE’s participation in public life is to launch awareness campaigns in a combi-
nation with the registration of previously unregistered RAE in Kosovo. According to the sub-
sidiarity principle, it is the municipalities’ responsibility to provide the unregistered RAE with 
legal aid to guarantee lower prices, especially for the returnees without any financial capabili-
ties, and to increase the number of registered RAE in Kosovo. 
In this case, it would be a good idea to educate the RAE leaders in each municipality about 
the necessity of and the procedure of applying for personal documentation in Kosovo. They 
could then function as disseminators and help their community registering. In addition, a 
“free-of-charge registration month” could be established to help reaching those people with  
specific need. 
 
PR 9: Foster the return of the RAE to urban instead of rural areas to increase access to 
health care institutions.  
Addressee: Municipalities, UNHCR 
Roma in particular face one major challenge accessing health care services in Kosovo. Fre-
quently, they do not find adequate primary or secondary health care institutions in their im-
mediate environment. Consequently, they have to travel to city centers in the Serbian domi-
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nated municipalities either in the North of Kosovo or in the Serbian enclaves in the East or 
South such as Gračanica/Graçanicë or Štrpce/Shtërpcë. These travels are often long and ex-
pensive, encouraging them to delay their illnesses because of a lack of money to travel and to 
receive proper treatment. In case of emergencies, these circumstances can be fatal if there is 
no health care provider close to the patient. The Roma returnees are particularly affected be-
cause they most likely return to rural areas and not to the city centers where primary and sec-
ondary health care institutions are often located. A first instrument to increase the Roma’s 
access to health care services is to foster the return to urban instead of rural areas. This has 
also the effect that the RAE returnees have access to other public services such as education, 
courts, and public transportation means. In order to reach that more refugees return to urban 
than to rural areas, UNHCR could also start a dialogue with the refugees before they decide, 
where they want to return to. 
 
PR 10: Promotion of better living conditions and more political participation for the Roma 
within the European Union. 
Addressee: European decision making institutions, such as the national parliaments, but 
also the Council of the European Union and other EU institutions 
The situation of the Roma within the European Union is very much linked to the situation in 
Kosovo. This is partly because Kosovo – more than any other Western Balkan country – ori-
entates its politics towards the European politics framework and European standards. For in-
stance, Kosovo’s Anti-discrimination Law derives from comparable laws in the EU and con-
tains all relevant aspects. As a result, one can observe that Kosovo takes into account what the 
EU does, also when it comes to the protection of minorities. In addition, the ultimate goal of 
Kosovo is to become a fully recognized state and a member of the European Union – integrat-
ed into the monetary union and benefiting from visa liberty and economic growth.  
Keeping this in mind, the promotion of better living conditions and political participation of 
the Roma within the European Union would not only improve the Roma’s situation within the 
EU, but also affects Kosovo and the other Western Balkan countries in their actions. Political 
stakeholders of the EU should create more forums for the Roma to actively participate in pub-
lic life, strengthen their rights, and integrate them into the European societies.  
 
PR 11: Give direct instructions to the municipalities about their priorities in the implementa-
tion of the Strategy and the corresponding Action Plan. 
Addressee: Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) 
It is encouraging that the Kosovar institutions discovered that the Roma, the Ashkali, and the 
Egyptians are not very well integrated into Kosovo’s society. The Strategy and the corre-
sponding Action Plan serve as instruments showing the reasons behind the unsuccessful inte-
gration and define measures towards their social, economic, cultural, and political integration. 
To sum it up, the Strategy is necessary, has an important reason behind it, and deals with the 
right policies that have also been identified in this dissertation. 
 
Nonetheless, the Action Plan does not refer to some major aspects in the Strategy such as the 
correlation between school education and employment possibilities and lacks concrete meas-
urements and indicators that would help implementing the relevant goals. Most alarming is 
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that none of the 15 studies planned for in the Strategy/Action Plan have been conducted so 
far. Thus, there is no basis for the development of concrete steps such as incentives for the 
integration of the RAE into the employment market. 
In addition, the actions already pointed out in the Action Plan have not been implemented yet 
due to a lack of budget and political will. For this reason, the Office of the Prime Minister 
(OPM) should start implementing the Strategy and the corresponding Action Plan. This main-
ly includes the accomplishment of the foreseen studies in order to develop concrete steps aim-
ing at the integration of the RAE into the society. In addition, the OPM should give direct 
instructions to the municipalities about their priorities in this matter. It would be helpful to 
provide them with a plan highlighting the short-term, the medium-term, and the long-term 
goals and the corresponding actions for their implementation. Examples for these goals could 
be: 
(1) Short-term goal: The establishment of a yearly “free of charge registration month” aimed 
at reaching the RAE, who are not registered in Kosovo and thereby lacking access to basic 
public services. 
(2) Medium-term goal: The identification of private companies that can employ RAE, fully or 
on a seasonal basis, the conclusion of a contract with these companies, and the employ-
ment of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians. 
(3) Long-term goal: The improvement of the security situation – also the subjective feeling of 
(in-)security – in the municipalities of origin where the RAE lived before their displace-
ment. 
 
PR 12: The RAE should not be repatriated from Western European countries without a com-
prehensive individual screening.  
Addressee: Western European governments with the support of the UNHCR 
Recalling the conditions of the forced returnees from the RAE communities in Kosovo, it is of 
utmost importance that the countries hosting the most Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian refugees 
from Kosovo do not repatriate them without a comprehensive individual screening. This 
screening should, in contrast to the screening of the UNHCR until 2008, include the follow-
ing: 
 the analysis of the municipality of origin, including 
 the security situation for the RAE communities,  
 access to education (at the best with specific subjects for the RAE communities),  
 access to health care services and social assistance,  
 employment opportunities for the RAE in public and private enterprises, e.g. existing 
co-operations between the municipality and private employers about the seasonal em-
ployment of the RAE, and 
 access to property or appropriate housing and 
 the existence of support mechanisms by the Municipal Communities and Return Officer 
(MCRO). 
 
If the conditions in the municipality of origin are not favorable to a sustainable integration of 
the RAE returnees, it should be analyzed whether there are other municipalities conducive to 
a return of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians from abroad. The before mentioned con-
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ditions and the existence of a social network should be taken into account while searching for 
a sustainable alternative to the municipality of origin.  
 
PR 13: The municipalities receiving the forcibly returned RAE should benefit from external 
assistance programs and should get more financial aid from the Kosovar institutions. 
Addressee: Kosovo Ministry for Internal Affairs 
The municipalities receiving the forcibly returned Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians should get 
more assistance from the Kosovo institutions, namely the Ministry of Internal Affairs being 
responsible for the administration of forced returnees. Additionally, these municipalities 
should explicitly benefit from the external assistance programs for forced returnees such as 
the URA 2 program operated by Germany. 
 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
188 
7. The Serbian Community 
7.1 Introduction 
The Serbs are the second largest ethnic community in Kosovo, belonging to the Orthodox 
Christian religion. The Serbs have lived in Kosovo since 1000 AD, around the same length of 
time as Albanians. In the early 1980s, the Kosovo Serbs complained about increasing discrim-
ination in public life when the Kosovo Albanians began asking for their own independent 
state, detached from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). During Slobodan 
Milošević’ regime, beginning in 1989, the tide turned, and the Serbs dominated public life 
while simultaneously and forcefully dispossessing the Albanians from the same. (Cf. Stevens 
2009: 10) The Serbian oppression of the Albanians came to an end with the NATO bombing 
of Yugoslavia.
141
 To sum up, the Serb’s role in Kosovo has significantly changed over the 
past 30 years. During the early days of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the 
Serbs held key posts in the administration of the then Serbian province Kosovo. (Cf. OSCE 
2010: 228) Today, their (political) influence is confined to the municipalities where they form 
the numerical majority. 
“Today, the position of Kosovo Serbs is dependent on Serbia, both in terms of security and 
political power to oppose and boycott Kosovo institutions. … Whatever Serbia agrees, Koso-
vo Serbs will have to accept, or leave.” (Stevens 2009: 10) The Kosovo Serbs constitute the 
majority in nine municipalities: three of them are in the North of Kosovo close to Serbia 
proper, namely Leposavić/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok, and Zvečan/Zveçan, as well as the north-
ern part of the city of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. Belgrade perceives Kosovo’s northern region as 
the most viable to uphold Kosovo’s status as a province. Therefore, these municipalities are 
analyzed thoroughly in Chapter 7.3 on the challenges and opportunities in the return process. 
Furthermore, Kosovo Serbs are the largest ethnic community in the southern enclave of 
Štrpce/Shtërpcë, the four Serbian municipalities created after the 2009 elections, namely 
Ranilug/Ranillug, Klokot/Kllokot, Gračanica/Graçanicë, and Parteš/Partesh, and in the now 
enlarged and Serbian dominated municipality of Novo Brdo/Novobërdë. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 
228) Subsequently, this chapter will give a brief overview of the non-northern Serbian munic-
ipalities, among them the municipalities that have been newly established after the 2009 local 
elections
142
. The following map shows the location of the municipalities with a Serbian ma-
jority. Please note that the enlarged municipality of Novo Brdo/Novobërdë is misleadingly 
not badged as a Serbian municipality.  
                                                 
141
  A greater historical overview is given in Chapter 5.  
142
  These local elections were the first elections after Kosovo declared its independence from the Republic of 
Serbia in February 2008. The majority of the Kosovo Serbs, particularly those living in the North, boycotted 
these elections. 
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Figure 26:  The Albanian and the Serbian Dominated Municipalities in Kosovo 
Source:  New Policy Centre, online at: http://www.cnp.rs/resources/images/sl.png  
 
(1) Gračanica/Graçanicë 
The Gračanica/Graçanicë municipality was established in 2009; prior to that, the territory be-
longed to the municipalities of Prishtinë/Priština, Lipjan/Lipljan, and Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo 
Polje. Approximately 19,200 Kosovo Serbs (83 % of the total municipality’s population) re-
side in the town and in all 16 villages. “Gračanica/Graçanicë is the cultural centre for Kosovo 
Serbs living in the central part of Kosovo and hosts a historic 13th century Serbian Orthodox 
monastery, which was included on the UNESCO World Heritage List in 2006. The munici-
pality has 12 Serbian Orthodox churches which are in use.” (Cf. OSCE 2011d: 78) Gračani-
ca/Graçanicë has another special relevance since it is located just a few kilometers from 
downtown Prishtinë/Priština and is nevertheless a total different world. 
 
(2) Ranilug/Ranillug 
The small municipality of Ranilug/Ranillug in eastern Kosovo, south of Kamenicë/Kamenica, 
was established on 5 January 2010. Until then, the area was part of Gjilan/Gnjilane municipal-
ity. (Cf. OSCE 2011d: 35) Ranilug/Ranillug is almost exclusively populated by Kosovo 
Serbs. In total, 5,718 Serbs reside in the town and in all twelve villages. Beyond that, accord-
ing to the Municipal Return and Community Officer and Information Officer, there are 82 
Kosovo Albanians residing in the Veliko Ropotovo/ Ropotovë e Madhe and Donje Kormin-
jane/Korminjani i Poshtëm villages. Since the Ranilug/Ranillug municipality does not have a 
minority with more than 10 % share of the whole population, there is no legal requirement to 
have a deputy municipal assembly chairperson for communities. “Nonetheless, Ranilug/Rani-
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llug municipal assembly appointed Kosovo Albanian, Lulzim Canaj (not affiliated) as its dep-
uty chairperson for communities.” (OSCE 2011d: 35) This was an ambitious undertaking 
since there is only a very small percentage of Albanians living in this eastern Kosovo munici-
pality. 
 
(3) Parteš/Partesh 
The Parteš/Partesh municipality is very comparable to the Ranilug/Ranillug municipality. 
Both are located in the East of Kosovo and formerly belonged to the Gjilan/Gnjilane munici-
pality before it became its own municipality with a Serbian majority on 19 August 2010. In 
Parteš/Partesh, 5,217 Kosovo Serbs reside in the town and in the villages of Pasjane/Pasjan 
and Donja Budriga/Budrigë e Poshtme. (Cf. OSCE 2011d: 33) There are no other ethnic 
communities living in this municipality. 
 
(4) Klokot/Kllokot 
The municipality of Klokot/Kllokot is located in southeastern Kosovo, totally surrounded by 
the Viti/Vitina municipality. The municipality belonged to Viti/Vitina before it became an 
independent municipality with a Serbian majority on 8 January 2010. The municipality is eth-
nically mixed with a majority of 3,350 Kosovo Serbs residing in the town and in all four vil-
lages. In addition, around 1,700 Albanians live in the town and in Mogillë/Mogila village and 
10 Roma live in the Serbian village of Vrbovac/Vërboc. (Cf. OSCE 2011d: 29)  
 
(5) Štrpce/Shtërpcë 
The municipality of Štrpce/Shtërpcë is located in southeastern Kosovo and includes 
Štrpce/Shtërpcë town and 16 villages. In total, 9,100 Serbs live in the town and in eleven vil-
lages. This municipality has a specific relevance for this thesis’ topic since after the 1999 con-
flict, around 900 displaced Kosovo Serbs and refugees from Croatia arrived and stayed long 
term. “Out of that number, 400 live in the collective shelters in Brezovica/Brezovicë while the 
rest live in private houses.” (OSCE 2011d: 37) Despite the amount of time that has passed 
since their displacement, their situation has not improved and refugees as well as IDPs con-
tinue to live in shelters instead of their homes in other parts of Kosovo, mainly Albanian pop-
ulated villages and cities.  
One important aspect to note is the fact that the Štrpce/Shtërpcë municipality has two local 
governments operating parallel to each other: “… the municipal administration operating un-
der Kosovo system and the structure elected in 11 May 2008 Serbian local elections that con-
sists of seven (7) municipal council members.” (OSCE 2011d: 37) 
 
(6) Novo Brdo/Novobërdë 
The ethnically mixed municipality of Novo Brdo/Novobërdë is located in the East of Kosovo 
with a total population of 9,670 residents. In total, 5,802 Serbs reside in the town of Novo 
Brdo/Novobërdë and in 24 villages, 3,771 Albanians live in the town and in 14 villages, and 
97 Kosovo Roma mainly reside in the village of Bostan. (Cf. OSCE 2011d: 31) One of the 
main challenges the enlarged municipality of Novo Brdo/Novobërdë faces is the poor infra-
structure. “Novo Brdo/Novobërdë town and ten (10) out of 24 villages are connected to water 
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supply and sewage systems; five (5) out of 24 are connected only to sewage system, and two 
(2) only to water supply.” (OSCE 2011d: 32) 
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7.2 The Displacement and the Return of the Serbs to Kosovo 
7.2.1 The Displacement of the Serbs and their Conditions in Exile 
The Kosovo Serbs – comparable to the RAE as illustrated in Chapter 6.2.1 – left their homes 
in Kosovo either voluntarily or forcibly during one of the following stages.  
Figure 27:  Waves of Displacement of Kosovo Serbs 
Source:  Own compilation 
The Kosovo Serbs were not displaced in large numbers during the war in the spring of 1999. 
On the contrary, the second displacement involved more than 250,000 members of ethnic mi-
nority communities, most of them Serbs. Fearing revenge, the Serbs and other minorities left 
Kosovo after the end of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia on 10 June 1999. (Cf. i.a. IOM 
2008: 61f.; IDMC 2007: 11) “Many members of minority communities left with the Yugoslav 
and Serbian forces, fearing revenge attacks and acts of retribution and retaliation.” (ICG 2002: 
1) The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) also speaks of the leitmotif “re-
venge,” which led to flight to mono-ethnic areas within Kosovo or to the countries in the re-
gion. Especially for the Kosovo Serbs, this motif had become the reason for their flight, be-
cause: 
“Despite the generally accepted premise that many of those who had actively participat-
ed in criminal acts left along with the withdrawing Yugoslav and Serbian security forc-
es, the assumption of collective guilt prevailed.” (IDMC 2007: 52) 
This flight generated the first enclaves within Kosovo, as more and more Serbs did not feel 
safe anymore in ethnically mixed villages and suffered from a lack of freedom of movement.  
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In early 2004, Kosovo experienced a considerable setback: The security situation rapidly dete-
riorated, violent riots between the Albanian majority and the ethnic minorities broke out and 
thus prevented a progress of the multi-ethnic coexistence in Kosovo. (Cf. IDMC 2007: 268)  
“Although limited in number, the 2004 events had a lasting and damaging impact on the 
confidence of non-Albanians in the capacity of the international community and the 
PISG to protect them.” (IDMC 2007: 12) 
Apart from the destruction of homes, religious sites, and the killing of civilians, over 4,000 
members of the Kosovar minorities fled during and after the riots into mono-ethnic areas in 
Kosovo or to Serbia proper. This third wave had the following consequences for the future 
return process: It acted (1) as a negative signal for the IDPs who were about to decide for a 
return, and (2) complicated the return of the newly displaced. More Serbs had been displaced 
during this turmoil than had returned up to this date. To sum it up, the balance of the Serbs’ 
return process deteriorated since the March 2004 riots. 
 
The largest group of Kosovo Serbian IDPs
143
 was displaced within Serbia proper: According 
to the Kosovo Ministry for Communities and Return (MCR), in 2009, 205,940 Serbs from 
Kosovo lived in Serbia proper. (Cf. MCR 2009: 8) The Kosovo IDPs in Serbia are mostly 
ethnic Serbs, who represent a total of 75 % of the refugees in Serbia. (Cf. UNHCR 2007: 10) 
The majority of the Kosovo Serbs live in the region around Kraljevo, in Belgrade, in the 
Southeast of Serbia, and in the northern areas of Novi Sad and Subotica. (Cf. IDMC 2007: 12) 
According to the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), the Kosovo Serbs in Serbia have a similar 
level of education compared to the locals, but are rarely in permanent employment and less 
active than the native Serbs. A large number of Kosovo Serbs in Serbia “… receive[s] trans-
fers from the Serbian state …” (DRC 2009: 48) due to widespread unemployment144. In addi-
tion to the lack of integration into the labor market in Serbia, their main challenges are:  
(a) the lack of adequate accommodation, 
(b) the lack of registration and the lack of personal documents, and 
(c) the lack of access to social and public services. 
These three deficiencies are causally connected with each other: Where there is no permanent 
place of residency, the Kosovo Serbian IDPs cannot register themselves in Serbia proper, and 
consequently cannot receive a permanent residence status. Lacking a permanent residence 
status, Kosovo Serbs do not have the right or the opportunity to use social/public services 
either.  
                                                 
143
  The Kosovar residents fleeing to Serbia proper are legally not called refugees since there is no internationally 
recognized border between Kosovo and Serbia as Kosovo is not an independent state. Therefore, Kosovo 
Serbs (and other Kosovo residents) living in Serbia proper are referred to as IDPs leading to the fact that they 
are not internationally protected by UNHCR. People, who are displaced within Kosovo itself, are sometimes 
called IIDPs – Internal Internally Displaced People. 
144
  Based on a study conducted by the DRC, it can be shown that unemployment among Kosovo Serbs in Serbia 
proper is relatively high: “In Serbia, 41% of the surveyed households are jobless and 71% have at least one 
unemployed member (Serbs 69%; RAE 83%).” (DRC 2009: 5) 
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Figure 28:  Challenges for the Kosovo Serbian IDPs without Permanent Accommodation 
Source:  Own compilation based on IDMC 2007: p. 279f. 
This chain leads to a situation, in which “[s]ome local authorities try to use such regulations 
to hinder the access of refugees and IDPs to social welfare” (IDMC 2007: 280). According to 
the IDMC, it has been shown in recent years that the Serbian government considers the stay of 
the IDPs as temporary, and hence does not provide a permanent accommodation. As a conse-
quence, the chain presented above comes into effect excluding the Kosovar IDPs in Serbia 
proper from social and public services and preventing a permanent integration into Serbia’s 
society.
145
 Generally speaking, many international organizations determine that the Kosovo 
Serbian IDPs in Serbia live under inhumane conditions. For instance, the International Organ-
ization for Migration (IOM) wrote in 2008: 
“Refugees and IDPs in Serbia are among the poorest of the poor. The most recent fig-
ures indicate that approximately 120,000 to 140,000 or 25 per cent of the total number 
of refugees and IDPs live below the poverty level.” (IOM 2008: 53) 
Most of the IDPs living in Serbia – even more than a decade after their displacement – reside 
in refugee camps or private accommodations with relatives and friends. Around 4,600 Kosovo 
Serbs and members of other ethnic minority communities live in 56 refugee camps. (Cf. DRC 
2009: 9) They are heavily dependent on humanitarian aid. In addition, approximately 25 % of 
the Kosovo Serbs in Serbia have the feeling that the locals are intolerant towards them. The 
ICG notes that the refugees from Kosovo are perceived as competitors for scarce resources 
and jobs in particular. (Cf. ICG 2002: 2) 
 
The number of IDPs in Kosovo itself is specified with 20,235. (Cf. MCR 2009: 8) The ma-
jority of the IDPs within Kosovo are the Serbs who fled from multi-ethnic into mono-ethnic 
areas such as to the Štrpce/Shtërpcë municipality due to their fear of revenge. (Cf. DCR 2009: 
9) 
 
Beyond that, the displaced Kosovo Serbs also fled to Macedonia and Montenegro.
146
 In Mac-
edonia, there are approximately 1,700 refugees, and some 16,000 Kosovars remain in Monte-
negro.
147
 (Cf. MCR 2009: 8) According to the MCR, there is a particular difficulty in these 
two countries:  
                                                 
145
  The IDMC also explains the difference between the general refugees and the IDPs from Kosovo within the 
Republic of Serbia: “In contrast to the government programme which facilitates local integration of refugees 
through rent-free or subsidised housing or cash grants, IDPs do not benefit from such programmes and are 
usually simply relocated to collective centres which still remain open.” (IDMC 2007: 280) 
146
  The other third countries can be ignored, since they are dealing with very small numbers of refugees from 
Kosovo. 
147
  For a full discussion of the problems the Kosovo Serbian refugees face in Macedonia and Montenegro, please 
see Them 2008: By force, if necessary. Minority returns to Kosovo after independence, in: Chachipe – Rights 
& Justice, pp. 6ff., online available at: http://kosovoroma.files.wordpress.com/2008/02/romano-them-forced-
returns.pdf, last retrieved on 26.12.2013. 
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“Displaced persons from Kosovo in Macedonia and Montenegro do not have official 
status of refugees although they are displaced across the border. They are commonly 
called Displaced Persons.” (MCR 2009: 8) 
Even the IDMC and the UNHCR have reported that the status of the Kosovo refugees in 
Macedonia and Montenegro is not clear. Yet, both organizations do not explain why these two 
states do not recognize the Kosovar refugees as such. In addition, in both countries, the refu-
gees from Kosovo have no access to political and social rights, which means that the possibil-
ity of durable integration is denied to them. (Cf. IDMC 2007: 287)
148
 
 
2002, three years after the displacement, one could assert that 
“… roughly one-third of the 230,000 IDPs from Kosovo prefer to integrate fully in Ser-
bia or Montenegro (or have already done so), another third is desperate to return (mostly 
the elderly, rural population who cannot sell their property in Kosovo, who do not have 
professions that allow them much flexibility and whose attachment to their land is gen-
erally strongest, while the last third remains undecided.” (ICG 2002: 2) 
After more than ten years since the first displacement of the Kosovo Serbs in 1999, the same 
refugees have “… uncertain return prospects and lack local integration opportunities.” (DRC 
2009: 9) One main reason is the social isolation resulting from the living conditions in refugee 
camps or in cramped housing with relatives and/or friends. Often, permanent residency is not 
a real option.  
The trilateral agreement between the UNMIK, the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government in Kosovo (PISG), and Serbia specifies that the IDPs can decide for themselves 
which of the three durable solutions they prefer.  
However, this option for a free decision does not exist in reality. Consequently, many ethnic 
minorities, Serbs in the frontline, have adopted a “… cautious ‘wait and see’ position …” 
(IDMC 2007: 267), which is reflected in the return figures. 
                                                 
148
  For the thesis at hand, the refugees in Macedonia and Montenegro are of secondary importance, since only a 
small number of them lives displaced in these two countries. 
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7.2.2 The Slow Return of the Serbs to Kosovo 
According to statistics of the UNHCR, the majority of the Serbian refugees and IDPs volun-
tarily returns from Serbia proper. In total, between the end of the violent hostilities in 1999 
and February 2013, 10,153 Serbs returned voluntarily to their homes in Kosovo. (Cf. UNHCR 
2013: 4) These figures must be considered in relation to the number of displaced persons. 
Because there is no accurate data of the displaced persons of the Serbian community, the fig-
ures have been calculated based on the figures of the census in 1991 (Cf. OSCE 2010), the 
current population estimations (Cf. OSCE 2010) and the OSCE municipal profile estima-
tions
149
 as well as the return figures (UNHCR February 2013) according to these formulas.  
Census 1991 – Current Estimations = Current Displaced Persons 
Current Displaced Persons + Returned Persons = Total Displaced Persons 
To calculate the return percentage, the number of total displaced persons is compared with the 
number of returned persons.  
        100 x Returned Persons 
             Total Displaced Persons 
The calculations for the Kosovo Serbs reveal the following picture: 
 
Serbs 
 
in Kosovo in the North 
Census 1991              (OSCE 2010: 275ff.) 139,499 
Total Displaced Persons 43,125 
Current Displaced Persons 32,972 
Returned Persons  
(UNHCR February 2013: 4) 
10,153 
Current Estimations  (OSCE 2010: 275ff.) 36,097
150
 70,430 
Return Percentage 23.54 % 
Table 12:  The Return and the Displacement Figures of the Kosovo Serbs 
Source: Own compilation according to OSCE (2010) and UNHCR (February 2013) data 
In the first years after the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and the associated displacement of 
thousands of Kosovo Serbs, the return to their homes was small but consistent. The Serbian 
refugees and IDPs returned mainly from Serbia and Montenegro
151
 and from within Kosovo 
itself back to their homeland. After the March 2004 riots, there were renewed displacements 
                                                 
149
  There is no accurate data for the Serbian municipalities of Leposavić/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok, and 
Zvečan/Zveçan, as well as the northern part of the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica municipality. These figures are de-
rived from the OSCE 2013 municipal profiles, which can be downloaded here: http://www.osce. 
org/kosovo/43753, last retrieved on 26.12.2013. 
150
  The current estimations are calculated as the arithmetic average of the current municipal estimations, current 
communities’ estimations, OSCE 2009 municipal profile estimations, and current OSCE field teams estima-
tions. This figure does not incorporate the three northern municipalities of Leposavić/Leposaviq, Zubin 
Potok, and Zvečan/Zveçan and the northern part of the municipality of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. 
151
  Montenegro belonged to Serbia until 2006 when it declared its independence and became a fully recognized 
state. 
= Return Percentage 
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Variation of the Serbian Return Figures in Comparison to the Total Return Figures
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and the return figures decreased significantly as can be seen in the following chart. (Cf. IDMC 
2007: 61) The March 2004 riots “… regressed conditions for ethnic minorities to a state they 
had not been at in years and brought back inhibiting factors including unstable security condi-
tions and a sharply decreased freedom of movement …” (IOM 2008: 88), which are two im-
portant factors influencing a refugee’s decision to return. 
Figure 29:  Variation of the Serbian Return Figures 
Source:  Own compilation based on the data presented in UNHCR 2013: 4 
From March 2004 to February 2008, there was uncertainty over the status of Kosovo: “The 
unresolved status of Kosovo encourages departures from Kosovo and acts as a deterrent to 
return … .” (IDMC 2007: 34) Many displaced members of the Serbian minority saw no future 
for themselves in an independent Kosovo. There was the fear that the declaration of inde-
pendence “… would certainly increase the fears of Kosovo’s minority communities.” (IDMC 
2007: 13) Due to the uncertainty of the future status of Kosovo, the displaced Serbs could not 
make an informed decision, as there was no objective information on the upcoming political 
and legal design of Kosovo available to them.  
With the declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, the number of returns fell sharply 
as particularly the Serbian minority did not feel safe anymore and hence refrained from re-
turning to their homes. Most refugees waited to evaluate the treatment of Kosovo authorities 
towards the minority communities, thereunder especially the Serbs.  
 
Although there are returns from internally and externally displaced Serbs to their pre-conflict 
homes, figures remain very low – approximately 23.5 % have returned yet – and returns pre-
dominantly occur to Serbian populated areas. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 242ff.; IDMC 2007; UNMIK 
2006: 10) This prevents almost entirely any exchange between the Albanian majority and the 
Serbian minority. Through the displacement and exclusive return to mono-ethnic areas, the 
establishment of Serbian enclaves is further promoted. These mono-ethnic areas “… have a 
very limited absorption capacity due to their remote locations and disadvantaged socio-
economic conditions, with limited possibilities for income generation.” (IOM 2008: 88) More 
often than not, the return occurs to rural areas since “[t]he lack of finding any other occupa-
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tion other than working in agriculture affects decisions on return …” (UNIJA-Union 2008: 
37). The infrastructure in most rural areas in Kosovo is poorly developed. Consequently, the 
MCR aims at encouraging “… where possible that displaced people return to areas where 
there is already some infrastructure, in terms of schooling, health facilities and so on.” (MCR 
2009: 15f.)  
 
The following chapter analyzes the challenges and opportunities within the return process of 
the Serbs focusing on the conditions awaiting them after their return to Kosovo and influenc-
ing their social, economic, cultural, and legal integration into the Kosovar society. 
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7.3 The Challenges and the Opportunities in their Return Process 
As the largest ethnic minority in Kosovo and the war opponent to the ethnic community cur-
rently in charge of institutional affairs, the Serbs are discriminated in public life and do not 
have the same access to public services as the Kosovo Albanians and other ethnic minorities 
such as the Bosniaks and the Turks. Their discrimination can be shown exemplary by the use 
of the Serbian language, which is regulated by law. The Law on the Use of Languages arrang-
es that 
“… minorities have the right to receive all information, documents and other services in 
any of the Kosovo’s official languages or in the language which has the status of a lan-
guage spoken in that specific municipality.” (UNIJA-Union 2008: 17) 
Several international organizations determined that the law’s implementation is still inade-
quate, and all public services in Kosovo provide little information in Serbian or other minority 
languages; electricity bills, bank statements, or leaflets are written and distributed in Albanian 
or in English. (Cf. UNIJA-Union 2008: 17, HLC 2008: 267) The names of non-Albanian cus-
tomers are often written incorrectly, e.g. with the Albanian “ç” instead of the Serbian “č” or 
the Albanian “q” instead of the Serbian “ć”. This limits the equal access of the ethnic minori-
ties, particularly the Serbs who most likely do not speak Albanian, to public services signifi-
cantly. The only recognizable progress is the supply of contracts for minorities in minority 
languages. (Cf. HLC 2008: 268) 
 
All following subchapters deal with the conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs and the 
unresolved status of Kosovo. Nonetheless, this chapter aims at dividing the different ideas and 
argumentations, such as the relevance of parallel structures in the North and the eastern en-
claves, into pieces in order to show the circumstances of the Serbs upon their return to Koso-
vo. 
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7.3.1 The Conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs 
“… [M]any Balkan self-identities have been constructed in direct opposition to an actual ori-
ental other … .” (Bakić-Hayden 1995: 920) In the case of Kosovo, the Albanians and the 
Serbs constructed their ongoing patterns of identity in direct opposition to each other.  
 
The relations between the Albanians and the Serbs can be regarded as relatively harmonious 
during medieval times. They were characterized by alleged blood ties. (Cf. Horvat 1988: 84; 
Vickers 1998: 13) Hondus confirms these harmonious relations by explaining that the mother 
of tsar Dušan152 was Albanian and Skenderbeg’s153 mother was Serbian. Beyond that, the 
Serbs and the Albanians fought together against the Ottoman Empire prior to the highly cele-
brated Battle of Kosovo. (Cf. Hondus 2007: 5f.) The positive relations continued to persist in 
the aftermath of the Serbian defeat. Hondus provides supportive evidence for this positive 
relationship in the ethnic composition of the borderland population of the neighboring coun-
tries, which are also of an ethnically mixed nature between Slavs and Albanians, such as in 
Montenegro and Albania. (Cf. Hondus 2007: 6) Numerous blood links between the Albanians 
and the Serbs among local tribes as well as ethnically mixed neighborhoods in medieval times 
support the symbiosis and peaceful co-existence between the Serbs and the Albanians, too. 
(Cf. Daskalovski 1999: 485) 
 
The root of the Albanian-Serbian conflict can be seen in the rise of European nationalism. In 
Yugoslav times, “bratstvo i jedinstvo” (brotherhood and unity) determined the political land-
scape, in which all nations and nationalities were equally represented in governing institu-
tions. After Tito’s death in 1980, Albanian nationalism manifested and “… the centres of po-
litical … power had tried to eradicate these forms of ethno-religious mixture, in order to press 
for clear-cut identities.” (Hondus 2007: 6) The autonomy of Kosovo was prevented through 
the approval of several amendments on 28 March 1989 by the Assembly of Kosovo, which 
effectively replaced the Albanian governmental institutions with Serbian. (Cf. Daskalovski 
1999: 499) During these times, both identities were reinforced in opposition to the relevant 
other. Both ethnic communities started to justify their claim on Kosovo’s territory and people. 
The following figure illustrates the different claims and reasons for both communities to pop-
ulate and rule Kosovo.  
                                                 
152
  Tsar Dušan was the King of Serbia (from 1331) and Emperor of the Serbs and the Greeks (from 1346) until 
his death in 1355. He was one of the most powerful monarchs in his time because he managed to conquer a 
large part of Southeast Europe. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 57f.) 
153
  George Kastrioti Skanderbeg (1405-1468) was a 15
th
-century Albanian lord who was appointed governor of 
the Sanjak of Dibra by the Ottoman Turks in 1440. Because of the defense of Albania against the Ottoman 
Empire for more than two decades, he received the title of the Chief of the League of the Albanian people. 
(Cf. Schmitt 2008: 61f.) 
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Figure 30:  The Serbian and the Albanian Reasoning for their Claim on Kosovo
154
 
Source:  Own illustration 
Both the Albanians and the Serbs argue that they were first in Kosovo. The Serbs migrated to 
Kosovo in the 10
th
 century. The Albanians migrated to Kosovo later than that but they claim 
that the Illyrians
155
 populated Kosovo before the Serbs. More importantly, the Serbs claim 
that  
“Kosovo and Metohija are as much the home and promised land of the Serbs as Jerusa-
lem is of the Jews.” (James 2003 quoted in Dahlman, Williams 2010: 420)  
This is substantiated in the founding of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the construction of 
several monasteries on Kosovo’s territory such as the Gračanica monastery or Visoki Dečani. 
In summary, Kosovo is considered to be the cultural center of Serbia.  
The Albanian reasoning for their claim on Kosovo is associated with the ancient and simulta-
neously contemporary paradox between the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo. The Serbs 
possess many Serbian monuments in Kosovo indicating their medieval presence, but only a 
few Serbian speaking inhabitants lived in Kosovo during this time. (Cf. Hondus 2007: 8; 
Daskalovski 1999: 492) In contrast, there is hardly any material evidence supporting the earli-
er presence of the Albanians, such as religious or cultural sites. Yet, this fact is counteracted 
by the sheer number of the population that speaks Albanian. The following chart demonstrates 
the development of population trends in Kosovo between 1948 and 1991. It is remarkable that 
the Serbian population remained approximately stable over 40 years whereas the Albanian 
population tripled over the same period.  
                                                 
154
  Marković provides a historical overview of stereotypes that the Serbs use regarding the Albanians and vice 
versa. Please see Marković, Predrag (2003): Ethnic Stereotypes: Ubiquitous, Local or Migrating Phenomena: 
The Serbian-Albanian Case. Michael Zikic Stiftung. 
155
  The Illyrians are a group of Indo-European tribes who populated the Balkans and the south-eastern coasts of 
the Italian peninsula. All Illyrian tribes were Slavicized in the course of the middle ages. In addition, the 
modern Albanian language might have descended from a southern Illyrian dialect. (Cf. Ceka 2005: 40ff., 59) 
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Figure 31:  Population Trends by Ethnicity (Based on the Yugoslavian censuses 1948-1991) 
Source:  Dahlman, Williams (2010): Ethnic Enclavisation and State Formation in Kosovo, p. 416. 
Keeping these population trends in mind, “… Muslims continued to play the role of the radi-
cal, indisputable Other in the Serbian collective imagery” (Petrović 2008: 73). Apart from 
that, both ethnic communities elaborated theses demonstrating that the majority of their “en-
emies” are not real Serbs or Albanians respectively. The Arnautaši thesis, for instance, indi-
cates that many Serbs converted to Islam, could keep their language and heritage for a long 
time, but eventually had to adopt the Albanian identity. Hence, many Albanians are “not real” 
Albanians and, at the same token, many Serbs are “not real” Serbs because they were Albani-
ans who converted to Orthodox Christianity in the Serbian medieval kingdom and eventually 
adopted a Serbian identity. (Both cf. Petrović 2008: 74)156 
The ultimate goal of the Albanians was and – in a different form still is – the independence 
from the Republic of Serbia and self-determination of their own people, territory, and eventu-
ally to form a proper state. On the contrary, the Serbs see Kosovo as an internal affair of the 
Republic of Serbia. An internal affair would eventually prevent the international community 
from intervening in this matter. Summarizing, “… both Albanians and Serbs dreamed about 
their own nation-state.” (Emphasis added, Hondus 2007: 8) 
“When it became apparent that neither Serbs nor Albanians would settle their claims 
over Kosovo on terms acceptable to both sides, the two nationalisms were poised to 
clash.” (Hondus 2007: 9) 
The unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovo Albanians in 2008 further aggra-
vated this situation and created political uncertainty and continued inter-ethnic tensions. Alt-
hough the general security situation in Kosovo has greatly improved, the Serbs still feel inse-
cure in Kosovo.  
International governmental and non-governmental organizations assess the security in Kosovo 
to be stable but fragile, so does the Secretary General (SG) of the United Nations (UN) in his 
report in April 2010. (Cf. Secretary General 2010-04: 4) Ethnically motivated violent inci-
                                                 
156
  There are some reasons behind these two claims – they are not conjecture. For further information and rea-
soning, please see Duijzings, Ger (2005): Religija i identitet na Kosovu. Beograd: XX vek, pp. 33f. 
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dents affecting the Serbian minority have also decreased in 2012 in comparison to 2011. The 
overall number of incidents against minority communities decreased from 406 (2011) to 361 
(2012). (Cf. Secretary General 2013-02: 4) This statement is also supported by the Interna-
tional Crisis Group (ICG): “… [I]nter-ethnic crime has remained constant at 9 to 10 per cent 
of all crime since 2002 and that its proportion of property-related crime and theft has ris-
en … .” (ICG 2006: 8) Ethnically motivated violence has basically switched from physical 
attacks to other crimes affecting the minorities’ property instead of their personal integrity, 
such as arson committed on unoccupied properties and land, the illegal occupation of houses, 
and vandalism at religious sites. (Cf. Secretary General 2013-02: 4) The menace of property is 
an obstacle to the refugees’ return: Due to a perceived lack of security and the fear of destruc-
tion of their residential property, many Serbs are forced to sell their property to the Albanians 
and to stay in exile rather than to return. (Cf. ICG 2006: 8) If returnees do not have a place to 
come back to, the return process will be less effective and returnees are likely to fail in the 
integration process because they have to start anew in a different place. This significantly re-
duces the chances of integration and of a sustainable return. Apart from the socioeconomic 
problems, that force many Serbian returnees to sell their property, recurring security incidents 
in several return areas further contribute to fear among the Serbian returnees.  
 
There are still civil disturbances, riots, and ethnically motivated violence against Kosovo 
Serbs, most notably the March 2004 riots, in which ethnic Albanians banished the Serbian and 
other minority returnees from their homes again, destroyed religious and cultural property, 
and killed many Serbs and other members of minority communities in Kosovo. Despite the 
fact that it occurred a long time ago, it still influences the inter-ethnic relations between the 
Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo. Even today, the security situation in Kosovo is character-
ized by smaller revolts, (Cf. Secretary General 2010-04: 4f.) in particular in North Mi-
trovicë/Mitrovica as e.g. in the summer of 2011. In December 2012, three private vehicles 
belonging to Serbian police officers were set on fire. “On the night of 9-10 January, an un-
known perpetrator opened automatic fire on a bakery in northern Mitrovica belonging to a 
Kosovo Serb member of the Advisory Board of the UNMIK Administration Mitrovica.” (Sec-
retary General 2013-02: 4) In addition, there is an increasing number of reported incidents 
against the Kosovo Serb community in the municipalities of Klinë/Klina and Istog/Istok.  
“During 2012, 73 incidents, or 20 per cent of all incidents reported, occurred in those 
two municipalities. There is a perception among the local Kosovo Serbs that the inten-
tion behind the crimes was to force them to leave.” (Secretary General 2013-02: 4f.) 
Apart from these security incidents against the Serbian population, some Serbian returnees 
were directly affected. “The most serious incident occurred on 6 July 2012, when a Kosovo 
Serb returnee couple were [sic] shot to death in their home in the mixed village of Muhaxher 
Talinovc/Muhadžer Talinovac.” (OSCE 2012b: 14) In addition, Serbian returns sites were 
also affected by repeated burglaries: “… in 2011, approximately 80 per cent of all uninhabited 
Kosovo Serb returnee houses were looted in each of the villages of Doganaj/Doganovic, Mu-
haxher Talinovc/Muhadžer Talinovac and Srpski Babuš/Srpski Babush.” (OSCE 2012b: 14) 
Beyond this, the Kosovo Serbs suppose that the Kosovo Police is not responding appropriate-
ly to these security incidents. When looking at the previously mentioned incidents against 
Serbian returnees, no perpetrators were identified, with the exception of Srpski Babuš/Srpski 
Babush, where nine individuals were detained for one month. (Cf. OSCE 2012b: 14) As a 
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consequence, the Serbs boycotted the meetings of the local community safety council in the 
Istog/Istok municipality. Beyond that, the declaration of independence renewed tensions and 
contributed to an increasing sense of insecurity and ethnic violence. Although the legal and 
the de facto status of the Serbs in Kosovo did not change due to the declaration of independ-
ence, they feel less safe than before. (Cf. HLC 2008: 192; CRIP 2009: 16)  
 
Freedom of movement of the Serbian minority is still limited in some municipalities. This 
element is supported by the desire of the Kosovo Serbs to be accompanied by an escort while 
traveling through some Albanian dominated municipalities. They call upon the Humanitarian 
Bus Transportation, which is escorted by the Kosovo Police or KFOR. (Cf. CRIP 2009: 15) 
For instance, “Serbs from Banje/Banjë conduct all administrative affairs through the Office of 
Communities, but if they wish to go to Skënderaj/Srbica, then they need to be escorted by 
KPS [Kosovo Police Service].” (HLC 2008: 192) The service has proven to be a success due 
to the high numbers of users, the quality of services, the passenger satisfaction levels, and the 
access to basic rights.
157
 
Also, traveling with Serbian license plates is still a barrier for members of the Serbian minori-
ty: Thereby, they are recognizable as Kosovo Serbs and have to be aware that they may have 
to face police controls and “[s]ometimes their driving licences are confiscated by the KP and 
they are required to pay a fine to get the licence back …” (CommHR 2009: 21). 
Furthermore, ensuring access to public buildings for ethnic minorities depends on the freedom 
of movement. There are some negative examples from Kosovar municipalities – notably, 
Obiliq/Obilić, Klinë/Klina and Skënderaj/Srbica – where members of the Serbian minority 
feel insecure and refrain from using Albanian restaurants or shops. (Cf. HLC 2008: 192) 
Therefore, with limited access to public buildings, Serbs – and other minorities accordingly – 
have a limited access to public services and goods, which are, for returnees in particular, es-
sential for survival. 
 
In order to assure thorough freedom of movement, Serbs have to be able to freely use their 
native language in public. However, ethnic minorities fear the unrestricted use of their native 
language in public in Kosovo. This is particularly evident for the capital of Prishtinë/Priština, 
which is almost exclusively populated by the Albanians. In 2006, the President of 
the Advisory Committee on the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protec-
tion of National Minorities Asbjørn Eide noted that “… speaking a minority language, in par-
ticular Serb, means running the risk of incurring harassment or violence” (EAR 2006a: 
99). Positive examples of areas where freedom of movement and security is guaranteed for 
the Serbian returnees are mono-ethnic villages such as Srpski Babuš/Babushi i Sërbve in the 
municipality of Ferizaj/Uroševac or Belo Polje/Bellopojë in the municipality of Pejë/Peć. The 
returnees indicate that they are completely free to move and do not feel restricted at all. (Cf. 
KIPRED 2006b: 16) Multi-ethnic areas, on the contrary, are rarely evaluated to ensure full 
freedom of movement and security.  
 
                                                 
157
  The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) published a report on the situation of the 
Humanitarian Bus Transportation, including a poll with users, in 2008. Please see OSCE (2008d): Humani-
tarian Minority Bus Transportation in Kosovo after Transfer to Kosovo Institutions. Monitoring Findings. 
Report No. 4. 
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In summary, the general security situation has improved enormously over the last decade, 
even for the members of the Serbian minority. Nevertheless, “… perceived insecurity and lack 
of freedom of movement continue to influence the decision to return” (Halili 2007: 7). These 
inter-ethnic tensions constrain the Kosovo Serbs to return to the Serbian enclaves or to the 
northern municipalities. This further encourages the accumulation of enclaves and prevents 
the establishment of a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo. Due to the (perceived) insecurity and 
the limited freedom of movement, the Serbian returnees are not integrated into Kosovo’s so-
ciety but drawn back into Serbian enclaves with almost no contact points to the rest of the 
society. These enclaves are an attempt by the Serbian population to create localized majority 
territories in Kosovo (Cf. Dahlman, Williams 2010: 408), which ignore the Albanian attempts 
to create an own state.  
 
“The cultural landscape in the enclaves circulates a Serbian ‘state idea’ … .” (Emphasis add-
ed, Dahlman, Williams 2010: 410) Within the borders of the Serbian enclaves, there is an 
exclusive usage of the Serbian language and Cyrillic letters, the currency is the Serbian dinar 
(RSD) despite paying with the Euro (EUR) in the rest of the country. Above all, the Kosovo 
Serbs use their parallel institutions in the areas of education, health care, administration, jus-
tice, etc., which are operated and financed by Belgrade. It has to be noted that these enclaves 
were not solely established and maintained either by the Serbian population or the Serbian 
government, but the international community accelerated the existence of these enclaves by 
its decentralization policies aimed at giving more power and resources to the Serbs in their 
majority areas.  
 
“Decentralization is defined as a process by which central state power is devolved to 
sub-national units to broaden access to political decision making and localize provision 
of public goods and services … .” (Gjoni et al. 2010: 291)  
Its aim is to accommodate the interests and concerns of different ethnic, religious, political, or 
cultural groups in post-conflict states. An asymmetric decentralization exists when only one 
community is treated preferentially while other communities cannot gain more power at the 
local level. With the exception of the municipality of Mamuşa/Mamushë/Mamuša where the 
majority belongs to the Turkish community, the Kosovo Serbs are favored disproportionally 
by any decentralization efforts. (Cf. Gjoni et al. 2010) Apart from the expected positive ef-
fects of the empowerment of disadvantaged groups and the decrease of inter-ethnic tensions, 
there is one particular risk of decentralization in post-conflict states. When the central gov-
ernment provides local governments with power and resources, they can easily use the power 
and resources for new attacks against the central government that is still too weak to hold off 
the attack.  
 
Figure 32: Risks of Decentralization Processes 
Source:  Own figure according to Gjoni et al. (2010): 292f. 
27ADL_Lib_20070209_A4_EN
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The decentralization mechanisms were implemented only in relatively small areas in the 
South of Kosovo. Power and resources given to these newly established municipalities are 
most likely not sufficient to attack the central institutions in Kosovo. There is a set of decen-
tralization efforts and mechanisms that have been partly implemented since the end of the 
conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs in 1999.
158
 It is worth mentioning that the ex-
pected effects of most decentralization efforts during the 2000s have not come into force. The 
main reason is the link between decentralization and the status of Kosovo, i.e. Kosovo’s uni-
lateral declaration of independence from Serbia.  
One proposed mechanism was the Framework Document for the Reform of Local Self-
government in Kosovo (2004), which established five Pilot Municipal Units (PMUs) that “… 
after a testing period [of 18 months], would convert into full-fledged municipalities.” (Gjoni 
et al. 2010: 302) The two possible new Serbian municipalities, Gračanica/Graçanicë and 
Parteš/Partesh, continued to refuse to co-operate and consequently did not gain official status 
as a municipality in the mid of the 2000s. The municipalities of Mamuşa/Mamushë/Mamuša 
(Turkish majority) and Hani I Elezit/Đeneral Janković and Junik (both Albanian), in contrast, 
gained official status as a municipality after a testing period of 18 months. (Cf. Gjoni et al. 
2010: 301ff.) 
The Eide Report (2005) actually suggested that “… new municipalities maintain special ties 
with the Republic of Serbia, if such links did not weaken the authority of Kosovo’s central 
government” (Gjoni et al. 2010: 301) and “… cooperation with and funding from Serbian 
institutions would be permitted.” (ICG 2009: 25) According to the Eide Report, education and 
health care, as well as other public services and goods, would still be run by Serbs for Serbs 
with Belgrade’s support. (Cf. ICG 2009: 25) 
 
Decentralization efforts have been perceived very differently by the various stakeholders in 
Kosovo. The Kosovo Albanians principally wanted independence: “Decentralization was a 
concession to Serbs, but a reasonable price to pay for statehood.” (Gjoni et al. 2010: 302) Ul-
timately, this strategy led to the failure of decentralization in Kosovo, which is explained later 
on. The Kosovo Serbs wanted to maximize their autonomy in Kosovo. Some Serbs perceived 
decentralization as a means to gain more power and to maintain links with Serbia without 
accepting Kosovo’s independence. Apart from that, “[i]nterest in reaching some form of 
pragmatic accommodation with Kosovo institutions, while avoiding acknowledging the coun-
try’s independence, is high” (ICG 2009: 22). Many Serbs South of the Ibër/Ibar River felt that 
decentralization is an attractive way to simplify their daily lives in Kosovo. The government 
of Serbia perceived decentralization as a means to strengthen the political influence of the 
Kosovo Albanians over the Kosovo Serbs and to cut ties with Serbia itself. The international 
community intended to establish a multi-ethnic Kosovo society
159
 and decentralization was 
one of their main instruments. (Cf. Gjoni et al. 2010: 302) “Forming new municipal territories 
became a means for the international community to manage community relations (read ethnic 
conflict) in Kosovo.” (Dahlman, Williams 2010: 420) 
                                                 
158
  For a detailed analysis of the different decentralization mechanisms, please see Gjoni, Roland, et al. (2010): 
Decentralization as a conflict transformation tool: The challenge in Kosovo, in: Public Administration and 
Development 30(5), p. 298ff. 
159
  This has been laid down in Kosovo’s constitution in Article 3,1 which reads “The Republic of Kosovo is a 
multi-ethnic society consisting of Albanian and other Communities, governed democratically with full re-
spect for the rule of law through its legislative, executive and judicial institutions.” 
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On 15 November 2009, Kosovo held its first post-independence municipal elections. Apart 
from the announcements of the Government of the Republic of Serbia and Serbian politicians 
in Kosovo, a significant part of the Serbian population in Kosovo, particularly in the southern 
and eastern municipalities, voted. (Cf. Gjoni et al. 2010: 305f.) This proves to be true espe-
cially for the new municipalities of Klokot/Kllokot, Gračanica/Graçanicë, Ranilug/Ranillug, 
and Novo Brdo/Novobërdë. In evaluation of this election turnout, it can be argued that there is 
a big difference between the behavior of Serbs in the South and in the North: “In northern 
enclaves … K-Serbs have continued to reject participation in Kosovo’s decentralization re-
forms. The situation in this part of the country thus continues to fit with the predictions of the 
decentralization skeptics.” (Gjoni et al. 2010: 306) 
The same can be asserted referring to the municipal elections, which were held on 3 Novem-
ber 2013 in all Kosovar municipalities. The voter turnout in the three northern Serbian munic-
ipalities was very low: According to OSCE’s information, the turnout was 22 % in Le-
posavić/Leposaviq, 22 % in Zubin Potok, and 11.21 % in Zvečan/Zveçan whereas the voter 
turnout in the southern and eastern Serbian municipalities was much higher.
160
 Although the 
Serbian government supported the Kosovar municipal elections, also in the northern Serbian 
municipalities, the voter turnout did not change significantly. 
 
Above all, the decentralization efforts in Kosovo did not reach the desired degree of conver-
sion because of the inevitable link between decentralization and the independence of Kosovo 
from Serbia. At several times, the Kosovo Serbs opposed the decentralization efforts despite 
expecting short-term positive effects on their daily lives because they felt that accepting de-
centralization would also mean slowly accepting the independent Kosovar institutions. Con-
cluding, “[it] shows that the devolution of authority can help to integrate minorities in post-
conflict states if the status of the state itself is clarified” (Emphasis added, Gjoni et al. 2010: 
308). 
 
Gjoni et al. claim that the positive developments in southern Kosovo have shown that decen-
tralization can be effective in Kosovo. They further argue that decentralization “… remains 
the best available plan for integrating minority communities by offering enhanced competen-
cies and funding to the K-Serb majority municipalities” (Gjoni et al. 2010: 310). That claim 
cannot be confirmed by the author of this paper, because decentralization did not create a 
multi-ethnic society in Kosovo, it only consolidated Albanian and Serbian majority areas. 
Decentralization created compartmentalization in Kosovo, i.e. a society in which the Albani-
ans and the Serbs do not live together and actively interact with each other, but live in (peace-
ful) co-existence with hardly any points of contact. (Cf. Monteux 2006: 178) Dahlman and 
Williams even emphasize that:  
“The enclaves not only confound post-war state-building tasks, such as the return of 
displaced persons, economic development, and public service provision, they risk a new 
conflict over enclave borders, property, and access.” (Emphasis added, Dahlman, Wil-
liams 2010: 408) 
                                                 
160
  Source: B92 (2013): Ballots from three polling stations annulled, published on 4 November 2013, online 
available at: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2013&mm=11&dd=04&nav_id=88229, last 
retrieved on 08.11.2013.  
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The majority of the Serbs did not return to their homes yet but if they return, they do so invar-
iably to mono-ethnic areas. “These return dynamics have contributed to the growing numeri-
cal and political marginalisation of the Serb community.” (Dahlman, Williams 2010: 418) It 
will be a challenge to break the vicious circle of insecurity, the uncertain status of Kosovo, 
inter-ethnic tensions between the Albanians and the Serbs, enclaves, and decentralization ef-
forts. In the future, more and more Serbs will either refuse to return to their homes in Kosovo, 
sell their property in Kosovo, or return to mono-ethnic areas and, consequently, contribute to 
the marginalization of their own ethnic community in Kosovo. This compartmentalization is 
best reflected in the parallel institutions organized, equipped, and financially maintained by 
Belgrade, which will be analyzed next. 
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7.3.2 The Parallel Institutions Funded and Organized by Belgrade 
After the NATO bombing, the remaining Serbs in Kosovo did not accept the legislation of 
UNMIK. “Different factors such as limitations on lack of freedom of movement contributed 
to the de facto perpetuation of the Serbian administration.” (Emphasis in original, OSCE 
2007: 5) These Serbian institutions ran parallel first to UNMIK institutions and afterwards to 
Kosovo institutions. According to OSCE, the term “… parallel structures is used to define 
bodies and institutions that have been or still are operational in Kosovo after 10 June 1999 
and that are not mandated for under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244” 
(Emphasis in original, OSCE 2007: 5). Sometimes, these institutions function next to the in-
stitutions of Kosovo or even under the same roof. 
The Serbian parallel institutions are most relevant in the northern municipalities of 
Zvečan/Zveçan, Zubin Potok, Leposavić/Leposaviq, and the northern part of Mi-
trovicë/Mitrovica. These municipalities have “… not been under effective control from Pristi-
na for two decades …” (ICG 2011: i). According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), the 
term “parallel institutions” is even misleading when referring to Serbian institutions in the 
North, since the Serbian institutions financing and organizing public services for their resi-
dents are the only institutions available to the population. This is partly true since on the one 
hand, civil administration, education, health care, public services, and land use regulation are 
all run by Serbian rules. On the other hand, the police wear Kosovar uniforms and report to 
Prishtinë/Priština. (Cf. ICG 2011: 2f.) In the area of power supply, there is a parallelism of the 
institutions observable: Kosovar and Serbian power utilities provide electricity to the northern 
municipalities. 
The Serbian rule in the North has a special relevance to the Republic of Serbia because Bel-
grade aims at “… regaining the region [North Kosovo] as a limited victory to compensate for 
losing the rest of its former province.” (ICG 2011: i) After the declaration of independence by 
Kosovo’s institutions, this relevance increased significantly: “Serbia allocated €500 million in 
support of parallel structures for the Serb community in 2008 … This is a significant sum 
given that the total annual budget of Kosovo is about €1.4 billion.” (Gjoni et al. 2010: 304) 
 
Despite the fact that one could think that Kosovo wants to have nonrestrictive sovereignty in 
the North, Kosovo “… expressly permits Serbian funding for education, medical care and 
municipal services, provided it is coordinated with Prishtina, which is currently not.” (Em-
phasis added, ICG 2011: i) The Serbian parallel institutions are not forbidden under Kosovo’s 
law; their operation only has to be in accordance with Prishtinë/Priština and not organized 
without consultation. The Ahtisaari plan even explicitly allows for the Serbian funding to 
cover education, health care, pensions, and other public services. The Kosovar law requires 
Belgrade to declare its aid to Prishtinë/Priština and to use Kosovo banks for the transfer of 
money to northern Kosovo.  
 
In February 2013, Belgrade and Prishtinë/Priština started negotiations regarding the parallel 
institutions in northern Kosovo. Despite the fact that “Belgrade says these will only be with-
drawn if its people are granted a broad degree of self-determination …”161, it is a large step 
                                                 
161
  Maguire, Helen (2013): Serbia, Kosovo premiers seek breakthrough in Brussels, in: europe online magazine, 
issued on 4 March 2013, online available at: http://en.europeonline-magazine.eu/serbia-kosovo-premiers-
seek-breakthrough-in-brussels_268038.html, last retrieved on 08.03.2013.  
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for the relationship between Belgrade and Prishtinë/Priština to even begin negotiations con-
cerning the parallel institutions in northern Kosovo with a positive agreement. In the future, 
all institutions shall be in accordance with the Serbian and the Kosovar constitution. 
 
For the moment, the Serbian parallel institutions in northern Kosovo are most prevalent in the 
areas of education, health care, justice, public administration, and administration related to 
property. Subsequently, these areas are explained and their consequences for the Serbian re-
turnees elaborated specifically.  
 
Education is organized in two parallel systems in Kosovo: the Kosovo Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology (MEST) runs the Kosovo Albanian schools where lessons are held in 
Albanian, Bosnian, and Turkish and the Serbian Ministry of Education and Sports (SMES) 
finances and organizes the parallel Serbian schools and educational institutions for members 
of the Serbian, the Roma, the Kosovo Croatian, the Bosniak and the Gorani community. (Cf. 
EAR 2006a: 102; OSCE 2009a: 4)  
“Following recent statements from the Serbian Ministry of Education and Sport, there 
are an additional 80 Serbian education facilities in Kosovo, representing 1,054 class-
rooms and an estimated 30,000 students in the pre-university system.” (UNICEF Koso-
vo 2011: 3) 
In the Serbian schools
162
, the curricula and the textbooks are directly imported from Belgrade 
but not adapted to Kosovo realities. Usually, the Serbian students study Serbia as a whole and 
then Kosovo as a separate part, disconnected from the whole story. The textbooks reflect a 
one-sided perspective of their history, which favors their ethnic origin. (Cf. OSCE 2009a: 18; 
KIPRED 2006a: 22) Contemporary history is most likely not dealt with. At most, it covers the 
events of 1998/1999 through a presentation of specific facts lacking a comprehensive analysis 
of the same. (Cf. OSCE 2009a: 19)  
 
The Serbian parents send their children to Serbian schools for three reasons: 
 
(1) Higher quality in Serbian schools than in schools run by the MEST (Kosovo) 
The quality of teaching and learning in the Kosovar educational system is very low. This can 
be explained as follows: During the Serbian domination of public life in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the Albanians were forced to resign from their offices, among them also teachers. The Serbs 
banned secondary and tertiary education in Albanian; only primary schools could continue 
teaching in the majority’s language. For this reason, the former Albanian teachers established 
parallel secondary schools in the underground, where they did not have access to a budget, 
new literature, new research results, or even textbooks in general. Consequently, the quality of 
education among the Albanians decreased during this time. The Serbs, in juxtaposition had 
full access to all necessary resources and requirements through Belgrade’s aid. The Schools 
and the universities were financed and provided with extensive curricula, textbooks, and sup-
plies by Serbia proper. The teachers were also paid and trained by the kin state. 
                                                 
162
  A detailed compilation of the primary and secondary Serbian education facilities in selected municipalities 
can be found in OSCE 2007: 33.  
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Even today, the fact that the parallel Serbian schools and the university in North Mi-
trovicë/Mitrovica is paid and equipped by Belgrade increases the quality of Serbian education 
in Kosovo significantly. Despite the fact that “[e]ducation is the single-largest programme of 
public expenditure [in Kosovo], as reflected by the Government of Kosovo’s increased budget 
allocation for education … the actual amount allocated to education is insufficient considering 
the sector’s needs” (UNICEF Kosovo 2011: 3f.). This fact is also reflected by the teachers’ 
salaries in the Serbian system that are approximately twice as high as in the Kosovar system. 
Although the following figures are from 2006 and 2008, recent estimations support the high 
quality of education of the Serbian community in Kosovo. For instance, an above-average 
share of the Serbian population in Kosovo has secondary education: 65 % in contrast to 46 % 
of Kosovo Albanians. 
Figure 33: The Serbian Educational Level According to the Highest Degree 
Source: Own illustration according to UNDP (2006): Kosovo Mosaic, p. 24 and UNIJA-Union 2008: KO-
SOVO, p. 46. 
The report “Non-majority communities in the primary and secondary educational systems” by 
the OSCE supports the high quality of Serbian education: 
“In general, Kosovo Serbs do not face difficulties in accessing curricula and textbooks 
for primary and secondary education. Serbian curriculum schools are generally in a 
comparatively good condition, school transport is provided, and, with the exception of 
Roma pupils, the drop-out rate is very low. University students commute to northern 
Mitrovica/Mitrovicë (mainly through the humanitarian bus transportation provided by 
the Kosovo Ministry of Transport and Communications) or to universities in Serbia.” 
(OSCE 2009a: 4)
163
 
The qualification of teachers is assessed as satisfactory. (Cf. OSCE 2009a: 4f.) This overall 
positive assessment is supported by the fact that the Serbian minority has the lowest illiteracy 
                                                 
163
  Admittedly, there are also contrary voices, such as the Humanitarian Law Center which assessed the follow-
ing: “Since Serbs generally do not have normal conditions to obtain education and to go to school, there are 
ever fewer Serbian students in the Serbian enclaves.” (HLC 2008: 262) Joseph Marko also sees significant 
weaknesses in the Serbian education system: “… the lack of freedom of movement and security for non-
majority communities is still a major obstacle for the establishment of an efficient educational and training 
system.” (Marko 2005: 14) Nonetheless, these voices are in the minority. 
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rate, “… followed by Albanians, Others with RAE communities ranking lowest, and the same 
trend is for secondary education. Only in primary education, Albanians rank higher …” 
(KIPRED 2007a: 57). 
 
(2) The Serbian language and the Serbian national subjects  
As there is no mutual understanding between the Albanians and the Serbs in their daily life, 
this attitude can be transferred to the educational system. The Serbian parents want their chil-
dren to be taught in Serbian, in literature, art, music, and in religion. In the Serbian parallel 
educational system, these subjects – also referred to as so-called national subjects – comprise 
50 % of the total classes in primary school. In addition, the Serbian parents want their children 
to be taught by Serbian teachers who teach history in the “right way.” This primarily includes 
the contemporary history of the war at the end of the 1990s but also the population of Kosovo 
in the past
164
. History is added in grade 5 in the Serbian schools. In the secondary school, 10 
out of 30 hours still remain dedicated to the national subjects. (Cf. OSCE 2009a: 19) 
 
(3) Safety concerns on the journey to the Albanian schools and in the schools 
The Serbian parents perceive the situation for their children in multi-ethnic schools as unsafe 
because “… harassment, intimidation and provocation is often a regular concern for Kosovo 
Serbs …” (OSCE 2007: 33). Even the way to school is often not safe for the Serbian students. 
Consequently, in the Albanian dominated areas, either transport to schools in Serbian en-
claves is organized, such as from the Ferizaj/Uroševac municipality to the Štrpce/Shtërpcë 
municipality, or Serbian schools are established in private facilities
165
. (Cf. KIPRED 2006a: 
22) Even though “[p]arallel Schools operate in all regions of Kosovo” (OSCE 2007: 33), ade-
quate transportation is for most Serbian students a necessary prerequisite to education since 
schools are usually located in Serbian dominated areas.  
“For example, the closest school that Serb students from Mušnikovo/Mushnikovë can 
attend and be taught in their mother tongue is in Štrpce/Shtërpc [sic], which is 30 km 
from their village.” (HLC 2008: 194) 
The municipalities Vushtrri/Vučitrn, Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje and Lipjan/Lipljan allow a 
free transportation for the Serbian children to the nearby Serbian enclaves. (Cf. OSCE 2009a: 
12f.) In the municipality of Viti/Vitina, the feeling of insecurity rose to the point that the par-
ents accompany their children to school because they do not want them to walk alone. (Cf. 
OSCE 2009a: 4) 
Even in big cities such as in the capital Prishtinë/Priština, there are not any schools that teach 
in the Serbian language. The Serbian children from the capital go to schools in the Serbian 
enclave of Gračanica/Graçanicë a few kilometers away. (Cf. KIPRED 2006b: 17) In this re-
gard, the access to transportation, mobility, and the security, especially protection from ethni-
cally motivated attacks are basic requirements to guarantee the right to education for ethnic 
minorities in Kosovo. 
 
                                                 
164
  For a detailed analysis of the perceptions of Kosovo’s history as well as different understandings of the cur-
rent roles of Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, please see Chapter 7.3.1. 
165
  Paradoxically, these Serbian private educational facilities resemble the Albanian schools in the underground 
during the 1990s. 
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Although the educational level of the Serbian minority in Kosovo is quite high, the parallel-
ism of the Kosovo Albanian and the Serbian educational system fosters a disintegration of the 
Serbian stayees and returnees in Kosovo. The pursued multi-ethnic society is rather avoided 
than aspired for. (Cf. OSCE 2009a: 15; KIPRED 2006a: 32) In addition, children and adoles-
cents have few opportunities to learn the other official language in Kosovo, which is a prereq-
uisite for multi-ethnic tolerance and mutual trust. As a consequence, Kosovo suffers from 
internal communication deficiencies that will likely intensify in the future.  
“In the future the Kosovo civil service is likely to be composed of civil servants unable 
to speak both official languages.” (OSCE 2009a: 23) 
Furthermore, any attempt to set up multi-ethnic schools has failed in the past. For instance, in 
September 2004, the former Albanian school was changed into a multi-ethnic school called 
“Sveti Sava” in Bresje, located in Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje municipality, because “… the 
school was not used in its full capacity, while the municipality had a deficit of classrooms 
space.” (OSCE 2009a: 15) Students, teachers, and administrators did not hold a multi-ethnic 
dialogue with each other: Hence, both school systems work next to each other but not with 
each other. That basically means that students who are integrated in the Kosovar and in the 
Serbian system have different hours and learn on different floors. 
Another example is a school in Poneš/Ponesh, which was constructed with financial support 
from the British Embassy aimed at establishing a multi-ethnic school, in which “national sub-
jects” are taught in their own system but classes such as physical education are shared. “How-
ever, the setup of a sign naming the school after a Kosovo Liberation Army member and a 
‘Republic of Kosovo’ sign proved too divisive and ran counter to the spirit of the project … .” 
(OSCE 2009a: 16) One further example is the primary school in Janjevë/Janjevo, which has 
three directors from three different communities and each of them refers to the school in a 
different name. (Cf. OSCE 2009a: 17) 
 
The Serbian returnees are particularly impacted by an educational dilemma that prevents fam-
ilies with children from returning to their home in Kosovo. The Kosovo Serb displaced fami-
lies with school-aged children deem lack of access to school facilities at their place of origin a 
major obstacle to return as has been observed in the municipality of Ferizaj/Uroševac. (Cf. 
Hinz 2009: 64) Since 1999, only elderly couples, individuals, and families without school-
aged children returned to this municipality. Due to the low return rate of non-Albanian speak-
ing minorities, there is no single school in the municipality of Ferizaj/Uroševac that offers 
classes in Serbian. The municipality is obliged to and has several times announced that they 
will either organize transportation to schools in Štrpce/Shtërpcë or in Gračanica/Graçanicë, or 
to build an own school providing education in Serbian. (Cf. Hinz 2009: 64) Regardless, if 
there are no school-aged children, there will be no Serbian schools in Ferizaj/Uroševac. Pos-
sibly, there are families with school-aged children who lived in this municipality prior to the 
war and would return to their home if there were Serbian schools. This vicious circle is a ma-
jor obstacle to the return process to Ferizaj/Uroševac and fosters the return of families from 
Ferizaj/Uroševac to Serbian near enclaves such as Štrpce/Shtërpcë.  
Due to the lack of educational facilities, the Serbian refugees and the IDPs are deprived of a 
free decision regarding return. They would have to choose a Serbian enclave instead of their 
municipality of origin if they want to guarantee their children free access to Serbian educa-
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tion. Consequently, the development of mono-ethnic areas is strengthened and the number of 
multi-ethnic areas continues to decrease.  
 
Among the youths in Kosovo, there are more Serbian graduates from high schools than Alba-
nians, but less Serbian graduates from university than Albanians. The background is the paral-
lel tertiary education: 
“Indeed, the University of Prishtinë/Priština does not offer any courses in languages dif-
ferent from Albanian, but only the University in Prishtinë/Priština has been accredited 
by virtue of the Law on Higher Education enacted in 2003 by the Kosovo Assembly, 
whereas the University in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica was granted only temporary license by 
SRSG [Special Representative to the Secretary General] which was renewed every 
year.” (UNIJA-Union 2008: 44) 
Even in higher education, a parallel educational system emerged. The Serbian University in 
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North, hosting around 9,000 students (Cf. ICG 2011: 4), is financed
166
 
and organized by Belgrade. Besides this parallel university, there are also “… a Consultative 
Centre of a private Faculty from Novi Sad (“Fakultet za Usluzni Biznis”) operating in 
Štrpce/Shtërpcë … . This Faculty offers studies in the fields of Business Management, Eco-
nomics, Tourism and Public Management.” (OSCE 2007: 43) 
Hence, members of the non-Albanian speaking minorities, who want to study at a university, 
have to move either to North Mitrovicë/Mitrovica or to Serbia proper since there are only a 
few transport options from different municipalities to the North. For instance, UN transports 
are only twice a week at the minorities’ disposal. (Cf. UNIJA-Union 2008: 45) Financial con-
straints may, particularly for the returnees who are usually not permanently employed, be a 
barrier to tertiary education. Furthermore, the exclusive university locations in Mi-
trovicë/Mitrovica and in Serbia proper may be a criterion for the refugees to return to the 
northern municipalities in Kosovo and not to their hometown where tertiary educational fa-
cilities are unavailable. In the big picture, one should keep in mind the importance of the uni-
versity in the North which “… is also a symbol of Serbia’s commitment to staying in the 
North – the whole campus was built from scratch.” (ICG 2011: 5) 
 
Education can create opportunities through which the returnees and the stayees alike can de-
velop peaceful means of conflict resolution, which prevents a renewal of violence in a post-
conflict society. In the case of positive intellectual interactions between students, this positive, 
enlightened attitude could possibly cause a ripple effect on the whole community. (Cf. Coles 
2011: 43) Schools are the places that ideally should overcome ethnic divisions because social-
ization begins at an early stage of childhood. Prejudices can be avoided when children learn in 
school how to live in a shared community. In Kosovo, one can observe that education is the 
area where the parallelism of the Serbian and the Kosovo Albanian system damages most.  
“The two educational systems have, in fact, contributed to entrench the chasm which 
divides communities in Kosovo.” (OSCE 2009a: 18)  
The Serbian and the Albanian children and youths go to school without having contact with 
the other ethnic community. They sometimes even go to the same school building but receive 
                                                 
166
  The University of Mitrovica/Mitrovicë costs Belgrade between 30 and 35 million EUR annually. (Cf. ICG 
2011: 4) 
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instruction on different floors and in different shifts with a 45 minute break in between so that 
physical interaction becomes unlikely. Any attempts to combine the teaching at least in non-
national subjects such as physical education or math did not succeed. 
 
The Serbian returnees are among the ones who suffer disproportionally from the separation of 
the two educational systems. In summary, the non-Albanian speaking refugee families with 
school-aged children who are willing to return cannot chose freely where to return to but have 
to return to the Serbian dominated areas where their children can go to a Serbian school. The 
same occurs with individuals who want to study at a university being that the only one exist-
ing is in North Mitrovicë/Mitrovica as previously mentioned. This leads to the following as-
sessment: 
“Displaced Serbs rank education second only to employment as the primary reason why 
they will not return to areas dominated by Albanians.” (Dahlman, Williams 2010: 421) 
“In this way, education perpetrates and reinforces separation.” (OSCE 2009a: 15) It reinforces 
the establishment of Serbian enclaves and the compartmentalization of the Serbs from the rest 
of the society, including the return of Serbs to Serbian dominated areas and the dissolution of 
multi-ethnic areas. Similar occurrences in the health care sector will be considered below. 
 
“In many return areas, the provision of health care facilities is intrinsically linked to the suc-
cess of Kosovo Serbs returns.” (OSCE 2007: 53) The Government of the Republic of Serbia 
established parallel health care facilities for the Serbian minority in Kosovo.
167
 The reasons 
for rejecting Kosovo’s institutions and the use of the parallel health care services are mani-
fold:  
Figure 34: Reasons for frequenting the Serbian Health Care Facilities 
Source: Own compilation 
The lack of security and of freedom of movement of Kosovo Serbs, particularly in the after-
math of the declaration of independence in 2008 gives rise to the fact that the Serbian resi-
dents and in particular the returnees feel more comfortable using their own health care system 
in their areas. (Cf. EAR 2006a: 103; OSCE 2007: 44) Also in the Serbian health system, there 
are only a few secondary and almost no tertiary institutions.
168
 This can have the effect that 
                                                 
167
  In the World Bank report of 2006, the parallel institutions in the municipality of Štrpce/Shtërpcë are very 
well explained: “In fact 195 health workers (including 37 doctors) are receiving salaries from Belgrade, and 
an entire parallel health system functions within the municipality. All hospital accounts paid from Belgrade, 
and supplies including drugs are provided free from North Mitrovica. Medical installations are not billed for 
utilities. The municipal health authorities argue that more health services are required since patients with se-
rious conditions have to be transported to Mitrovica (rather than the local referral hospital in the neighboring 
municipality of Gjilan). The health facilities in the municipality report to Belgrade. It is recognized that there 
is an excessive number of doctors given the population of the municipality, but the perceived security situa-
tion, together with the financing from Belgrade make the transfer of staff to other municipalities impossible. 
As a solution, the health authorities have proposed that a new hospital be built (as a secondary health care in-
stitution) financed by the central Ministry of Health.” (World Bank 2006: 151) 
168
  Health care systems are usually divided into three levels: primary health care includes first aid for minor 
illnesses and injuries, secondary health care for more severe injuries and illnesses is provided by hospitals, 
while the tertiary health care encompasses cardiology, oncology, trauma, transplantations, and mental illness-
es. (Cf. UNMIK 2007: 14) 
Lack of 
Security
Mistrust
Language 
Differences
Financial 
Constraints
Better Quality
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
216 
diagnoses are confirmed too late and treatments begin too late. The lack of freedom of move-
ment – whether de facto existent or subjectively perceived – and the mistrust towards Kosovo 
Albanian institutions despite being geographically closer than the Serbian institutions can lead 
to delays with severe health consequences. (Cf. Bloom, Hoxha et al. 2006: 432)  
This lack of trust is especially evident when referring to the training and qualification of the 
Albanian doctors and the other medical staff. The Kosovo Serbs doubt that the Albanians pos-
sess “… the same level of professional skills as Kosovo Serb medical professionals.” (OSCE 
2007: 44; cf. HLC 2008: 208) This mistrust is not unfounded as Albanian doctors, nurses, and 
other hospital personnel were excluded from medical institutions in the 1990s. Although the 
dismissed staff was still able to acquire theoretical knowledge in their parallel environments, 
they lack practical experience.  
It is also reasonable that the Kosovo Serbs are provided with health care in the parallel system 
because “… the services at a Serbian healthcare institution are free of charge” (HLC 2008: 
190). Due to the limited financial resources that are available to the returnees, they are often 
not able to pay the price for transportation, treatment, and medication – albeit being small. 
Consequently, it seems logical that the Serbian returnees frequent the parallel institutions in-
stead of the Kosovar institutions. In addition, the Serbian system is attributed to have a higher 
quality than the Kosovar system. (Cf. OSCE 2008a: 11) This is mainly due to the better edu-
cation of the Serbian physicians and comprehensive financing by the Serbian government. In 
summary, it can be argued, “[a]s a result, nearly all Serbs stay away from most of the health 
care facilities administrated by ethnic Albanians“ (Bloom, Hoxha et al. 2006: 431). 
 
The Serbian health care system consists of several institutions
169
 most of which are located in 
the Serbian enclaves and in northern Kosovo. Often, the health care facilities that were used 
before the war remained open and have been continuously used by the Serbian government. 
(Cf. Bloom, Hoxha et al. 2006: 431) In the North of the Ibër/Ibar River are better health care 
institutions than in the rest of the country: In addition to the local fixed health facilities, there 
are some mobile teams that travel once or twice a week to the Albanian-dominated municipal-
ities in order to ensure primary health care for the Serbian residents living there. (Cf. OSCE 
2007: 51) This statement was also confirmed by a Serbian returnee who was interviewed in 
the town of Ferizaj/Uroševac: 
“Every Tuesday and one other day during the week, there is a doctor coming to Talino-
vac either from Štrpce/Shtërpcë or from Gračanica/Graçanicë. The doctor has some 
medicines, others we have to buy on our own. When we need special medicines, we can 
prescribe it for the next week and then the doctor is bringing it during his next visit.” 
(Hinz 2009: 68) 
The quality of health care in the Serbian parallel institutions is good because “… these facili-
ties are supplied very well with drugs and other materials” (CRIP 2009: 59). It only lacks ter-
tiary institutions, which are only available in the Kosovo university hospital in Prisht-
inë/Priština. However, the Serbian returnees and the other Serbian residents only use these 
institutions in case of extreme emergency. For surgeries and difficult treatments, they tend to 
drive to Serbia to seek treatment instead of approaching the university hospital. According to 
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  For a detailed list of all parallel health facilities of the Serbian government in Kosovo please see OSCE 2007: 
Annex II – Parallel Healthcare Facilities in Kosovo, p. 59 ff. 
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the OSCE (2007: 49), the other challenges within the Serbian health care system in Kosovo 
are: 
 the insufficient network of health care facilities in remote areas, 
 the lack of transportation to the health care facilities in Serbian areas, 
 the lack of adequate and modern medical equipment,  
 the lack of opportunities to treat emergencies, and 
 inadequate secondary health care facilities.  
In a few cases, Serbian institutions are frequented by the Kosovo Albanians and vice versa, 
but these are isolated cases, which are often related to the fact that the patient was already 
treated by the individual physician before the war. (Cf. Bloom, Hoxha et al. 2006: 431) There 
are also a small number of multi-ethnic institutions “… even though it is sometimes in differ-
ent areas of the same building or in different shifts from one another” (Bloom, Hoxha et al. 
2006: 431).
170
 Nonetheless, it can be generalized that the Serbian residents of Kosovo, includ-
ing the returnees, almost exclusively use the parallel institutions. 
 
Overall, the quality of the Serbian health care in Kosovo can be rated as sufficient despite the 
previously mentioned shortcomings. The most grievous difficulties the Serbian returnees face 
in the field of health care are the long transportation distances to the health care facilities in 
the North and in the southern enclaves in Kosovo, and the lack of tertiary health care in the 
parallel system. The returnees usually cannot afford a transport to Belgrade due to their finan-
cial constraints. Similar to the two co-existing educational systems in Kosovo is the situation 
in the health sector: the Serbian parallel system does not promote the integration of the Serbi-
an returnees into Kosovo’s society but leads to an ethnic segregation. As a consequence, 
health care in Kosovo does not contribute to sustainability in the return process of the Serbs. 
The same occurs when considering judicial and public administration in northern Kosovo and 
the southern Serbian-dominated enclaves. 
 
UNIJA-Union argues (2008: 18) that “[t]he goal of establishing a multiethnic judiciary system 
was not accomplished”. This can be mainly explained by the existence of a parallel Serbian 
judicial system. Nowadays, there are parallel courts maintained by Belgrade within the territo-
ry of Kosovo and in towns in Serbia proper that are connected to Kosovo by liaison offices in 
the Serbian enclaves such as the liaison office in Gračanica/Graçanicë of the parallel court in 
Niš, Serbia.171 It has to be noted that most courts existed before the war in 1999 and could not 
continue working afterwards because of the jurisdiction created by the Security Council Reso-
lution 1244. Since then, some courts operate from Serbia proper dealing with the payment of 
alimony, loans, the transfer of property, marriage, and divorce, among others. (Cf. OSCE 
2007: 20) “According to OSCE information, Serbian courts currently attempt to cover, juris-
                                                 
170
  The OSCE observed in 2007 that in some municipalities, particularly in Štrpce/ Shtërpcë, Kosovar institu-
tions were used by the Serbs and vice versa: “The clinic in the village of Drajkovce/Drajkofc 
(Štrpce/Shtërpcë Municipality) is sometimes used by Kosovo Serbs for the medical services of MoH paid 
doctors. There are even more frequent cases of Kosovo Albanians using the medical services in the 
Štrpce/Shtërpcë health house, which operates completely under the Serbian Ministry of Health (SMoH). Ac-
cording to the Deputy Director of the Štrpce/Shtërpcë Municipal Health Department, all patients are treated 
equally and free of charge.“ (OSCE 2007: 44) 
171
  See a detailed list of the parallel courts in Kosovo as well as the courts in Serbia that are dealing with Kosovo 
in OSCE 2007: Parallel Structures in Kosovo, pp. 16ff. 
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dictionally, every municipality and district of Kosovo.” (OSCE 2007: 16) Parallel courts are, 
for instance, the parallel District Court of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica – the Kosovska Mitrovica Dis-
trict Court – in the Zvečan/Zveçan municipality. In the majority of cases, the parallel courts 
deal with administrative issues such as the verification of documents and signatures of con-
tracts.  
 
The Kosovo Serbs and the Serbian returnees approach the Serbian parallel courts in Kosovo 
and in Serbia because of three main reasons. First, they mistrust the Kosovar justice system 
and “… often do not report crimes committed against them, although they are often targets of 
the theft of agricultural tools and machines …” (UNIJA-Union 2008: 18). Second, the Serbs 
use these institutions because the security situation sometimes does not allow them to travel to 
courts operated by Kosovo, which are most likely located outside of the northern municipali-
ties and the Serbian enclaves in the rest of Kosovo. Thus, filing a lawsuit at a Serbian parallel 
court is usually the most accessible option for most Kosovo Serbs. (Cf. OSCE 2007: 15) 
Third, all communities, including the Serbs and notably the Serbian returnees, approach these 
courts when they are in need of documents that are recognized in Serbia proper. Since the 
relatives of the returnees are often left behind in exile, it is essential for the Serbian returnees 
to approach the Serbian courts in case of family law judgments or civil status changes that 
have to be recognized in Serbia proper, too.  
 
The Serbian courts only apply the current applicable law in Serbia, which differs severely 
from the law in Kosovo. Due to the non-applicability of Kosovar laws, the Serbian parallel 
courts prevent an equal access of all communities in Kosovo to justice. (Cf. OSCE 2007: 15) 
A further risk is double jeopardy, which can create a situation where “… a defendant can be 
prosecuted and sentenced twice for the same crime.” (OSCE 2007: 16, 20) According to sev-
eral Human Rights Conventions, double jeopardy is prohibited. The criminal procedure law 
applicable in Serbia until 2004 acknowledged, “… a court shall reject a case ‘if the accused 
has already been validly convicted of the same crime or acquitted of the charge …’” (OSCE 
2007: 22). The problem is that neither judicial system recognizes the other. Therefore, the 
accused has not been validly convicted of the crime. This is problematic in criminal law, due 
to  
“[t]he effect on defendants, particularly Kosovo Serbs who have endured trials in Serbia 
proper and then return to Kosovo, has been troubling since they are not immune from a 
second trial on the same charges in an UNMIK court …” (OSCE 2007: 16).172  
Consequently, the Kosovo Serbs can be charged and convicted for the same offence twice as 
the courts do not recognize each other. This possibility is not conducive to a sustainable return 
and integration of the Serbian returnees into the Kosovar society. “These parallel courts, 
which operate both in Kosovo and in Serbia proper, prevent an environment in which all eth-
nicities may live with equal access to justice under the same law.” (Emphasis added, OSCE 
2007: 15) 
 
                                                 
172
  This situation has not changed since the declaration of independence except for the fact that the courts oper-
ate under Kosovo’s jurisdiction and not under UNMIK anymore. 
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In addition, the parallel courts create challenges in the validity and recognition of judgments, 
confusion, and additional costs resulting from overlapping jurisdiction. In some cases, re-
sources are doubled and the legal outcomes were conflicting with each other.
173
 (Cf. OSCE 
2007: 20) “It creates confusion for people who do not understand which court to approach and 
want decisions recognized in both Serbia proper and Kosovo.” (OSCE 2007: 22) The return-
ees are among the people who often cannot rely on a social network of relatives and friends 
who can assist them in approaching the right court.  
 
The situation in the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica region is eminently devastating for the returning and 
the remaining Serbs. In February 2008, just after the declaration of independence, a group of 
50 to 200 protestors, among them mostly pre-war judicial staff, gathered in order to get entry 
into a building to return it to the Serbian court system. After they entered the building force-
fully on 14 March 2008, a joint operation by UNMIK and KFOR arrested the occupants on 17 
March 2008. Serious civil unrest followed this operation. (Cf. OSCE 2008b: 2) By 2011, 
“… neither the court nor the prosecution offices have been able to resume their work.” (OSCE 
2008b: 2) As a result, the residents of the northern Kosovar municipalities do not possess an 
equal access to justice. The continuously operating courts only dealt with urgent cases and 
only functioned in a limited capacity. (Cf. OSCE 2011c: 6) In 2008, a considerable number of 
civil cases, including inter-ethnic property cases, were already pending when the courts in the 
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica region were suspended. According to OSCE information, these cases 
remain stalled (Cf. OSCE 2011c: 8) and usually affect the returnees who are attempting to 
retrieve the right to their property. Once the Serbian returnees are deprived of this right, one 
can no longer speak of a sustainable return since they cannot return to their original homes. 
Instead, they rely on social housing and the favor of their relatives or friends. 
 
Property related challenges are of utmost importance for the Serbian refugees who intend to 
return to their homes in Kosovo. Hence, the parallel administrative structures with property 
related competencies have a special relevance and influence on the Serbian refugees and the 
returnees.  
The Serbian administrative institutions are the only local government bodies existing in 
northern Kosovo. Although Kosovo’s municipalities have responsibility in land use, spatial 
planning, construction, and social housing, “… parallel administrative structures continue to 
make reference to non-applicable law and to provide inaccurate information to citizens re-
garding available legal remedies” (OSCE 2007: 28). Beyond that, the implementation of the 
Republic of Serbia framework on Construction and Social Planning is “… inadequate, creates 
legal uncertainty and leaves individual rights unprotected” (OSCE 2007: 31). When, for in-
stance, a Serbian refugee returns from Serbia proper to Kosovo and intends to repossess 
his/her property, which is currently occupied by ethnic Albanian IDPs, he/she would first ap-
proach the Serbian parallel administrative institutions. Even though they might decide in fa-
vor of the returnee, these institutions do not have the legislative rights to decide on property 
on the territory of Kosovo. Consequently, no legal decision could be implemented and the 
status quo would not change. This would effectively create a new conflict between the Serbi-
an returnee and the Albanian IDP occupying his/her house. 
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  For specific examples, please see OSCE (2007): Parallel Structures in Kosovo, p. 21. 
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In addition, two separate cadastral records are maintained pertaining to the same properties: 
This can lead to a situation where an individual transfers the same immovable property twice 
to different persons. (Cf. OSCE 2007: 31) Additionally, the Republic of Serbia Geodetic Au-
thority (RSGA) offices continue to be dislocated after the end of the conflict within Serbia 
proper, mainly in Kruševac, Leskovac, and Niš. The RSGA issues documents that are 
“… utilized on different occasions by NGOs and/or implementing agencies to support the 
reconstruction of houses for displaced persons and potential returnees.” (OSCE 2007: 32) 
Since these documents are not considered valid and these institutions are generally not recog-
nized in Kosovo, the Kosovar residents and potential returnees are the victims because they 
will not be granted the right they deserve. (Cf. OSCE 2007: 32) Admittedly, there are also 
positive examples of de facto recognition of parallel structures in Serbia that helped the indi-
vidual Serb returning to his/her home in Kosovo: 
“In other instances, local authorities have found ad hoc solutions. Apart from the coop-
eration observed in the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica Roma Mahala reconstruction process de-
scribed earlier, the Municipal Cadastre Office in Ferizaj/Uroševac has on one occasion 
cross-checked documents submitted by displaced persons and issued by the displaced 
cadastral office in Kruševac despite the availability of records in the Municipality. The 
Municipal Cadastre Office then updated its own records to issue cadastral certificates 
necessary for the reconstruction process.” (OSCE 2007: 32) 
Yet, these cases are the exception: Property and housing are one of the most intense and com-
plicated challenges the refugees are facing upon their return. Because of the existence of par-
allel administrative institutions with property related competencies that are not recognized in 
Kosovo, the returnees face difficulties deciding what institution to approach. In the worst case 
scenario, the returnees approach the Serbian institutions, awaiting a decision that cannot be 
legally implemented because these institutions are not recognized within Kosovo. Conse-
quently, this parallelism again increases the segregation of the Serbs within their municipali-
ties instead of creating mutual understanding and fostering an integration of the Serbian re-
turnees into Kosovo’s society.  
 
The same dilemma occurs in the public transportation sector. Most of Kosovo’s residents, 
regardless of ethnicity, use their own car for transportation. “However, public transportation 
by bus is functioning optimally at both levels – interurban and within the cities.” (CRIP 2009: 
15)
174
 Also in the area of public short- and long-distance transportation, there is a Serbian 
parallel system:  
“In order to get to Gračanica/Graçanicë, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica or Serbia, Serbs mainly 
use services of Serb transport companies, taxis driven by Serbs, UNMIK vehicles, or 
they use their own cars with ‘KS’ [Kosovo] license plates.” (HLC 2008: 192) 
One reason for transportation by Serbian means of public transport is mainly the fact that 
there is no Kosovo public transportation in or to the Serbian enclaves. The Humanitarian Law 
Center (HLC) argues that there was never a Kosovo transport to Gračanica/Graçanicë, within 
the enclaves in the municipality of Obiliq/Obilić, to Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North or the other 
northern municipalities. (Cf. HLC 2008: 192) The result was the private organization of the 
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  The price of a bus ride from one city to another within Kosovo is between 1 and 5 EUR. Within cities, a bus 
ride costs 40 to 50 cents. (Cf. CRIP 2009: 15) 
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transport to schools or to hospitals in the Serbian enclaves. Yet, many Serbian returnees do 
not have the financial ability to take a taxi and often do not have a car either. Due to the lack 
of public transportation, many Serbian returnees could not return to their municipalities of 
origin, but chose to return to Serbian enclaves where education and health care facilities were 
available on site. In contrast, in their municipalities of origin, they would have to rely exclu-
sively on primary health care facilities and would not be able to send their children to the 
school of their choice.  
 
Public transportation also does not support a sustainable return of the Kosovo Serbs to their 
homes because Kosovo’s public transportation does not allow the residents to drive to Serbian 
enclaves or to the North of Kosovo. Instead, as in many other sectors too, a parallel system 
was created that provides the Kosovo Serbs with an inexpensive option to undertake the often 
necessary drives.  
 
Concluding, the parallel institutions play a significant role in the return process of the Serbs to 
Kosovo, particularly because most Serbian refugees return to the northern municipalities. 
Three main correlations between the parallel institutions and the situation of the Serbian re-
turnees can be summarized: 
 
(1) The Serbian returnees are better off than returnees of other communities due to the paral-
lel institutions. 
The Republic of Serbia spends around 200 million EUR annually for the support of all Serbian 
institutions Kosovo-wide. This equals around 3,636 EUR per person in contrast to the EU 
support for the rest of Kosovo which amounts to 37.29 EUR per person. (Cf. ICG 2011: 4) 
This has a significant impact on the lives of the Serbian returnees who can easily access edu-
cation, health care, pensions, and social welfare in the Serbian majority areas. The following 
question arises: What if this financial support decreases or even ceases to exist in the near 
future. Although this cash infusion is solely available to the Serbian population in Kosovo, it 
simultaneously releases Kosovo’s social system from providing services and financial support 
to one part of the population. By a significant decrease of this financial support or the final 
dismissal of the cash flow, the Serbian returnees and the stayees would have to be integrated 
into Kosovo’s education, health care, and social welfare systems immediately, which are al-
ready overwhelmed with their current responsibilities.  
Due to this financial support, the Serbian returnees are better off than the returnees belonging 
to other communities in Kosovo, notably in the areas of education and health care, which are 
two cornerstones for a sustainable return to Kosovo. The Serbs in the North feel that their 
system is superior to Kosovo’s institutions and it is true that the system is better organized 
and the services are superior to those in the Kosovar system. Reasons exist in the much higher 
budget provided by the Republic of Serbia and the continuous education and equipment of 
teachers and health care staff during the past 30 years. As a consequence, the Serbs in the 
North ask themselves the following question: “Who … ‘wants to integrate into an inferior 
system’?” (ICG 2011: 8)  
 
(2) Parallelism leads to a segregation between the Albanians and the Serbs 
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The current parallel Serbian institutions can be compared to the Albanian parallel institutions 
that established in the underground during the 1990s. The reasons for the parallel institutions 
can be traced back to the oppression by the majority community, a lack of trust, and a lack of 
safety. The current situation is characterized by inter-ethnic tensions, the lack of mutual un-
derstanding and trust as well as insurmountable language differences. This parallelism is ex-
ceptionally fostered through the division of the educational system: The Serbs and the Alba-
nians learn apart from each other, including the different languages and a different version of 
history. Multi-ethnic schools do not exist and the few attempts to establish schools in which 
both communities can learn together ended in a situation in which all learn under the same 
roof but in different time shifts and on different floors. “The language barrier reinforces divi-
sion. … younger Albanians and Serbs communicate in English.” (ICG 2011: 7) 
 
(3) Uncertainties and inconveniencies for the returnees 
The returnees suffer greatly and are further vulnerable from uncertainties and inconveniencies 
that exist because of the parallelism, especially in the northern Kosovo municipalities. For 
instance, the Serbian schools are not located in every municipality throughout Kosovo. On 
that account, the families with school-aged children are forced to either immediately return to 
areas where Serbian schools exist or to move to those areas when their children are at the age 
of entering primary school. Because of this limitation, the Serbian returnees are not free to 
decide where to return and often cannot return to their municipality of origin.  
In addition, the Serbian returnees are often deprived of the possibility to make use of tertiary 
education since the only location of a Serbian university is in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North (or 
in Serbia proper). Long travel distances to health care centers and the lack of tertiary health 
care at all are two of the most grievous obstacles for a sustainable Serbian return. Their finan-
cial constraints can lead to a lag in a diagnosis or sometimes receiving any treatment at all. 
 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
223 
7.3.3 The Discrimination in Public Life 
Before the discrimination against the Serbs in general and the Serbian returnees in particular 
can be addressed properly, the legal basis of discrimination in Kosovo must be elaborated on. 
In September 2004, the “Anti-Discrimination Law” entered into force in Kosovo, being one of 
the first countries in South East Europe (SEE) adopting an anti-discrimination law. The law is 
largely based on EU legislative acts, dealing primarily with “… the equal treatment directives 
in relation to race and equal treatment in employment and occupation.” (Cf. YIHR 2011: 1) It 
covers sixteen grounds of discrimination including sex, gender, age, marital status, language, 
mental or physical disability, sexual orientation, political affiliation or conviction, ethnic 
origin, nationality, religion or belief, race, social origin, property or any other status. The 
phrase “any other status” allows for superior protection in regards to new grounds of discrim-
ination. (Cf. YIHR 2011: 2)  
To sum up the general perception of this law, it is “… one of the worlds [sic] most compre-
hensive and detailed domestic laws banning discrimination” (Cahn 2007: 92). Comparing 
similar laws, few go beyond what is determined in Kosovo’s Anti-discrimination Law, not 
even the anti-discrimination regulations by the EU. Regardless,  
“… the Anti-Discrimination Law provides ‘protections only on paper’, which creates a 
myth that the law protects all against discrimination and in practice there are ‘other rea-
sons’ for lacking effectiveness.” (Emphasis added, YIHR 2011: 2) 
The process of implementation of the law is at the beginning, creating a huge gap between 
theory and practice although the law was adopted in 2004. For instance, several public bodies 
were established to evaluate discrimination in Kosovo. Yet, these institutions created unnec-
essary bureaucracy, which has a serious impact on their effectiveness and they do not protect 
the most marginalized groups such as ethnic minorities, women, and the LGBT communi-
ty
175
. (Cf. YIHR 2012: 19) Beyond that, it is embarrassing and unacceptable that the law itself 
contains significant translation deficiencies and even errors in the Serbian version. (Cf. Mati-
jević 2007: 33f.) 
 
The two articles relevant for this particular section on the discrimination in public life are Ar-
ticle 4a) and 4i): 
Articles 4 – Implementation Scope 
This Law shall apply to all natural and legal persons as regards both the public and private 
sectors, including public bodies, in relation to any action or inaction which violates the right 
or rights of any natural or legal person or persons, to: 
a) conditions for access to employment, self-employment and to occupation, including se-
lection criteria and recruitment conditions, whatever the branch of activity and at all lev-
els of the professional hierarchy, including promotion; 
 … 
(i)  access to and supply of goods and services which are available to the public;
176
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  LGBT is the abbreviation for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transsexual. 
176
  The Kosovar Anti-discrimination Law can be downloaded here: http://www.assembly-kosova.org/ 
common/docs/ligjet/2004_3_en.pdf, last retrieved on 18.11.2013. 
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The first section of this chapter deals with the predominant integration of the Serbian return-
ees in Serbia’s employment market, the lack of job opportunities in Kosovo’s private and 
public institutions and the discrimination against the Serbs in Kosovo’s employment market. 
 
The general macro-economic situation in Kosovo is disastrous: the GDP per capita was 
around 1,760 EUR in 2009 and remains the lowest in Europe. (Cf. World Bank 2011: 1) One 
of the biggest challenges of Kosovo’s economy is unemployment; figures range between 40 
and 70 % of the population of working age. (Cf. i.a. CRIP 2009: 34) The employment status 
of many Serbs
177
 changed during the 2000s: “Prior to the conflict in 1999, many Kosovo 
Serbs were employed in both the public sector and in socially owned enterprises. Today, 
many remain unemployed or informally employed.” (OSCE 2010: 231) Only a few Serbs 
work permanently and the unemployment figure of the Kosovo Serbs is higher than for the 
Albanian community. (Cf. UNIJA-Union 2008: 21) That does not take into account the em-
ployment in parallel institutions
178
, particularly in the northern municipalities. For instance, 
“[i]n the Vushtrri/Vučitrn and the Skenderaj/Srbica municipalities, in the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 
region, the socio-economic situation of Kosovo Serbs remains dire. Most residents are unem-
ployed and rely on social assistance, minimum wages deriving from previous public employ-
ment or pensions from Serbia-run institutions.” (OSCE 2010: 232) 
 
In fact, the Serbs in the northern municipalities as well as in the southern/eastern enclaves 
around Kosovo prefer to work in the Serbian parallel institutions funded and organized by the 
Serbian government. (Cf. ICG 2009: 6; Kita 2008: 17) For this reason, the unemployment rate 
in the three northern Serbian dominated municipalities is relatively low (Cf. UNDP 2006: 26) 
and the parallel institutions pay better wages (often double) than the Kosovar institutions.
179
  
The employment situation in the North, where most Serbian returnees live, is characterized by 
public companies and the lack of private companies. “Northern reliance on the public sector is 
in stark contrast to the rest of Kosovo, where the private sector is developing.” (ICG 2011: 6) 
In addition, the Serbian Chamber of Commerce does not offer any projects or incentives for 
business people to establish private companies. A further issue is the fact that salaries in pub-
lic companies are generally higher than in private companies. The International Crisis Group 
therefore argues that “… Serbian state funding undermines private sector growth and econom-
ic development.” (ICG 2011: 6) Reviewing this particular supremacy of the public institu-
tions, the following question arises: What if public companies and parallel institutions cease 
to exist in the North? Many Serbs would be left without any employment opportunities be-
cause of a lack of private job alternatives. Regardless, the Kosovar system would then be 
more stressed since more people would apply for the already scarce vacancies.  
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  It is difficult to assess data on the socio-economic situation of Serbs. On that account, many figures are based 
upon estimations and outdated statistics such as the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) conduct-
ed by the World Bank in 2000. No update has been published since then. However, the statements of national 
and international stakeholders suggest that the situation since the end of the war, especially as regards to the 
situation of minorities, has not changed significantly. 
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  Generally speaking, Kosovo and international institutions do not have access to data related to Kosovo Serbs, 
their employment figures, or any other information about their parallel institutions. 
179
  In most cases, the Serbian parallel institutions and public companies working in Kosovo pay better wages 
because they aim at attracting workers from Serbia proper to work in the undesirable North of Kosovo. 
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Enterprise Total Employees
Serbian employ-
ees before 2008
Serbian employ-
ees after 2008
7,564 28 28
Kosovo Electricity 
Company (KEK)
2,484 41 41
Post & Telecommuni-
cation Kosovo (PTK)
389 41 22Kosovo Railroads
577 5 5Airport Prishtinë/a
in percentage
(after 2008)
0.37 %
1.65 %
5.66 %
0.87 %
7,119 710 296Kosovo Police 4.16 %
Most returnees, however, do not even have access to these public employment opportunities 
as they return to rural and very remote areas. Kosovo’s North is mainly rural “… with North 
Mitrovica now the last remaining urban outpost …” (ESI 2004: 2). As UNDP (2006: 26) 
claims, in Kosovo’s rural areas, there are almost no employment opportunities at all. The rea-
son for the Serbs to return to rural areas, however, is their feeling of insecurity in their origi-
nal urban neighborhoods. They consequently return to the villages, which are only populated 
by the Serbs “… where they feel safe, and survive on subsistence farming, provided they can 
have access to farmland … .” (EAR 2006a: 102) One prominent example is the village of Srp-
ski Babuš/Babushë i Sërbëve in the Ferizaj/Uroševac municipality, a village that is exclusive-
ly populated by Serbian returnees, which is far away from Ferizaj/Uroševac town and from 
any store where they could buy groceries. Subsistence farming and NATO food donations are 
their only means to survive. Therefore, many Serbian returnees depend on informal, seasonal 
work or the black market. (Cf. UNIJA-Union 2008: 21) Alternatively, the Serbian returnees 
could engage in self-employment. Yet, this is not a viable option because the initial financial 
support of 2,000 EUR by the donor community is not enough to create sustainable livelihoods. 
“The income generation assistance … usually is not sufficient to restart activities that 
would have more serious economic impact (i.e [sic] relaunch of agricultural activities) 
as returnees are lacking expensive yet essential agricultural tools like tractors, etc.” 
(UNIJA-Union 2008: 37) 
 
There are a few employees in Kosovo municipalities, such as in the Office for Communities 
or in public companies such as “… KEK, PTK, Kosovo Railways, or Prishtinë Airport, Ko-
sovo Correctional Service, or UNMIK Customs Service” (Emphasis in original, HLC 2008: 
195).
180
 The following table illustrates these few employees. Special relevance lies in the dif-
ference between employees before and after Kosovo’s declaration of independence.  
Table 13: The Serbian Employees in Kosovo Public Companies 
Source: Own graphics according to HLC 2008: p. 196f. and Strategy (2008): p. 9.  
Some Serbs decided not to work in Kosovo public companies or institutions anymore after the 
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. For instance,  
“[o]n March 3 2008 [sic], the Serbian Railways Company usurped the entire infrastruc-
ture of Kosovo Railways in the municipalities of northern Kosovo. Since then, 19 Serbi-
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  A detailed list of the Kosovo Serbs employed in public institutions can be found in HLC 2008: p. 197. 
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an employees have said that they do not want to work for Kosovo Railways. Instead, 
they would make themselves available to the Serbian Railways Company.” (Emphasis 
in original, HLC 2008: 197)  
In general, one can argue that employment in Kosovar public companies is very limited to a 
small percentage of Serbs. Comparing the five before mentioned companies there is an aver-
age of 2.54 % Serbs employed compared to the total employees despite the reality that Serbs 
comprise a 7 % share of the total population in Kosovo. The Serbian returnees have even less 
of a chance to be hired by Kosovo’s public companies and municipal institutions because of 
their previous absence in which they could not learn how to apply for these open vacancies or 
how to even find job vacancies. When it comes to Kosovo’s private employment market, the 
Serbian returnees are mostly not aware of open vacancies and ongoing competitions, basically 
due to a lack of job announcements in the Serbian language. Admittedly, examples do not 
only relate to private companies, but also include Publicly Owned Enterprises (POE), the pub-
lic administration of the municipalities, and public companies. If announcements are written 
in Serbian and/or English, they are usually published in Albanian newspapers, thereby exclud-
ing the Serbian readers. This represents a new dimension of indirect discrimination against the 
Serbs in the labor market (Cf. UNIJA-Union 2008: 18), thereby acting against Article 4a) of 
Kosovo’s Anti-discrimination Law which says that access to employment, self-employment 
and to occupation, including selection criteria and recruitment conditions, should be equal for 
all members of the society.  
If the Serbian returnees get the opportunity to apply for a job in Kosovar institutions or pri-
vate companies, they most likely fail in the application process anyhow because of their lack 
of Albanian language skills. In the future, this language deficit will increase as both educa-
tional systems – the Kosovar and the Serbian – function separately from each other, leading to 
a society in which the largest communities in Kosovo do not understand each other anymore 
and cannot communicate effectively.  
Moreover, the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) notes that “[w]orkplace democra-
cy allowing for safe and secure work environments for all employees (and communities) can 
not [sic] be assured – the level of risk for Serb and Rom communities is particularly high …” 
(Emphasis added, EAR 2006a: 102). It cannot be guaranteed that the Kosovo Serbs are not 
discriminated at their workplace. 
 
Unemployment, the dependency on social assistance and remittances from abroad, low-
income jobs, and general poverty are closely linked to each other. It is not surprising that “[i]t 
is estimated that 90 % of Kosovo IDPs/returnees live under the poverty line …” (UNIJA-
Union 2008: 22).
181
 The World Bank argues, “[t]he estimated poverty incidence for Serb 
heads of households has increased over time …” (World Bank 2007: iii). The 2007 Poverty 
Assessment remarks that the poverty rate among Serbian households rose from 9 to 44 % be-
tween 2003 and 2005. (Cf. World Bank 2007: 9)  
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  The poverty line is considered as adequate to meet basic needs = 1.55 EUR per adult per day and the lower 
extreme poverty line equals 1.02 EUR per adult per day (using 2009 prices to calculate the poverty line). (Cf. 
World Bank 2011: iii) 
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Headcount
Poverty 
Gap
53.8 14.6
54.0 16.3
18.0 3.8
38.0 12.2
37.2 10.9
21.8 6.2
33.9 7.6
34.5 9.6
Ferizaj/Uroševac
Gjakovë/Đakovica
Gnjilane/Gjilan
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica
Pejë/Peć
Prishtinë/Priština
Prizren
Overall
Headcount
Poverty 
Gap
17.7 3.7
22.4 5.9
3.6 0.9
17.0 4.2
13.1 3.8
9.0 1.3
6.8 1.0
12.1 2.7
Full Poverty Line Extreme Poverty Line
Ferizaj/Uroševac
Gjakovë/Đakovica
Gnjilane/Gjilan
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica
Pejë/Peć
Prishtinë/Priština
Prizren
Overall
Table 14:  Poverty Headcount by Household Head Ethnicity 
Source:  World Bank (2007): Kosovo Poverty Assessment, p. 46. 
“With that background the results indicate that the poverty headcount for Serb areas and Serb-
headed households seems to have skyrocketed between 2003 and 2005 … .” (World Bank 
2007: 18) The World Bank identifies three hypotheses for this increase:  
H1: “… Serb areas have become enclaves, isolated economies, which are experiencing 
gloomier economic prospects within a largely stagnant Kosovo economy.” 
H2: “… many better off Serbian households have left for the Republic of Serbia and those 
left behind are mostly the very poor.” 
H3:  “… data quality from mostly Serb statistical areas are [sic] poor because the Statisti-
cal office does not have much control over the enumerators in the Serbian areas.” 
(World Bank 2007: 19) 
It is most likely that all three hypotheses apply to the case at hand, especially the hypotheses 1 
and 3. (Cf. World Bank 2007: 19) However, in this area, it is very important to note that there 
is a significant lack of accurate data. The Statistical Office of Kosovo does not maintain data 
on the Serbs in Kosovo. In order to estimate figures, the Statistical Office separated Kosovo 
into Serbian and Albanian dominated regions and then collected data in this regard. The 
World Bank, however, claims that this data often does not appear to be very realistic. (Cf. 
World Bank 2007: 19) The results of their analysis are shown below. 
Table 15:  Poverty and Extreme Poverty by Region in 2009 
Source:  World Bank 2011: Consumption Poverty in the Republic of Kosovo, p. 6. 
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06
Kosovo
Albanians
38.4 % 43.6 % 32.1 % 42.5 %
Kosovo Serbs 30 % 34.7 % 34.3 % 81.8 %
Other 58.7 % 54.3 % 67 % 51.8 %
Percentage of per capita poverty by ethnicity
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The region Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, including the three northern Serbian municipalities, is slight-
ly above the average when comparing poverty headcounts between the six regions in Kosovo: 
38 % of this region’s population lives below the formal poverty line, living on less than 
1.55 EUR per person per day. The same applies to extreme poverty in this region: 17 % of the 
population lives below the extreme poverty line, i.e. living from less than 1.02 EUR per day. 
(Cf. World Bank 2011: 6) Poverty, as mentioned above, is closely related to the economic 
activities of a household, especially the employment status, and if employed, the sector and 
type of employment. (Cf. World Bank 2011: 11)  
 
The Serbian returnees are not integrated in the Kosovar employment market. In addition, they 
are affected disproportionally by the lack of employment opportunities and discrimination in 
the Kosovar employment market due to various reasons. The Serbs often refuse to return to 
their municipalities of origin because of safety concerns. Consequently, they return to rural, 
remote, mono-ethnic areas in which they are excluded from the main employment opportuni-
ties. Furthermore, the Serbian returnees have less knowledge of the employment markets and 
the different methods and opportunities to even find open vacancies. In several cases, the re-
turnees can no longer rely on a social network in Kosovo and do not know how to apply for a 
job in this newly established economy. The following example illustrates the difficult situa-
tion of the Serbian returnees:  
“Of five women who returned to Deçan/Dečane [sic] in 2008 and actively searched for a 
job, only one of them was able to find employment as advisor to the municipal commu-
nity office, on a short-term contract. The woman, who is the first and only Kosovo Serb 
employed in Deçan/Dečane since 1999, worked in the municipality on a voluntary basis 
without the legal and social protection of a contract until June 2010.” (OSCE 2010: 232) 
Additionally, “[r]eturnees in Zallq/Žac and Dragolevc/Dragolevac in Istog/Istok municipality 
are supported by humanitarian assistance and do not have any means of employment” (OSCE 
2011: 233). The lack of employment opportunities and ergo the lack of income continues to 
be a major obstacle for the Serbian returnees in Kosovo. 
 
A further concern is the lack of a continuous power supply, which fosters the inability of Ko-
sovo’s economy to fully recover from the war and further influences the decision of the Serbi-
an refugees whether or not to return to their homes. “… Power outages, an everyday occur-
rence in Kosovo since 1999, are one of the main obstacles to the country’s economic devel-
opment …” (Sinani, Demi 2011: 8) and prevent the Serbian returnees from establishing sus-
tainable livelihoods. 
 
First, it can be observed that “… energy is a hot topic in Kosovo, as it is understood as the 
basis for any further economic development.” (KIPRED 2007b: 4) Kosovo’s general devel-
opment and the economic security of every returnee depend upon a stable supply of energy 
and future energy security. Currently, the situation is characterized by “… rolling power fail-
ures and black-outs …” (Kumkar 2003: 102). In some areas, power is regularly switched off 
for several hours a day; even the capital is no exception. The energy interruptions have severe 
implications on households and also on agricultural and industrial enterprises alike. (Cf. 
Džihić, Kramer 2008: 12) 
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“The World Bank estimates that businesses lose an average of 5 percent of sales due to 
electricity challenges.” (ISSR 2006: 12)  
The reason for the energy shortages is the low capacity of the two power plants Kosovo A and 
Kosovo B, both constructed between the 1960s and the 1980s, which produce a total amount 
of only about 560 MW whereas the national consumption stands at around 800 MW. (Cf. EU, 
UNMIK 2007: 4; KIPRED 2006a: 39) Thus, the demands – particularly during the winter 
months – cannot be covered. Furthermore, the power plants lack modernization and the Koso-
vo energy company KEK
182
 is without an effective management, which is particularly evident 
in the fact that “… only one of its five units [is] in operation …” (KIPRED 2006a: 39).183 
Whether systematic discrimination against the Serbian minority in the energy supply sector is 
present will be analyzed subsequently. 
 
Due to many unpaid bills in recent years, the KEK decided in 2004 to divide the whole Koso-
var territory in three categories:  
“The so-called ‘ABC policy’ guarantees approximately 24 hours electricity supply for 
customers residing in areas with a very good bills payment record (zone A), while zone 
B and C, where customers have a poor and poorer payment record, will experience re-
ductions.” (UNIJA-Union 2008: 40 f.). 
The ABC policy achieved its primary objective: More and more Kosovar residents now pay 
their bills although “… a financially self-sustaining Kosovo Electricity Company … appears 
to be pie in the sky … .” (Kukmar 2003: 103)184 A major problem of zoning is that individual 
households can be essentially punished if they are the only ones paying in their village be-
cause if the majority does not pay their electricity bills the whole village will be categorized 
in C. This can have the opposite effect, because residents thereby can be encouraged to cease 
paying their bills, too, if they realize that their individual payment does not lead to an im-
provement in categorization. 
 
All Serbian enclaves in Kosovo are classified in category C. (Cf. UNIJA-Union 2008: 40f.) 
This results from the fact that the majority of the Kosovo Serbs, including the returnees, is not 
able to afford the payment of electricity bills: electricity in Kosovo costs 26 EUR per month 
compared to an average income of around 280 EUR (cf. Eurofound 2012: 3; Shaipi 2012: 7). 
The economic situation of the Serbian returnees forces them to accept significant limitations 
in power consumption, which does not only restrict their private activities but also any farm-
ing efforts, which are often essential for their survival. 
As a result of the renewed power cuts in 2009
185
, there were numerous protests in several Ser-
bian villages, because the population perceived these shutdowns as politically and ethnically 
                                                 
182
  The Albanian term is: Korporata ElektroEnergjetike e Kosoves (KEK). The abbreviation KEK is also used in 
English literature. 
183
  “… [T]he current management of the Kosovo Electricity Company (KEK, Korporata ElektroEnergjetike e 
Kosovës) includes many individuals who had been out of the system for the 10-year period of exclusion up to 
1999 (the period of ‘emergency measures’ by the Serbian regime).” (Kukmar 2003: 103) 
184
  In comparison to 2004, the percentage of paid bills could be increased from 38 % to 42 % in 2007. (Cf. EU, 
UNMIK 2007: 5) 
185
  The villages Plementina/Pelmetin and Miloševo/Milloshevë had no electricity for over a week. Through the 
electrically operated water pumps, the two villages had no water supply either. (Cf. KFOR 2009a: 1) The 
same occurred in the village Dobrotin/Dobratin, which was four days without electricity, and Donja Gušteri-
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motivated. In the villages Shillovë/Šilovo and Pasjane/Pasjan, the cuts even led to violent up-
risings. (Cf. Secretary General 2009-06: 6) In most cases, particularly in the Serbian enclaves 
in the South of Kosovo, agreements could be reached after the protests. (Cf. CommHR 2009: 
21) In some cases, the Belgrade authorities intervened in the attempt to achieve an agreement 
between the KEK and the Serbian villagers. The following interview was held by the ICG in 
December 2005 with the then KEK Commercial Director Sean McGoldrick: 
“We would virtually reach local agreement. Then Belgrade’s CCK [Coordination Cen-
ter for Kosovo] would always step in and intimidate them, saying they would stop their 
welfare payments from Serbia, they would be bad Serbs etc.” (ICG 2006: 28). 
Some Kosovo Serbs rejected a contractual agreement with KEK, because a contract with a 
Kosovar institution would indirectly recognize the existence of a Kosovar state and, hence, 
the independence of Kosovo itself. (Cf. Secretary General 2009-06: 7) For the several reasons 
mentioned, in four eastern municipalities, no agreement could be found. (Cf. ICG 2009: 22) 
 
The Serbian residents in the North of Kosovo are in a unique situation: Because of its geo-
graphical proximity to the Serbian territory, Belgrade is increasingly committed to supply the 
Serb-dominated North with electricity from Serbia. KFOR argued that “[i]n 2009, Serbia will 
be heavily investing in North Kosovo with new electricity and independent water systems.” 
(KFOR 2009b: 1) In addition, the municipalities in the North – unlike the rest of the country – 
are not divided into the categories A-C by KEK. This is the reason why “… electricity is less 
of a problem” (UNDP 2006: 38) for the North and the Serbs living there.  
In the rest of the territory, however, the Serbian returnees are affected monumentally by the 
unreliable power supply and the lack of agreements with KEK. Not only are the invoices of-
ten exceeding their monthly disposable financial resources, the required payments often in-
clude the time period that the Kosovo Serbs spent in exile. (Cf. HLC 2008: 214) During their 
flight, and their stay in exile, the houses of the Serbian refugees were often occupied by IDPs. 
If the Serbian returnees were not able to claim their property at the KPA after their return (due 
to restrictions in the suitability of ownership conflicts), KEK now demands payments of the 
Serbian returnees relating to the power consumption in their absence, used by other residents. 
This exceeds their already scarce financial resources and creates new tensions within Koso-
vo’s population, particularly between the Serbs and the Albanians, the latter often being the 
persons who occupied the vacant houses. (Cf. OSCE 2008a: 13; UNIJA-Union 2008: 41)  
 
To summarize, the Serbian returnees face many difficulties: Financial hardships, high unem-
ployment, and the remaining invoices from the period in which their homes were occupied by 
others often prevent the returnees from paying the utility bill in the amount of 26 EUR per 
month. These factors determine that they fall into the last category within the ABC policy and 
receive power only when there is sufficient power available for the whole country. This policy 
is discriminatory and bans the Serbian returnees from a continuous power supply, which pre-
vents them from establishing sustainable livelihoods. Once again, this is a direct contradiction 
to the provisions pointed out in Article 4i) of Kosovo’s Anti-discrimination Law, which en-
sures that every person has access to goods and services which are available to the public.  
                                                                                                                                                        
ca/Gushtericë e Ulët and Gornja Gušterica/Gushtericë e Epërme that had already spent three days without 
power supply at the time the KFOR report was written. (Cf. KFOR 2009b: 1) 
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In conclusion, the correlation between power supply and sustainable returns becomes particu-
larly obvious during hard times, such as bitter winters as the following example illustrates. 
“Six Kosovo Serb families in Ferizaj/Uroševac Municipality left for Serbia, reportedly be-
cause of electricity and water shortages.” (Secretary General 2012-04: 8) 
 
Finally, the Kosovar Anti-discrimination Law plays a significant role: Despite being one of 
the most advanced anti-discrimination laws worldwide, it lacks concrete implementation. By 
examining the employment situation of the Kosovo Serbs and their access to power supply, 
this chapter could illustrate that the Kosovo Serbs are discriminated against in public life in 
Kosovo. The Anti-discrimination Law provides a de jure framework for the protection of 
marginalized groups and encourages inclusion and inter-ethnic tolerance. In practice, howev-
er, it does not provide any de facto means to protect the marginalized groups from discrimina-
tion in public life. For instance, the Kosovo Serbs are often afraid of using their native lan-
guage in public because they are running the risk of harassment or even direct violence. The 
Kosovo Serbs and the Serbian returnees especially have almost no chance of being hired by 
Kosovo public or private institutions/companies due to language barriers and the fact that they 
most likely are not even aware of open vacancies because these are published in the Albanian 
language and in Albanian newspapers, thereby excluding Serbian possible applicants.  
In the energy supply sector, the Kosovo Serbs living in the southern/eastern enclaves are all in 
category C, deprived of a continuous power supply. Consequently, the Serbian returnees in 
these neighborhoods are challenged to build sustainable livelihoods under these conditions. 
Furthermore, these enclaves have few chances to change their category. Any attempt by the 
population to negotiate with KEK was further negatively influenced by Belgrade because any 
agreement with a Kosovar institution would indirectly recognize the Kosovo state as such, 
even though an agreement with KEK is essential for the survival of most Serbian returnees in 
these areas. 
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7.4 The Unsolved Status of Kosovo Influences the Return of Kosovo Serbs 
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 marked the end of hostilities in Kosovo 
by establishing the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as the legal administration, 
thereby combining all legislative, executive, and judicial rights and duties under an interna-
tional roof. UNMIK had three main tasks: 
 the establishment of a transitional government, 
 the establishment of a final Kosovar administration/governmental institutions, and 
 the finding of a final solution to Kosovo’s status. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 336) 
Since 2005, different compositions of international stakeholders (such as the UN itself or the 
troika of the Kosovo Contact Group consisting of the EU, the USA, and the Russian Federa-
tion) have negotiated the terms of the future status of Kosovo. Two main positions can be 
identified in these negotiations: Most western states supported the independence of Kosovo 
under the condition that Kosovo will not be separated anyhow, which means that Kosovo is 
not separated into a Serbian North and an Albanian South. The other position being that Ser-
bia (with the support of the Russian Federation) claims that Kosovo belongs to Serbia and its 
status cannot be changed. (Cf. Schmitt 2008: 366) Both parties could not find a compromise 
and held very strong positions. This is also the reason why the last negotiation led by former 
Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari in 2007 failed. He designed the scenario of an internation-
ally observed independence with comprehensive minority rights for the Serbian population. 
(Cf. i.a. Badger 2012: 5; Schmitt 2008: 366f.) Whereas the Kosovo Albanians accepted, Ser-
bia argued that Kosovo is an internal affair and will not be separated from the Serbian territo-
ry.  
Due to the hardening of the positions and the situation as such, Kosovo – with the support of 
mainly Western states – unilaterally declared its independence from the Republic of Serbia on 
17 February 2008. Until November 2013, 108 out of 193 (54.9 %) United Nations member 
states recognized Kosovo as an independent state. “In the opinion of these states, Kosovo was 
a sui generis case whose independence was vital for maintaining regional peace and security.” 
(Emphasis in original, Economides et al. 2010: 99) Yet, from an international law perspective, 
Kosovo is not an independent state
186
. It is still a province of the Republic of Serbia and not a 
fully recognized member of the United Nations.
 187
 The following map shows the states that 
have recognized Kosovo as an independent state until November 2013. 
                                                 
186
  This is the reason why in this thesis, Kosovo residents are not called citizens, there is no legal border between 
Serbia and Kosovo, and Kosovo is not called a state but it is referred to as a country or a region. 
187
  In international public law, four requirements are necessary to be recognized as a fully independent state: a 
territory, a population within this territory, the sole power over this population on this territory, and the 
recognition by others. This most likely occurs through the membership in the United Nations Organization 
(UNO). In order to become a full UN-member, one has to get a two-thirds majority in the UN General As-
sembly, including the majority of the Security Council and, hence, the five veto powers. The Russian Federa-
tion, however, always supports Serbia in their position and uses its veto. The same occurs with the People’s 
Republic of China, which uses its veto power, too, since they fear that Chinese provinces could separate 
themselves from China, such as Tibet. 
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Figure 35:  Countries Recognizing Kosovo as of November 2013 
Source:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:CountriesRecognizingKosovo.png  
Economides et al. claimed in 2010 that due to the lack of recognition by the United Nations 
Organization, Kosovo was left in limbo despite having hoped for a quick international recog-
nition. In 2013, the same situation remains. After its declaration of independence “… Serbia 
quickly announced that it would not oppose Kosovo’s secession through violence. Instead it 
confined its campaign to political, diplomatic, and judicial avenues. Belgrade began an inten-
sive lobbying campaign against recognition.” (Economides et al. 2010: 99f.) Consequently, 
the Serbian residents in northern Kosovo became the cue ball of Belgrade. The Serbian gov-
ernment started to fulminate against Kosovo by using the Kosovo Serbs in the North to im-
plement Belgrade’s policies by ignoring any Kosovar institution whatsoever. For instance, 
with the help of pressure from Belgrade, the Serbian residents in the North boycotted the Ko-
sovar parliamentary and municipal elections.  
In 2008, Serbia filed an application before the United Nations General Assembly to bring the 
Kosovo question before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The UN General Assembly 
Resolution A/63/L.2 (2008) posed the following question to the ICJ: “Is the Unilateral Decla-
ration of Independence Proclaimed by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Ko-
sovo in Accordance with International Law?” The resolution was passed 77 votes in favor, 6 
against, and 74 abstentions. (Cf. Economides et al. 2010: 112 en. 2) Thereupon, many states 
waited to make their decision on the recognition of Kosovo after the ICJ’s judgment. In con-
clusion, “… the judges decided to opt for a very narrow reading of the question posed to 
them, concluding that ‘general international law contains no applicable prohibition of declara-
tions of independence ... the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate 
general international law’ … .” (Economides et al. 2010: 101) Yet, the ICJ did not answer the 
question of whether the unilateral declaration of independence was legal and if Kosovo should 
be recognized by other states. Nonetheless, the ICJ dealt with this question and explicitly stat-
ed that this was not the General Assembly’s question: 
“In the present case, the question posed by the General Assembly is clearly formulated. 
The question is narrow and specific; it asks for the Court’s opinion on whether or not 
Kosovo  
States that recognize Kosovo as independent 
States that have not recognized Kosovo as independent  
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the declaration of independence is in accordance with international law. It does not ask 
about the legal consequences of that declaration. In particular, it does not ask whether 
or not Kosovo has achieved statehood. Nor does it ask about the validity or legal effects 
of the recognition of Kosovo by those States which have recognized it as an independ-
ent State … .”188 (Emphasis added) 
As a result, the ICJ’s decision did not change anything and gave a green light to those states 
that oppose Kosovo’s independence and to those states supporting Kosovo’s independence to 
continue doing so. (Cf. Economides et al. 2010: 101) 
 
The Kosovo Serbian returnees are basically affected by the unsolved status in two ways, 
which are to be elaborated upon subsequently. Primarily, most Kosovo Serbs return to the 
northern municipalities of Kosovo, namely Zubin Potok, Leposavć/Leposaviq, and 
Zvečan/Zveçan and the northern part of the city of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, which is the Serbian 
center of Kosovo. In a future ultimate solution for Kosovo, the North will be a corner post of 
any negotiations. For these reasons, the next subchapter deals with possible solutions for Ko-
sovo with a special focus on the question of northern Kosovo (solutions 2 and 3). Secondly, 
because of the non-recognition of Kosovo by Serbia proper, there are no diplomatic relations 
between the two whatsoever. Nonetheless, there are thousands of Kosovo Serbs still displaced 
in Serbia proper. In some sectors, such as property repossession, the Kosovo Serbs suffer 
from the lack of diplomatic relations because it directly inhibits their sustainable return to 
Kosovo.  
 
                                                 
188
  International Court of Justice (2010): Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo’, online at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf, last re-
trieved on 26.12.2013. 
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7.4.1 A Long-term Solution for Kosovo? 
The following chapter takes a closer look at three possible long-term solutions for Kosovo. 
The first one is remaining the status quo without significantly changing Kosovo’s legal status. 
The second and third scenarios deal with the special relevance of northern Kosovo and exam-
ine whether the partition from or the integration in Kosovo would be a solution to strive for. 
Subsequently, each scenario is evaluated according to the consequences for the Serbian re-
turnees. 
 
Scenario 1: Maintenance of the Status Quo 
This scenario might be called “maintained independence,” in which the current status of Ko-
sovo is not changed significantly. This scenario can already be considered reality because for 
five years on, Kosovo’s status has not changed. It is true that this maintained independence 
“… is only feasible because of the political and economic largesse of Kosovo’s Western 
backers” (Emphasis added, Economides et al. 2010: 101). Without the support of the USA 
and the large member states of the European Union such as Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, and Italy, Kosovo would not be able to maintain its independence. Nonetheless, 
this specific status quo has also some negative consequences: It is excluded from any possible 
UN or EU membership despite being a full member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank since 29 June 2009. Economides et al. fear that the continuation of the 
current status quo might increase frustration among the Albanians.  
“At best, Kosovo would remain a frozen conflict. At worst, it could become a failed 
state.” (Emphasis added, Economides et al. 2010: 102) 
For Serbia, this future scenario is not the worst case because Belgrade can still claim that Ko-
sovo is a Serbian province and that any discussion about Kosovo’s status would affect Ser-
bia’s integrity, thereby violating the United Nations Charter Article 2(4)189.  
 
The maintenance of this current form of independence would not have many additional con-
sequences affecting the existing challenges either in a positive or in a negative sense. The 
return figures would probably remain constant, but low. Since 2000, approximately 700 Ser-
bian refugees return to their homeland every year. Comparing to the still displaced, this is a 
drop in the bucket. The already ongoing return to mono-ethnic areas would continue because 
the Serbs do not feel safe in the rest of Kosovo, which is under Albanian rule.  
More importantly, the Serbian politicians influence the Serbian refugees not to return or to 
exclusively return to the northern municipalities to stay under the guardianship of Belgrade. 
The result is, in some cases, that the Serbian refugees are not able to return to their municipal-
ities of origin but are forced to return to the North. Hence, they are not at home and do not 
even live in Kosovo proper. In addition, if the Serbian refugees need a judicial decision before 
their return (e.g. a property repossession claim or a civil status change), it is a challenge for 
them to find the right court. The Serbian courts are not recognized in Kosovo and vice versa. 
                                                 
189
  Chapter 1, Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter says: “All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The UN Charter is online 
available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/, last retrieved on 18.11.2013. 
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Since there are no diplomatic relations between the two entities, the return can only be facili-
tated and supported by the UNHCR. This is particularly damaging for the Serbian minority. 
 
Scenario 2: Partition of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica along the Ibër/Ibar River 
“Up until the 90s, Mitrovica was a multiethnic one-company town built around the Trepca 
mining and metallurgy complex. Generally, there was peaceful co-existence and tolerance, 
with some degree of ethnic interaction.” (Jackson 2011: 8) During the war, the city of Mi-
trovicë/Mitrovica was hammered by ethnic cleansing of the Albanians and later, the Albanian 
mobs torched the homes of the few remaining Serbs in the South of the city. Nowadays, tit for 
tat violence dominates the cityscape. Main challenges in the city are inter-communal violence, 
political contestation, and poverty and social instability. Jackson even argues that “Mitrovica 
is a dying town” (Jackson 2011: 10). He explains this by the two main problems that plague 
the city: a dysfunctional government and economic underdevelopment.  
In Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, no state has the monopoly of violence. The so-called “bridge watch-
ers”, the Serbian police, and a few brave Kosovar police officers compete to provide security 
in the North of the town. On that account, statehood is fundamentally contested, i.e. that there 
are “… profound differences about what should constitute the polity and which demos or 
demoi shall be members of the political community …” (Linz, Stepan 1996: 16). Beyond that, 
the city has the highest unemployment rate and the lowest employment rate in Kosovo. Social 
transfers and illegal employment comprised around 60 % of the residents’ total income in 
2008. (Cf. World Bank 2007) 
 
Jackson finalized a comprehensive risk analysis for the two possible solutions for Mi-
trovicë/Mitrovica.
190
 Subsequently, these two solutions will be presented and their risks brief-
ly explained.  
 
Partition can be defined as cutting a new border through at least one community’s homeland, 
creating a minimum of two separate political units. (Cf. Jackson 2011: 14) One argument in 
favor of dividing Kosovo: “Kosovo was created because the region is populated by a different 
ethnicity threatened by the ruling majority. If this is a reason for granting independence for 
Kosovo, then the lines ought to be drawn in accordance to the ethnicities.” (Badger 2012: 7) 
A new border would separate the South and the North of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica from each oth-
er; it could look like these two maps illustrate: 
                                                 
190
  For the full analysis, please see Jackson, David (2011): Resolving northern Kosovo: Partition or Integration? 
In: Hertie School of Governance – Working Papers 58. 
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Figure 36:  Possible New Border after the Partition of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica  
Source:  Jackson (2011): Resolving northern Kosovo: Partition or Integration?, p. 14. 
Kosovo would in all probability reject the idea of separating the North from the rest of its ter-
ritory: “Suspecting this, Belgrade has begun to float the idea, though not yet in public, of trad-
ing a large part of the Preševo Valley for the North of Kosovo, coupled with mutual recogni-
tion.” (Jackson 2011: 15) Admittedly, it is not known whether Kosovo would accept this trade 
of land.  
Partition would mean an official divorce between the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo ena-
bling two states to function separately and next to each other. This divorce can only be suc-
cessful if there is a mutual desire for partition, which is not the case since the Albanians are 
not in favor of this solution. Partition would also involve high costs to the economic devel-
opment: “Markets will not be entirely cut off, but costs of access will be higher due to tax 
revenues demanded by border custom regimes.” (Jackson 2011: 16) The Serbs in the North 
will lose easy access to 2 million Kosovar customers and the nearest market in Serbia will 
then be Novi Pazar, which is a 90 minute drive from the center of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North. 
Jackson identifies three main risks resulting from a possible partition of the North from the 
rest of Kosovo.  
(1) There are 2,000 Albanians living north of the Ibër/Ibar River in the three tower blocks, in 
the Bosniak Mahala, and in a remote village in the West, which would potentially feel in-
secure after the partition and demand relocation to another area in Kosovo. “However, re-
location in this context is only small scale involving around 500 families, and the costs of 
relocation are less than the potential costs of an uprising or persecution.” (Jackson 2011: 
17) The relocation of 2,000 Albanians would cost around 60m EUR
191
. Then remains the 
question – who pays this amount of money – especially since the reconstruction of houses 
that had been destroyed during the war has not been finished yet, also because of finan-
cial constraints. Many refugees are still waiting for their houses to be reconstructed so 
that they have a place to return to.  
(2) Partition would send a signal to secessionist groups in the region, which could trigger a 
domino effect in South East Europe. Special attention needs to be placed at the Preševo 
Valley in South Serbia and at Macedonia where the Albanians and the Slavs converge. 
“As a result, Mitrovica could revert to low-intensity warfare in which reintroduced Serbi-
                                                 
191
  The cost to build a house in Kosovo is approximately 60,000 EUR including the construction and land. Fur-
thermore, the Albanians would receive compensation for loss of business and other losses, which is estimated 
at another 60,000 EUR per family = 120,000 EUR x 500 = 60,000,000 EUR (60m EUR). 
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an security forces would regularly clash with Albanians across the river.” (Jackson 2011: 
18) 
(3) According to Jackson, the Albanians in the South of the city will lose access to welfare 
provisions, such as vital educational and health facilities, as most of the schools, the hos-
pital, and the university reside in the North of the city.
192
 (Cf. Jackson 2011: 18f.) How-
ever, as explained above, the Albanians do not use Serbian parallel institutions and would 
consequently not realize a loss of public services.  
Recapitulating, partition has its reasoning in the ethnic division of peoples in Kosovo. None-
theless, this divorce could only work if there is a mutual desire for it, which is not the case. 
The total costs emerging out of the risk mitigation policies would be at around 72m EUR for 
the relocation of 2,000 Albanians, the maintenance of security, and the development of a wel-
fare perspective for the population in the South of the city. 
 
In the case of partition of northern Kosovo from the rest of the land, the returnees would have 
some significant advantages. They could return to their homes in the North without changing 
jurisdiction: Property conflicts would be solved more easily, and responsibilities and compe-
tencies would be clarified. For instance, the returnees would only have to approach Serbian 
courts, whether in Serbia or in northern Kosovo.  
However, partition would be a significant symbol against the concept of multi-ethnicity in 
Kosovo. One of the first principles in the Ahtisaari plan was: “Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic 
society.” (Cf. Dahlman, Williams 2010: 407) This principle was always at strife for the inter-
national community, in particular, for the United States and several important EU member 
states. “Minority rights are certainly a principle that the Republic of Kosovo must uphold but 
this assumes that the new state governs these spaces.” (Dahlman, Williams 2010: 407) It 
should include a society in which the minority communities have comprehensive rights and 
duties. By separating the North from the rest of Kosovo, this principle would be ignored. The 
few Serbs living in the southern enclaves and the other minority communities such as the 
Roma, the Ashkali, the Egyptians, the Goranis, the Bosniaks, the Montenegrins, the Croats, 
and the Turks, would be vanishing.  
Consequently, the Serbian returnees would not be integrated into Kosovo’s multi-ethnic so-
ciety, but they would return to a different country instead, being exclusively among their own 
ethnic community and not together with all the peoples that once were combined in the terri-
tory of Kosovo. Nonetheless, the separation of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica from the rest of Kosovo 
would also create clear circumstances for the Serbian returnees: They know what courts and 
other public institutions to approach, they have a functional government with clearly defined 
competencies, and access to schools and health care services under the administration of their 
government. Beyond that, the physical relocation from the exile to the home area would be 
easy. 
 
Scenario 3: Full Integration of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica into Kosovo
193
 
                                                 
192
  Jackson develops a policy that would include building a new hospital, a new university, and three new 
schools in South Mitrovicë/Mitrovica to offer the Albanian residents a welfare perspective after the separa-
tion of the North. All in all, this would afford 12m EUR. 
193
  Jackson gives the positive example of Brčko in Bosnia and Herzegovina where integration worked well: 
“Brcko represents a striking example because this integration formula aimed at resolving a situation very 
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According to Jackson, the full integration of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica into Kosovo would include 
dissolving the parallel structures and re-orientating the Serbs in the North towards Kosovo 
and its institutions. (Cf. Jackson 2011: 20) Yet, at the beginning of the year 2013, there were 
negotiations between Serbian and Kosovar diplomats about maintaining the parallel structures 
and legalizing them under Kosovo’s constitution. Full integration would also need to give 
substantial political autonomy to the Serbs and establish local power sharing through an inter-
nationally mediated “Joint Board”. (Cf. Jackson 2011: 20) In addition, the integration of the 
North of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica into Kosovo would also mean that Kosovo becomes a fully rec-
ognized state by the international community.  
When these two principles are to be implemented as outlined in the Ahtisaari plan, substantial 
political autonomy would be given to the Kosovo Serbs “… which go far beyond European 
standards” (Emphasis in original, Jackson 2011: 20), including the creation of more and ex-
panded Serb-majority municipalities, extended competencies and the right to benefit from 
financial support by the Republic of Serbia, and special protective zones and prerogatives for 
the Serbian Orthodox Church. (Cf. Badger 2012: 5) Most likely, integration would foster the 
town’s economic development because a functioning statehood would improve property 
rights and micro economic governance, and market access will be enhanced since integration 
will reopen the markets now closed by ethnic division. 
 
The three risks that could emerge after the full integration of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica are a Serbi-
an exodus, spoilers attempting to destroy this agreement, and political polarization through 
the lack of social interaction.  
One major risk is the “brain drain” of the Serbs in the North of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica as they 
have better economic prospects in Serbia proper than in the three northern municipalities in 
Kosovo. This risk is very likely to become a reality as many Serbs from the North are already 
migrating out of Kosovo. (Cf. Jackson 2011: 22) However, Jackson identifies a strong corre-
lation between economic advantage and the desire to join other or form new states: “This 
finding is not only convincing from a theoretical perspective, as evidence from the Serbia 
[sic] enclaves suggests that the less money being paid by Belgrade to Serb public workers, the 
more likely they are to co-operate with the Kosovan state.” (Emphasis added, Jackson 2011: 
22) On that account, this risk can be contained by either reactivating the Trepča/Trepçë min-
ing complex through a Public Private Partnership (PPP) or by transforming Mi-
trovicë/Mitrovica into a regional “center of excellence” for service provision. Through the 
reactivation of the Trepča/Trepçë mining complex, around 7,000 – 10,000 jobs would be cre-
ated.
194
 Costs would be at around 100m EUR because the site would have to be cleaned to 
match European standards. (Cf. Jackson 2011: 23) Admittedly, Jackson does not bear in mind 
that the Trepča/Trepçë mine has left a high-polluted area, which is no longer inhabitable.195 
                                                                                                                                                        
similar to Mitrovica. Both Brcko and Mitrovica suffered from bitter ethnic divisions in the 1990s; both have 
a similar population, with similar ethnic proportions; and both suffered from post war economic decline and 
the absence of a functioning state. Integration has been particularly successful in Brcko where, once consid-
ered a “black hole of chauvinism, intransigence, criminality and despair,” there is now even a multi ethnic 
police force, a clear sense of security and relative economic prosperity.” (Jackson 2011: 21) 
194
 “In Mostar, the re-start of the aluminium manufacturing plant, which now enjoys a major contract with auto-
mobile manufacturer Daimler-Benz, significantly boosted the local economy.” (Jackson 2011: 23, fn 24) 
195
  For further information on the pollution of the Trepča/Trepçë mining complex, please see Chapter 6.4 on the 
construction of temporary IDP/returnee camps for members of the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptian 
communities on the grounds of the former Trepča/Trepçë mine. 
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Option 1
PARTITION
Option 2
INTE-
GRATION
GOAL ANALYSIS RISK ANALYSIS RETURNEES
Functioning 
State
Economic 
Development
Risk Identification 
& Assessment
Risk Mitigation 
Policy & Cost
Consequences 
for the Returnees
HIGH LOW
1. Albanian relocation
2. Regional instability
3. Albanian exodus
Total: 72m EUR
Albanian Relocation:   60m EUR
Welfare prospective: 12m EUR
― Separation from for-
mer neighbors (and 
from relatives)
― Clear responsibilities
― Integration into all 
Serbian institutions
HIGH HIGH
1. Serbian exodus
2. “Spoilers” attempt to 
destroy agreement
3. Political polarization
Total: 156m EUR
Trepča reactivation:   100m EUR
Hospital renovation: 10m EUR
University renovation: 40m EUR
EU Administration: 6m EUR
― Clear responsibilities
― Integration into 
Kosovo as a whole
For this reason, it should be reassessed carefully before investors are approached. The trans-
formation of the city into a regional “center of excellence” for service provision would in-
clude modernizing the hospital and the university with costs of around 50m EUR in total. (Cf. 
Jackson 2011: 22f.)  
The second risk refers to so-called spoilers who could attempt to destroy any integration 
agreement, e.g. the “Kolasin group” from a village deep in northern Kosovo. In order to miti-
gate this risk, an interim “European Administration Mitrovica” should be instituted, which 
would cost around 6m EUR to secure law and order during and after the process of integrating 
Kosovo’s North into the rest of the territory. (Cf. Jackson 2011: 23f.) 
Thirdly, with the integration of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, political positions could be hardened and 
political polarization enhanced. “Given the ethnic divide in Mitrovica it is necessary to create 
‘bridging social capital’ which spans different identities, histories and viewpoints.” (Jackson 
2011: 25) That would help to dismantle exaggerated and exclusionary ethnic identities. To 
reach this goal, Jackson suggests building a university based on the Tetovo model.
196
  
 
In the short run, the integration of North Mitrovicë/Mitrovica will create insecurity among the 
Serbian refugees who opt for return. The uncertainty of the success of the integration of the 
divided city and the rest of North Kosovo will overshadow any return prospects of the Serbian 
returnees. The returns will most likely decrease in the first months after the full integration of 
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. In the end, the Serbian refugees will have the chance of returning to an 
area where they can live among their peers as well as being fully integrated into Kosovo. 
 
The subsequent table illustrates the results generated from the analysis of the two possible 
solutions for Kosovo’s North.  
Table 16:  Analysis of the Two Possible Comprehensive Solutions for Mitrovica 
Source:  Jackson (2011): Resolving northern Kosovo: Partition or Integration? P. 27. 
The partition option would cost 84m EUR less than the integration option “… which could 
prove an attractive saving in today’s budgetary climate.” (Jackson 2011: 27) However, parti-
tion will probably lead to an economic decline, directly threatening the stability of this solu-
                                                 
196
  Jackson provides the example of the South East European University in Tetovo, Macedonia, which opened in 
2001, helped to stabilize the town, and provided much-needed jobs and capital. The institution is now self-
financing. (Cf. Jackson 2011: 23) 
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tion. Additionally, it might involve ethnic cleansing of Albanians, which will raise the human 
cost factor of this solution, too. (Cf. Jackson 2011: 28) Beyond that, the risk mitigation poli-
cies are “damaging limitations” whereas the risk mitigation policies within the integration 
solution are positive investments in the future of Kosovo. The author of this thesis supports an 
integration of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica’s North into Kosovo: although the costs are higher, the 
outcome is more stable and includes a long-term perspective in which the Albanian and the 
Serbian community have a place to live and can exist peacefully with each other. 
The returnees would benefit in both cases because of clear responsibilities on the institutional 
level: The double existence of courts, administrative, educational, and health care institutions 
would be abolished. When Mitrovicë/Mitrovica is disconnected from the rest of Kosovo, the 
Serbian returnees could be easily integrated into the North’s society whereas in the integration 
scenario, the Serbian returnees would be integrated into the Kosovar society as a whole. Yet, 
when dividing Kosovo, the Serbian returnees could be separated from their former neighbors, 
relatives, and friends despite having returned home.  
As a consequence, the integration scenario is conducive to a sustainable return of Serbian re-
turnees and would be beneficial to the political and economic development of Kosovo as 
such. 
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7.4.2 The Unsolved Status Derogates the Likelihood of Property Repossessions 
Between the establishment of the KPA in March 2006 and December 2007, a total of 40,000 
lawsuits were filed: “The majority of these claims concern agricultural land belonging to Ko-
sovo Serbs …” (OSCE 2008a: 15) since before their establishment, there was no possibility to 
file a lawsuit related to agricultural land. Only 11,000 of these cases were decided by 2008, 
none of these decisions, however, have been implemented so far. The KPA has neither the 
financial nor the human resources to be able to perform these duties. In general, the property 
restitution mechanisms lack effective enforcement and a suitable institution. (Cf. OSCE 
2008a: 15) 
 
Property restitution claims can only be successful if the claimant can prove that the respective 
property belongs to him/her. Many of the property titles, which clarified property ownership 
before the refugee movements at the end of the conflict, have been lost during and after the 
war. Roughly half of them are estimated to be missing. (Cf. UNHCR et al. 2007: 76) 
In addition, due to the non-recognition of Kosovo and the non-acceptance of Kosovar legal 
decisions in Serbia and vice versa, the Kosovo Serbian refugees in Serbia are not able to re-
solve their property issues prior to their departure to Kosovo.  
 
One major obstacle to the unambiguous clarification of many property disputes, especially 
between the Kosovo Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians is “… the removal to Serbia of cadas-
tral and judicial records by withdrawing Serbian authorities” (Kretsi 2007: 666). The situation 
is exacerbated by the fact that in June 2008, the responsibilities of the KPA were transferred 
from UNMIK to the International Civilian Office (ICO). Consequently, the Serbian authori-
ties did not recognize the KPA anymore because its patron belongs to the Kosovar institutions 
and that recognition would imply acknowledging Kosovo as a state. As early as 19 June 2008, 
the KPA offices in Belgrade and other Serbian cities were closed. (Cf. OSCE 2008a: 14) 
These closures affect the property restitution process of the KPA, it “… does not have access 
to displaced cadastral records …” anymore and that it is increasingly difficult to verify own-
ership claims.
197
  
“In addition, the Kosovo Property Agency will face obstacles in delivering decisions to 
displaced persons concerning their property claims, due to the closure of the agency’s 
offices in Serbian cities.” (OSCE 2008a: 14) 
Nonetheless, the KPA’s operations in Serbia are now being undertaken by the UNHCR Prop-
erty Offices. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the KPA and UNHCR 
Prishtinë/Priština on 19 August 2009 closed the gap. (Cf. KPA 2012: 15) “On 22 November 
2011 the MoU between KPA and UNHCR was extended for a further period of one year.” 
(KPA 2012: 9) As a result, the access to dislocated property archives has been restored. How-
ever, “[a]ccess to the historiats of parcels held in Krusevac is still being sought.” (KPA 2012: 
15) 
                                                 
197
  The same challenge occurred in the field of legal security when it comes to civil registry books. After Koso-
vo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, Belgrade did not provide access to civil registry books 
located in Serbia proper for Kosovo institutions. Recently, a pilot project has been completed, which included 
the handing over of 359 copies of civil registry books. In Lipjan/Lipljan municipality, “… image tak-
ing/recording, printing and verification of religious, birth and marriage registry books … has been complet-
ed” (Secretary General 2012-11: 4). 
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“In all, only in 5,199 cases (17.8 per cent) implementation has resulted in a request for 
repossession by the property right holder, which often signifies the sale of the residence 
to either the current occupant or otherwise a new buyer.” (OSCE 2008c: 61) 
The sale of property most likely occurs when the Kosovo Serbs feel that their return to 
Kosovo is an unlikely scenario. For them, the sale is the only way to draw a profit from their 
refugee situation, which simultaneously means relinquishing their home and old life. 
Although “[a]ny refugee or displaced person who lost possession of property has the right to 
return to the property or to sell it” (Emphasis added, Eyre, Wittkowsky 2002: 8), the sale of 
residential property prevents a sustainable return process. The sale of their property takes 
away the refugee’s chance of ever returning to their home. (Cf. Smit 2006: 75) The sale of the 
property also affects the ethnic composition of Kosovo, because “… many only return to sell 
their property and subsequently relocate to an area where they belong to the majority group.” 
(Von Carlowitz 2005: 554) The Secretary General explained in his report in November 2012 
the following: 
“During the reporting period, sales by Kosovo Serbs of their properties and their reloca-
tion to Serbia proper stimulated renewed debate over the progress of sustainable returns. 
Socioeconomic problems continue to be cited among the underlying factors prompting 
Kosovo Serbs to sell houses and land. Recurring security incidents in several returnee 
areas have, however, further contributed to perceptions of insecurity among potential re-
turnees.” (Secretary General 2012-11: 7f.) 
The uncertain status of Kosovo complicates the process of property repossession severely. It 
is not sure whether the KPA as such will be consequently recognized by Serbia. Without Ser-
bia’s support, however, is the KPA often incapable of action. Beyond that, some Kosovo 
Serbs feel unsafe in the current Kosovar environment and sell their property rather than return 
to their municipalities of origin. 
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7.5 Preliminary Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
The conditions for Serbian returnees are non-sustainable. As described above, the first criteri-
on of a sustainable return is the establishment of sustainable livelihoods, which can be main-
tained without external inputs and that are sufficiently robust to withstand external shocks. 
This criterion is partly fulfilled for the Serbian return process in the North because these Ser-
bian returnees are better off than their counterparts of other ethnic communities. They work 
for and approach the Serbian parallel institutions in the North. Belgrade’s support is specifi-
cally evident in the areas of education and health care, which have a better quality and are less 
expensive than the Kosovar services. At the moment, the Serbian returnees in the North have 
good employment opportunities in Serbian public institutions and companies. Nevertheless, if 
these institutions cease to exist, there is almost no private economy to absorb the unemployed. 
In the South or the other parts of Kosovo, however, employment opportunities for the Serbian 
returnees are less good. Most likely, the Serbs return to rural, remote, mono-ethnic areas 
where their only income generation is subsistence farming.  
Beyond that, the returning Kosovo Serbs often face challenges related to the reconstruction 
and repossession of their property in cases of illegal occupations by Albanian IDPs who also 
had to flee. If the returnees are able to repossess their property, the sale of the property is a big 
risk in the return process. In addition, the Serbs feel insecure and not able to freely move 
within Kosovo. Consequently, the Serbs are almost exclusively returning to the North or other 
mono-ethnic areas no matter where their municipality of origin is located.  
 
The second criterion for a sustainable return is the returnees’ integration into the whole socie-
ty. The question here is whether the Serbian returnees have a chance of being fully integrated 
into the Kosovar society. The argument is that the Serbian returnees only have a chance of 
being fully integrated when they return to the southern enclaves where the situation and the 
attitude of the Serbs towards the Kosovar institutions are slightly changing. This can be illus-
trated by the parliamentary elections in 2009 and the municipal elections in 2013 when the 
Serbs in the enclaves voted to some extent.  
Nonetheless, the economic and social situation of the Serbs in the enclaves or in the surround-
ing municipalities is not as good as in the North where the Serbian returnees would be abso-
lutely isolated from the rest of the country, living solely among their peers without any possi-
bilities of integration into the society as a whole. In the enclaves, the Serbs have poor em-
ployment opportunities – apart from the few Serbian parallel institutions that provide limited 
vacancies –, face power outages on a daily/weekly basis, and have less access to Serbian pub-
lic institutions and services than in the North. These conditions are reflected in the fact that 
the absolute majority of Serbian refugees return to the northern municipalities of 
Zvečan/Zveçan, Leposavić/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok, and North Mitrovicë/Mitrovica.  
 
Kosovo’s society is divided along the Ibër/Ibar River between the Albanians and the Serbs. 
One could even venture to argue that the society is still divided between the Albanian victims 
and the Serbian perpetrators. Although more than a decade passed since the end of the violent 
conflict, the Albanians continue to see themselves solely as victims of the war and the Serbs 
as their oppressors. Any attempts to discuss the role of the Albanians in the conflict are highly 
controversial and condemned by the Albanian population. For instance, the well-known jour-
nalist Jeta Xharra, who moderates one of the most famous TV shows in Kosovo, namely “Life 
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in Kosovo,” got several e-mail death threats in 2009 after she discussed war crimes committed 
by ethnic Albanians. Following the transmission, she was even accused of being “an Agent of 
the Serbian Secret Police”.198 This division of the country leads to a de facto exclusion of the 
Serbian residents from the rest of the society because the entire people is still perceived as the 
perpetrating people. The Anti-discrimination Law, despite giving the right legal protection 
mechanisms, cannot change this status quo because it lacks the political will and implementa-
tion by governing bodies. 
 
The Serbian returnees have no other choice than to go along with this ethnic division. They 
almost exclusively approach the Serbian parallel institutions, have no contact with the Albani-
ans, and, most often, also not with the other ethnic communities. They live in mono-ethnic 
areas, where they are surrounded by their peers and do not take part in public life. In conclu-
sion, the return of the Kosovo Serbs can consequently not be classified as being sustainable.  
Furthermore, it can be argued that the situation of the Kosovo Serbs and of the Serbian return-
ees respectively is dependent on Belgrade’s attitude towards Kosovo and the resulting deci-
sions. Even though Kosovo can try to improve the situation of the Kosovo Serbs, there will 
not be any significant change unless Serbia accepts Kosovo as an independent state. By rec-
ognizing Kosovo, it would open the door for an improvement of the situation and an actual 
integration of the Kosovo Serbs into the whole Kosovar society. Although Kosovo has in 
many ways created supportive realities when it comes to the integration of the Serbs into Ko-
sovo’s public and political life, e.g. the commitment to Serbian parliamentary seats and Serbi-
an ministers as well as the whole decentralization process. Nonetheless, the discourse among 
the Serbs does not change significantly unless Belgrade changes its attitude towards Kosovo.  
Belgrade still influences the Kosovo Serbs in many ways, either through their nationalistic 
campaigns or through the indirect dependency on the parallel institutions and the financial 
support, which would cease to exist when the Serbs in Kosovo start to fully cooperate with 
Kosovar institutions on a large scale. Figure 37 shows the prospects of the Serbian returnees 
when returning to the North or to the southern enclaves and the role of Belgrade influencing 
the sustainability of the return of the Serbs. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
198
  Cf. Balkan Insight (2009): Albania Journalists Condemn BIRN Kosovo Threats, online at: http://www. 
balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-journalists-condemn-birn-kosovo-threats, last retrieved on 18.11.2013. 
The same occurred to Carla del Ponte. The book “Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity’s 
Worst Criminals and the Culture of Impunity” by the former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia Carla del Ponte received a lot of negative attention because del Ponte 
brought up the issue that the Albanians dealt with the organs of Serbian residents. The sole mentioning of 
Albanians as perpetrators in the 1999 conflict led to many threats against her life after publishing the book. 
Please see the chapter “Confronting Kosovo: 1999-2007”, pp. 273-304. 
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Figure 37:  The Return of the Serbs to Kosovo – Return to Non-sustainable Conditions  
Source:  Own illustration 
The conclusion that the return of Serbs to Kosovo is not sustainable can be supported by the 
statistic that only 23.54 % of the displaced Serbs returned to Kosovo since 1999. In fact, more 
Kosovo Serbs are leaving their homes than returning from exile:  
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“Yet, many leave each year due to the economic uncertainty in Kosovo and their per-
ceptions that a more sustainable future is available outside of Kosovo.” (OSCE 2010: 
241) 
The following policy recommendations intend to improve the living conditions of the already 
returned Serbs in Kosovo, to prevent them from leaving Kosovo again, and to attract future 
returnees if they see that the conditions in Kosovo are sustainable. 
 
PR 1: Solve Kosovo’s status question. 
Addressee: Government of the Republic of Serbia 
Kosovo as such and the situation of the Serbian returnees cannot make any significant im-
provement unless the Republic of Serbia recognizes Kosovo as a legally independent state and 
abstains from keeping Kosovo under its jurisdiction as a Serbian province. For different op-
tions, especially referring to the specific situation of the city of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, please 
see Chapter 7.4.1. If Serbia recognizes Kosovo, the Serbian returnees would benefit in multi-
ple ways: First, the two cadastral records in Kosovo and Serbia could ultimately be adjusted 
to each other, thereby simplifying ownership conflicts of the returning Kosovo Serbs. Second, 
judicial decisions of Kosovo courts would be recognized in Serbia and vice versa. This recog-
nition is of utmost importance for the Kosovo Serbs who have to clarify legal issues before 
their departure from Serbia, especially in case they leave relatives behind in Serbia and need a 
legal decision to be valid in Kosovo and in Serbia such as a civil status change. A first step 
that was taken in order to implement this recommendation is the “First Agreement on Princi-
ples Governing the Normalization of Relations”, but it needs to be taken seriously and to be 
reinforced. A successful implementation of the dismissal of the Serbian police in the North of 
Kosovo is inevitable. 
 
PR 1a: Provide incentives for the Kosovo Serbs in the southern/eastern enclaves for their 
integration into Kosovo. 
Addressee: Serbian-dominated municipalities in the South and East of Kosovo 
Belgrade’s influence in the non-northern municipalities is less ostensible than in the North. 
The Kosovo Serbs realize that the co-operation with Kosovar institutions can simplify their 
daily lives. One should keep in mind Jackson’s argumentation (2011: 22) that there is a strong 
correlation between economic advantage and the desire to join other or form new states: the 
less money Serbs in the enclaves receive from Belgrade and the more incentives they are of-
fered by Kosovar institutions, the more likely they are to co-operate with Kosovo as can be 
illustrated in the voter turnouts at the end of 2009. In order to further integrate the Serbs into 
the non-northern municipalities in the Kosovar institutions would be a free health care system 
within the Kosovar health care system. 
 
At the same time, it is advisable that the municipalities with a Serbian majority are further 
promoted. Thereby, decentralization mechanisms should be fostered so that the Serbs have 
more power within Kosovo and feel more accepted and politically represented. 
 
PR 1b: Integrate the Serbian parallel institutions into Kosovo’s jurisdiction. 
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Addressee: Kosovo, Serbia, and the EU as the negotiation’s facilitator 
It is not advisable to dissolve the parallel institutions despite the popular belief that they are 
harmful for Kosovo’s political and economic development. This is because of the immense 
financial support by Belgrade and the fact that the Kosovo Serbs would not immediately inte-
grate into Kosovo’s institutions. Hence, they would be left without any appropriate alternative 
to the Serbian parallel institutions such as schools and health care centers. The Serbian paral-
lel institutions absorb – to some extent – the deficiencies in the Kosovar system, such as in the 
Kosovo health care system, which is still dilapidated and lacks modernization in all respects. 
The advice would be to harmonize the parallel institutions with Kosovo’s jurisdiction so that 
the institutions are legal; the money is transferred through Kosovar banks but at the same time 
these institutions are maintained because they fulfill a very important need in Kosovo. This 
need can be accounted for with Belgrade’s financial support of around 200 million EUR an-
nually for the support of all Serbian parallel institutions. In comparison to the GDP of Kosovo 
in 2012, which amounts to 4.82 billion EUR, this is a significant sum, which should not cease 
to exist. 
The on-going existence of the parallel institutions, but under the jurisdiction of Kosovo’s con-
stitution would create a win-win situation for all – Kosovo, Serbia, and the Kosovo Serbs 
themselves, primarily the Serbian returnees will benefit the most since they are one of the 
most vulnerable groups of the Serbian community in Kosovo. 
 
PR 2: Focus any police and other security efforts on appeasing Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North.  
Addressee: Kosovo Police, Kosovo Ministry for Internal Affairs 
The inter-ethnic communication is predominantly overshadowed by the continued inter-ethnic 
tensions and ethnically motivated security incidents in the divided city of Mi-
trovicë/Mitrovica, particularly in the North. Therefore, the focus of any police and other secu-
rity efforts should be on appeasing Mitrovicë/Mitrovica so that the focus shifts away from 
inter-ethnic tensions to positive examples of inter-community life, e.g. in the southern and 
eastern enclaves.  
 
Ultimately, there is the risk that the currently open living space
199
 in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 
turns into a violent and hostile area where the Serbs are not safe anymore. Hogan (1992: 
413f.) argues that although the return of refugees to one area might be a sound and compre-
hensible idea at one time because it is peaceful, the continuous existence of the underlying 
causes for war – as can be observed in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North where both parties are still 
as antagonized as before the violent conflict in 1999 – can turn a peaceful environment into a 
violent one. The open living space for the Serbian returnees would hence be closed. 
 
PR 3a: In a short-term vision, legalize the Serbian educational system and establish more 
and regular transportation between the Albanian and the Serbian dominated munici-
palities.  
Addressee: Kosovar governmental institutions, particularly Kosovo MEST, the govern-
ment of the Republic of Serbia, the EU as the negotiation facilitator 
                                                 
199
  For more details on the concept of open living spaces, please see Chapter 4.1. 
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“Education does not cause wars, nor does it end them. It does, however, frequently con-
tribute to the factors that are underlie conflict [sic], but it also has the potential to play a 
significant role both directly and indirectly in building peace, restoring countries to a 
positive development path, and reversing the damage wrought by civil war. (Buckland 
2005: 86) 
In this regard, education is a very sensitive issue, especially in an inter-ethnic conflict where 
the conflict parties both have their own view of the atrocities that occurred and of the path to 
peace. Despite the many voices – such as Buckland’s quote – that education can create mutual 
understanding and help overcoming antagonism, there is no way out to avoid the two parallel 
educational systems in Kosovo in the short term. Neither the Kosovo Albanians, the Kosovo 
Serbs, or Serbia are able to establish one system in which the Albanian and the Serbian chil-
dren learn one history, one culture of their common homeland Kosovo, and both languages 
equally. Therefore, it would be advisable to maintain both systems, legalize the Serbian sys-
tem under Kosovo’s jurisdiction, and begin with a regular communication between the two 
systems on a higher level, such as the ministers of both Ministries of Education, and also on 
the lower level between teachers, students, and administrators.  
Beyond that, it is important to create more and regular transportation to the Serbian enclaves 
from Albanian municipalities and between the enclaves. This would have the effect that the 
Serbian returnees with school-aged children would have the free choice where to return to 
regardless if there is a Serbian school located nearby or not because they would make sure 
that their children are transported to the closest school. 
 
PR 3b: In a long-term vision, combine both educational systems in one.  
Addressee: Kosovar governmental institutions, particularly Kosovo MEST, the govern-
ment of the Republic of Serbia, the EU as the negotiation’s facilitator 
Nonetheless, combining the two separate systems into one should be the long-term goal in 
Kosovo. One could begin with combined and separated subjects. The Serbs and the Albanians 
could learn non-national subjects together such as natural sciences and physical education. 
National subjects, such as history or music, should be taught separately in the beginning with 
the long-term goal of combining them and teaching both kinds of music and one common 
history of their shared homeland Kosovo. It should be a precondition that in the combined 
system, all students learn together the Albanian and the Serbian language.  
 
PR 4: Integrate Serbian classes in the University of Prishtinë/Priština. 
Addressee: Kosovo Ministry for Education, Science, and Technology (MEST) 
Since the tertiary educational system is also divided between the University of Prisht-
inë/Priština and the University of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, an initial harmonization should take 
place through the integration of Serbian classes into the University of Prishtinë/Priština. The 
Serbian returnees would have the choice to return to the capital or to other surrounding areas 
and would not be confined to the North or to stay in Serbia proper when they aim at studying 
at a university.  
 
PR 5: Provide health care free of charge in the Kosovar system. 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
250 
Addressee: Kosovo Ministry of Health (MoH) 
There are two parallel health care systems in Kosovo. The predominant reason for the mainte-
nance of both systems is the fact that the Serbian system is free of charge. Although the Ser-
bian system also has a better quality and both peoples are still afraid of using the institutions 
of the respective other, the main cause for the lack of maintenance and the inability to com-
bine both systems is money. Meaning in effect that despite any efforts Kosovo could make in 
order to attract the Serbs to use their system instead of the parallel institutions (as e.g. in the 
Serbian enclaves), the lack of money, especially in the case of the Serbian returnees, would 
adumbrate their decision and always force them to use the Serbian parallel institutions. If Ko-
sovo plans to combine these two health care systems in the near future, the system would 
have to be free of charge. An alternative would be the establishment/modernization of the 
current social security system to provide free health care to those who are in need such as the 
returnees who recently returned to their homes and did not establish sustainable livelihoods 
yet.  
 
PR 6: Implement the Anti-discrimination Law in Kosovo to protect minority communities 
and other vulnerable groups. 
Addressee: All relevant Kosovar governmental institutions, in particular the government 
and the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) 
Despite being one of the most advanced anti-discrimination laws worldwide, it lacks concrete 
implementation. It mentions all thinkable reasons for discrimination and provides a basis for 
tolerance and respect among all communities in Kosovo. However, all institutions in Kosovo 
should breathe life into the law by exercising it in daily practice to protect the most vulnera-
ble. One could start with the discrimination of the Serbs in the employment market as de-
scribed in Policy Recommendation No. 8. 
 
PR 7: Create employment opportunities in Serbian mono-ethnic areas with a special focus 
on rural areas and provide Serbian returnees with microloans. 
Addressee: International (non-)governmental organizations, which are involved in the re-
construction process of Kosovo 
If the returnees move to rural areas, they are effectively excluded from major towns and thus 
potential job markets. (Cf. Arowolo 2000: 68) One proposal to create employment opportuni-
ties for the returnees in remote, rural areas would be the creation of small-scale reconstruction 
projects, which basically employ the returnees. It would support both at the same time, the 
returnees can create sustainable livelihoods, and the infrastructure of the war-damaged area 
benefits from these projects. A positive example is the Indo-Chinese refugees returning to 
Vietnam who were supported by micro projects, which provided temporary jobs for the re-
turnees and improved the living conditions and infrastructure in the communities with high 
returnee concentration. (Cf. Duong, Morgan 2001: 104) Particularly, the reconstruction of 
houses is still a major obstacle for return. The returnees, who reconstruct the houses of their 
potential new neighbors also returning from abroad, would help solving this problem.  
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At the same token, the Serbian returnees should be provided with microloans instead of or 
additional to the initial financial support they receive upon their return. These 2,000 EUR are 
not sufficient to buy all the agricultural machines that are necessary to start an agricultural 
business apart from subsistence farming. Microloans would be an alternative for the returnees 
to get more money than the initial financial support.  
 
PR 8: Abolish the discrimination against the Serbian speaking minority in the process of 
job applications and at work. 
Addressee: Public institutions in Kosovo 
According to the Anti-discrimination law of Kosovo, there should be no discrimination relat-
ed to the conditions for access to employment. The Serbs do not have the same access to em-
ployment due to the lack of open vacancies published in the Serbian language and in Serbian 
newspapers. Subsequently, the Serbs do not know of open vacancies. This policy recommen-
dation suggests beginning with public institutions, which by law should publish their open 
vacancies also in the Serbian language and in Serbian media. Private companies should follow 
suit. 
 
PR 9: Exempt the Serbian (and other) returnees from paying electricity bills right after 
their return. The Serbian returnees should not be billed for the power that had been 
consumed by illegal occupiers of their property when they were in exile. 
Addressee: KEK, municipalities 
Energy supply is a very hot topic in Kosovo. The ABC-policy is discriminatory against the 
Serbian population, and among them the most vulnerable are the returnees. Even if it is not 
intentional against the Serbian population, it still creates an image of a “class society,” in 
which not everybody has the same access to public services such as power. The Serbian re-
turnees are among those who most likely cannot afford the sum of 26 EUR per month to pay 
the electricity bill. Upon their arrival in Kosovo, they usually do not have a regular income 
and should therefore be exempted from the monthly bill until they have established a sustain-
able livelihood.  
 
Furthermore, the returnees are burdened by electricity bills, which refer to the time they spent 
in exile and illegal occupants, who used power in their homes. One of the most important 
principles of the refugee law is that refugees should not be disadvantaged or discriminated 
because they were displaced. Charging the returnees for the power consumption of the illegal 
occupiers of their property while they spent time in exile puts the refugees and the IDPs in a 
difficult position and does not foster a society in which all share the same rights and duties.  
In order to charge the right persons, who actually consumed the power, a closer co-operation 
between the Kosovar institutions is necessary. 
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8. The Bosniak and the Gorani Community 
Preface to the Existing Material 
This chapter investigates the return conditions of the Bosniak and Gorani community. The 
topic appears to be largely unexplored.  
There is only little research dedicated specifically to the Bosniak community in Kosovo. Ex-
ceptions include: 
 Božić, Gordana (2010): The Ethnic Division of Education and the Relations among Non-
Serb Minorities in Kosovo, in: Canadian Slavonic Papers 52(3/4), pp. 273-298. 
 Maglajlić, Munib (2003): Bosniaks and Bosnia, in: DIWAN Special, pp. 1-4. 
The conditions upon return for the Bosniak community are extracted from various reports, 
mostly from international organizations, and papers dealing with (the return of) all ethnic mi-
nority communities in Kosovo. While the author sought to give an important insight to the 
return conditions of refugees, she does not claim to have drawn a full picture.  
 
The challenge regarding the resources on the return of the Gorani community is a different 
one: By the end of the twentieth century, after the breakup of Tito’s Yugoslavia, Gora/Gorë 
and the Gorani community has become an object of research for several Serbian scholars. The 
first results were presented at the interdisciplinary round table in 2000 in Belgrade and col-
lected in an edited volume issued two years later. This volume and another edited book pub-
lished in 2007 are among the best resources to study the Gorani community in Kosovo and 
beyond:  
 Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (2002): Goranies, Muslims and Turks in the Šar 
(Shar) Mountain Župas (Parishes) of Serbia: Problems of the Actual Living and Survival 
Conditions. 
 Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (2007): Kosovo and Metohija. Living in the En-
clave.
200
 
Both volumes are highly politicized. They glorify the Serbian government and its politics and 
at the same time demonize nearly almost every political or societal decision that was taken in 
Kosovo. On this account, information was carefully selected after thorough review. 
One exception from this biased research is: 
 Müller, S. (2004): Gutachten zur Situation der Gorani (Goranci) im Kosovo unter beson-
derer Berücksichtigung der Situation ehemaliger Angehöriger der Jugoslawischen Armee, 
online available at: European Country of Origin Information Network, http://www.ecoi.net 
/file_upload/1329_1202899680_sh37-041129gakosovogoranijnaupdate.pdf, last retrieved 
on 26.12.2013. 
 
                                                 
200
  Both volumes do not appear separately in the bibliography because the author only used certain papers and 
not the volumes as a whole.  
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8.1 Introduction: Muslim Slavs in Kosovo – the Bosniaks and the Gorani 
8.1.1 The Bosniaks and their Identity 
The Bosniaks are Muslims and speakers of the Slavic languages, who adopted Islam during 
the Ottoman Empire (1453-1912)
201. (Cf. Stevens 2009: 8) Historically, the term “Bosniak” 
was associated with the religion of Islam on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Later 
on, it was their languages (Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian), which distinguished Bosniaks 
from other people (late 1980s). 
“Finally, Bosniaks made the crucial reversal to their historical ethnic name during the 
aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the decision was made 
official at the First Assembly of Bosniaks, in the Autumn of 1993.” (Maglajlić 2003: 1) 
Following the Bosnian war, the Bosnian language was recognized as an own language, dis-
tinct from Croatian and Serbian. By 1999, Muslims speaking the Bosnian language in Kosovo 
called themselves “Bosniaks.” (Cf. Stevens 2009: 8) Nowadays, the term “Bosnian” refers to 
the entire population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas a “Bosniak” is a Bosni-
an/Serbian/Croatian-speaking Muslim Slav. (Cf. Cocozzelli 2008: 291)  
There are around 40,000 Bosniaks currently living in Kosovo, which represent the second 
largest minority community after the Kosovo Serbs. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 96ff.) They predomi-
nantly live in the municipalities of Prizren, Pejë/Peć, Istog/Istok, and Dragash/Dragaš. In Mi-
trovicë/Mitrovica, Bosniaks constitute roughly 1.1 % of the total population. Most of them 
live in the Bosniak Mahala in the North of the divided city. A limited number also lives in the 
South of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 76) Although Kosovo Bosniaks also appear 
in the other regions, this is an exception.  
 
As previously mentioned, the Bosnian language plays a significant role for the identity of the 
Bosniaks in Kosovo. During Tito’s era, all Yugoslavian peoples were equal. This is also re-
flected in the fact that officially no distinction was made between the Bosnian, Croatian, Ser-
bian, or Macedonian languages. Due to the ethnic cleansing in the mid-1990s in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, these peoples sought for ethnic partition. This separation is still manifested in 
the administrative division of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the two autonomous entities: the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, with a third region, the 
Brčko District, administered under local government. Consequently, Bosnians wanted to be 
recognized as an own, distinct people with a distinct language. As a consequence, the Bosnian 
language was recognized as an own separate language at the end of the Bosnian War in 1995.  
The problem remains that apart from a different caption – Serbs write with Cyrillic letters 
whereas Bosnians and Croats use the Latin alphabet – both languages sound very similar. Of-
ten, Albanians in Kosovo associate Bosniaks with Serbs and think that they were collabora-
tors of Milošević during the oppression of Albanians in the 1990s. (Cf. Stevens 2009: 8) It 
                                                 
201
  The Ottoman Empire was a transcontinental empire, which was originally founded as the Ottoman state by 
Turkish tribes under Osman Bey in north-western Anatolia in 1299. In 1453, with the conquest of Constanti-
nople by Mehmed II, the Ottoman state was transformed into an empire. During the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, 
the Ottoman Empire was one of the most powerful states in the world. At the beginning of the 17
th
 century, it 
contained 32 provinces, there under also some Balkan territories, which were lost during the Balkan Wars be-
tween 1912 and 1913. (Encyclopaedia Britanica 2013, online available at: http://www.britannica.com/ 
EBchecked/topic/434996/Ottoman-Empire, last retrieved on 23.11.2013) 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
254 
leads to irritation, which can have severe consequences as illustrated by the following state-
ment:  
“The risk of being mistaken for a Serb when using their language has restricted freedom 
of movement outside their local area and inhibited equal access to social services and 
economic opportunities.” (UK Border Agency 2008: 14) 
For this reason, the Bosnian language and its differences from the Serbian language is a sig-
nificant factor for generating a Bosniak identity in Kosovo. Beyond that, they face limited 
recognition of their own language in Kosovo, which is comparable to the situation of the 
Turkish language in Kosovo. (Cf. Stevens 2009: 8) Bosnian was recognized as one of the lan-
guages of legislative and legal documents as well as a “language in official use”202 (according 
to the Law on the Use of Languages) in the municipalities of Prizren and Pejë/Peć (cf. Diz-
darević 2002: 2), in Dragash/Dragaš (cf. Stevens 2009: 8), and in Istog/Istok (cf. OSCE 2010: 
89). This includes the obligation to provide interpretations when accessing municipal services 
and translations of municipal documents into Bosnian upon request. Nonetheless, the number 
of translated documents and the quality thereof is not satisfactory. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 89f.) In 
South Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and in Dragash/Dragaš, information on the municipal notice board 
is posted in Albanian although the Bosnian language is an official language in Dra-
gash/Dragaš municipality. “Furthermore, Dragash/ Dragaš outpatient clinic, where Bosniaks 
and Goranis are treated and employed, issues all documents and medical files in Albanian.” 
(HLC 2008: 202) In areas where the Bosniaks constitute a significant minority, the Bosnian 
language has also become a teaching language at all levels of education.
203
 (Cf. Dizdarević 
2002: 2) 
 
The larger community of the Bosniaks can also be considered as a mixture of different sub-
communities with at least two sub-groups. The first sub-group encompasses Macedonian 
Muslims, who are located in the Zhupë/Župa Valley204 and in the Podgor area205. The Mace-
donian Muslims have not fully established an own identity, but they are part of the larger 
Bosniak identity. The second sub-group is the Goranis, a Balkan minority that has become 
politically active in Kosovo. Gorani are predominantly located in the municipality of Dra-
gash/Dragaš, south of Prizren. The characteristics of the Gorani identity and the friction be-
tween fraternization with the Kosovo Bosniaks and separation from them are discussed in 
further detail in the Chapter 8.1.2. 
 
                                                 
202
  According to the Law on the Use of Languages, a language becomes an “official language” when the respec-
tive minority constitutes more than 5 % and a “language in official use” when more than 3 % of the popula-
tion in this municipality speak this language. (Cf. i.a. Božić 2010: 285) 
203
  For more information on the educational conditions for Bosniaks in Kosovo, please see the Chapter 8.3.2. 
204
  The Zhupe/Župa Valley is located between the cities of Shtime/Štimlje and Prizren in Kosovo. 
205
  The Podgor area is located between the cities of Istog/Istok and Pejë/Peć.  
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8.1.2 The Goranis – Separation from the Bosniaks 
The Goranis are the “inhabitants of Gora/Gorë,”206 which means translated into English the 
“inhabitants of the mountains”. (Cf. Dragaš 2002: 71; Müller 2004: 3) Around 12,000 Goranis 
live in a relatively isolated community in Kosovo’s south-west, the Gora/Gorë region. The 
Gora community inhabits three areas: (1) Kosovo (Prizren Gora), (2) Аlbania (Kukës Gora) 
with nine neighborhoods solely inhabited by the Goranis, and (3) two villages in Macedonia 
(Urvich and Jelovene). (Cf. Koleva 2012: 135). This region is naturally isolated, as it provides 
no access to the sea. It is also “… surrounded by the high mountain ranges of Shar Planina, 
Vratsa, Korab and Koritnik.” (Koleva 2012: 135; cf. Hasani 2007: 144)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38:  The region of Gora/Gorë
207
 
Source:  Online at wikimedia
208
 
 
 
 
                                                 
206
  For a historical overview of the region, please see Dragaš, Orhan (2002): The story about Goranies, in: Jour-
nal of the Geographical Institute Jovan Cvijic, SASA 51, pp. 71-74. It is important to note that Gora/Gorë 
and the entire Sharr/Šar Mountains (local name: Šar-Planina) have frequently changed rulers. (Cf. Dragaš 
2002: 71) Their districts underwent significant changes through medieval times. 
207
  The dashed line signifies the municipal border of Dragash/Dragaš. 
208
  The complete link is the following: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/39/Gora_ 
Region_between_Kosovo_and_Albania.png, last retrieved on 19.12.2013.  
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Figure 39: Distribution of Goranis in Kosovo (2011) 
Source: Online at wikimedia
209 
The majority of the Gorani community lives in the municipality of Dragash/Dragaš, which is 
divided into two parts: The upper Dragash/Dragaš, called Opojë/Opolje, which is dominated 
by Albanian settlers, whereas the native Goranis have remained to reside in the lower Dra-
gash/Dragaš called Gora/Gorë. (Cf. Hasani 2007: 149; Müller 2004: 2) In this municipality, 
the Goranis make up around one third of the total population and form an important block in 
municipal politics, which is discussed in Chapter 8.1.3. Dragash/Dragaš is a site of local eth-
nic dispute and focus of the international community because of its ethnic variety.  
“Dragash/Dragaš municipality is probably unique in Kosovo for the tolerance between 
the communities living there. Incidents of ethnic violence occurred after the 1999 con-
flict but the situation has been calm since mid-2001.” (OSCE 2009c: 1) 
 
The Goranis’ ethnic origins are not clear, as the following quote from Müller shows:  
“Macedonians, Serbs, and even Bulgarians claim the Goranis as part of their nation or 
ethnic community, but who converted to Islam. Also the Bosniaks (Muslim Slavs), who 
live mainly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandžak, and in some areas in Kosovo, see 
the Goranis as part of their community.”210 (Müller 2004: 3)  
                                                 
209
  The complete link is the following: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/05/Gorani_ 
in_Kosovo_2011_census.GIF, last retrieved on 19.12.2013.  
210
  Original quote in German: “Makedonier, Serben, und sogar Bulgaren reklamieren die Gorani als Teil ihrer 
Nation bzw. Ethnie, die allerdings zum Islam konvertierten. Auch die Bosniaken (Muslimische Slawen), die 
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A widely held view is that the Goranis descend from Orthodox Christian Slavs who came 
from Bulgaria in the 13
th
 century and stopped in the Gora/Gorë region on their way to the 
current territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
The Gorani community often uses the phrase star nash jezik (“our old language”) in commu-
nication with other communities. The name nàshinski or nàshinci derives from this phrase, 
referring to the name the Gorani community itself wants to call their native language. (Cf. 
Koleva 2012: 138) The Gorani language is part of the Bulgarian-Macedonian dialect located 
in the contact zone between the Albanian and the Slavic languages. (Cf. Koleva 2012: 137) 
Their language “… is the strongest factor of identity.” (Antonijević 2002: 226) For Goranis, it 
is therefore of importance that their names are not changed into Albanian ones, which has 
often happened in the past, particularly in Kosovo. Mladenović even goes as far as claiming 
that: “As soon as they break connection with their Gorany speech they become ethnically as-
similated.” (Mladenović 2002: 49) Thus, ethnic identification is strongly connected to the 
language nàshinski.  
 
“… [T]he constitutional status for both the Goranis and the Bosniaks has been confirmed 
through the recognition of each group as a distinct ‘community’ and through the correspond-
ing acknowledgment of their equal claims to minority rights.” (Božić 2010: 275) The thesis at 
hand analyzes the role and the challenges of the Bosniak and the Gorani returnees separately, 
particularly because of their distinct self-perception and their position within the Kosovar 
society. However, the Bosniaks and the Goranis share the same religion and, to some extent, 
also the same language. In addition, both peoples have been categorized as Slavic Muslims 
for centuries. For instance, in the 1991 census, only one category was provided for both, the 
Bosniaks and the Goranis – called “Muslim Slavs”. As a consequence, they share some chal-
lenges within Kosovo. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
hauptsächlich in Bosnien-Herzegowina und im Sandschak leben, und in einigen Gebieten im Kosovo sehen 
die Gorani als Bestandteil ihrer Gemeinschaft an.” Translation by the author. 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
258 
8.1.3 Political Engagement and the Differentiation between the Bosniaks and the 
Goranis 
As explained above, while the Bosniaks and the Goranis share some key characteristics, such 
as their religion and language, one of the main distinguishing features between the two is their 
political affiliation. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 76) “… [M]embers of both groups like to emphasize 
that the division between them is more political in nature than genuinely cultural.” (Božić 
2010: 292) Both communities, especially the Bosniaks, are fairly well-represented in public 
life compared to other non-majority communities such as the Roma, the Ashkali, and the 
Egyptians.  
The Bosniak and the Gorani communities provide a deputy municipal president each and are 
represented in the municipal executive boards in the municipalities of Prizren, Pejë/Peć, and 
Dragash/Dragaš. Beyond that, “… the Bosniak political parties were a deciding factor for the 
formation of the local or municipal government through coalition with Albanian political par-
ties” (UNHCR 2004b: 25, fn. 79) in the regions of Prizren and Pejë/Peć. Despite their consid-
erable influence in Kosovo’s municipal and parliamentary elections, the Bosniaks and the 
Goranis diminish their own potential: “Factionalism has weakened the community’s political 
presence on both the provincial level and the municipal level.” (Cocozzelli 2008: 291)  
 
Figure 40 and the brief explanation of power suspensions between the different political par-
ties demonstrate the factionalism and illustrate the missed potential in parliamentary and mu-
nicipal elections. 
The most prominent Bosniak party in Yugoslavia before 1999 was the Party of Democratic 
Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije, SDA) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with some branches 
in Kosovo. (Cf. Cocozzelli 2008: 291) In the aftermath of the NATO intervention, the SDA 
was a small political power. One reason for this is that they were unable to find the right can-
didate for the first post-war elections in 2000. The party rather competed on an ad hoc basis in 
specific municipalities. It won two seats in the municipal assembly in Dragash/Dragaš, one in 
Istog/Istok, and one in Pejë/Peć. The Bosniak Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo 
(Bošnjačka Stranka Demokratske Akcije Kosova, BSDAK) gathered more votes in 2000, but 
only managed to get two seats in the municipal assembly of Prizren. (Cf. Cocozzelli 2008: 
291) The Democratic Reform Party of Muslims (Demokratska Reformska Stranka Muslima-
na, DRSM) also won one seat in Prizren’s municipal assembly. It was renamed after its first 
participation in the local elections in 2001 into Democratic Bosniak Party (Bošnjačka Demo-
kratska Stranka, DSB). The three parties – SDA, DRSM, and DSB – later formed a coalition 
called VATAN
211
, which separated in 2004 and was replaced by a new coalition party called 
VAKAT
212
 (Koalicija VAKAT). The VAKAT “… supports the full integration of the com-
munity into Kosovo’s public institutions coupled with the promotion of Bosniak identity, and 
education in Bosnian in accordance with the Kosovo curriculum” (OSCE 2010: 88). The 
VAKAT coalition did not include the Gorani Citizens’ Initiative (Građanska Inicijativa Gore, 
                                                 
211
  The word vatan appears to derive from the Turkish or Ottoman word for fatherland or homeland. Although it 
is not an acronym it is usually presented in full capitals as “VATAN.” 
212
  Similar to vatan, the word vakat appears to derive from the Turkish or Ottoman language. The root word in 
Turkish would be vakit, which means “time.” Like VATAN, the political coalition generally uses full capi-
tals, “VAKAT.” Although both words, vatan and vakat, would have been common in the larger Ottoman 
Balkans at one point, they now have come to be associated with the Bosniak community. 
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GIG) anymore, but the DSB, the Democratic Party Vatan (Demokratska Stranka Vatan, 
DSV), and the Bosniak Party of Kosovo (Bošnjačka Stranka Kosova, BSK).  
The Goranis, who identify themselves as an own ethnic community, are politically organized 
under the GIG. Because the Goranis are recognized as an own ethnic community and GIG is 
the only political party representing them, GIG always receives one seat in the Kosovo As-
sembly.
213
 (Cf. Cocozzelli 2008: 292) GIG perceives itself as the only legitimate representa-
tive of the Gorani community. Most Goranis reject the Bosniak VAKAT coalition because 
they feel that VAKAT aims at assimilating Goranis into the Bosniak community. GIG sup-
ports this idea and wants to preserve the Gorani cultural heritage.  
 
The Goranis, who are not aligned with GIG, support the Democratic Party Vatan (Demo-
kratska Stranka Vatan, DSV). The DSV views the Goranis as a part of the larger Bosniak 
community.  
“From this position, the term Gorani is primarily a geographic designation derived 
from the community’s location in the high mountains, or gora in various Slavic lan-
guages.” (Emphasis added, Cocozzelli 2008: 293) 
According to the DSV, GIG supports the political and social parallel structures of Belgrade in 
Kosovo. The question of whether or not the Goranis belong to the Bosniak community is the 
main reason for the political division within the Gorani community.  
 
Nowadays, the SDA and VAKAT are regionally based parties, which do not challenge each 
other directly as they compete in different municipalities. Both parties are the biggest repre-
sentatives of the Bosniak community. (Cf. Cocozzelli 2008: 294) However, by splitting the 
number of representatives “… between two political entities, Kosovo Bosniaks are reducing 
their level of representation, but potentially increasing the level of democracy practiced within 
the community.” (Cocozzelli 2008: 294) 
                                                 
213
  This is regularized in the Kosovo constitution, article 14 on “Transitional Provisions for the Assembly of 
Kosovo” that reads as follows: “… Ten (10) seats shall be allocated to the parties, coalitions, citizens’ initia-
tives and independent candidates having declared themselves representing the Kosovo Serb Community and 
ten (10) seats shall be allocated to other Communities as follows: the Roma community, one (1) seat; the 
Ashkali community, one (1) seat; the Egyptian community, one (1) seat; and one (1) additional seat will be 
awarded to either the Roma, the Ashkali or the Egyptian community with the highest overall votes; the Bos-
niak community, three (3) seats; the Turkish community, two (2) seats; and the Gorani community, one (1) 
seat.” (Emphasis added) 
 The Kosovar constitution can be downloaded here: http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/ 
Constitution1Kosovo.pdf, last retrieved on 23.11.2013.  
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
260 
SDA DRSM
Coalition VATAN
Municipal Elections (2001)
GIG BSDAK
2 seats in 
Dragash/Dragaš
1 seat in 
Istog/Istok
1 seat in 
Pejë/Peć
1 seat in Prizren
New Name: 
DSB
Provincial Elections (2001)
3 reserved seats (2 Bosniak, 1 Gorani) + 1 open seat 
in Kosovo Assembly
2 seats in 
Prizren
1 seat in Kosovo 
Assembly
Municipal Elections (2002)
3 seats in Dragash/Dragaš, 2 seats in Prizren
1 seat in Istog/Istok, 1 seat in Pejë/Peć
1 seat in Prizren
Provincial Elections (2004)
1 reserved seat 
in K-Assembly
1 reserved seat 
in K-Assembly
–
SDA
DSB (Prizren)
GIG
DSV (Dragash/ 
Dragaš)
Provincial Elections (2004)
1 reserved seat 
in K-Assembly
1 reserved seat 
in K-Assembly
BSK (Pejë/Peć)
Coalition VAKAT
3 reserved seats in Kosovo Assembly
Provincial Elections (2007)
1 reserved seat 
in K-Assembly
2 reserved seats + 1 open seat in Kosovo Assembly
1 reserved seat 
in K-Assembly
Provincial Elections (2010)
1 reserved seat 
in K-Assembly
1 reserved seat + 1 open seat in Kosovo Assembly
BSDAK
1 seat in Kosovo 
Assembly
GIG Coalition VAKAT
1 seat Commu-
nity Assembly
Serbian Elections (2008)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40:  Bosniak and Gorani Political Parties and Their Election Results (2001-10) 
Source:  Own compilation according to Cocozzelli 2008: Small Minorities in a Divided Polity: Turks, Bos-
niaks, Muslim Slavs and Roms, Ashkalis and Egyptians in Post-conflict Kosovo, p. 291f. 
On the one hand, the stability of the Bosniak community – and to some extent also the Gorani 
community – was achieved by the political parties. (Cf. UNHCR 2004b: 25) On the other 
hand, the previously described ongoing rift between the political elites of the Bosniaks and 
the Goranis and within both ethnic communities continues minimizing their political influ-
ences on the national, and especially on the local level. One example for this is the Prizren 
area. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 87) The gap is exceptionally obvious with regard to the local school 
curriculum, which is dealt with in Chapter 8.3.2 and 8.4.1. (Cf. Cocozzelli 2008: 293) 
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8.2 The Displacement and the Return of the Bosniaks and the Goranis 
Figures for displaced persons and returnees from the Gorani and Bosniak communities may 
vary from source to source. Where possible, this thesis is based on and refers to data from the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
214
 as there is no official data from Kosovar or Serbian 
authorities.
215
 
 
8.2.1 Displacement 
The displacement waves of Bosniaks and Goranis are comparable to those of other non-
majority communities in Kosovo. All in all, around 23,000 Bosniaks and around 6,000 Go-
ranis were displaced in 1999 and in 2004.  
Shortly after the war, around 60 Bosniaks were killed and thousands were forced out of their 
apartments and houses as a consequence of the revenge attacks by the ethnic Albanians. (Cf. 
Dizdarević 2002: 3) Following the riots in March 2004, another 75 Bosniaks were killed and 
more displaced. Most likely, the displaced Bosniaks fled to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to 
Western European countries. (Cf. Ward 2000: 42) There are several reasons explaining the 
attacks and harassment against members of minority communities, such as the Bosniaks and 
the Goranis, who have not committed crimes against Albanians: 
(1) the minority’s general association with Yugoslavia and Serbia, in particular due to their 
Slavic language and 
(2) “… other Slavic-speaking minorities may also be perceived to have had a privileged status 
in Kosovo …” (Ward 2000: 41) when Albanians were forced out of public life in the 
1990s. 
Today, around 40,000 Bosniaks are left in Kosovo. 
 
The Goranis, who stayed in Kosovo during the NATO intervention, were ill-fated: They as-
sumed that Gora/Gorë would always be their homeland. However, the ethnic Albanians at-
tacked the Goranis because they considered them to be collaborators of the Serbs. This forced 
the Goranis to leave their homes. “Their private property, including houses, apartments and 
shops, was often plundered, destroyed, or, in many cases, usurped, mostly by Albanians from 
the neighbouring Opolje area.” (Hasani 2007: 148) In most of the cases, Goranis were dis-
placed to central Serbia, Belgrade, or to the Vojvodina (one of the two provinces of Serbia).  
Hasani’s figures are based on a survey conducted by the National Community of Goranis of 
Kosovo and Metohija. The temporarily displaced persons have found shelter in eighty differ-
ent towns in central Serbia and twenty towns in the northern province of the Vojvodina. (Cf. 
Hasani 2007: 152) In addition, a considerable number of Goranis moved to the area of 
Gračanica/Graçanicë, which has gained the status of a municipality in Kosovo recently. (Cf. 
OSCE 2010: 152)  
 
                                                 
214
  These figures are illustrated in Table 17. 
215
  In some cases, such as the table on the distribution of displaced Goranis in Serbia, figures may deviate from 
the data generally used. 
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To recap, one can assume that the Bosniaks and the Goranis were displaced because they 
were perceived as collaborators of the Serbs and associated with the atrocities the Serbs 
committed during the 1990s. “… [S]ignificant numbers of minority populations not associated 
with abuses against Albanians, including Gorani, Muslim Slavs (Bosniaks), and Croats have 
been displaced from their homes by harassment and intimidation, including violent attacks.” 
(Ward 2000: 41) Most of them have not returned to their homes yet, which is next. 
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8.2.2 Return of the Bosniaks and the Goranis to Kosovo 
According to UNHCR statistics, the majority of Bosniak refugees voluntarily return to Koso-
vo from Serbia, Montenegro, and Western European countries. In total, between the end of 
the violent hostilities in 1999 and February 2013, 1,789 Bosniaks returned to their homes in 
Kosovo. (Cf. UNHCR 2013: 4) Beyond that, 1,412 Goranis returned during the same time, 
predominantly from Serbia proper. These figures must be considered in relation to the number 
of displaced persons. As there are no accurate data of Bosniaks and Goranis, who were dis-
placed, the figures are based on the population census in 1991 (Cf. OSCE 2010), on current 
population estimations (Cf. OSCE 2010) and on OSCE municipal profile estimations
216
, and 
on return figures (UNHCR February 2013) according to these formulas.  
Census 1991 – Current Estimations = Current Displaced Persons 
Current Displaced Persons + Returned Persons = Total Displaced Persons 
To calculate the return percentage, the number of total displaced persons is compared with the 
number of returned persons.  
         100 x Returned Persons 
             Total Displaced Persons 
The calculations for the Bosniaks and the Goranis are revealed in Table 17: 
 
Bosniaks Goranis 
Census 1991  
(OSCE 2010: 96ff. and 165ff.) 
62,450
217 
16,168
217
 
Total Displaced Persons 22,923 5,574 
Current Displaced Persons 21,134 4,162 
Returned Persons 
(UNHCR February 2013: 4) 
1,789 1,412 
Current Estimations
218
 
(OSCE 2010: 96ff. and 165ff.) 
41,316 12,006 
Return Percentage 7.8 % 25.33 % 
Table 17:  Return and Displacement Figures of the Bosniaks and the Goranis 
Source: Own compilation according to OSCE (2010) and UNHCR (February 2013) data 
                                                 
216
  There is no accurate data for the Serbian municipalities of Leposavić/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok, and 
Zvečan/Zveçan, as well as the northern part of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica municipality. These figures are derived 
from the OSCE 2013 municipal profiles, which can be downloaded here: http://www.osce. org/kosovo/43753, 
last retrieved on 26.12.2013. 
217
  The data collected for the 1991 census is contested as there was neither a specific category for the Bosniaks 
nor for the Goranis. Both were subsumed under the ethnic category of “Muslims.” The presented data is 
therefore estimated by the OSCE according to the existing information. 
 The figure for Gorani living in Kosovo in 1991 is often estimated much higher. Some sources even suggest 
that around 30,000 Gorani lived in Kosovo before the war. 
218
  The current estimations are calculated as the arithmetic average of the current municipal estimations, current 
communities’ estimations, OSCE 2009 municipal profile estimations, and current OSCE field teams estima-
tions. 
= Return Percentage 
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The figures display that only a very small percentage of the Bosniaks and the Goranis re-
turned to their homes in Kosovo to date. They further show that more Goranis (25 %) than 
Bosniaks (8 %) returned to Kosovo. The motives for their non-return are similar to those of 
the other minority communities: a combination of fear of revenge, mistrust in the ability and 
willingness of local and national authorities to protect them, and the lack of any economic 
prospects in Kosovo. (Cf. Stevens 2009: 8) The UNHCR and the OSCE claimed in 2002 that 
there are “[v]irtually no returns of members of the Kosovo Bosniak [and Gorani] minority to 
Kosovo …” (UNHCR, OSCE 2002: 171). In 2002, the return figures should have been higher 
than today as it is assumed that a longer displacement decreases the likelihood of return. Nev-
ertheless, almost none of the Gorani or the Bosniak refugees returned to Kosovo in the first 
years after their displacement.
219
 The largest return figures were measured in 2004 but due to 
the riots and the following new displacement of many members of minority communities, the 
return figures for the Bosniaks and the Goranis decreased dramatically in the following years 
and remained low since then. This is illustrated in Figure 41. 
Figure 41:  Variation of Bosniak and Gorani Return Figures 
Source:  Own compilation based on the data presented in UNHCR 2013: 4 
First of all, there is not a single specific return program designed for the Bosniak or for the 
Gorani community. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 81) Beyond that, the return figures and the return condi-
tions for the Goranis and the Bosniaks largely depend on the region, to which they return. The 
Bosniak and Gorani returnees in the Prizren region get considerable support from various or-
ganizations.
220
  
 
Within the administrative region of Prizren, the Bosniaks mostly return to the Zhupë/Župa 
Valley, to Prizren town, and to the Podgor area and the returns usually occur to their places of 
origin. (Cf. UNHCR 2004b: 26) The ability to return to the place of origin is not very com-
                                                 
219
  Between the years 2000 and 2002, only 206 Bosniaks and 76 Goranis returned to Kosovo. (Cf. UNHCR 
2013: 4) 
220
  Chapter 8.3 on the “Challenges and Opportunities in the Return Process of the Bosniaks” analyzes whether or 
not the general conditions for the returning Bosniaks are better in Prizren than in other Kosovar regions. 
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mon in Kosovo, because of the severe ethnic divisions. However, the Bosniaks always lived 
in some small, mono-ethnic areas, and were not widely dispersed throughout the country. 
Therefore, they can return to the places of their origin without any difficulty. In addition, they 
enjoy full freedom of movement in the Prizren region.  
 
The Gorani refugees mainly return to the municipality of Dragash/Dragaš. One third of Dra-
gash/Dragaš’ population belongs to this community. In Dragash/Dragaš, the reconstruction of 
eight Gorani houses, which were destroyed during the war, was completed in 2009. Moreover, 
reconstruction material for an additional 19 houses was provided by international non-
governmental organizations and the municipality. On top of this, 27 Gorani returnees received 
food and furniture donations as well as small-scale financial support to generate income and 
to buy tools in 2009. Nevertheless, the Goranis are not involved in the municipal return work-
ing groups in Dragash/Dragaš. Hence, they cannot take part in any decision-making processes 
related to return issues. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 152)  
It is not known whether the Goranis also return to other regions. According to the available 
information, they only return to Prizren, which is the only region in Kosovo, where they con-
stitute a significant minority.  
 
Some of the Bosniaks return to Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, usually to the Bosniak Mahala. Despite 
the fact that there was no security incident directly targeted at the Kosovo Bosniaks since 
2004, this community is trapped in the intense and unpredictable environment of this particu-
lar region. “Some Bosniaks in north Mitrovice/a sold their properties and departed Kosovo. 
To further attest the precarious situation of Bosniaks, several returns, whether forced or vol-
untary also resulted in secondary displacement.” (UNHCR 2004b: 27)  
 
Neither the Bosniaks, nor the Goranis usually return to the Prishtinë/Priština or to the 
Gjilan/Gnjilane region, because of the low numbers of Bosniaks and Goranis living there and 
their isolation. “Unlike the communities in Peje/Pec and Prizren regions, the Bosniak com-
munities in this region have lost the critical mass in the recent period to anchor their commu-
nity, making it extremely difficult to return to the pre-war conditions.” (UNHCR 2004b: 26) 
To give a picture of the small Bosniak population in the Prishtinë/Priština region: in 2004, 
only four to five Bosniak families lived relatively isolated within this region. Instead of re-
turning to these regions, the Bosniaks usually sell their property and relocate to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina or Sandžak221 in Serbia proper. (Cf. UNHCR 2004b: 26) This situation is exac-
erbated by socio-economic factors such as the lack of job opportunities, vocational training, 
and support for starting up an own business. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 82) 
 
The return of the Bosniaks to the Pejë/Peć region is facilitated by bilingualism. The ability to 
speak Albanian affects their mobility within this region positively. Bosniak returnees enjoy 
freedom of movement, not only within the Pejë/Peć region, but also on the way to and within 
the neighboring Montenegro. Nevertheless, the migration to countries in Western Europe and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina pose a serious challenge to the Bosniak community. For instance, in 
                                                 
221
  Sandžak is a region between the borders of Serbia and Montenegro where many Bosniaks settled down in the 
past centuries. 
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2004, 43 Bosniak families from the Pejë/Peć region left Kosovo, which represents 46 % of the 
total number of recorded departures in the region. (Cf. UNHCR 2004b: 27) 
 
The return of former Gorani members of the Yugoslavian army remains especially challeng-
ing. Around 2,200 Goranis were compelled to or voluntarily served in the Yugoslavian army 
at the end of the 20
th
 century. One reason for this is that the Yugoslavian government feared 
an invasion of NATO ground forces from Macedonia or Albania. The Gora/Gorë region is 
close to Albania and Macedonia, so they recruited Goranis for defending Yugoslavia at this 
front. This enduring recruitment was a sign for the Albanians that the Goranis were actively 
taking part in the oppression and persecution of Albanians. (Cf. Müller 2004: 5) According to 
UNHCR assessment, former members of the Yugoslavian army should not return to Kosovo 
yet, because they are still connected with the Serbian regime and the atrocities committed 
during the war. These Gorani men are not allowed to return to their homes in the municipality 
of Dragash/Dragaš, because of the position they held in the Yugoslavian army. It is unlikely 
that they can return to Prizren either, since Prizren’s residents know about their specific past 
to the same extent as their neighbors in Dragash/Dragaš. Nonetheless, the Prizren region is the 
only return alternative where the Goranis can use their own language in everyday life. A re-
turn to other areas of Kosovo is also difficult, because most Goranis are unlikely to speak Al-
banian and therefore cannot be integrated. Neither is it a feasible option to return to Serbia, 
with the exception of the Sandžak region, because the Goranis’ Muslim faith and their Alba-
nian names. (Cf. Müller 2004: 9) 
 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
267 
8.3 Challenges and Opportunities in the Return Process of the Bosniaks 
8.3.1 The Bosniaks’ Role in Kosovo 
The role of the Bosniaks in Kosovo can be described as a situation between two fronts. On the 
one hand, the Bosniaks share their religious views with the Albanians. On the other hand, 
there is a linguistic resemblance of the Bosnian and the Serbian language
222
, which creates a 
common ground with the Serbs. In most of the cases, this “bi-ethnic role” has a positive ef-
fect. For instance, the Bosniaks do not exclusively approach Kosovo or Serbian institutions, 
but rationally choose whether to approach a Serbian or an Albanian institution in Kosovo. It is 
neither a linguistic, nor an ideological decision they make, but rather a matter of their place of 
residence, the availability, and the physical accessibility of services. Their bilingualism makes 
this switch possible and easily applicable.  
Some argue that it is exactly this position that can also be very threatening: 
“The criticism is directed against nationalistic actions of Serbs in Kosovo, particularly 
on the example of Mitrovica as a divided town, where Bosniaks (from Bosniak Mahala 
[Quarter]) are placed in an [sic] highly thankless position, standing on the way both to 
Serbian and Albanian extremists – either for their nationality and religion, or for their 
language.” (Dizdarević 2002: 3) 
At the same token, the Kosovo Bosniak magazine Alem
223
 accuses both Serbs and Albanians 
for their aspirations to assimilate the Bosniaks and for ignoring the Bosniaks’ individual iden-
tity. (Cf. Dizdarević 2002: 3) One example for the fact that the Bosniaks are not perceived as 
a distinct, relevant ethnic community in Kosovo is the exclusion of them from all decentrali-
zation processes: Apart from the fact that there are areas with a Bosniak majority and the 
Bosniak community is the second largest ethnic minority community in Kosovo, there is not a 
single Bosniak municipality predominantly ruled by Bosniak politicians. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 
87) Even the Turks, who rank third among the ethnic minorities in Kosovo, have a majority 
municipality (Mamuşa/Mamushë/Mamuša). Nevertheless, the “… Bosniaks feel that for cul-
tural survival, they need decentralization as much as Serbs do” (Stevens 2009: 8). 
Although the Bosniaks’ stance in Kosovo is positive, they fear assimilation and refusal of 
their distinctive ethnic identity. In the conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs, the Bos-
niaks are often left out.  
“… Bosniaks feel that in the newly independent Kosovo their options are to assimilate, 
or leave for countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina.” (Stevens 2009: 8) 
This situation in between the main two ethnic communities rather deters the Bosniaks from 
returning to Kosovo. The Bosniak refugees do not necessarily see a place for their ethnic 
community in newly independent Kosovo, especially when they sought asylum in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
                                                 
222
  All three languages – Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian – share the same grammar and to a large extent the 
vocabulary. The major difference is that whereas Bosnian and Croatian use Latin characters, Serbs write in 
Cyrillic letters.  
223
  Alem is a weekly magazine in the Bosnian language. “Alem provides information on current developments in 
Kosova and the re-integration of the Bosniac community into a post-war Kosovar society.” (Berisha 2004: 
236) In 2004, Alem was distributed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, Italy, Germa-
ny, and Switzerland. 
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When it comes to the employment situation, the Bosniaks benefit from their position between 
Albanians and Serbs. Some of the Bosniaks who were employed by SOEs still receive pen-
sions from Serbia-funded institutions. In northern Kosovo, around 100 Bosniaks work in Ser-
bia-financed educational, health care, and civil service institutions. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 82) 
Therefore, in some areas, the Bosniaks are “… comparatively better off than other non-
majority communities.” (OSCE 2010: 77) In Pejë/Peć, for example, there are qualified doc-
tors, engineers, teachers, nurses, and civil servants among the Kosovo Bosniak community. 
Nevertheless, unemployment affects the community in the same way as it affects other minor-
ity communities and the Albanians in Kosovo. The Bosniaks further claim that they are un-
derrepresented in the Kosovar public institutions.  
In addition, there are two smaller challenges affecting these two minority communities in par-
ticular:  
(1) The Bosniak and the Gorani residents of the Dragash/Dragaš municipality are unable to 
access information on job vacancies because there is no media coverage in their lan-
guages, so no information is directed specifically at these two groups. (Cf. HLC 2008: 
204)  
(2) Because of the status as a minority and their bilingualism, “[t]here are cases when some 
Albanians present themselves as Bosniaks in order to get jobs that are supposed to be for 
Bosniaks” (HLC 2008: 203).  
Both challenges decrease the Bosniaks’ employability. Since the Bosniak refugees are often 
well integrated in their countries of asylum, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, the lack of em-
ployment opportunities especially hampers their return to Kosovo. 
 
The Bosniaks are still victims of mistreatment, including intimidation, harassment, and dis-
crimination. They predominantly live in isolated, protected neighborhoods, which are exclu-
sively populated by members of their own ethnic community, and to some extent of the Go-
rani community. When leaving their own neighborhoods, they are afraid to use their native 
language in public as it has similarities with the spoken Serbian, which is almost not distinct 
from the sound of the Bosnian language. (Cf. IDMC 2012: 115) Admittedly, the ability to 
speak Albanian, which is widely spread among the Kosovo Bosniaks, “… remained a deter-
minant factor for the sense of security and for the level of freedom of movement exercised by 
an individual” (UNHCR 2004b: 25). In general, the Bosniaks can move throughout Kosovo 
without any major constraints when they speak Albanian. However, the fear of harassment 
and the restriction on the use of their own language often imposes the decision to return to the 
areas with a Bosniak majority, where the Bosniak returnees feel safe and unrestricted to 
move.  
 
A factor conducive for the Bosniaks’ feeling of security and freedom of movement is their 
great trust in the Kosovo Police. The Bosniak community is relatively well represented in this 
institution; “… with 185 male and 37 female officers Kosovo-wide, [it is] the second largest 
non-Albanian community presence in the service” (Emphasis added, OSCE 2010: 79). In 
comparison to other ethnic minority communities in Kosovo, such as the RAE and the Serbs, 
the Bosniaks are most likely to report security incidents to the Kosovo Police because of their 
great trust in this institution.  
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Nonetheless, the Bosniaks are still involved in sporadic security incidents, especially in Mi-
trovicë/Mitrovica North. They are occasionally caught up in the tensions between the Albani-
ans and the Serbs. The situation aggravated after the EU-led dialogue between Belgrade and 
Prishtinë/Priština in spring 2013. Following the agreement between both delegations, the 
Serbs in northern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica denounced the compromise and started small attacks, 
especially on offices of international organizations in the northern part of the town. This in-
cluded some attacks on the Kosovo Bosniaks, mostly living in the Bosniak Mahala in north-
ern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. On 4 February 2013, an explosion was recorded in the neighborhood 
of Bosniak Mahala, injuring two children. “… on 28 February a hand grenade was thrown at 
the house of a Kosovo Bosniak whose son works for the Office.” (Secretary General 2013-04: 
5) Another incident happened on 19 February 2013, an explosive device detonated in the yard 
of a Kosovo Bosniak police officer. (Cf. Secretary General 2013-04: 5) 
In addition, Bosniaks also continue to be the target of security incidents in the municipality of 
Pejë/Peć, namely harassment and assault. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 80) For instance, “[on] 29 March 
[2011], in the ethnically mixed village of Vitomiricë/Vitomirica (Pejë/Peć municipality), a 
Kosovo Bosniak male was severely injured when he was shot by three unknown males” (Sec-
retary General 2011-05: 6). 
 
Despite some smaller security incidents, the Bosniak community in Kosovo is not classified 
as a minority at risk of persecution according to the assessment of the UNHCR. (2006: 1f.) 
The UK Border Agency further summarized in 2008:  
“Although Bosniaks may be subject to discrimination and/or harassment in Kosovo this 
does not generally reach the level of persecution. Considering the sufficiency of protec-
tion available and the option of internal relocation, in the majority of cases it is unlikely 
that a claim based solely on a fear of persecution because of Bosniak ethnicity will qual-
ify for a grant of asylum or Humanitarian Protection and cases from this category of 
claim are likely to be clearly unfounded.” (UK Border Agency 2008: 15) 
One could argue that the Bosniaks are not persecuted because of their ethnicity, but that they 
are rather randomly a subject to violence by accident. Further, this is a geographical problem; 
the inter-ethnic tensions that prevail in the northern part of the divided city of Mi-
trovicë/Mitrovica and the other northern Serbian dominated municipalities. Yet, the occasion-
al occurrence of violence in northern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica prevents the Bosniak refugees from 
making a free decision, where to return to. The Bosniak refugees, originally from the Bosniak 
Mahala, may be forced to return to other regions than their home towns; because of the fear of 
becoming a subject of violence at home is too high. Some even decide not to return at all. 
 
To sum up, “ … the Kosovo Bosniak community … has managed, unlike many other com-
munities in Kosovo, to live peacefully alongside both the Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb 
communities” (OSCE 2010: 76). In some areas, they are better off than their counterparts 
from other ethnic communities due to their special role, the cultural closeness to the Albani-
ans and the Serbs, and especially the Bosniaks’ ability to communicate with both of them eas-
ily and equally. However, this positive may also lead to an uncertain position of the Bosniaks 
and their fear of assimilation by the Albanians and/or the Serbs. Furthermore, the Bosniaks 
have a latent feeling of insecurity when speaking their native language in public. As a conse-
quence, they are best integrated when speaking the majority Albanian language in public. 
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8.3.2 Access to Education for the Bosniak Community  
The access to and the quality of education is a highly political topic for the Bosniak communi-
ty. This is partly due to the decision to choose one or the other educational system in Kosovo, 
but it is also visible in comparison to the Gorani community, which deals with education for 
their children in a very different manner. Beyond that, education is a relevant condition influ-
encing the sustainability of refugee returns of families with children at school age. 
 
One would assume that the Bosniaks attend the Serbian educational system in Kosovo, be-
cause there is a strong resemblance between the Bosnian and the Serbian language. However, 
the Bosniaks attend ethnically mixed or Albanian schools within the Kosovar system
224
, 
where they learn with their own distinct curriculum in the Bosnian language and where na-
tional subjects, such as language, history, art, and music, are separately taught as well. In Ko-
sovo, an own curriculum is otherwise only available to the Turks and to the Serbs within the 
Serbian system. (Cf. UNHCR 2004b: 25) Božić explains that the reason for establishing a 
separate Bosnian curriculum is the Bosnian language: “Because the Bosniaks use ethno-
linguistic criteria for defining their identity, it is necessary to ensure education in Bosnian for 
the Bosniaks … .” (Božić 2010: 279) Consequently, 
“[i]n nearly every town where Bosniaks live, they can attend elementary and high 
schools and be taught in their mother tongue …” (HLC 2008: 203). 
This implies a significant advantage vis-à-vis the other non-majority communities in Kosovo, 
such as Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians. One can only speculate that the Bosniaks have an own 
curriculum due to their political influence
225
, particularly on the municipal level, and the fact 
that they constitute the second largest minority community (the third largest community in 
general) in Kosovo after the Serbs. This special role can also be emphasized by an example 
from the teachers’ representation in the southern part of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica: There are sev-
eral Bosniak teachers employed in this region, despite the fact that there is only a very low 
enrolment of Bosniak children. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 84) Even higher education is available in 
Kosovo. For instance, there is a business school in Pejë/Peć, an education facility in Prizren, a 
Bosnian language department in the University of Prishtinë/Priština, and the private AAB 
University in Prishtinë/Priština that organizes education in Bosnian, too. (Cf. Stevens 2009: 8; 
UNHCR 2004b: 25; HLC 2008: 203) 
 
Although education is one of the key issues, it is also one of the most relevant obstacles to a 
sustainable return of the Bosniaks to Kosovo. This privileged role within the Kosovar educa-
tional system is confined to the areas, in which the Bosniaks represent a significant minority. 
Thus, it is most likely to be established in the south-western part of Kosovo. In 
Gjilan/Gnjilane, for instance, there are no schools that offer education in Bosnian and accord-
ing to the Bosniak curriculum. In some municipalities, the Bosniak children have to attend 
schools in another municipality, where the Bosniak community represents a larger part of the 
population. Hence, transport for students of these schools is required. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 85) 
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  To some extent, Bosniaks also attend schools within the Serbian curriculum, particularly in the Serbian 
northern municipalities where there are no schools teaching with a Bosnian curriculum. (Cf. OSCE 2009a) 
225
  For more information on the Bosniaks’ political influence and role in Kosovo, please see Chapter 8.1.3. 
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Admittedly, transportation is often not funded by the municipality as the following example 
shows:  
“For instance, in Prapaqan/Prapaćane (Deçan/Dečane), a Kosovo Bosniak family rely-
ing on social welfare assistance pays Euro 50 per month[
226
] for transport of two chil-
dren to the closest Bosnian language secondary school in Pejë/Peć, as they cannot re-
ceive education in Bosnian in Deçan/Dečane.” (OSCE 2009a: 12, fn. 50)  
As a consequence, the Bosniak refugee families with children at school age are restricted in 
their freedom of choice: They cannot freely decide where to return to without bearing in mind 
the location of schools that offer Bosniak education.  
 
A significant part of forcibly and voluntarily returned children from Western European coun-
tries have difficulties to integrate because they neither speak Bosnian nor Albanian. In their 
Western European host countries, they learned the national language and often neglected their 
native languages, which would fundamentally facilitate their integration in Kosovo. (Cf. 
OSCE 2010: 82) This is one of the major reasons that prevent the Bosniaks from returning to 
their homes in Kosovo. Most Kosovar schools do not offer extracurricular language classes 
for returnee children, who were not raised in Kosovo but in Western European or other West-
ern Balkan countries.  
 
Beyond that, the Kosovo Bosniaks still face some challenges with regard to textbooks and to 
representation within school management. One of the most serious issues is the lack of school 
books: “… [T]here are no books in their languages [Bosnian and Turkish] for secondary and, 
in some cases, primary education.” (OSCE 2009a: 3) In 2009, no Bosnian textbooks for sec-
ondary higher education (grades 10-13) existed and there were only few Bosnian textbooks 
for secondary lower education (grades 6-9). The provision of textbooks is limited by “… the 
small number of qualified authors and the low profit or even economic loss related to the pub-
lication of limited-number copies. Publishing houses incur losses when issuing less than 1,000 
copies per book, while – Kosovo-wide – no grade has more than 200 Kosovo Bosniak stu-
dents” (OSCE 2009a: 6). Equally important, authors from minority communities have to in-
vest around 3,000 EUR for a textbook on top of a 20 % tax – no matter how many copies are 
sold afterwards. (Cf. Božić 2010: 287) 
In order to get a better idea of the shortage of textbooks: In Prizren, as of October 2008, the 
following books providing material for national subjects were not available: 
 the Bosnian alphabet (grade 1), 
 Bosnian language readers (grades 4-5), 
 Bosnian art (grades 3 and 5), and 
 Bosnian music (grades 3-5). (OSCE 2009a: 6, fn. 25) 
Most national subject textbooks are imported from Bosnia and Herzegovina, which fulfill the 
necessary language requirements, but not reflect the Bosniaks’ way of life in Kosovo or their 
historical background. (Cf. OSCE 2009a: 7) In addition, the curricula and textbooks for the 
general subjects are created by Kosovo Albanian experts and are then translated into Bosnian. 
The “… translation is often considered poor” (OSCE 2009a: 5). On that account, the Bosniak 
                                                 
226
  This sum has to be set in comparison to the average monthly income of 280 EUR in Kosovo. (Eurofound 
2012: 3; Shaipi 2012: 7) 
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refugee families with children at school age often tend to stay in exile in Bosnia and Herze-
govina rather than to return to their homes in Kosovo, where education fulfills higher quality 
standards.  
 
The second challenge concerns the representation in school management positions. In general, 
the Bosniaks lack sufficient management representation within ethnically mixed schools. Yet, 
where education is conducted in non-official languages such as Bosnian, they tend to be rep-
resented in the school management. For instance in the mono-ethnic Bosnian schools in the 
Zhupë/Župa valley (Prizren) and in Vitomiricë/Vitomirica (Pejë/Peć), teachers and principals 
are Kosovo Bosniaks. (OSCE 2009a: 10) 
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8.4 Challenges and Opportunities in the Return Process of Goranis 
8.4.1 The Goranis’ Role in the Society 
The Gorani ethnic community is very close to the Serbian community in Kosovo and to Ser-
bia proper. According to Ahmetović, the Goranis have always been devoted to their state Ser-
bia and to Yugoslavia in general. (Cf. Ahmetović 2002: 55) The reasons for this relationship 
are twofold: (1) The Našinski dialect is close to the Serbian language, and (2) “[t]he ethnic 
self-identification is also associated with a certain political and/or ideological orientation”227 
(Müller 2004: 4), which serves as the background for their contemporary close relationship 
with the Serbs in Kosovo and beyond.  
Their relationship peaked in the 1990s when the Goranis benefited from the Serbi-
an/Yugoslavian policy which favored small minorities, while excluding the Albanians from 
public life. This also led to the short-term political independence of the Gora/Gorë region be-
tween 1990 and 1999.
228
 (Cf. Müller 2004: 4) Today, in Dragash/Dragaš municipality, the 
Serbian institutions are not directly administered by the Serbian government, but by the mu-
nicipality of Gora i Opolje
229
, which belongs to the territory of the Republic of Serbia. The 
municipality of Gora i Opolje was re-established after the Serbian local elections in April 
2008. This municipal distribution illustrates the close connection between Serbia proper and 
the Gorani people.  
“The Serbia-funded health and education services are administered by the Serbia-
administered Gora municipality, which – although not able to provide much needed in-
frastructural investment – exercises a great deal of political influence over the commu-
nity’s choices regarding integration with the majority population … .” (OSCE 2010: 
153)  
Maintaining close relations with the Serbian population in Kosovo automatically results in 
poor relations with the Albanians. 
 
Regardless of whether the Goranis joined the army voluntarily or were forced to,
230
 it is a fact 
that approximately 2,200 Goranis served in the Yugoslavian army. This was another sign for 
the Albanians that the Goranis were part of the oppression and persecution of the Albanians in 
the last century. 
                                                 
227
  Original quote in German: “Die ethnische Selbst-Identifizierung ist auch mit einer gewissen politischen 
und/oder ideologischen Ausrichtung verbunden.” Translation by the author. 
228
  The Gora/Gor region was and still is partly populated by Albanians in Opojë/Opolje. In 1991, the Serbian 
assembly promulgated a law deciding that the municipality Gora is set up. (Cf. Ahmetović 2002: 57) There-
by, Albanians in this region could be isolated and excluded from public life and employment opportunities. 
229
  The Republic of Serbia has its own territorial division into municipalities, which encompasses Kosovo due to 
its continuing legal status as a Serbian province. Within the Prizren district, there exists the municipality of 
Gora i Opolje. See the information on districts and municipalities in Serbia on the webpage of the Serbian 
government, at: http://www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice_o_srbiji/okrug.php?id=303, last retrieved on 24.11.2013. 
230
  At this point, it should be noted that both opinions prevail. On the one hand, a Serbian researcher glorified 
the serving of Goranis in the Yugoslavian army by stating that: “Goranies, however, whether in a separate 
municipality or not, have always protected with honour their ethnic individuality, Serbia and Yugoslavia, 
whenever there was a need.” (Ahmetović 2002: 57) On the other hand, Müller claims that Goranis had to 
serve in the Yugoslavian army, especially because of the geographically strategic location of the Gora region 
between Macedonia and Albania. (Cf. Müller 2004: 5) 
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“The peak of this association with Belgrade was the presence of a Gorani representative as 
part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia delegation to the February 1999 Rambouillet con-
ference.” (Cocozzelli 2008: 292) Mr. Ibro Vait was the representative of the Gorani people 
within the Yugoslavian delegation at the time and, fully supported the point of view of this 
delegation. (Cf. Vait 2002: 46) Since the Rambouillet conference was one of the triggers for 
the NATO intervention in March 1999, the Albanians perceived the participation of an ethnic 
minority in the Yugoslavian delegation as a direct threat to their people. 
 
One result of the positive relations between the Goranis and the Serbs is the fact that “… most 
Gorani have friends, relatives and business contacts in Serbia and Montenegro, which are 
maintained through regular cross boundary travel” (IDMC 2007: 60). Another result is that 
the Gorani almost exclusively use Serbian institutions in Kosovo. In some cases, however, the 
decision between the Kosovar system and the Serbian system depends on other, non-
ideological reasons. For instance, “… the free provision of health care by the former [Serbia-
supported institutions] remains an attractive incentive over Kosovo facilities.” (OSCE 2010: 
153) In addition, within the Serbian system, families can get a children’s allowance for every 
child at school age. (OSCE 2010: 154) This is a crucial factor for many families, especially 
returnees, since sending children to school costs approximately 50 EUR per month. (Cf. HRW 
2010: 56) Within the Kosovar social security system, families only get support for their chil-
dren up to the age of six although this is exactly the time when families are in need of finan-
cial aid for textbooks, warm meals in school, and sometimes even school uniforms. 
 
Moreover, Goranis often do not speak Albanian and, consequently, do not have access to the 
labor market in Kosovo. (Cf. Stevens 2009: 10) Hence, they remain disintegrated from the 
Kosovar society, but they are integrated into the parallel Serbian structures. According to in-
formation from the journalistic network B92, the Gorani community wants to belong to the 
community of Serbian municipalities.
231
 For emphasis, the Serbian municipality of Gora is 
located in Kosovo but administered through the government of Serbia and, thus, has a sepa-
rate administrative structure, including a parallel municipal president, the Gorani Murselj Hu-
seini. Accordingly, the municipality of Gora wants to be a part of the community of Serbian 
municipalities which was negotiated between the representatives of Serbia proper and Kosovo 
under the supervision of the European Union’s High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton. The community of Serbian municipalities will 
“… have ‘full overview’ on ‘economic development, education, health, urban and rural plan-
ning’.”232  
What would integration into the community of Serbian municipalities mean for the Gorani 
returnees? The Gorani returnees are not integrated into the Kosovar society, but rely on the 
parallel Serbian society. The Serbian government – through the municipality of Gora i Opolje 
supports the Goranis financially and morally. Nevertheless, the Goranis live relatively isolated 
in the South of Kosovo. By contrast, the Serbs predominantly live together in the North, 
where they have a strong voice because of their large number. They also benefit from the im-
                                                 
231
  Gorani want to join community of Serb municipalities, in: B92 on 8 March 2013, online available at: 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2013&mm=03&dd=08&nav_id=85060, last re-
trieved on 19.12.2013.  
232
  Kosovo-Serbia deal: partial self-governing status agreed for Kosovo Serb municipalities, in: Nationalia on 22 
April 2013, online available at: http://www.nationalia.info/en/news/1419, last retrieved on 24.11.2013. 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
275 
mediate vicinity to Serbia. This is particularly advantageous when it comes to the provision of 
water and electricity, which can be accessed through Serbia, the short distance to the next 
hospital for tertiary health care, the University of North Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, and full access 
to social services and public goods.  
The majority of the Gorani refugees lives in Serbia proper. The prospect to return to their 
homes in the Dragash/Dragaš municipality, where they would live isolated with their peers, 
where they would suffer from a lack of contact to other parts in Kosovo, and where they 
would be far away from Serbia proper, which they are still connected to through family and 
friends, is not appealing. In most of the cases, the Goranis opt to stay in exile rather than to 
return to their homes in the Gora/Gorë region, which is supported by the low return percent-
age of 25 %. 
 
“The popular perception of the Goranis as pro-Serb and thus, disloyal, not only re-
mained but actually was consolidated when they opted to follow education in Serbian.” 
(Božić 2010: 291) 
One prominent feature illustrating the position of the Gorani community, which is between 
the Albanian-Serbian tensions, is the access to education within the Serbian educational sys-
tem. In the municipality of Dragash/Dragaš, most Gorani students are enrolled in Serbian 
schools. This has various, especially practical, reasons. Gorani students want to receive edu-
cation in the Serbian language, which is closer to their own dialect than Albanian. Further-
more, receiving education in Serbian is a tradition within the Gorani community, which par-
ticipates in Serbian education since the 1930s. (Cf. Božić 2010: 279) However, there is no 
Serbian curriculum within the Kosovar educational system. In addition, “… Serbian helps 
increase [sic] opportunities for quality education, employment, and consequently for regional 
integration” (Božić 2010: 279). Since Kosovar diplomas are not recognized by universities in 
Serbia and other Western Balkan countries, the Goranis choose the Serbian system. Beyond 
that, the Gorani students receive free textbooks in good quality from Belgrade, the Gorani 
teachers receive higher salaries within the Serbian system, and the Gorani parents receive a 
monthly allowance for every child in Serbian schools
233. (Cf. Božić 2010: 294f.)  
 
The Gorani teachers and students  
“… have increasingly become the subject of an escalating struggle for authority which 
prevails between the two school systems maintained in Kosovo, specifically the push by 
Kosovo institutions to integrate Gorani pupils and teaching staff into the Kosovo educa-
tional system.“ (OSCE 2010: 155)  
At the beginning of 2008, a conflict over Gorani teachers’ contracts and common school 
space in the primary school of Nezim Berati/Nebojša Jerković in the Dragash/Dragaš munici-
pality erupted. Over a couple of months, two conflict parties struggled over the access to the 
primary school: On the one hand, the Gorani teachers and the Gorani students with the sup-
port of the GIG and the government of Serbia
234
 tried to uphold their right to use the school 
premises of Nezim Berati/Nebojša Jerković and to continue education within the Serbian sys-
                                                 
233
  Gorani parents receive 20 EUR for every child enrolled in a primary school and 50 EUR for every child en-
rolled in a secondary Serbian school. 
234
  The government of Serbia is represented through the Mayor of the Serbian municipality of Gora.  
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Dragash/Dragaš 
municipality
Bosniaks (DSV)
Dragash/Dragaš
municipality
tem. On the other hand, the Kosovar municipal government of Dragash/Dragaš aimed at inte-
grating the Gorani community in their educational system with the support of the Bosniak 
community and the DSV. 
Figure 42:  Parties in the Conflict over Teacher Contracts in Dragash/Dragaš 
Source:  Own compilation 
It is important to note that until 2005 dual contracts from Belgrade and Prishtinë/Priština were 
possible. The political reasons for Belgrade and Prishtinë/Priština to maintain this flexibility 
until 2005 were twofold: “Belgrade used contracts as proof that it still exercised authority in 
Kosovo, while for Priština they served as evidence that there was ‘integration’ of the Serbs in 
Kosovo.” (Emphasis in original, Božić 2010: 295) The Gorani teachers signed contracts with 
the Serbian Ministry of Education (SMES) in 2006. Since the municipal institutions are re-
sponsible for the administration of primary schools in Kosovo, Dragash/Dragaš forced the 
Gorani teachers to sign contracts with their municipal institutions. Otherwise, they would be 
banned from the primary school “Nezim Berati/Nebojša Jerković” in Dragash/Dragaš town in 
autumn 2008.
235
 The Gorani teachers denied signing these contracts with the Kosovar institu-
tions as it was no option to receive education in the Kosovar system in Bosnian either. The 
GIG explains the conscious decision against the Bosniak curriculum as follows: 
(1) Education within the Kosovar institutions using the Bosniak curriculum would lead to a 
process of assimilation to the Bosniak community and would ultimately destroy the Go-
rani identity. 
                                                 
235
  This is one example of a school, in which Albanians, Bosniaks, and Goranis share the same premises and it is 
possible to receive education in two different educational systems. 
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(2) The Kosovar school diplomas would not be recognized by Serbian universities and most 
universities within the region. Thus, Gorani students would be denied admission.  
(3) Lastly, the Bosnian-language materials are below the average of Serbian textbooks. (Cf. 
Cocozzelli 2008: 293) 
Following this decision, the Gorani teachers were banned to enter the Kosovar primary school 
in Dragash/Dragaš town.  
“As a result, Gorani children became unable to share the school premises with Kosovo 
Albanian and Kosovo Bosniak students, as they had done since before 1999, and could 
not receive Serbian language education in the school.” (OSCE 2009a: 4)  
School was interrupted for four months for Gorani children, until the Gorani students from the 
“Nezim Berati/Nebojša Jerković” school resumed their education in Serbian schools in the 
neighboring villages of Lubivshtë/Ljubovište and Kukajan/Kukuljanje. These schools already 
struggled with inadequate space for all their students. Obviously, this problem aggravated 
when the students from the Nezim Berati/Nebojša Jerković School were relocated to these 
two facilities. (Cf. Božić 2010: 293ff.) Although there was an agreement between the conflict 
parties in March 2009, the Gorani teachers withdrew from their positions in the primary 
school and it was never reopened. (Cf. OSCE 2009a: 4) 
 
From the perspective of the Bosniak DSV, the entire dispute was highly influenced by Bel-
grade. Many Goranis in Dragash/Dragaš still receive “salaries” from the former SOEs. “These 
families were told that the salaries would cease to be paid if their children continued to attend 
schools using the standard Kosovo curriculum.” (Cocozzelli 2008: 293) Likewise, the Gorani 
teachers were put under intense pressure from Belgrade that they would not receive their dou-
ble salary
236
 from Belgrade anymore if they relied on the Kosovar instead of the Serbian cur-
riculum. (Cf. Cocozzelli 2008: 293) 
“From the DSV perspective, Belgrade was effectively blackmailing Gorani families into 
an unnecessary confrontation with the Kosovo authorities.” (Cocozzelli 2008: 293) 
In conclusion, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo is still involved in mediating between the con-
flicting parties, as Cocozzelli summarizes: “Resolution of the conflict has been an ongoing 
process.” (Cocozzelli 2008: 293) 
 
Apart from the ongoing dispute, which dominates the discourse on the Goranis’ access to ed-
ucation, there is another challenge directly related to the situation of the Gorani returnees. 
This challenge concerns the geographical location of the community, which is located in the 
mountains and has many remote villages and only one major town.  
“… [O]n the one hand, long ways to school, and on the other hand that, in winter many 
of the villages are cut off from the outside world. This also means that a large part of the 
                                                 
236
  Belgrade pays a salary twice as high as the salary for teachers within the Kosovo system. This salary works 
as an incentive for teachers to teach within the Serbian educational system. 
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salary of teachers (180 Euros) [and of parents] are consumed for transportation 
costs.”237 (Müller 2004: 8f.)  
In most of the settlements, students are able to walk to their schools, even if they are in neigh-
boring settlements. However, “[t]his is not possible at Secondary [sic] school level due to the 
schools’ locations in Dragash/Dragaš and Mlike/Mlikë … Costs for this transportation must 
be paid by the families” (UNDP 2012: 93). As a result, the Gorani refugees choose areas, in 
which there is a Serbian school, so that their children can receive education in the Serbian 
language. It becomes particularly relevant for the Gorani returnees to have a Serbian school 
nearby as they often do not have any money to spend on transportation to school for their 
children. Their preference for the Serbian system also has a practical reason. Kosovar diplo-
mas are not recognized at Serbian or other regional universities. The return to Kosovo is often 
restricted by the lack of appropriate return areas with Serbian schools nearby.  
 
Another factor influencing the return of the Goranis to their homes in Kosovo is the security 
situation. Until July 2001, there were numerous attacks on the Gorani population in Kosovo. 
In the following years, the Goranis were partly victims of harassment and intimidation such as 
threats, looting, and racketeering. (Cf. Müller 2004: 6) After the declaration of independence 
in 2008, “[s]hops owned by members of the Gorani community were devastated. Only a few 
perpetrators were brought to justice.”238 Today, the lack of freedom of movement is more 
menacing for the Gorani community than actual security threats such as in the aftermath of 
the declaration of independence in 2008. The Goranis are restricted, because they do not 
speak Albanian. The majority of Goranis only speaks the Gorani dialect Našinski, Serbian, or 
Bosnian. (Cf. Müller 2004: 6) Thus, “… those with limited knowledge of the Albanian lan-
guage are reluctant to venture in rural areas inhabited by Kosovo Albanians” (OSCE 2010: 
151). This poses a direct challenge for the Gorani stayees and returnees in Dragash/Dragaš 
because of the division of the municipality into a Gorani-inhabited and an Albanian-inhabited 
territory.  
 
The lack of freedom of movement supports the hypothesis that the return of a Gorani refugee 
results in a confinement into the Gora/Gorë region. In the theoretical chapter of this disserta-
tion, it was discussed that a sustainable return process needs to occur under certain conditions 
that allow the refugee to reestablish their decision-making capacity and self-esteem. Without 
the ability to move freely from one part of the municipality to the other – not to mention to 
other municipalities in Kosovo – the Gorani returnees are not able to fully access all social 
services and public goods to establish a good life standard. 
 
                                                 
237
  Original quote in German: “Dies bedeutet zum einen lange Schulwege und zum anderen, dass im Winter 
viele der Dörfer von der Außenwelt abgeschnitten sind. Dies bedeutet auch, dass ein Großteil des Gehaltes 
der Lehrkräfte (180 Euro) für Transportkosten verbraucht werden.” Translation by the author.  
238
  Original quote in German: “Läden im Besitz von Angehörigen der Goranen-Gemeinschaft wurden verwüstet. 
Nur wenige Täter wurden zur Rechenschaft gezogen.” Translation by the author. Source: N.N. (2009): Situa-
tion von Goranern in Dragasch (Dorf Lubovica) - sozioökonmische Lage, Diskriminierung, ärztliche Versor-
gung, psychiatrische Behandlung, Anfragebeantwortung a-7013 (ACC-KOS-7013), online available at: 
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/response_en_130963.html, last retrieved on 24.11.2013. 
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8.4.2 Emigration as a Survival Strategy or Depopulation of Dragash/Dragaš? 
Returning refugees are often struggling with the poor conditions in their home country. There-
fore, they look for alternative livelihood strategies. One alternative is migration. The follow-
ing chapter deals with the question whether or not the traditional migration of the Goranis to 
other cities in Kosovo or even abroad – now relevant for the Gorani returnees – can be per-
ceived as contributing to or impeding a sustainable return. On the one hand,  
“[e]migration may be seen as an indicator of strength of a community that is capable of 
bringing up and sending ‘into the world’ dynamic individuals. … The members of the 
diaspora are trend scouts and change agents. In their respective environments in diverse 
countries and capacities, they learn about new trends in markets, production techniques 
and business concepts. They can bring this information back to Dragash/Dragaš and 
help local actors to innovate and perform better.” (UNDP 2012: 110) 
On the other hand, emigration often entails a brain-drain
239
 of individuals with technical skills 
or knowledge, who do not use their knowledge anymore for the development of their home 
country. In large numbers, brain-drain can be a significant obstacle to the reconstruction of 
post-war countries. 
 
8.4.2.1 Migration as a Survival Strategy? 
The municipality of Dragash/Dragaš is characterized by very poor economic conditions and a 
general lack of employment opportunities. This poor economic situation is particularly severe 
for the Gorani population: Those who served in the Yugoslavian/Serbian military or worked 
for Serbian institutions and/or companies before the war, were left alone without employment 
after the NATO intervention and the subsequent UNMIK operation. “Until 1999, there were 
some industrial enterprises, but these are now mostly closed or predominantly employ Alba-
nians.”240 (Müller 2004: 3) 
The Goranis, who have their own businesses in Dragash/Dragaš or in other parts of Kosovo, 
have difficulties keeping them alive due to the discrimination from the Albanians, who would, 
according to Müller and Stevens, never walk into the Gorani shops. (Cf. Müller 2004: 7; Ste-
vens 2009: 9) On top of that, some businesses and shops that belonged to the Goranis were 
illegally occupied. “According to information from the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), 
nearly 100 shops belonging to Gorani are unlawfully occupied.”241 (Müller 2004: 7) The main 
employers in the Dragash/Dragaš municipality are: the municipality itself, UNMIK police, 
private companies such as “KUK Commerc” – a medium-sized enterprise producing electric 
heaters and manufacturing iron, “Meka” – a small-sized meat factory, and some former SOEs. 
(Cf. OSCE 2008e: 2) When seeking employment, the Goranis claim that they are discriminat-
ed against by Albanian employers. (Cf. OSCE 2010: 149) Beyond that, agricultural activities 
are quite limited, because the Dragash/Dragaš municipality and notably the Gora/Gorë region 
                                                 
239
  Brain-drain can be defined as the departure of educated or professional people from one country, economic 
sector, or field for another; usually for better pay or living conditions. (Merriam Webster, online available at: 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/brain+drain, last retrieved on 19.12.2013.) 
240
  Original quote in German: “Bis 1999 gab es einige Industriebetriebe, die jetzt allerdings zumeist geschlossen 
sind oder überwiegend Albaner beschäftigen.“ Translation by the author. 
241
  Original quote in German: “Nach Angaben des Norwegischen Flüchtlingsrates (NRC) sind knapp 100 Ge-
schäftslokale, die Gorani gehören widerrechtlich besetzt.” Translation by the author. 
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are located in the mountains. Concisely, Dragash/Dragaš is among the most underdeveloped 
Kosovar municipalities. As a result of these poor economic conditions, “… many now live 
and work abroad for 11 months of the year” (Stevens 2009: 9). 
 
Why do people in post-conflict countries migrate? First of all, livelihood options are generally 
scarce in post-conflict countries. (Cf. Stepputat 2004: 12) In particular in remote areas, people 
lack employment opportunities. Beyond that, they are often unable to engage in agricultural 
production for various reasons related to unwillingness and distress, such as crowded markets, 
high competition, the lack of access to land, the dislocation and/or abandonment of previous 
assets, or natural or civil disasters. (Cf. Ellis 2000: 55) People are then forced to diversify 
their livelihood strategies
242. “Poor or vulnerable people have complex strategies for diversi-
fying their sources of income and to minimize risk … .” (Einarsdottir 2007: 42) Returnees opt 
for alternative livelihood strategies in order to spread risks and try to be detached from any 
income opportunity that is prone to loss. 
 
Migration is the most common response to the need of diversifying livelihood strategies:  
“Migration means that one or more family members leave the resident household for 
varying periods of time, and in so doing are able to make new and different contribu-
tions to its welfare, although such contributions are not guaranteed by the mere fact of 
migration.” (Ellis 2000: 70) 
One can distinguish between seasonal, circular, and permanent migration. Seasonal migration 
refers to farmers who leave their households to emigrate when labor is not needed for land 
preparation or harvesting and who return during peak times. As Ellis describes it: “All rural 
households confront seasonality as an inherent feature of their livelihoods.” (Ellis 2000: 58) 
The seasonality of agricultural work results in varying income per week/month and even in a 
lack of income out of season. Therefore, individuals migrate seasonally to other regions (e.g. 
urban areas) or even to other countries in order to offer their labor to balance the lack of work 
and of income in the agricultural sector.  
 
By contrast, circular migration is defined as temporary migration that is not directly linked to 
agricultural production and cyclical needs.  
“Circular migration implies that migrants routinely return to the resident household and 
regard that as their principal place of domicile; in other words, they do not set up per-
manent living arrangements in the places they go for temporary work.” (Ellis 2000: 71; 
cf. also Stigter 2006: 112) 
 
Permanent migration refers to a process that is distinct from the other two forms of migration, 
because it implies that individuals or entire households relocate to a new place instead of 
moving between the original dwelling and a temporary place of residence. Permanent migra-
tion mostly occurs from rural to urban areas since urban areas often provide more opportuni-
ties to generate income for poorer households. In most cases, one male individual per family 
                                                 
242
  The concept of “livelihood strategies” derives from the livelihood framework of the British Department for 
International Development (DFID). It refers to what people actually do to generate income and guarantee 
food security for themselves and their families. (Cf. Einarsdottir 2007: 41) 
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or household would migrate permanently, and would send the remittances to support the rest 
of the family. (Cf. Ellis 2000: 71) 
 
Migration always played a significant role in the lives of the Gorani community in Kosovo, 
Albania, and Macedonia. After the Islamization in South East Europe (SEE), the Goranis 
moved to two main locations: 
(1) Either to the prosperous town of Prizren, which is the commercial center of the region or 
(2) to Tetovo in Macedonia. (Cf. Hasani 2007: 145) 
“Another larger migration of Goranies occurred after the First Balkan War, i.e. after the liber-
ation from the Ottomans in late 1912.” (Hasani 2007: 145) On that account, many Goranis left 
their homes for political and socio-economic reasons and settled down in Turkey. Following 
World War II, many Goranis relocated again and settled down in Prizren or Tetovo – the clos-
est towns to the Gora/Gorë region. The reasons for migration included hunger and poverty. 
Another reason for this large migration wave was the imposed ideological framework, “… i.e. 
political circumstances marked by Soviet-type collectivization and forced expropriation of 
crops by the communist authorities in their villages.” (Hasani 2007: 146) Since the 1950s, the 
Goranis largely migrated to Kosovo’s neighboring countries and to Western Europe for socio-
economic reasons. “Migratory processes have continually been going on in Gora for more 
than fifty years.” (Hasani 2007: 147) The Goranis were often gastarbeiter243 in the second 
generation in Western Europe
244
 and succeeded in creating more favorable living conditions 
there in comparison to their home in Kosovo. As a consequence, they decided to bring over 
their family members. Until today, most emigrants temporarily return to Kosovo either during 
the summer to spend their holidays in the Gora/Gorë region or during the St. George’s Day 
festivities that last six days in spring. (Cf. Hasani 2007: 147) 
 
As explained in Chapter 8.2.1, several thousands of Goranis were displaced after the NATO 
intervention in the summer of 1999. They were displaced to central Serbia or to the Vojvodina 
in Serbia, but 34 % of the Goranis were displaced to Belgrade. (Cf. Hasani 2007: 148) 
 
Nowadays, the reasons for the migration of the Goranis are: “Economic reasons, better sala-
ries and improved living conditions were of crucial importance for the choice of their resi-
dence.” (Hasani 2007: 147) On that account, the Gorani villages – and to some extent also the 
Bosniak villages – continue to empty out. “The aim of the residents is that at least one part of 
the family emigrates and supports those left behind with their income.”245 (Mattern 2008: 20) 
 
The previous paragraphs illustrated that migration in general is very typical for the Goranis: 
“For example, over 72 percent of the inhabitants of the village Mlike [Dragash/Dragaš munic-
ipality] reside and work in places beyond the boundaries of their native region, 85.4 percent of 
them in Belgrade.” (Hasani 2007: 148) Looking at the figures from the former Yugoslavia, a 
                                                 
243
  Gastarbeiter is a German term for guest workers who were invited to work in Germany during the 1960s and 
1970s.  
244
  Hasani even claims that Gorani were the Yugoslavian people that emigrated mostly to Western European 
countries in the 1960s and 1970s. (Cf. Hasani 2007: 149) 
245
  Original quote in German: “Ziel der BewohnerInnen ist, dass zumindest Teile der Familien auswandern und 
die Zurückgebliebenen mit ihren Einkünften unterstützen.” Translation by the author. 
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similar picture is drawn: About 12,000 Goranis in 234 settlements migrated. (Cf. Hasani 
2007: 148) “Therefore, probably more Goranis live outside their actual home than in their 
home region.”246 (Müller 2004: 3) 
The nature of the Gorani migration changed in comparison to earlier ages: Previously, migra-
tion was characterized by “… working-age men [who] migrated in several stages, a process 
known as gurbetchijstvo (‘leaving in order to earn’) with their sons …” (Koleva 2012: 135). 
The connection to the home village and one’s kin was still existing and often supported by 
newly built houses as a sign of prosperity. Today, however, whole families migrate. (Cf. 
Koleva 2012: 135) For this reason, the Gorani migration transformed from circular migration 
into permanent migration.  
In earlier ages, men and their sons regularly spend eleven months in another country to work 
and send remittances to the rest of the family, while the family’s center of life was still in the 
Gora/Gorë region. Several Gorani returnees also migrated in search for better living condi-
tions and sustainable livelihoods. When returnees migrate seasonally or circularly, these 
forms of migration can be an alternative livelihood strategy in itself, which is not opposing 
but contributing to sustainable return:  
“It can be argued that continued mobility could be a prerequisite for sustainable reinte-
gration, in which the migration of some allow others to remain stable … .” (Stigter 
2006: 120)  
It enables returnees to diminish their risks of economic loss and make them less vulnerable to 
civil or natural disasters as well as economic trends.
247
 Today, whole Gorani returnee families 
migrate for eleven months into foreign countries, leave their houses unoccupied during this 
time, and lose the link to their homeland Gora/Gorë. As a consequence, the current form of 
Gorani migration can be classified as a permanent migration, which equals full emigration 
and hampers a sustainable return. Individuals or even entire households neither establish any 
means of living in their return areas anymore nor are they integrated in their home society. 
“… [T]he link between the diaspora and the home community is severed and the return of 
human or financial resources to the home community is interrupted.” (UNDP 2012: 110)  
To sum up, despite the fact that migration was and still is a survival strategy for the Gorani 
community, which can be found in one of the most underdeveloped areas in Kosovo, condi-
tions for the Goranis in Kosovo worsened within the last decade, so that migration is likely to 
be permanent. Migration movements usually do not include any prospects for return.  
 
“Under conditions of typical economic underdevelopment and poverty the work abroad 
seemed to be a specific way to preserve both the distinct character of Gora and its traditions.” 
(Hasani 2007: 148) Nevertheless, the contemporary permanent form of the Gorani migration 
does not support a sustainable integration of returnees into their original society, but discon-
nects them again from their home society. 
                                                 
246
  Original quote in German: “Daher leben wohl mehr Gorani außerhalb ihrer eigentlichen Heimat als in ihrer 
Heimatregion.” Translation by the author. 
247
  Stepputat refers to an example from Guatemala where returnees hoped to engage in the agricultural produc-
tion of goods whereas they realized that competition is high and they cannot sustain on this livelihood strate-
gy. Consequently, they adopted the strategies that the “locals” had developed over the past years and engaged 
in seasonal labor migration to Mexico and the US. In combination with subsistence agriculture, they could 
survive and feed their children. This mobility actually helped them to reintegrate into their home society and 
ensured a sustainable return. (Cf. Stepputat 2004: 13) 
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8.4.2.2 Emigration Reduces the Chances for Sustainable Integration 
Apart from the lack of integration,  
“[t]he considerable amount of emigration also reveals and exasperates weaknesses of 
the communities of origin: while the capacity to send young people to the world is a 
strength, the incapacity to provide them opportunities for the subsequent phases of their 
personal and family projects is a weakness of the community of origin” (UNDP 2012: 
110). 
This also applies to young returnees and returnee families. One example of the very high emi-
gration from the Gora/Gorë region to foreign countries is the Dikance/Dikanc settlement: Out 
of 912 registered inhabitants, only 133 are permanent residents (data from 2007; cf. UNDP 
2012: 35). This means that only about one seventh of its population permanently lives and 
works in the settlement of Dikance/Dikanc. In addition, 53 % of the dwellings in this settle-
ment are unoccupied most of the year. The diaspora populates these dwellings only during the 
holiday season as previously explained. In summary, this settlement – as well as many other 
in the Gora/Gorë region – is abandoned.  
In total, only 38 % of all registered residents in the Gora/Gorë region are permanent residents. 
(Cf. UNDP 2012: 35) The population in the majority of the Gora/Gorë settlements decreases: 
out of 16 settlements in total, 3 establishments note an increase in their population, 5 are sta-
ble, and 8 denote a decrease. (Cf. UNDP 2012: 37) “The consequences for depopulated set-
tlements include a reduction in farmed arable land due to a lack of labour force or market op-
portunities, migration of the young labour force and educated persons, a reduction in marriag-
es and births, and an ageing population.” (UNDP 2012: 36) On that account, the living condi-
tions for younger people are especially difficult in the Gora/Gorë region. The rural and moun-
tainous territory, the poorly developed infrastructure, and the hard winters do not attract 
young people or returnees. By contrast, the Opojë/Opolje (upper) part of the Dragash/Dragaš 
municipality, which is largely populated by ethnic Albanians, is three times more densely 
populated than Gora/Gorë and the distances between settlements are 1.6 times shorter. (Cf. 
UNDP 2012: 57) In addition, accessing education is more problematic in the Gora/Gorë re-
gion, because of the longer distances between the settlements and thus the longer distances 
from home to school. The effect is that only 55.2 % of children at secondary school age are 
enrolled in school in Gora/Gorë.  
 
In general, younger Gorani refugees and families with children (in particular at school age) 
are hesitant to return to the Gora/Gorë region because of economic underdevelopment, insuf-
ficient provision of education in Serbian, a lack of economic opportunities, and a decreasing 
population. This worsens the previously mentioned challenges. Especially young returnees 
fear another displacement, because they are not able to find the satisfactory conditions for a 
sustainable integration into Gora/Gorë. 
 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
284 
8.5 Preliminary Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
The chapters on the return conditions of Bosniak and Gorani refugees are merely based on a 
few reports and papers. This is due to a general lack of literature on the Bosniaks’ and Go-
ranis’ return to Kosovo. This research can only approximate the reasons for the shortage of 
returns. The following preliminary conclusions aim at showing the complex decision-making 
processes of those Bosniak and Gorani refugees, who are expelled to Bosnia and Herze-
govina, to Western European countries, and to Serbia proper and now have to decide whether 
or not to return to Kosovo.  
 
8.5.1 Preliminary Conclusion on the Bosniak Returnees 
The majority of Bosniaks were either displaced to Bosnia and Herzegovina or to Western Eu-
rope. Although the return conditions for the Bosniaks in Kosovo are partly sustainable, they 
have to decide whether they prefer their integration into the exile society or if they want to 
return to Kosovo. This has a significant influence on the return figures of the Bosniaks. The 
following paragraphs illustrate the decision-making process and its consequences for the sus-
tainability of the Bosniaks’ return. One can identify two options: (1) the return to Kosovo, and 
(2a) the integration into Bosnia and Herzegovina or (2b) the integration into a Western Euro-
pean country.  
 
(1) Return to Kosovo 
One of the most important aspects for returnees is their possible integration into the Kosovar 
society. It is remarkable that the Bosniaks play an important role within the Kosovar society. 
Although the Bosniaks are a small minority of approximately 2 % of the overall population in 
Kosovo and the Bosniaks have a kin-state, they are politically active and involved in many 
decision-making processes, especially at the municipal level. With regard to education, the 
Bosniaks have their own curriculum in primary and secondary schools as well as the option to 
take the tertiary educational level in Bosnian in comparison to other minority communities, 
who do not have these opportunities. Further, the Bosniaks are well represented in public in-
stitutions such as the Kosovo Police. Both, the Bosniak stayees as well as the returnees have 
the possibility to choose between the two dominant systems – the Kosovar or the Serbian – 
according to vicinity, availability, and quality. These are the pull factors that attract the Bos-
niak refugees in exile as they make a full integration of Bosniak returnees into the Kosovar 
society very likely. The positive aspects multiply when they return to a site where the Bos-
niaks constitute a considerable minority such as the municipalities of Prizren, Pejë/Peć, Is-
tog/Istok, or Dragash/Dragaš. In these municipalities, the Bosniak returnees have very good 
chances of establishing sustainable livelihoods and of being integrated into the Kosovar socie-
ty. For instance, “[i]n the Pejë/Peć region, there are qualified doctors, engineers, teachers, 
nurses, and civil servants among Kosovo Bosniaks …” (OSCE 2010: 78). In Prizren, the em-
ployment situation of the Bosniaks is relatively good: “… many have their own commercial 
activities or engage in construction and seasonal work in Montenegro.” (OSCE 2010: 78) In 
addition, “[i]n Dragash/Dragaš, out of 110 civil servants working in the municipal administra-
tion, 36 are Kosovo Bosniaks. This number amounts to 30% of the administration …” (OSCE 
2010: 79). This positive situation in the Dragash/Dragaš municipality is supported by existing 
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vocational trainings; there is a permanent vocational training center located in Prizren and 
several mobile centers in Dragash/Dragaš. 
Challenges include the fear of assimilation by the ethnic Albanians because of their small 
share of the population and the fact that the Albanians sometimes present themselves as Bos-
niaks in order to get jobs that are supposed to be for the Bosniaks. Furthermore, returning 
Bosniak children have difficulties integrating into the Kosovar educational system. Most Bos-
niaks returning from Western European countries do not speak Bosnian or Albanian and no 
language classes for returnees are offered to catch up on these skills. In addition, the lack or 
poor quality of Bosnian textbooks and the underrepresentation of the Bosniaks in school man-
agement positions play a significant role for the Bosniak returnee families with children at 
school age. Schools teaching according to the Bosniak curriculum and in the Bosnian lan-
guage are only available in the areas with a significant proportion of a Bosniak population. 
Consequently, returns mostly take place to these sites and do not support the establishment or 
the maintenance of multi-ethnic areas. 
 
In conclusion, there is a difference between the returns of the Bosniaks to the Prizren and Pe-
jë/Peć regions and to the rest of Kosovo. Returns to the former two areas can be classified as 
sustainable. Returns to the other regions in Kosovo can be rated as partly sustainable due to 
the previously mentioned challenges.  
 
However, only 7.8 % of the displaced Bosniaks returned to their homes in Kosovo to date. 
One possible explanation includes the lack of stable prospects as a minority in the post-
declaration of independence in Kosovo and the related fear of assimilation by ethnic Albani-
ans.  
“The primary reasons … are not direct security threats per se, but rather a function of 
the inability of Bosniaks to confidently use their own language in public outside their 
very small communities without facing a security risk, which effectively creates social 
and economic isolation, pressure to assimilate, and an environment of discrimination. 
There are no significant indications of aspirations amongst Bosniak IDPs and refugees 
to return to Kosovo in the foreseeable future.” (UNHCR, OSCE 2002: 171f.) 
Most Bosniaks are displaced to Bosnia and Herzegovina and tend to stay there when it comes 
to the decision of whether or not to return to Kosovo. The Bosniak refugees perceive their 
future in Bosnia and Herzegovina as more prosperous than in Kosovo.  
 
(2a)  Integration into Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is the kin state of the Bosniaks in Kosovo. Despite the fact that the 
Bosniaks in Kosovo do not trace their origins back to Bosnia and Herzegovina, “… the cul-
tural and religious connection to the country is present among them” (OSCE 2010: 76). This 
manifests itself particularly in the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina is the most favorable asy-
lum country for the Bosniak refugees. Moreover, the integration into Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is simple due to the linguistic, the cultural, and the religious similarities with the native popu-
lation. Although being from Kosovo, the Bosniaks do not perceive themselves as a minority 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but rather as a part of the country.  
In particular, the integration into the school system is much easier in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
This is one of the strongest incentives for Bosniak refugee families with children at school age 
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to stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Cf. KIPRED 2006b: 18; Božić 2010: 287) Apart from 
that, the living conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina are much better than in Kosovo. On that 
account, many of the Bosniak refugees opted to stay in exile in Bosnia and Herzegovina ra-
ther than to return to their home in Kosovo. 
 
(2b)  Integration into Western European Countries 
One does not have to mention that the living conditions in Western European countries are 
better than in Kosovo. To illustrate the difference, one can consult the data of the Human De-
velopment Index (HDI)
248
 for Kosovo (0.700), which is ranked 91
st
 worldwide. This is fairly 
low in comparison to countries such as Norway (0.955), the Netherlands (0.921), Germany 
(0.920), Switzerland (0.913), and Denmark (0.901). Apart from that, many Bosniak children 
were born in Western European countries, they went to school there, and are now very well 
integrated into the Western societies. Returning to Kosovo without any language skills would 
be hazardous. Therefore, many displaced Bosniak families tend to stay in exile. In fact, even 
stayees or recently returned Bosniaks attempt to depart again and the “… new departures ap-
pear to be largely destined for other European asylum countries” (UNHCR, OSCE 2002: 
171). 
 
The following figure illustrates these three options; the opportunities and the challenges inher-
ited to these options, and it rates them accordingly. A picture emerges, in which the Bosniaks 
prefer staying in exile rather than returning to their homes in Kosovo. The main deterrent as-
pects of return are the fear of assimilation by Albanians and the difficult integration into 
schools. The better living conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Western European coun-
tries are also among the most prominent factors facilitating the integration into the exile socie-
ties. These living conditions further influence the Bosniaks’ future prospects, which include 
more options and sustainable livelihoods in exile than in Kosovo. 
                                                 
248
  For a full list of countries and their ratings, please see UNDP (2013): The 2013 Human Development Report 
– “The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World” in various languages, online available at: 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2013/, last retrieved on 24.11.2013. 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
287 
Option 1
Kosovo Kosovo
Good communications 
with Albanians and Serbs
Security
Freedom of movement
Access to social services/
public goods
Fear of assimilation
Difficult integration into school
Return to Sustainable Conditions 
in Bosniak Majority Areas
In
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 i
n
to
 C
o
u
n
tr
y
 o
f 
E
x
il
e 
o
r 
R
et
u
rn
 t
o
 K
o
so
v
o
?
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Western Europe
Option 2b
Western Europe
Option 2a
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Very good living conditions
Return to Kosovo Integration into Exile
Kin state facilitates integration
Good living conditions
 
Figure 43:  Bosniaks’ Decision Making Regarding the Return to Kosovo 
Source:  Own illustration 
As one can see in the figure, the return to Bosniak majority areas and the integration into 
Bosnia and Herzegovina are the best options for Bosniak refugees (green dots), the return to 
non-Bosniak majority areas or the integration into Western European countries are less better 
options (yellow dots). The Bosniak refugees have some significant advantages as they have 
four options, which are all more or less conducive to a long-term integration into the society 
(no red dot).  
 
In conclusion, “[t]here are no significant indications of aspirations amongst Bosniak IDPs and 
refugees to return to Kosovo in the foreseeable future.” (IDMC 2012: 297) In order to in-
crease the return percentage of the Kosovo Bosniaks, the Kosovar institutions must facilitate 
the integration of Bosniak returnee children into school and diminish the Bosniaks’ fear of 
assimilation in the Kosovar society.  
 
PR 1: Facilitate the integration of the Bosniak returnee children into the Kosovar educa-
tional system by offering language classes and by increasing the quantity and quality 
of Bosnian textbooks for general and national subjects. 
Addressee:  Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) 
The most important challenge for returning families is the complicated integration of their 
children into school. Often, Bosniak returnee children do not speak Albanian or Bosnian be-
cause a great part of them was born and lived in a Western European country for a significant 
period of time. Hence, they do not speak any of the languages, Albanian, Bosnian, and Turk-
ish, in which classes are offered. Consequently, those Bosniak returnee children cannot attend 
school at the same level as their classmates, who did not leave Kosovo during or after the war. 
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This lowers the motivation and the self-esteem among Bosniak returnee children. The Kosovo 
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) should provide Bosniak returnee 
children with extracurricular language classes in Albanian and Bosnian, not only to facilitate 
their integration into school, but also their integration into the Kosovar society. 
 
Apart from that, Bosnian national-subject textbooks are often imported from Bosnia and Her-
zegovina. They neither reflect the reality of Kosovo Bosniaks nor do they include the history 
of Kosovo in general. This should be corrected in the future. Many translations of general-
subject textbooks into Bosnian have a poor quality. The translation of general-subject text-
books and the quantity and quality of national-subject textbooks must be improved to ensure 
integration and a sustainable return.  
 
PR 2: Implement minority regulations so that the Bosniaks do not fear assimilation, but see 
a future for them in a multi-ethnic state. 
Addressee: Kosovar governmental institutions 
After the declaration of independence, most members of ethnic minorities did not feel repre-
sented in the Kosovar society and in the political system anymore. Although several political 
rights and minority representation regulations were released, Kosovar minorities perceived the 
declaration of independence as a step towards a mono-ethnic, Albanian state. This discrimina-
tion in public life is especially visible in the field of employment and economic opportunities. 
By implementing the Anti-Discrimination Law and employing members of minority commu-
nities in public institutions, many Kosovar residents would be successfully integrated into the 
society. 
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8.5.2 Preliminary Conclusion on the Gorani Community’s Returns 
The Goranis’ situation is, apart from some similarities, mostly different from the situation of 
the Bosniaks. Within the Kosovar society, both communities are located between the Albani-
ans and the Serbs. However, the relationship of the Goranis to the Serbs is much closer than 
the one between the Bosniaks and the Serbs. The latter relation is almost exclusively defined 
by the similarities of their language. In addition, the Goranis maintain poor relations to the 
Albanians, predominantly because of their participation at the Rambouillet Conference in 
1999 and their close relations to the Serbs. These relationships have a significant influence on 
the Goranis’ choice of whether to return to their homes in Gora/Gorë region in Kosovo (1) or 
to stay in Serbia (2). These two options will be explained next. 
 
(1) Return to Kosovo 
Gorani refugees almost exclusively return to their homeland Gora/Gorë, where the Goranis 
lived for hundreds of years. They have a strong connection to their homeland, are bound by a 
long history, and defended their territory during the NATO intervention in 1999. On the one 
hand, the return to their homeland is conducive to sustainable return because the wish to be-
long to their own homeland and to reconnect with their people as well as their ancestry are 
very important for the refugees’ emotional need, which will be met in this way. On the other 
hand, the likelihood of establishing sustainable livelihoods in the Gora/Gorë region is quite 
limited because the Dragash/Dragaš municipality is one of the most underdeveloped munici-
palities in Kosovo.  
 
In addition, the Goranis are generally not fully integrated into the Kosovar society. Instead, 
they feel discriminated by the Albanian population. One example is provided by Mattern 
whose interviewee’s friend worked for an electric company. “He was asked to cut an Albani-
an village from the power supply. Out of fear of revenge acts, he rejected that and was dis-
charged because of it.”249 (Mattern 2008: 20) Furthermore, since there is no Serbian curricu-
lum within the Kosovar educational system, the Goranis rely on Serbian schools, which are 
rarely found in the Dragash/Dragaš municipality. The returnee families have to carefully 
choose their return site according to the availability of Serbian schools. This restriction con-
tradicts a sustainable return and does not allow returnee families to reconnect with their for-
mer neighborhoods.  
 
(2) Integration into Serbia 
The Goranis have a very strong connection to Serbia and often perceive Serbia proper as their 
home country. “The ethnic community of Goranies is today fully integrated into the socioeco-
nomic and political life of the Republic of Serbia. The fact of integration is reflected in the 
continuation of a separate territorial unity – the municipality of Gora.” (Vait 2002: 45) By 
contrast to the Albanians, the Goranis were and are always integrated and supported in their 
ethnic identity in Yugoslavia and Serbia. They can even be called “role models” for the inte-
gration of minorities in Serbia.  
                                                 
249
  Original quote in German: “Ein Freund arbeitete für eine elektrische Gesellschaft. Er wurde aufgefordert, ein 
albanisches Dorf von der Stromversorgung abzuschneiden. Aus Furcht vor Revancheakten lehnte er das ab 
und wurde deswegen entlassen.” Translation made by the author. 
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Beyond that, the Goranis feel more safe in Serbia proper than in Kosovo because they speak a 
Serbian-like dialect. (Cf. Hasani 2007: 149) The continuous voluntary migration to Serbia 
over centuries facilitates the integration of the Goranis in Serbia proper because they have 
established social networks with their peers. To some extent, the Goranis often have friends 
and family in Serbia, who can support them. 
The only two challenges for the Gorani refugees in Serbia proper are that their names were 
albanized and that their Muslim faith creates a feeling of insecurity in some areas of Serbia.  
 
The following figure illustrates the two options, including their opportunities and challenges, 
and comes to this conclusion:  
Figure 44:  Goranis’ Decision Making Regarding the Return to Kosovo 
Source:  Own illustration 
As can be clearly seen in the figure is the fact that the return to Gora/Gorë is not a sustainable 
option for the Goranis (red dot) whereas the integration into Serbia is a very good option 
(green dot). Around 25 % of the Gorani refugees returned to their homes in Kosovo since 
1999. The emotional need to return to their homeland seems to be a significant pull factor 
towards Kosovo. Nevertheless, this paper argues that both the return to Kosovo and the conti-
nuity of the Goranis in Serbia will in most cases eventually lead to integration into Serbia 
proper. Due to the poor economic conditions in the Gora/Gorë region and the particular mi-
gration tradition, many of the returned Goranis opt for migrating to Serbia after their return to 
Kosovo. This process often includes selling their property in Gora/Gorë. 
 
The Goranis could be integrated into the Dragash/Dragaš municipality through the revitaliza-
tion of the economy and a Serbian curriculum within the Kosovar educational system. 
 
PR 1: Revitalize the economy in the Dragash/Dragaš municipality. 
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Addressee: Kosovar governmental institutions, i.a. the Kosovo Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Rural Development (MAFRD) and the Kosovo Ministry of 
Labour and Social Work (MLSW) 
One if not THE most important criterion to establish sustainable livelihoods after returning 
home is a vibrant economy, which includes employment opportunities, a functioning industry, 
a lively service sector, and arable land for agricultural production at the return site. “Due to 
poor agricultural resources and geographical isolation Dragash/Dragaš is among the most un-
derdeveloped regions in Kosovo.” (OSCE 2009c: 2) The Gorani returnees have very limited 
possibilities to establish any form of long-term livelihoods to feed their children and to pay 
the bills. There are only few large companies in Dragash/Dragaš and agricultural activities are 
only possible in non-mountainous regions, such as in Opojë/Opolje.  
 
In order to support a long-term integration of the Gorani returnees into the Kosovar society 
after their return to Dragash/Dragaš as well as to prevent that large numbers of the Gorani 
returnees or stayees emigrate to Serbia, Kosovar institutions and international stakeholders 
should focus on revitalizing Dragash/Dragaš’ economy. The instruments to enhance the econ-
omy could include small loans to residents in order to establish their own businesses, regional 
infrastructure projects, and any other step to develop a tourist industry in Dragash/Dragaš. 
The region has a beautiful landscape and a lot of potential to attract national and international 
tourists. (Cf. OSCE 2013: 72) 
 
PR 2: Integrate the Goranis into the Kosovar educational system by developing and intro-
ducing a Serbian curriculum and negotiate the recognition of Kosovar diplomas in 
universities in Serbia and other Western Balkan states. 
Addressee: MEST, Kosovo governmental institutions in negotiations with Southeast Euro-
pean governments, with the support of OSCE and UNESCO 
The Gorani families are forced to choose their return site according to the availability of Ser-
bian schools, which significantly prevents the Gorani refugees from making free decisions, 
where to return to and, in some cases, even to return to their previous home as the preferred 
return site. Since the Republic of Serbia maintains most schools in the Serbian-dominated 
North, schools in Dragash/Dragaš and the municipalities nearby are rather rare. In some cases, 
the lack of Serbian schools even prevents Gorani refugee families from returning at all. 
 
Moreover, the enrolment of Gorani students into Serbian schools supports integration into the 
parallel Serbian world and contradicts any chances of a unified Kosovar society encompass-
ing all ethnic communities. It is therefore advisable to develop and implement a Serbian cur-
riculum within the Kosovar educational system. Such a system can only integrate the Goranis 
and the Serbs if Kosovar diplomas are recognized in Serbia and abroad. Most of the Gorani 
and the Serbian students seek to study at universities at the Western Balkans, which requires 
that their high school diplomas are recognized. Kosovar institutions must start negotiations 
with governments in South East Europe regarding the recognition of Kosovo high 
school/university diplomas with the support of international stakeholders such as OSCE and 
UNESCO. 
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9. Summary of the Communities’ Returns 
The following section aims at presenting a comparative summary of the results. It gives a 
brief overview over each returnee community, their return figures, and the conditions await-
ing them upon their return. This section also answers the question of sustainability. The main 
questions deriving the summary are:  
Figure 45:  Summary of Every Community 
Source:  Own compilation 
 
9.1 The Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptian Communities 
Until February 2013, 10.89 % of the displaced Roma returned to their homes in Kosovo. In 
total, 3,380 displaced Roma returned in this period, but their return cannot be classified as 
sustainable. Members of the Roma community often have nowhere to return to. Most Roma 
neighborhoods were completely destroyed during the revenge attacks in 1999 and 2004 and 
are now occupied by ethnic Albanian IDPs. The UNHCR even classifies the Roma communi-
ty as a “community at risk.” (Cf. UNHCR 2009: 17f.) They have to face security threats and 
have limited freedom of movement, especially because they share many characteristics with 
the Serbs. Above that, many believe that the Roma collaborated with the Serbs and committed 
crimes against the Albanians in the 1990s. This perception prevents a successful integration 
into the society and seems to be the basis for their decision against a return to Kosovo. Due to 
their widespread social marginalization, the Romas’ sources of income are limited to daily 
work, hard physical work, as well as the search for and trade with metal. As a consequence, 
the Roma are not able to establish sustainable livelihoods. As their prospects of economic and 
social integration into Kosovo are very low, they tend to stay in exile rather than returning to 
Kosovo. 
 
Although the Ashkali and the Egyptians share some relevant challenges with the Roma 
community, they returned in larger numbers: Until February 2013, 82.89 % of the displaced 
71
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Ashkali and 62.25 % of the displaced Egyptians returned to their homes in Kosovo. In total, 
these are 3,303
250
 Ashkali and 3,303 Egyptians returnees. Despite the relatively high return 
figures, the returns are not sustainable. The Ashkali and the Egyptians’ situation are charac-
terized by a low level of education and high illiteracy, which lead to unemployment and pov-
erty. A significant part of the RAE IDPs and returnees lived in lead-contaminated camps for 
years, where they suffered from inhumane living conditions and severe health issues. One 
major concern is that 30 % to 40 % within these communities are not registered as Kosovar 
residents and lack identification papers. These people consequently live in fear of stateless-
ness. Their prospects of economic and social integration into Kosovo are small. One could 
even argue that the Ashkali and the Egyptians, but also the Roma, are structurally excluded 
from the Kosovar society. However, the Albanian-speaking Ashkali and Egyptian minority 
communities seem to be better positioned than the Serbian-speaking Roma. They share the 
Muslim faith and the language with the Albanian majority. As a consequence, they feel save 
to move around Kosovo and are more accepted by the Albanian community.  
 
9.2 The Serbian Community 
Until February 2013, 23.54 % of the displaced Serbs, that is 10,153 in total figures, returned 
to their homes in Kosovo and their return can also be classified as un-sustainable. Usually, 
the Serbs return to rural and mono-ethnic areas, such as the northern municipalities Le-
posavić/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok, and Zvečan/Zveçan. On the one hand, their return prefer-
ences stem from the general feeling of insecurity, the limited freedom of movement, and the 
lack of perspective after Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. On the other hand, 
the access to employment, education, health care, and other public services within the Serbian 
system is better in the North than in the rest of Kosovo. The existence of parallel institutions 
prevents the Serbs from integrating into the Kosovar society. In addition, the Serbian return-
ees find it challenging to repossess their former property, because illegal occupations, the de-
struction of their property, or destroyed/relocated cadastral records prevent them to do so. On 
that account, many Serbian refugees stay in Serbia. At the moment, more Kosovo Serbs leave 
their homes than return from exile. 
 
9.3 The Bosniak and the Gorani Community 
Until February 2013, only 7.8 % of the displaced Bosniaks returned to their homes in Koso-
vo. In total, 1,789 Bosniaks returned to their place of origin, which are mono-ethnic neigh-
borhoods, in which they had always lived. Although this is the lowest return percentage 
among the six communities, the Bosniaks’ return is partly sustainable. The Bosniaks main-
tain good relations to the Albanians and to the Serbs; predominantly because most of them are 
able to speak both official languages and they have no direct link to Milošević’ regime. The 
Bosniaks do not decide to approach institutions of one system according to their ethnic pref-
erences, but according to vicinity, availability, and quality. The integration into the Kosovar 
society is thus very likely, as the selection of public services is broader. These positive effects 
even multiply, when they return to a site, where the Bosniaks constitute a considerable minor-
                                                 
250
  Please note that this figure derives from the return numbers for Ashkali and Egyptians together. Due to a lack 
of separated data, this number was subsequently divided by two to generate return percentages for both 
communities separately. 
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ity, for instance in Pejë/Peć and Prizren. However, the returnees’ children find it more diffi-
cult to integrate into the Kosovar educational system, as there are no language classes for 
them and the textbooks are poorly translated or often not even available. On the negative side, 
the Bosniak community fears assimilation by the Albanians. They also have better prospect to 
be integrated within their kin state, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Western European states. 
The reasons mentioned above and better living conditions seem to be the basis for their deci-
sion to integrate into the host society and against the return to Kosovo. 
 
By contrast, 25.33 %, i.e. in total numbers 1,412, of the displaced Goranis returned to their 
homes, which are usually located in the municipality of Dragash/Dragaš. On the one hand, the 
return to the Gora/Gorë region can revitalize the strong connection to their homeland. On the 
other hand, the Gorani returnees face severe challenges in establishing sustainable livelihoods, 
as Dragash/Dragaš is one of the most underdeveloped municipalities in Kosovo. Because of 
the poor economic conditions, many Gorani returnees sell their property and migrate to Ser-
bia. Since their center of life shifted completely to the new place, this process is not sustaina-
ble. Beyond that, the Goranis maintain very good relations to the Serbs and many have friends 
and family in Serbia. Thus, the Goranis are often linked to the Serbian role during the war and 
have poor chances of being integrated into the Kosovar society. They usually approach the 
Serbian institutions only and lack unlimited freedom of movement. The economic and social 
integration into Serbia proper is an easier and more sustainable option for the Goranis than the 
return to Kosovo. This is further reinforced by the lack of Serbian schools in Dragash/Dragaš 
and the discrimination of Goranis by the Albanian majority. On that account, their return con-
ditions are not sustainable. 
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10. SWOT Analysis and Policy Recommendations 
SWOT Analysis is a strategic planning method to evaluate the Strengths, Weaknesses, Op-
portunities, and Threats involved in a specific process. The analysis at hand gives a more ab-
stract account of the results. This allows drawing conclusions about the return of minority 
refugees to Kosovo in general. The method helps to identify the processes that work very well 
and the ones that do not work at all. The strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats are 
presented in more detail. The chapter closes by formulating policy recommendations for na-
tional and international stakeholders in Kosovo.  
 
10.1 Strengths 
In the following, the SWOT analysis is conducted in more detail. The initials S W O T are 
indicated in the text to refer to the respective criteria it was assigned to. The first initial S 
stands for the strengths. These are characteristics, which contribute to the development of 
sustainable livelihoods and foster the integration of the minority returnees into the society. 
Following the individual minority groups’ analyses, it is imaginable that there are only a few 
strengths in the return process to Kosovo. 
 
At the institutional level, the principle of subsidiarity is the main strength of the return process 
in Kosovo. The municipalities are responsible for the management of minority returns as they 
are the smallest and closest entity to the returnees. Constant and thoughtful communication 
between the national and the local level is required. The return to some municipalities can be 
classified as partly sustainable, because these municipalities support the returnees significant-
ly. Hence, the principle of subsidiarity seems to work almost perfectly for those role model 
municipalities. 
 
Another significant strength is the general security situation in Kosovo, which is stable, also 
with regard to inter-ethnic violence. The overall number of incidents against minority com-
munities decreased from 406 in 2011 to 361 in 2012. (Cf. Secretary General 2013-02: 4) 
Moreover, the returnees, who speak Albanian, also benefit from a very secure and mostly free 
movement within Kosovo.  
 
In education, the quality of education is much better in the Serbian system than in Kosovar 
schools. However, the availability of a Turkish and a Bosniak curriculum for two of the big-
gest minority communities in Kosovo is a major strength of the Kosovar system. In addition, 
no tuition fees apply in Kosovo.  
A similar assumption can be made about the Serbian health care institutions. The Serbian sys-
tem is free of charge and the service quality is better than in the Kosovar institutions.  
The last major strength is the legal protection of minority communities in Kosovo. Above all, 
the comprehensive Anti-Discrimination Law provides a detailed theoretical basis for the 
avoidance of discrimination. Beyond that, several minority rights are established in Kosovo, 
e.g. guaranteed parliamentary seat(s) for every minority community, an employment-quota for 
minority communities, or the local status of minority communities that represent more than 
10 % of the local population. 
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10.2 Weaknesses 
The second initial W stands for the weaknesses. These are characteristics that constrain sus-
tainable livelihoods and prevent a successful integration of the minority returnees into the 
society. It is striking that there are a lot more weaknesses than strengths, which significantly 
confine a sustainable return of minority refugees to Kosovo.  
 
The return of ethnic minority communities to Kosovo predominantly occurs to rural, remote, 
and mono-ethnic areas. The refugees decide to return to those areas, where their minority 
community is a significant part of the population, such as the Dragash/Dragaš municipality 
for the Goranis or the municipalities Leposavić/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok, and Zvečan/Zveçan 
for the Serbs. Often, their old neighborhoods have a different ethnic composition today than 
before the war. “Experience from elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia indicates that displaced 
persons rarely return to their former areas of residence, especially if they will be in a minori-
ty.” (Ward 2000: 37) Refugee families with children at school age choose those areas, where 
they find schools that teach in their preferred language and according to their preferred cur-
riculum. As a consequence, the refugees cannot freely decide where to return to and the crea-
tion of enclaves is enhanced.  
 
The Ministry of Communities and Return claims, “… no institution responsible can claim any 
particular success in the minority communities’ returns process.” (MCR 2009: 10) There are 
several different governmental and non-governmental stakeholders dealing with return to Ko-
sovo, but their rights and duties overlap, and their tasks are not clearly defined. The saying 
“too many cooks spoil the broth” perfectly applies here. Another consequence of the overlap-
ping competencies is the lack of appropriate communication between the national and the 
local level in Kosovo. On that account, the majority of the Kosovar municipalities does not 
know about their duties and cannot implement the necessary steps to integrate the returnees 
into the society and to help them to establish sustainable livelihoods. 
 
When the refugees return to their new place of residence, they often have to deal with a new 
form of ethnically motivated violence that is now directed at the minority communities’ prop-
erty, e.g. malicious arson of unoccupied properties and land, illegal occupation of houses, and 
vandalism at religious sites. In some restricted return areas, the security situation is even more 
fragile. This is often the case, because the Albanian community does not welcome the minori-
ty returnees, because the Albanians accuse the minorities of collaboration with Milošević’ 
regime during the war. In some cases, resulting insecurity has severe consequences, such as in 
the village of Nerodimja e Epërme/Gornje Nerodimlje (Ferizaj/Uroševac municipality), where 
100 protesters prevented Serbian displaced persons from entering the village during a go-and-
see visit (GSV). (Cf. OSCE 2012b: 23) Another example is Zojić/Zojiq in Prizren municipali-
ty, where the participants of a GSV were physically attacked with guns. (Cf. OSCE 2012b: 
28) The security situation in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica needs special attention. At the moment, 
many minority returnees are caught up in ethnic tensions and general violence in this ethnical-
ly divided town.  
 
In addition, all ethnic minority communities suffer from insufficient freedom of movement in 
Kosovo to a certain extent. Minority refugees consequently return to their majority areas and 
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are afraid of leaving those for any purposes. Those, who speak Serbian or a dialect thereof 
(e.g. the Goranis, the Roma, and the Bosniaks), are identified as former perpetrators or their 
collaborators. This intensifies feelings of insecurity, marginalization, and a lack of freedom of 
movement.  
 
Apart from the security situation, there are other factors that negatively influence the decision 
to return and where to return to; for instance, Kosovo’s economic situation, which is not very 
prospective. High unemployment challenges every ethnic community. Within the Kosovar 
economic system, the ethnic minority communities face discrimination on the labor market 
and at work. This is manifested in the fact that not all minorities have access to open vacan-
cies, because advertisements are neither published in all minority languages nor all minority 
newspapers, radio channels, or other media.  
 
Another factor is the lack of satisfaction. There is no national jurisdiction that deals with rec-
onciliation, such as the Gacaca courts in Rwanda. In Kosovo, the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
251
 is the only judicial institution that hears cases of 
human rights’ violations during the war in Kosovo. Moreover, the Serbian government has 
never apologized for the violence and outrages. As a consequence, the society is still divided 
between victims and perpetrators and the affected minority communities are not rehabilitated 
yet. This significantly prevents a return, as many minorities do not want to return, because 
they still fear revenge.  
Many weaknesses can also be identified in the housing sector: Houses are still fully or partly 
destroyed. The political will and the financial resources are not sufficient to reconstruct the 
destroyed houses. This affects many refugees, who are willing to return, but lost their homes. 
In addition, the Kosovar institutions are not able to deal with property conflicts appropriately. 
Often, there are conflicts between the original owners and illegal occupiers, usually Albanian 
IDPs, whose properties were destroyed or are occupied too. As there is no social housing pro-
gram in Kosovo, the returnees and the IDPs have no adequate
252
 alternative to their own cur-
rently destroyed property. Rental apartments are scarce and only available to the urban popu-
lation.  
 
In Kosovo, there are parallel Serbian institutions in almost all areas of social life: These insti-
tutions create a parallel society in Kosovo as the Serbian and the Kosovar systems are incom-
patible with each other. All ethnic minority communities have to decide whether to approach 
the Kosovar or the Serbian institutions. This fuels ethnic differences and creates a significant 
gap within the society. A further challenge is that parallel institutions are not legal under Ko-
sovo’s jurisdiction and the probability is high that they will not last forever.  
 
Minority returnees and especially their children face additional challenges related to the ac-
cess to and the quality of education in Kosovo. More than a decade after the war, many re-
turnee children at school age were born abroad and are not able to speak either Albanian or 
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  The same tribunal also deals with the cases from Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
252
  The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides in its General Comment No. 4 on the 
Right to Adequate Housing (1991) a checklist including seven criteria for adequate housing (Cf. Leckie 
2003: 33): security of tenure, habitability, affordability, accessibility, availability of materials, location, and 
cultural adequacy.  
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Serbian, which are the two official languages in Kosovo. Yet, there are no specific language 
classes for these children after their return to Kosovo. 
Even though the Kosovar educational system has a separate curriculum for the Turkish and 
for the Bosniak community, the textbooks for their curricula are rarely available. If there are 
any, the quality and the translation thereof are very poor. Many refugee children and teenag-
ers also have to deal with a difficult recognition process of their school certificates from 
abroad and vice versa. Although there is no tuition fee in Kosovo, going to school is expen-
sive: It costs around 50 EUR per month. The quality of education in the Serbian schools is 
much better than in the Kosovar schools, but the realities of ethnic minorities are not reflected 
at all. Yet a handful of minority communities join the Serbian system, they are educated under 
the same curriculum and use the same textbooks, which are imported from Serbia proper. The 
existence of two parallel educational systems separates the society. This is also visible in the 
failure and the absence of multi-ethnic schools. 
 
The same is true for the health care sector: Two systems exist parallel to each other. Health 
care services in the Kosovar system are expensive, because the patients have to pay for treat-
ments, medication, and transportation to health care centers or hospitals by themselves. The 
quality in the Kosovar system is also worse than in the Serbian system. Apart from that, one 
major weakness of the Serbian system is the lack of tertiary health care services. Patients con-
sequently have to drive to Belgrade to receive tertiary care. 
 
Infrastructure is a general problem in Kosovo as it was neglected during the 1990s by Yugo-
slavia. Today, Kosovo has to deal with regular power outages, which affect every Kosovar 
resident, including the returnees. However, the returnees have to face two particular challeng-
es when it comes to power supply:  
First, many members of ethnic minority communities are classified in category C of the ABC 
energy policy. As a consequence, they only get electricity when every other resident was pro-
vided with power. The problem is that Kosovo’s two power plants are unable to cover the 
needs of the entire population.  
Secondly, the electricity company KEK demands from the returnees to pay the electricity bills 
that occurred when the returnees were absent. Consequently, the returnees are forced to pay 
for the illegal occupants’ power consumption. This tightens the conflict, as the illegal occu-
pants are often Albanians and new ethnic tensions can arise.  
The public transportation by bus works well within and between different municipalities, but 
there is no public transportation to the North or to the Serbian enclaves in the South and East 
of Kosovo, which weakens the overall impression of the public transportation system. Be-
sides, some minority communities still depend on the Humanitarian Bus Transportation. 
 
Kosovar returnees are also negatively affected by the parallelism of two judicial systems in 
Kosovo, because the legal decisions from Kosovar courts are not recognized by the Republic 
of Serbia and vice versa. In addition, the communities that approach the Serbian courts run the 
risk of double jeopardy: They can be prosecuted twice for the same crime, because the two 
systems do not acknowledge each other’s verdicts.  
Another major weakness regarding legal security is that minority communities are almost 
absolutely excluded from any law-making processes. Furthermore, around 30 % to 40 % of the 
RAE communities do not own identification documents and risk statelessness in Kosovo.  
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Generally, the Anti-discrimination Law aims at protecting the minority communities, includ-
ing their returnees. However, neither the Anti-discrimination Law nor the minority rights are 
fully implemented and/or do not serve their purposes. For instance, despite the de jure guaran-
tee of minority seats in the Kosovar Assembly, the minorities have no political influence as 
the Albanian majority controls 80 % of the seats and does not need the votes of any other 
community to pass a law. “As long as voting follows ethnic lines, minorities may have repre-
sentation but little or no real political influence.” (Simonsen 2005: 300) 
In addition, communities that are dispersed across Kosovo do not have the chance to be repre-
sented at the municipal level or to take part in policy-making institutions. (Cf. Volčić, Erjavec 
2011: 127) This is particularly true for the non-Serbian minority communities as national and 
international stakeholders always focus on political representation and positive discrimination 
of the Serbs. For instance, the Serbs gained a considerable amount of self-determination rights 
through decentralization mechanisms, whereas all other minority communities are excluded 
from those.
253
 In Kosovo, there is a “… problem of guaranteeing the rights of Kosovo Serbs 
only, as if only Albanians and Serbs live in Kosovo.” (Emphasis added, Volčić, Erjavec 2011: 
124) Consequently, the minority communities do not feel well represented in Kosovo. Some 
scholars call the non-Serbian minority communities the “hidden minorities,” who are 
“… institutionally unrecognized, publicly invisible and absent from policy-making institu-
tions” (Volčić, Erjavec 2011: 126). 
 
10.3 Opportunities 
Opportunities are chances the Kosovar context entails to improve the situation of minority 
returnees in the future. They form the basis for the policy recommendation in Chapter 10.5. 
 
One of the main post-war goals for Kosovo is the creation of an ethnically mixed society, in 
which every ethnic community has the same rights and duties. The return of minority refugees 
could play an important role in achieving this goal: When minority refugees return to their 
pre-war ethnically mixed neighborhoods or to other safe areas, where they are not only sur-
rounded by their peers, Kosovo could be mixed up again without changing the location of the 
current residents. The city of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica could be a role model for inter-ethnic toler-
ance and co-operation. “Up until the 90s, Mitrovica was a multiethnic one-company town 
built around the Trepca mining and metallurgy complex. Generally, there was peaceful co-
existence and tolerance, with some degree of ethnic interaction. Mitrovica had a multiethnic 
football team … .” (Jackson 2011: 8) When refugees, who belong to different ethnic commu-
nities, return to their hometown Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, this would create contact points between 
the communities and enable them to get to know each other again. Beyond that, if this exam-
ple is transferred to other regions or particular cities, a multi-ethnic society could be estab-
lished. 
 
The opportunities and threats related to the economic conditions of returnees are located on a 
continuum: “returnees as a burden” versus “returnees as an economic force.” By engaging in 
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  The only exception is the Turkish community that got their own municipality Mamuşa/Mamushë/Mamuša in 
the South West of Kosovo. 
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farming, the returnees could help to establish food security in Kosovo as they have the skills 
to do so. Currently, Kosovo heavily relies on agricultural and food imports. “Domestic agri-
culture satisfies 25 to 35 percent of local demand for agricultural and food products … .” 
(World Bank 2007: 4)
254
 The rest must be imported from abroad. As refugees usually return 
to rural areas, they must be supported to establish sustainable agriculture that exceeds the sub-
sistence level and enables them to sell their products on a Kosovar market. The returnees 
could also be integrated in reconstruction projects, such as the reconstruction of destroyed 
houses or the reconstruction of the infrastructure, e.g. schools, roads, or health care centers. 
The skills the returnees bring into the Kosovar society with regard to farming and handicraft 
work can been seen as an opportunity for the society as a whole. 
 
A major opportunity is the legal basis for the protection of minority communities, the Anti-
Discrimination Law. It includes every reason for discrimination and is very specific with re-
gard to how discrimination can be prevented. In the future, it is necessary to fully implement 
this law. Consequently, the minority communities would feel more integrated if they know 
the law applies to them and is more than just mere theory. This may attract refugees, who see 
a future in Kosovo. 
 
The relationship between Kosovo and Serbia has significant consequences on the sustainabil-
ity of refugee return, because most minority refugees were displaced to Serbia proper.
255
 Dur-
ing the course of writing this thesis, a rapprochement between the two regions takes place. 
The clearest sign is the “First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalization of Rela-
tions,” which was reached on 19 April 2013.256 Therein, Kosovo and Serbia agreed on the 
establishment of the Association of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo. The Serbian mu-
nicipalities have legal guarantees by Kosovo and Serbia, and an initial authority on economic 
development, education, health, urban, and rural planning. This rapprochement is a great 
achievement and notably an opportunity for the refugees, who are still in Serbia proper and 
want to return to their homes in Kosovo. 
 
10.4 Threats 
The fourth initial T stands for threats, which are elements that could cause problems for the 
future return of minority refugees to their homes in Kosovo.  
 
The main threat regarding the return of minority refugees to Kosovo is the fact that every re-
turnee stretches the already strained economy and the social system disproportionally. Kosovo 
is not able to provide the basic needs to the current residents, as there are already not enough 
jobs for even half of Kosovo’s population. It becomes obvious that every additional returnee 
worsens rather than improves the social and economic conditions in Kosovo. As the returnees 
                                                 
254
  World Bank (2007): Integrating Environment into Agriculture and Forestry Progress and Prospects in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia. Volume II KOSOVO Review, online available at: http://www.worldbank.org/eca/ 
pubs/envint/Volume%20II/English/Review%20KOS-final.pdf, last retrieved on 07.12.2013. 
255
  This is the reason why this chapter deals with their relationship although the SWOT analysis scrapes through 
the specific conditions for sustainable return. 
256
  The text of this agreement can be downloaded here: http://www.rts.rs/upload/storyBoxFileData/2013/ 
04/20/3224318/Originalni%20tekst%20Predloga%20sporazuma.pdf, last retrieved on 17.12.2013. 
PART IV – EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
301 
face severe challenges regarding the establishment of sustainable livelihoods in Kosovo, it is 
likely that they emigrate.
257
 This exit strategy implicates a brain-drain of knowledge and 
competencies and initiates the depopulation of entire neighborhoods. As a consequence, this 
may further discourage refugees to return to those neighborhoods. 
An additional threat is the continuous return to mono-ethnic areas, which fosters the absolute 
division of the society into different ethnic communities.  
 
Although it was known as one of the most ethnic diverse areas before the war, the security 
situation in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica today is very fragile. When the security situation worsens, 
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica may collapse and the open space for the refugees, which attracted them 
to return to this city, closes. If this happens, the returnees, who belong to minority communi-
ties, could become a fresh target to insurgent groups. 
 
The parallel institutions are currently a major threat for sustainable return to Kosovo. They 
create parallel societies, fuel ethnic differences, and complicate the integration of returnees in 
Kosovo. If both systems continue to exist parallel to each other, this creates multiple long-
term consequences. In the education sector, the durable parallel existence can create a situa-
tion, in which the different communities literally do not understand each other anymore lin-
guistically and culturally.  
 
Despite the fact that Kosovo established some minority rights that were supposed to protect 
the minority communities, the enforcement of those rights is too lax to confidently conclude 
that they are an opportunity. Things may also tip back and can also have negative conse-
quences. Various minority rights consolidate the differences between the minorities in the 
long-run. For instance, “… the electoral system implies that a party that wishes to benefit 
from the overrepresentation of Serb (or other minority) parties in the assembly has to pre-
register as an ethnically Serb (or other minority) party – a system that is clearly not conducive 
to cross-ethnic appeals.” (Simonsen 2005: 302) Some minority rights reinforce these ethnic 
differences and do not help to establish a multi-ethnic society, but achieve the opposite.  
 
The last threat is the fraught relationship between Kosovo and Serbia that negatively influ-
ences the return of refugees to Kosovo. The two entities are divided through the question of 
Kosovo’s independence and the human rights violations, which were committed during the 
1990s, for which Serbia never apologized. In the long-term, a deterioration of the relations 
could even lead to the partition of the northern municipalities plus Mitrovicë/Mitrovica from 
the rest of Kosovo. Should this happen, the idea of a Kosovar multi-ethnic society would have 
failed. It would further mean the ultimate separation between Kosovo and Serbia and entail a 
deterioration of their relations. 
 
 
                                                 
257
  The Goranis in Dragash/Dragaš already use this exit strategy and permanently migrate to Serbia and other 
neighboring countries. For further information, please see Chapter 8.4.2. 
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AREA 
STRENGTHS 
Characteristics, which contribute to the development of sustainable 
livelihoods and foster the integration of the returnees into the society 
WEAKNESSES 
Characteristics that constrain sustainable livelihoods and prevent  
a successful integration of the minority returnees into the society 
RETURN 
 The return of minority refugees to some municipalities 
in Kosovo is (partly) sustainable, e.g. the return of Bos-
niaks to Prizren. 
 No particular success in the minority return to Kosovo 
 Return often occurs to rural and mono-ethnic areas. 
 Minority refugees are not able to freely decide where to return to. 
 Separated society 
 Principle of subsidiarity   “Too many cooks spoil the broth.” – no clear task sharing 
PHYSICAL  
SECURITY 
 Stable security situation in Kosovo, also concerning 
violence against the personal integrity of minorities. 
 Inter-ethnic violence against minority returnees’ property 
 Insecurity in some return areas 
 Albanian speakers among the returnees feel secure 
moving around. 
 Freedom of movement for all ethnic minority communities restricted to a certain 
extent. 
  Minority returnees are caught up in ethnic tensions in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. 
ECONOMY 
 Parallel institutions partly cushion unemployment and 
the lack of social services.  
 A high unemployment rate is challenging for every ethnic community. 
 Discrimination against the minority communities in the labor market and at work. 
RECON-
CILIATION 
  No satisfaction, no reconciliation 
 Continuous division between victims and perpetrators 
HOUSING 
  Still many fully or partly destroyed houses. 
 No social housing program in Kosovo. 
 Inadequate handling of property conflicts. 
 Lack of housing solutions for illegal occupiers (Albanian IDPs). 
PARALLEL  
INSTITU-
TIONS 
 Parallel institutions absorb parts of the population. 
 Sound financial/technical support of parallel institutions 
by Belgrade = annual expenditure of 500mio. EUR 
 Parallel institutions are unlikely to remain or sustain. 
 Parallel institutions are illegal under Kosovo’s jurisdiction  
 parallel institutions = parallel society 
EDUCA-
TION 
 Bosniak and Turkish curriculum. 
 No tuition fees. 
 No language catch-up classes for children after their return. 
 Lack or poor quality of textbooks. 
 Recognition of European school certificates in Kosovo and vice versa is difficult. 
 Schooling is expensive = 50 EUR children/month 
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AREA 
STRENGTHS 
Characteristics, which contribute to the development of sustainable 
livelihoods and foster the integration of the returnees into the society 
WEAKNESSES 
Characteristics that constrain sustainable livelihoods and prevent  
a successful integration of the minority returnees into the society 
 Good quality of education in Serbian schools.  Separation of the society through two distinct educational systems. 
 Minority realities are not reflected appropriately in both systems.  
HEALTH 
CARE  
 Good quality of Serbian health care provision. 
 Free health care provision in the Serbian system. 
 No tertiary health care in the Serbian system.  
 Expensive health care services (treatment, medication, transportation) in the Ko-
sovar system. 
INFRA-
STRUCTURE 
  Regular power outages 
 Discriminatory classification of minorities within the ABC policy. 
 Conflicts over power consumption between KEK and returnees. 
 Public transportation by bus works well within and 
between the municipalities. 
 No public transportation to the North nor to the Serbian enclaves. 
 Dependency of some minorities on the Humanitarian Bus Transportation. 
LEGAL  
SECURITY 
  Kosovar legal decisions are not recognized by Serbia and vice versa. 
 Risk of double jeopardy: twofold prosecution for the same crime. 
 Minority communities are almost absolutely excluded from any law-making pro-
cesses. 
MINORITY 
RIGHTS 
 The comprehensive Anti-discrimination Law aims at 
protecting the ethnic minority communities. 
 The Anti-discrimination Law is not fully implemented. 
 Several minority rights, such as guaranteed parliamen-
tary seat(s) for every minority community. 
 Despite a legal guarantee of minority seats, the Albanian majority can pass laws 
without the consent of the minority communities. 
 Decentralization provides the Serbs with considerable 
self-determination rights. 
 In Kosovo, there is a “… problem of guaranteeing the rights of Kosovo Serbs 
only, as if only Albanians and Serbs live in Kosovo.” 
Table 18: Strengths and Weaknesses of the Refugee Return to Kosovo 
Source: Own compilation 
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AREA 
OPPORTUNITIES 
Chances to improve the situation of minority returnees in the future 
THREATS 
Elements that could cause problems for the future return  
of minority refugees to their homes in Kosovo 
RETURN 
 Creation of a multi-ethnic society through the return of minority refu-
gees to mixed areas. 
 Returns to mono-ethnic areas increase and support an ethnic separa-
tion of the society. 
 More returns of minority refugees exhaust the economy and the social 
security system disproportionally. 
PHYSICAL  
SECURITY 
 The divided city of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, where many ethnic commu-
nities live together in one city, can become the “role model” for inter-
ethnic tolerance and co-operation. 
 Mitrovicë/Mitrovica collapses = the open space for refugees closes 
 Returnees from ethnic minority communities can become a fresh tar-
get for insurgent groups, e.g. in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 
ECONOMY 
  Emigration (exit strategy) due to very poor economic conditions 
 Brain-drain and depopulation of entire neighborhoods 
 By engaging in farming, returnees could help to establish food securi-
ty or they could help to reconstruct Kosovo’s infrastructure. 
 Returnees exhaust the economy and the employment capacities. 
 Increasing unemployment. 
HOUSING  The reconstruction of destroyed property attracts refugees to return.  
PARALLEL 
INSTIT. 
  Parallel institutions fuel ethnic differences & create a parallel society. 
EDU-
CATION 
 The combination of the two educational systems could create mutual 
understanding and multi-ethnic tolerance in Kosovo. 
 In the long-term, the parallel existence of two educational systems 
creates a situation, where the ethnic communities misunderstand each 
other linguistically and culturally. 
MINORITY 
RIGHTS 
 Full implementation of the Anti-discrimination Law. 
 Minorities would feel more integrated than today. 
 The minority rights consolidate the differences between the minorities 
in the long-run. 
KOSOVO  
SERBIA 
 The “First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalization of 
Relations” between Kosovo and Serbia (19 April 2013) facilitates the 
return of minority refugees from Serbia. 
 The relationship between Kosovo and Serbia worsens. 
 Partition of the northern municipalities plus Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 
North from the rest of Kosovo. 
 Failure of the idea of a multi-ethnic state. 
Table 19:  Opportunities and Threats of the Refugee Return to Kosovo 
Source: Own compilation 
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10.5 Policy Recommendations  
The following policy recommendations were derived based on the opportunities and threats’ 
analyses above. They are directed towards the improvement of the return of all minority 
communities to Kosovo and aim at avoiding that potential threats become reality. Their order 
is based on the seven criteria for sustainable return. The list begins with the recommendations 
related to general return issues, the process itself, and the organizational procedure.  
 
The following policy recommendations require a significant financial input by Kosovo or by 
the international stakeholders. Kosovo on its own lacks these financial means. However, Ko-
sovo is one of the biggest recipients of development aid by the international community. The 
author therefore suggests to reassign development aid and to focus more on the minority 
communities and their return conditions, if possible. This is important, because the returnees’ 
well-being serves as an indicator of how well the government institutions manage develop-
ment goals in the post-conflict period. (Cf. Chapter 3.2) The recommendations’ addressees are 
either the Kosovar governmental institutions, including the relevant ministries (top down) or 
the municipalities (bottom up) – both with the support of international (non-)governmental 
organizations. 
 
PR 1a: Launch programs that provide incentives to move back to the returnees’ pre-war 
areas whenever possible. 
Addressee:  Municipalities, Kosovo Ministry for Communities and Return 
Since the feeling of insecurity still influences the refugees’ decision where to return to, return 
predominantly occurs to mono-ethnic areas. To avoid this, incentives for the return to pre-war 
areas should be established. These programs could solve two problems at the same time:  
(1) The return to the place of origin creates a mixture of ethnic communities instead of sepa-
rate, mono-ethnic enclaves.  
(2) It further supports the return to the place of origin, which meets the emotional need of 
belonging to a homeland and facilitates family reunions. 
When promoting the return to the place of origin, the responsible stakeholders must take into 
account that these regions are safe and that the necessary infrastructure is available. Please see 
therefore the Policy Recommendation No. 1b. They may also want to consider promoting the 
return to role model municipalities, where the returnees are supported with regard to the ac-
cess to social services or finding employment. Amongst other things, the incentives could 
include financial benefits, the reconstruction of the returnees’ houses before they physically 
move back, and other non-financial benefits such as clothes, furniture, or medication. 
 
PR 1b: Choose the return site carefully according to set criteria and give preference to the 
place of origin.  
Addressee: Municipalities according to the principle of subsidiarity 
Apart from the decision for or against the return to the place of origin, other set criteria should 
be taken into account when choosing a return site: 
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 The infrastructure must be well-developed and access to employment, adequate housing, 
and health care services must be available.  
 The security situation must be stable. The chances that an open space for refugees closes 
must be avoided. 
 Preparatory negotiations with the receiving community must be completed, especially 
when the returnees were believed to be involved in crimes during the war. The ICG ar-
gues, “[t]here can be no political or other conditionalities placed on return by receiving 
communities” (ICG 2002: 26). However, if the receiving community is not prepared to 
accommodate the returnees and even prevents their return to a neighborhood, a conflict 
between both communities can arise quickly and may prevent a sustainable return.  
 In the best case, the existence of social networks (of relatives and friends) must be consid-
ered, too. A social network facilitates the returnees’ integration into the society. Family 
and friends can explain to the returnees, how to apply for public services and advise them 
with regard to finding an employment, etc.  
 
PR 1c:  Teach the Kosovar refugees Albanian before they return.  
Addressee: (Non-)governmental organizations/UNHCR in the host societies 
The ability to speak Albanian seems to be a significant advantage in the return process to Ko-
sovo. If the refugees have at least basic knowledge of Albanian, they feel safer and experience 
a more secure freedom of movement upon their return. They have greater chances to be inte-
grated into the society, and they fear less discrimination on the employment market and when 
approaching public institutions. As a consequence, it would be advisable to teach the refu-
gees, who are willing and able to return to Kosovo, the basics of the Albanian language. This 
is of special importance for those returnees, who were born abroad (e.g. in countries of West-
ern Europe). This task can be fulfilled by governmental institutions or non-governmental or-
ganizations in the host countries.  
 
PR 1d: Promote the reconciliation process
258
 in Kosovo. 
Addressee: Serbian government, Kosovar governmental institutions 
This policy recommendation is rooted in the continuous societal division between victims and 
perpetrators in Kosovo. The fear of revenge resulting from the (perceived) support of Mi-
lošević’ regime is one of the main reasons why refugees decide against the return to Kosovo. 
Reconciliation has not yet taken place in Kosovo, because “… the local population in Serbia 
and Kosovo are not ready ‘to forgive and be forgiven’ today because ‘civil society… has not 
had the strength to face the darkest parts of the past’ …” (Guisan 2011: 24). Until today, there 
are only small, regional projects in some municipalities that deal with inter-community dia-
logue, but no national initiatives focus on the reconciliation between the Albanians and the 
Serbs. The following solutions could help to address this topic holistically: 
(1) One first step must be an apology from the Serbian government for the atrocities that were 
committed during the 1990s under Milošević. This also includes “… that Serbs must first 
                                                 
258
  Reconciliation is a very comprehensive topic that cannot be addressed in detail in this thesis. However, it 
needs to be dealt with; as one of the main results of this analysis is that a negative role of certain ethnic 
communities during the war prevents them from returning to their homes in Kosovo. 
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of all transform their imperial mind-set, just as the Germans did after 1945.” (Guisan 
2011: 24)  
(2) A mid-term solution could be the formation of an own national jurisdiction that exclusive-
ly deals with cases from Kosovo, but not with cases that are generally related to former 
Yugoslavia.  
(3)  The last step concerning the reconciliation process could be the establishment of a recon-
ciliation commission following the example of the South African “Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission,” which was established to give the victims of gross human rights viola-
tions a voice. For the same reason, perpetrators could give testimony and request amnesty. 
The South African Commission was divided into three committees: The Human Rights 
Violations Committee investigated human rights abuses, which were committed between 
1960 and 1994. The Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee was responsible for formu-
lating rehabilitation proposals and for helping to restore the victims’ dignity. The Amnes-
ty Committee dealt with applications for amnesty from perpetrators. This Commission is a 
very progressive institution dealing with reconciliation and can serve as a good example 
for Kosovo. 
 
PR 2:  Appease Mitrovicë/Mitrovica.
259 
 
Addressee: Kosovo Police with the support of international observes, such as the OSCE 
Ultimately, there is the risk that the currently open living space in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica turns 
into a violent and hostile area, where the Serbs and other minority communities are not safe 
anymore. Hogan (1992: 413f.) argues that although the return of refugees to one area might be 
a sound and comprehensible idea at a time, the area can turn into a violent environment. The 
continuous existence of the underlying causes for war, as it can be observed in Mi-
trovicë/Mitrovica, where both parties are still as antagonized as before the violent conflict in 
1999, is the major reason for this threat. The returnees’ open living space may be closed if no 
appeasing measures are taken. As a consequence, the city must be appeased and observed 
thoroughly. International observers could supervise the work of the Kosovar Police and sup-
port it with the establishment of a peaceful co-existence of all communities in Mi-
trovicë/Mitrovica.  
 
PR 3:  Use the returnees’ workforce to create food security in Kosovo through farming 
activities or to reconstruct the infrastructure. 
Addressee: Kosovo Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development (MAFRD) 
Some scholars and several stakeholders argue that the Kosovar refugees, who are still dis-
placed in neighboring countries or Western Europe, should not return to Kosovo before the 
economy is stable and enough employment opportunities are available in the return areas. 
However, as it was pointed out in Chapter 3.2, refugee return supports the legitimacy of the 
state with its new institutions. In an ethnic conflict, the return of minority refugees signifies a 
major step towards the establishment of a multi-ethnic society. The return of minority refu-
                                                 
259
  This policy recommendation is derived from the policy recommendations for the Serbian returnees. As it has 
a general relevance for the sustainability of the return of all ethnic minority communities, the policy recom-
mendation is mentioned a second time in this chapter.  
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gees is a necessary condition to reconciliation between the conflict parties. As a consequence, 
this paper recommends that the potential of the returnees should be deployed to enhance eco-
nomic development. 
 
The Kosovar economy is currently not prepared to accommodate more returnees and to pro-
vide appropriate livelihood opportunities. The social security system cannot absorb more 
needy people either. Hence, refugee return must not occur spontaneously to areas that do not 
provide the means for the establishment of sustainable livelihoods. The relevant stakeholders 
must account for Policy Recommendation No. 1b. The returnees must be integrated into a 
farming program, where they receive the necessary tools, knowledge, seeds, and arable land 
to start agricultural activities. One example is the Twinning-Program between the German 
Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection and Kosovo. Such projects 
seek to improve Kosovo’s agricultural sector and general rural development.260 
Alternatively, they must be integrated into reconstruction projects. Returnees often gained the 
necessary skills during their displacement, either through training provided by international 
relief agencies or due to their capacities to adapt quickly to new situations. This means that 
they are able to not only help themselves, but to help entire communities to re-establish their 
livelihoods. (Cf. Petrin 2002: 6) 
 
PR 4a:  Establish a social housing program for those who do not own property or whose 
property is still destroyed. 
Addressee: Kosovo Ministry for Internal Affairs 
Social housing refers to tenements, which are owned and managed by the state and aim at 
providing affordable housing for those in need. In socialist times, the state absorbed those 
people, who could not afford own property. Today, the returning refugees are left alone with 
the search for adequate housing solutions. Some minority returnees additionally face discrim-
ination as tenants, and category C claims can only be successfully implemented by the KPA, 
if there are adequate housing solutions for the current (illegal) occupants. Kosovo’s institu-
tions should therefore consider establishing a social housing program, which helps the entire 
society to find adequate housing, but especially for those refugees who tend to decide against 
a return to Kosovo for reasons related to the poor housing situation. The establishment of a 
social housing program requires money, which is currently not available at the national level. 
However, Kosovo is one of the biggest recipients of financial support from the European Un-
ion and various other international organizations. The existing financial means should conse-
quently focus on the reconstruction of destroyed houses and support the establishment of a 
social housing program.  
 
PR 4b: Foster the reconstruction of non-Serbian minority communities’ houses. 
Addressee: Donor countries and those (non-)governmental international organizations that 
are responsible for the reconstruction of houses in Kosovo 
                                                 
260
  More information can be found at: http://www.bmelv.de/DE/Ministerium/IntZusammenarbeit/Twin-
ning/_Texte/TwinningKosovo.html, last retrieved on 13.12.2013. 
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Donors and stakeholders in Kosovo must put more effort in reconstructing destroyed houses, 
especially those of the non-Serbian minority communities, as they are currently not in the 
focus of reconstruction projects. By reconstructing the refugees’ property, they have a place to 
return to and do not have to return to a randomly chosen place.  
 
PR 5: Partly integrate the minorities into the Kosovar society before the parallel institu-
tions are completely dissolved or integrated into the Kosovar system. 
Addressee: Kosovar and Serbian governmental institutions 
This paper suggests that the Serbs and any other affected minority community have to be part-
ly integrated into the Kosovar society before the integration of Serbian and Kosovar institu-
tion can be implemented. First steps are already taken with the first Kosovo-Serbian agree-
ment of April 2013 that schedules the dismissal of all Serbian police officers in Kosovo by 
Belgrade in December 2013, which was successfully implemented. Premier Hashim Thaçi 
thereupon announced the recruitment of police officers that previously worked for the parallel 
institutions.
261
 This is one specific form of integrating the Serbian minority into the Kosovar 
society. 
 
PR 6a:  Combine the two educational systems with each other. 
Addressee: Kosovo Ministry for Education, Science and Technology (MEST), Serbian 
Ministry of Education and Science (SMES) 
“Overall, smaller communities tend to gravitate towards either curricula depending chiefly on 
their geographical location and, to a lesser extent, on language and/or religion.” (OSCE 
2009a: 18) Whether this choice is geographically or ethnically motivated, it creates separatism 
within the society. As a consequence, the goal should be to unite the two systems and create 
one for all ethnic communities. They could be educated together in the main subjects and sep-
arated in the national subjects, e.g. art, music, and history. Since the minorities’ choice merely 
depends on the geographical location and other rational factors, it should be easy for them to 
be integrated into a unified system if the schools are also available in the most neglected, ru-
ral, and remote (return) areas. In addition, both educational systems can only be united if the 
quality gap between them diminishes. The improvement of the quality needs additional finan-
cial efforts. Belgrade currently spends a significant amount of money into the maintenance of 
the Serbian schools in Kosovo. This money could be rededicated to establish a joint system.  
 
PR 6b: Ensure that every Kosovar resident is able to speak basic Albanian and Serbian. 
Addressee: Kosovo Ministry for Education, Science and Technology (MEST) 
Language is the key to education and education the key to social integration. Mattern argues 
that language affiliation is the most important feature for the (dis-)functioning of integration 
into the Kosovar society. (Cf. Mattern 2006: 3f.) In the near future, there will be a generation 
that literally does not understand its vis-à-vis any longer. Albanians do not understand Serbian 
and vice versa as they grew up in different educational systems. When returnees speak a min-
                                                 
261
  N.N. (2013): Belgrad entlässt seine Polizisten im Kosovo, in: Kleine Zeitung, 10.12.2013, online available at: 
http://www.kleinezeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/3490661/belgrad-entlaesst-seine-polizisten-kosovo.story, last 
retrieved on 12.12.2013. 
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imum level of Albanian and Serbian, they have the best chances to be integrated into the soci-
ety, to communicate with each other, to find employment, and to get access to various social 
services. A combined educational system must have obligatory Albanian and Serbian lan-
guage classes for every student at every level.  
 
PR 7: Exempt the returnees from the co-payment for health care services within the Ko-
sovar system. 
Addressee:  Ministry of Health (MoH) 
As the returnees do not have any substantial financial means after their return to Kosovo, they 
should be exempted from the co-payment for health care services within the Kosovar system, 
at least in the first year of their return. Since health is a basic condition for life – as codified in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 25.1 – the health and life of returnees must 
be especially protected by the respective institutions. Returnees, who are ill and do not have 
the money for the treatment and the medication, are eventually unable to establish sustainable 
livelihoods.  
 
PR 8:  Exempt the returnees from paying electricity bills that charge the power consump-
tion in their absence.  
Addressee:  KPA, KEK 
This paper recommends exempting the returnees from paying electricity bills that charge the 
power consumption in their absence. The question of electricity bills must be included in any 
property repossession claim directed at the KPA. Until there is no solution to the property 
dispute, these electricity bills must be put on hold. Please see the Policy Recommendation No. 
9 in Chapter 7.5. 
 
PR 9: Provide all returnees with a definite legal status. 
Addressee: Ministry for Internal Affairs (MIA) 
All returnees must be provided with a definite legal status and identification papers, as the 
legal status is a precondition for employment, property restitution, education, health care, and 
social welfare. One possible initiative would be to launch awareness campaigns about civil 
registration in combination with the registration of previously unregistered residents in Koso-
vo. For further information, please see the Policy Recommendation No. 8 for the Roma, the 
Ashkali, and the Egyptians in Chapter 6.7. 
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11. Wrapping Up: Evaluation of the Research Questions  
This evaluation and discussion chapter summarizes and reviews the main results of this thesis. 
Chapter 2.3 presented four research questions that are answered in the following. The first 
research questions deals with the theoretical foundation of this paper. The other three research 
question with the empirical findings.  
 
Research Question 1: In theory, what makes a refugee return sustainable? 
A sustainable return enables the returnee to establish sustainable livelihoods, which they can 
maintain without extraordinary external input and where they are able to withstand external 
shocks, such as a crop failure. In addition, a sustainable return supports the full social integra-
tion of the returnee into the home society. In Chapter 4, seven specific criteria were derived 
from the conceptual framework, which have to be met, so that a sustainable return can be ful-
ly implemented. These are physical security, economic conditions, reparation and housing, 
education, health care, infrastructure, and legal security. In theory, return should be sustaina-
ble if all conditions are fulfilled. However, the author acknowledges that these are ideal con-
ditions and that the full establishment of all conditions requires a huge financial effort and 
may not be realistic in practice. The discrepancies between theory and practice are addressed 
by the fourth research question, which asks whether or not every single condition is required 
to ensure a sustainable return. Even though post-conflict societies often do not have the finan-
cial and institutional capacities to fulfill the criteria that were developed theoretically, a sus-
tainable return may still be possible if the core criteria are met and the policy recommenda-
tions in Chapter 10.5 are followed carefully and are implemented wisely.  
 
Research Question 2: Why is the return of some ethnic minority communities to Kosovo 
more sustainable than others?  
The individual analyses of the six ethnic minority communities showed that there is only one 
community, whose return to Kosovo can be classified as (partly) sustainable: the Bosniak 
community.  
 
A full integration of the Bosniak returnees into the Kosovar society is very likely, because the 
Bosniaks take on a positive role in Kosovo. Although the Bosniak community represents only 
2 % of the population, they have a major political impact, particularly on the local level. The 
Bosniak community maintains positive relations to the Albanian and to the Serbian communi-
ty, which is underlined by their ability to speak both languages fluently. Within the Kosovar 
educational system, they have their own curriculum, which highlights their prominent posi-
tion in Kosovo and provides them with an additional mean that supports their integration. The 
Bosniaks are also well represented in public institutions, such as the Kosovo Police. They 
have full access to social and other public services. Due to this positive position, they can 
decide freely, which institutions they want to approach according to vicinity, availability, and 
quality. They do not have to take into account ethnical preferences. This factor differentiates 
them to a large extent from the other five communities. These positive conditions even multi-
ply when they return to the municipalities Prizren, Pejë/Peć, Istog/Istok, and Dragash/Dragaš, 
where they are a considerable minority. Apart from these positive integration prospects, the 
Bosniaks can also establish sustainable livelihoods. 
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The other five ethnic minority communities face particular challenges that neither support a 
full integration into the society nor the establishment of sustainable livelihoods. As the Serbs 
usually return to the northern municipalities, which are close to Serbia proper and predomi-
nantly occupied by other Serbs, the returnees are dependent on parallel Serbian institutions. 
Even though these may provide them with the necessary public services and workplaces, the 
Serbian returnees cannot be integrated into a multi-ethnic Kosovar society. Furthermore, these 
institutions are not stable, because they are illegal under Kosovo’s jurisdiction.  
A similar situation applies to the Gorani returnees, but in addition, their return area, Dra-
gash/Dragaš municipality, does not provide many employment opportunities, which tightens 
their situation. As a consequence, the Gorani rather emigrate than stay.  
The Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians suffer from structural violations in Kosovo. Unem-
ployment amongst these groups is close to 100 %, the lack of identification documents pre-
vents a full access to public services, and the discrimination against gypsies is still prevalent 
and does not allow their integration into the society. The returning Roma additionally fear 
revenge from Albanians because of their (perceived) role as collaborators during the war in 
Kosovo.  
 
Research Question 3: Do more refugees return if the return conditions are sustainable? 
In order to find out whether or not sustainable conditions attract more refugees to return to 
Kosovo, the following two aspects must be analyzed: First, how many refugees returned from 
each ethnic minority community? Second, are the conditions of the respective communities 
sustainable? Subsequently, the comparison of both answers will show if more refugees return 
if the conditions are sustainable. Figure 46 compares the return figures and the sustainability 
of the conditions upon return with each other.  
Figure 46:  A Comparison of the Return Percentages and the Sustainability 
Source:  Own compilation 
The left chart shows the return percentages of each minority community in Kosovo, whereas 
the right matrix illustrates the two levels of a sustainable return, which are social integration 
and the establishment of sustainable livelihoods. Those returning minority communities that 
are located in the lower left square cannot integrate into the Kosovar society and have low 
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chances to establish sustainable livelihoods. Those returning minority communities that are 
located in the upper right square have high integration prospects and are likely to establish 
sustainable livelihoods. 
The result is obvious: The only ethnic minority community that is located in the upper right 
square (sustainable), has the lowest return percentage. On the contrary, the two communities 
with the highest return percentage, the Ashkali and the Egyptians, are located in the lower left 
square and their return is not sustainable. The answer to this research question must therefore 
be no, sustainable conditions do not automatically lead to an increase in return figures in 
Kosovo. It may well be that there are particular characteristics of one return group that influ-
ence the refugees’ decision to return to Kosovo. This is addressed by Research Question 3a.  
 
Research Question 3a: What are the characteristics that influence the refugees’ decision to 
return to Kosovo? 
At first sight, the following picture is drawn, when comparing the characteristics of the return 
movements of the six minority communities:  
Those ethnic minority communities, which are believed to be collaborators of Milošević’ re-
gime and probably participated in the human rights violations against the Albanian majority, 
hesitate to return. This applies to the Serbs, the Roma, and the Goranis. All three communities 
still fear revenge attacks and do not feel that they can move freely within Kosovo. In addition, 
they do not usually speak Albanian. By contrast, the Ashkali and the Egyptians return to Ko-
sovo, although their integration perspectives are low and they may be severely discriminated 
when accessing public services in Kosovo. However, they speak Albanian, maintain close 
relations to the Albanian majority, and are not believed to be connected to the atrocities in the 
1990s. On that account, the following three characteristics seem to support the return to Ko-
sovo (see Figure 47): 
Figure 47:  Three Characteristics Promoting the Return to Kosovo 
Source: Own compilation 
Unfortunately and surprisingly, these return characteristics do not apply to the Bosniaks. Even 
though they speak Albanian, did not take part in the atrocities against the Albanian majority 
during the 1990s, and maintain good relations to the Albanians, they seem not to return to 
Kosovo. So far, only 7.8 % Bosniak refugees returned to their homes in Kosovo. One possible 
reason is that the Bosniak community does not see a positive future for their ethnic communi-
ty in Kosovo. They are not included in the decentralization process, they fear assimilation by 
the Albanians, and their language is not recognized as a minority language in some municipal-
ities. Outside of their preferred areas, the Bosniaks “… have lost the critical mass in the recent 
period to anchor their community, making it extremely difficult to return to the pre-war condi-
tions” (UNHCR 2004b: 26).  
 
Another reason why the Bosniak community does not confirm the three supportive character-
istics is the existence of a kin state, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which provides the Bosniak ref-
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ugees with a good integration perspective. This factor seems to be relevant for the other ethnic 
communities too. Figure 48 illustrates for every minority community whether the integration 
into the host society or the return to Kosovo was more attractive. The thick arrows demon-
strate that most refugees belonging to this community opt for this durable solution. In 
contrast, the thin arrows show that this option was less favorable for the refugees of this 
community. 
Figure 48: Integration into the Host Society or Return to Kosovo? 
Source: Own compilation 
In most cases, the Bosniak refugees are displaced to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Not only the 
living conditions are far better in Bosnia and Herzegovina than in Kosovo, but there is also a 
strong cultural, historical, and linguistic connection between the Bosniaks and their kin state. 
As a consequence, they have good integration perspectives and often decide to stay there in-
stead of returning to Kosovo. A similar situation applies to the Serbs and the Goranis. Both 
are usually displaced to Serbia proper. Both communities have a strong connection to Serbia 
and call it their home country. “The ethnic community of Goranies is today fully integrated 
into the socioeconomic and political life of the Republic of Serbia.” (Vait 2002: 45) Conse-
quently, both ethnic communities often decide against the return to Kosovo, because they 
have better living conditions in Serbia proper.  
 
Finally, this chapter, especially Research Question 4, evaluates whether the theoretical con-
cept of sustainable return is implementable. The concept implies two elements: (1) the re-
establishment of the returnees’ own life, which they lost during the time in exile and (2) the 
integration into the receiving community. In order to achieve these two goals, seven criteria 
were developed theoretically in Chapter 4. They describe an ideal situation, in which a sus-
tainable refugee return can take place. However, the reality in post-conflict settings looks dif-
ferent: Often, these conditions cannot be guaranteed to a full extent due to small financial 
capacities or for other reasons. There appears to be a discrepancy between the ideal conditions 
and what is actually achievable in practice. 
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Research Question 4: What are the minimum conditions that need to be met before a sus-
tainable refugee return can take place? 
The review of Research Question 4 considers three main aspects to identify the absolute min-
imum conditions of a sustainable refugee return:  
(1) Does the criterion serve to achieve the two main goals of a sustainable return, i.e. the re-
establishment of an own life and the integration into the society? 
(2) Does the lack of a criterion entail the threat of a secondary displacement or the renewal of 
violence? 
(3) Is the criterion inalienable for every returnee or only for a specific group? 
 
The first condition “Physical Security and Freedom of Movement” essentially includes the 
absence of attacks and the threat thereof, the absence of harassment and of the destruction of 
property in return areas. Beyond that, freedom of movement means that the returnees are able 
to move freely within and beyond their return area. The lack of physical security contradicts a 
sustainable return, as it increases the likelihood that refugees decide not to return.  
In the case of Kosovo, particularly the Roma and the Serbs refrain from returning to Kosovo, 
as they still fear revenge from the Albanian majority. Threats of attacks and harassment are 
consistently present for these two ethnic communities. Additionally, the Roma, the Serbs, the 
Bosniaks, and the Goranis all fear to use their native languages in public as their spoken lan-
guages are similar to and thus considered to be Serbian. This restricts their freedom of move-
ment. As a consequence, “… perceived insecurity and lack of freedom of movement continue 
to influence the decision to return” (Halili 2007: 7) or force them to return to mono-ethnic 
areas. Recurring security incidents against the Serbian minority and its property in return are-
as further contribute to fear and to a secondary displacement of the Serbian returnees. 
To sum up, physical security and freedom of movement are inalienable conditions and neces-
sary to guarantee a sustainable return of all refugees.  
 
The second condition “Economic Opportunities” mainly deals with employment opportuni-
ties for the returnees in two different return areas. Firstly, the refugees who return to urban 
areas must have access to employment and should neither be discriminated in the application 
process for open vacancies nor at work. As an alternative livelihood strategy, the returnees 
should have access to loans in order to start their own business. Secondly, in rural areas, they 
must have access to fertile land, seeds, and the necessary farming equipment. In Chapter 3.2, 
it was argued that employment opportunities help the returnees to establish sustainable liveli-
hoods. The lack thereof, on the contrary, fosters the competition for scarce resources and can 
create new violence.  
In the case of Kosovo, the Serbian community is a good example to illustrate the different 
consequences of the access to employment opportunities and of the lack thereof. The Serbian 
refugees, who return to the northern municipalities, are able to find employment in the Serbi-
an public institutions. The returnees in the southern and eastern Serbian enclaves are mainly 
excluded from any employment opportunities, because they are discriminated on the Kosovar 
market and there are less Serbian public and private companies than in the North. The latter 
are dependent on social assistance and have no chance to create any livelihood means whereas 
the former can establish sustainable livelihoods.  
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Another supporting case is provided by the Bosniak community, which has good employment 
opportunities in the regions of Prizren and Pejë/Peć. The few Bosniak refugees, who return to 
other regions in Kosovo, have less opportunities and their return is not classified as sustaina-
ble. 
To provide the returnees with employment opportunities is inalienable for the sustainability 
of a return process. The lack of economic opportunities can lead to a secondary displacement 
or permanent migration, as has been shown for the Gorani community, whose economic op-
portunities in Dragash/Dragaš are rather scarce. 
 
The third condition “Reparation and Housing” includes the reconstruction of destroyed 
property or the compensation for the loss of property, profits, and incidental expenses. As the 
residents of houses often change during war, the provision of solutions to property disputes is 
important.  
Many members of the Roma, the Ashkali, the Egyptian, and the Serbian communities, who 
are displaced, refuse to return to Kosovo until now, because their houses are destroyed or ille-
gally occupied by ethnic Albanian IDPs. The refugees, who returned but did not own proper-
ty, are more vulnerable to poverty and violence, because they have to compete over scarce 
rental apartments. “Extreme cases have also been reported in Istog/Istok municipality, where 
repatriated persons became homeless, and … were temporarily accommodated in an informal 
camp in Gurakoc/Djurakovac.” (Caritas International 2010: 59) This fact emphasizes the im-
portance of this condition.  
 
However, there is one specific limitation to this criterion that can be derived from the experi-
ences in Kosovo. Indeed, the lack of reconstructed property and of solutions to property con-
flicts has severe consequences for the Kosovar refugees, usually up to the point that they can-
not return to Kosovo at all. This is because housing in Kosovo is almost exclusively built on 
residential property instead of rental apartments. As a consequence, the refugees, whose prop-
erty is either destroyed or illegally occupied, have no alternative where to stay upon their re-
turn to Kosovo. The criterion “Reparation and Housing” in the form outlined in Chapter 4.3 is 
thus only partly necessary to guarantee a sustainable return. If there are alternative housing 
solutions available, the lack of reconstructed property and of solutions to property disputes 
would not create new violence or a secondary displacement of the refugees. In addition, it 
would not automatically deter the refugees from returning at all. In summary, to reconstruct 
the refugees’ houses and to provide solutions to property disputes is only partly required to 
guarantee a sustainable return if there is another housing solution. 
 
In essence, the condition “Access to and Quality of Education” refers to a non-
discriminatory access to primary and secondary education, close-by or within the return areas. 
Slightly less important are appropriate curricula, the existence of ethnically mixed schools, 
and low educational costs.  
What can be observed in Kosovo is that the access to education in the preferred system is a 
decisive factor for refugee families with children at school age. There is the example of dis-
placed families from Ferizaj/Uroševac, who would like to return but cannot do so because 
there are no Serbian schools in this municipality. Beyond that, there are a few families, who 
returned to Ferizaj/Uroševac with their toddlers, but now have to move to another area, as 
their children grow up and they look for an appropriate school close-by. However, this exam-
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ple shows the limitation of this criterion: If the access to and the quality of education are not 
secured, families with children at school age cannot return to their preferred area or are dis-
couraged to return at all. As a consequence, this criterion does not apply to all refugees, their 
prospects to return, and the conditions awaiting them upon their physical movement. In addi-
tion, the fact that returnee children have to choose between two different educational systems, 
do not learn to be tolerant towards other ethnic communities, and do not even learn the two 
official languages in Kosovo is not conducive to a sustainable return. However, adults without 
children at school age and especially the elderly can return without facing these obstacles and 
this criterion does not affect the sustainability of their return. Consequently, this criterion is 
only inalienable for a certain group, but not for all returnees.  
 
The criterion “Health Care” means the access to health care in the return areas, in particular 
the provision of basic health care services, and the availability of treatment and medication at 
little or no cost. The analysis of the six communities in Kosovo has shown, that it can neither 
be confirmed that the provision of health care supports the establishment of sustainable liveli-
hoods and the integration of the returnees into the society nor that the lack thereof entails sec-
ondary displacement or new violence. Regardless, health care is a human right, as defined in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in article 25.1: “Everyone has the right to a stand-
ard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including … 
medical care and necessary social services … .”262 If the returnees do not have access to basic 
medical care, it is possible that they become ill over a short or even a long time period. In the 
worst case, the illness prevents them from establishing sustainable livelihoods and from con-
tributing to the Kosovar society and economy. Apart from that, if their life is threatened due 
to the lack of appropriate care and medication, one cannot speak of a sustainable return any-
more. In summary, this criterion is inalienable for a sustainable return.  
 
The criterion “Infrastructure” encompasses three areas: the unrestricted and non-
discriminatory access to water and to sanitation, the access to electricity, and the access to 
roads, bridges, railways, and to transportation.  
Again, the cases of the six returning communities do not give any proof for the necessity of 
the first sector, which is water. Nonetheless, two reasons support the necessity of the access to 
water as a criterion for sustainable return: First, the large amount of returnees, who are en-
gaged in farming, benefit from the unrestricted access to water that they need for irrigation. 
Secondly, the access to water is also included in the Millennium Development Goals as the 
Target 7C, which supports the meaning of it: “Halve, by 2015, the proportion of the popula-
tion without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation.”263 
The lack of access to electricity plays a crucial role for the Serbian returnees in Kosovo. Pow-
er outages are still an everyday challenge for every Kosovar resident, but the Serbian return-
ees face two additional problems: Serbian returnee villages are often classified as C in the 
ABC policy from KEK. In addition, the Serbian returnees are charged for the electricity that 
                                                 
262
  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 
December 1948. It was the first written expression of rights every person is entitled to. The declaration can 
be looked at online: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml, last retrieved on 16.12.2013. 
263
  The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are eight international development goals that should be 
achieved by 2015. They can be downloaded online at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATA-
STATISTICS/Resources/MDGsOfficialList2008.pdf, last retrieved on 16.12.2013. 
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was consumed during their displacement. Both problems prevent them from establishing sus-
tainable livelihoods and marginalize them from the rest of the society. 
In most areas, the Roma and the Serbs are dependent on the humanitarian bus transportation, 
which connects settlements and towns populated by the Roma and the Serbs in the region of 
Gjilan/Gnjilane. They use this transportation means, because the buses are less expensive and 
more secure than the Kosovo-Albanian public transportation means. However, this prevents 
their integration into the Kosovar society. 
In summary, all three areas – water, electricity, and transportation – are inalienable for a sus-
tainable return.  
 
The condition “Legal Security” refers to the non-discriminatory provision of identification 
documents, no discrimination before the law, and a non-discriminatory access to courts. Legal 
security is the precondition for the returnees to be integrated into the society. The example of 
the Roma, the Ashkali, and the Egyptians illustrates what happens with those returnees with-
out legal security. It is estimated that around 30 to 40 % of the RAE communities are not reg-
istered as Kosovar residents. In addition, many documents from returnees, who were dis-
placed abroad, cannot be recognized by Kosovo. This has severe consequences: Unregistered 
RAE children cannot be enrolled in schools, the affected RAE returnees cannot apply for so-
cial welfare, the access to secondary health care is denied, and they fear statelessness.  
Providing the returnees with a legal status is the precondition for the full re-establishment of 
their lives in the homeland and of the relationship between the citizen and the state. Other-
wise, they are denied the most basic public services, can neither establish sustainable liveli-
hoods nor integrate into the society. As a consequence, many RAE returnees are forced to flee 
again. This criterion is inalienable for a sustainable return.  
 
The evaluation has shown that not every criterion, which was included in the theoretical and 
ideal typical conceptualization of a sustainable return, bears up against the practical circum-
stances in post-conflict societies. Yet, no criterion can be completely excluded, but the recon-
struction of property and the solution of property disputes are not inalienable, if there are al-
ternative housing solutions. In addition, the access to schooling is not necessary for every 
returnee, but only for those returnee families with children at school age. On that account, the 
author suggests establishing a two-level-concept. The first level includes the minimum condi-
tions that have to be met to create a sustainable return to a post-conflict country. These are 
physical security, economic opportunities, health care, infrastructure, and legal security. On 
the second level are the less important criteria, which are reparation and housing as well as 
education. The results are summarized in Figure 49. 
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Figure 49:  Sustainable Return – A Concept Revised? 
Source:  Own compilation 
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PART V: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
12. Conclusion 
This thesis explored the conditions that enable a sustainable refugee return by looking at the 
example of Kosovo. It was pointed out in the review of the literature that there is no universal 
definition of the term “sustainable return” and that no one so far has explored under what 
conditions a return is sustainable studying a particular case. This thesis contributed both. It 
provided a definition and set out criteria that could be used to evaluate refugee return as sus-
tainable (Chapter 3 – 4). It also tested the newly defined concept empirically by qualitatively 
analyzing minority return to Kosovo (Chapter 6 – 11). Beyond this, the thesis at hand also 
critically revised the theoretical framework it set out by discussing the discrepancies between 
the newly defined concept of sustainable return and practical obstacles. It yet came up with a 
minimum definition of sustainable return. This concluding chapter seeks to discuss the main 
results and to point to the strengths and the limitations of this research. 
 
According to the definition that was given in this thesis, a refugee return is sustainable when 
two goals are fulfilled: (1) The returnee is able to maintain sustainable livelihoods without 
significant external support and which can withstand external shocks. (2) The returnee is inte-
grated into the society. The author theoretically developed seven criteria that need to be met 
in order to achieve these goals. These are: (1) physical security, (2) economic conditions, (3) 
reparation and housing, (4) education, (5) health care, (6) infrastructure, and (7) legal security.  
 
The seven criteria formed the basis of the subsequent analysis of the six communities. Only a 
small amount of the Roma returned to Kosovo. They are a marginalized community that lives 
at the edge of the society and faces severe challenges in finding employment, in obtaining 
identification documents, and in finishing secondary education. In contrast, the Ashkali and 
the Egyptians returned to a large extent to their homes in Kosovo. They are as excluded from 
the Kosovar society as the Roma, but they maintain good relations to the Albanians, which 
they benefit from. Only a small amount of the Serbs returned to their homes in Kosovo. The 
Serbs are not integrated into the Kosovar society, but established a parallel society with their 
own institutions and their own administration. However, the parallel Serbian institutions are 
illegal under Kosovar law and are unlikely to last forever. The majority of the Goranis did not 
return to Kosovo. They maintain close relations to the Serbs and consequently integrate into 
the Serbian parallel institutions. Even though only a very little percentage of the Bosniak ref-
ugees returned to their homes in Kosovo, they have good opportunities to establish sustaina-
ble livelihoods. In fact, they appear to be the most successful minority group when it comes to 
sustainable return to Kosovo. The Bosniak community has a high political influence, especial-
ly on the local level. They maintain good relations to the Albanians and to the Serbs, which is 
their major benefit.  
The analysis of the six ethnic minority communities and their return to Kosovo revealed an 
interesting picture. The refugees of four communities stay in exile rather than returning to 
Kosovo. Two communities, namely the Ashkali and the Egyptians, return to Kosovo in large 
numbers. However, this does not mean that their returns are particularly sustainable. In fact, it 
indicates that sustainability as it was previously defined was misunderstood and frankly incor-
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rect. Sustainable return conditions are not a per se guarantor for returns to Kosovo. By con-
trast, the return conditions for the Bosniak community are sustainable, but only a very small 
amount of the Bosniak refugees returned to Kosovo so far. 
 
The sustainability of the return conditions does not have a significant influence on the return 
figures in Kosovo. It is rather crucial, which role the minorities played during the 1990s, 
whether they are able to speak Albanian, and if they maintain good relations to the Albanian 
majority. The likelihood of refugee return is less dependent on the country-wide living condi-
tions and on the community-specific conditions, but might be enhanced if the local level is 
particularly involved and the principle of subsidiarity is implemented.  
The latter applies to five communities. Even though the Bosniak community maintains good 
relations to the Albanians, speaks Albanian fluently, and did not commit any human rights 
violations during the 1990s, their return figures are very low. There are two possible explana-
tions: Either the Bosniak community does not see a future within the independent Kosovo, 
because they are not included in any decentralization developments and fear assimilation by 
the Albanians, or their integration prospects in their host society in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
are better than in Kosovo. The latter could also apply to the Serbs and to the Goranis, who 
await better living conditions in Serbia proper than in Kosovo. It is up to further research to 
investigate, which of these explanations is true. 
 
The analysis also revealed that the seven conditions ensuring a sustainable return, as defined 
in Chapter 4, are not fully applicable in a post-conflict environment. On that account, Chapter 
11 revised the theoretical concept by identifying if every condition is inalienable for a sus-
tainable return. The revision considered three aspects: 
(1) Does the criterion serve to achieve the two main goals of a sustainable return, i.e. the re-
establishment of an own life and the integration into the society? 
(2) Does the lack of a criterion entail the threat of a secondary displacement or the renewal of 
violence? 
(3) Is the criterion inalienable for every returnee or only for a specific group? 
The revision showed that not every condition is inalienable to ensure a sustainable return to a 
post-conflict country. Consequently, the author suggests a two-level-concept. The first level 
includes the absolute minimum conditions. These are physical security, economic conditions, 
health care, infrastructure, and legal security. The second level includes the two additional 
criteria reparation/housing as well as education. 
 
The thesis’ contributions are threefold: 
 It improves the definition of sustainability in refugee return research and comes up with 
seven criteria to be met in order to classify a return as sustainable. 
 It tests the definition and the criteria empirically looking at Kosovo and six ethnic minori-
ties within Kosovo employing qualitative methods. 
 It critically revises the conceptual framework of sustainable return following discrepan-
cies found between theory and practice and it gives focused policy recommendations to 
improve return to Kosovo and other post-conflict societies. 
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While this thesis’ contributions are significant, it also has several limitations. The main as-
sumption that the likelihood of returns to Kosovo is supported by three characteristics does 
not apply to the Bosniak community. Even though the author provided some alternative ex-
planations, new research on the Bosniak returnees is required to give a final judgment. The 
author suggests using a different method. It would be advisable to conduct interviews with 
Bosniak returnees and refugees to ask them about their personal decision-making processes. 
In general, one can claim that this thesis lacks the perspective of the refugees and their inte-
gration prospects in the host societies, which it was unable to achieve due to the high financial 
cost, time and labor related to this. However, such research is especially relevant for the Ser-
bian, the Bosniak, and the Gorani communities.  
In addition, quantitative and descriptive figures on the Kosovar minority communities are 
difficult to obtain. Some ethnic communities did not exist before the last census in 1991, as 
e.g. the Ashkali. As a consequence, comparative figures are hardly available or rely on esti-
mates, but no factual data. Furthermore, figures from the Serbian community, especially of 
those living in the North, are hard to find or collect, because the Kosovar institutions and in-
ternational organization have no access to those people. They rely heavily on parallelism 
within society.  
One major criticism may bet the implementation of the policy recommendations presented in 
Chapter 10.5. They require a significant financial input by Kosovo or international stakehold-
ers. Kosovo on its own lacks these financial means. However, Kosovo is one of the biggest 
recipients of development aid. The author therefore suggests to rededicate the development 
aid and to focus more on the minority communities and their return conditions if possible. 
This thesis provided the basic ideas and recommendations to achieve a sustainable return, but 
it cannot give specific recommendations about the financing. This is beyond its scope and 
should be achieved by future research. Moreover, this thesis cannot test the effectiveness of 
the proposed policy recommendations. In order to do so, the recommendations need to be 
implemented and evaluated. Hopefully, this can be achieved by future research as well. 
 
As Lijphart argues, the most fruitful approach is to regard a qualitative comparative analysis 
as the first stage of research and to formulate hypotheses as a result of this kind of research, 
which can be tested (statistically) in further research. (Cf. Lijphart 1971: 685) This last sec-
tion summarizes some questions that future research must address. It formulates specific hy-
potheses, which may be tested using quantitative large N comparative analysis.  Testing these 
hypotheses is an appropriate method to find out whether the conclusions of this thesis reflect 
the special case of Kosovo only or whether they are applicable to other countries. 
 
H1: In ethnic conflicts, refugees, who belong to those communities sympathizing with the 
winning party, are more likely to return than their counterparts.  
The case of Kosovo revealed that those refugees, who belong to minorities that maintain close 
relations to the Albanian majority, are more likely to return. A future statistical test could 
compare the return figures of ethnic minority communities in countries that recently struggled 
with an ethnic conflict.  
 
H2: Refugees who speak the majorities’ language(s) are more likely to return than their 
counterparts. 
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In Kosovo, language seems to be one of the first means of identification. It was shown that 
those refugees that speak Albanian feel more free to move around Kosovo and more comfort-
able to do so. By contrast, those refugees speaking Serbian or a dialect thereof fear using their 
native language in public. 
 
H3: The return of refugees is less likely when the refugees are displaced in their kin state. 
This thesis demonstrated that the Serbs, the Goranis, and the Bosniaks are often displaced to 
their kin states or homelands. Due to the close cultural, linguistic, and religious ties to these 
states, they have better integration prospects there compared to Kosovo. New research should 
address the role of kin states when deciding, which is the most durable solution.  
Beyond that, new research could focus on the refugees’ individual decision-making processes 
and their life in displacement.  
 
In summary, this study showed that if the concept of a sustainable return is defined more pre-
cisely and criteria in the home countries meet minimum standards, refugee return is more suc-
cessful and can contribute positively to post-conflict reconstruction and to the way towards 
peace. 
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German Summary 
Viele Flüchtlinge verharren seit Jahren und u. U. sogar Jahrzehnten in Flüchtlingslagern oder 
in beengten Wohnsituationen unter unwürdigen Lebensbedingungen. Zwar können einige 
Flüchtlinge nie in ihre Heimatländer zurückkehren, besteht aber die Möglichkeit einer Rück-
kehr, geschieht dies meist unter nicht zufriedenstellenden Bedingungen und kann sogar zu 
einer erneuten Vertreibung oder Gewalt im Heimatland führen. Um dies zu vermeiden, wird 
eine nachhaltige Flüchtlingsrückkehr angestrebt.  
 
Obwohl sich der Begriff nachhaltige Rückkehr großer Beliebtheit erfreut, wurde er weder von 
wissenschaftlichen noch von politischen Akteuren hinreichend definiert. Diese Dissertation 
befasst sich mit nachhaltiger Rückkehr und stellt vier grundlegende Forschungsfragen, die sie 
anhand der Fallstudie des Kosovo untersucht und beantwortet: 
Frage 1: Was bedingt eine nachhaltige Flüchtlingsrückkehr in der Theorie? 
Frage 2: Warum ist die Rückkehr von einigen Minderheitenflüchtlingen in den Kosovo 
nachhaltiger als von anderen? 
Frage 3: Kehren mehr Flüchtlinge zurück, wenn die Rückkehrbedingungen nachhaltig 
sind? 
Frage 4: Was sind die Minimalbedingungen, die eine nachhaltige Rückkehr ermögli-
chen? 
 
Die vorliegende Dissertation leistet folgenden Forschungsbeitrag: 
 Sie präsentiert eine verbesserte und präzisere Definition nachhaltiger Rückkehr in der 
Flüchtlingsforschung und entwickelt sieben Kriterien, die eine Rückkehr nachhaltig ge-
stalten. 
 Mit Hilfe qualitativer Methoden testet sie diese Definition und die Kriterien anhand des 
Fallbeispiels Kosovo und vergleicht sechs in den Kosovo zurückkehrende Minderheiten. 
 Aufgrund einer identifizierten Diskrepanz zwischen Theorie und Praxis liefert diese Dis-
sertation einen überarbeiteten theoretischen Rahmen von nachhaltiger Rückkehr und gibt 
Politikempfehlungen, um eine Rückkehr in den Kosovo, aber auch in andere Nachkriegs-
gesellschaften, zu verbessern. 
 
Kapitel 1 leistet einen Überblick über den Forschungsstand nachhaltiger Rückkehr und arbei-
tet die Forschungslücken systematisch heraus. In Kapitel 2 wird die methodische Vorgehens-
weise erläutert. Anschließend präsentieren Kapitel 3 und 4 eine verbesserte und genauere De-
finition und empfiehlt sieben Kriterien, die erfüllt sein müssen, um eine nachhaltige Rückkehr 
zu ermöglichen. Kapitel 5-11 präsentieren die empirische Analyse. Mit Hilfe einer qualitati-
ven Inhaltsanalyse der Literatur über sechs Minderheiten (Roma, Ashkali, Ägypter, Serben, 
Bosniaken und Goranen) im Kosovo, sowie einer vergleichenden Inhaltsanalyse dieser, und 
auf Basis einer SWOT Analyse wird das neue Konzept der nachhaltigen Rückkehr untersucht 
und Politikempfehlungen an internationale und nationale Akteure formuliert. Der Vergleich 
von Theorie und Wirklichkeit gibt Anlass, das Konzept final zu überprüfen und anzupassen. 
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Kapitel 12 fasst die Ergebnisse der Dissertation zusammen und präsentiert darüber hinaus ihre 
Stärken und Schwächen. 
 
Die Ergebnisse aus den empirischen Analysen lassen sich wie folgt zusammenfassen: 
(1) Eine Rückkehr ist dann nachhaltig, wenn die Rückkehrer in der Lage sind, sich eine nach-
haltige Lebensgrundlage zu schaffen, die sie ohne externe Hilfe und auch nach externen 
Schocks (wie z. B. einem Ernteausfall) aufrechterhalten können. Eine nachhaltige Rück-
kehr erfordert die vollständige Integration der Rückkehrer in die Heimatgesellschaft. Es 
wurden sieben Kriterien entwickelt, die eine nachhaltige Rückkehr ermöglichen. Diese 
sind: 
 physische Sicherheit, 
 wirtschaftliche Sicherheit, 
 Entschädigung und Wohnraum, 
 Bildung, 
 Gesundheitsversorgung, 
 Entwickelte Infrastruktur und 
 Rechtssicherheit. 
 
(2) Die empirische Analyse hat gezeigt, dass nur die Rückkehr der Bosniaken als nachhaltig 
eingestuft werden kann, sofern sie stattfindet (siehe Frage 3). Dies liegt scheinbar an ih-
rem großen politischen Einfluss sowie an den positiven Beziehungen zur albanischen und 
zur serbischen Gemeinschaft. Die Bosniaken sprechen zudem beide kosovarischen Amts-
sprachen. Die anderen fünf ethnischen Minderheiten stehen unterschiedlichen Herausfor-
derungen gegenüber, die weder die vollständige Integration in die Gesellschaft noch den 
Aufbau nachhaltiger Lebensgrundlagen ermöglichen.  
 
(3) Die Untersuchungen zeigen, dass die Bosniaken trotz ihrer nachhaltigen Rückkehrbedin-
gungen nicht in den Kosovo zurückkehren. Gleichzeitig finden die zwei Minderheiten mit 
den höchsten Rückkehrerzahlen (Ashkali und Ägypter) keine nachhaltigen Bedingungen 
vor. Hieraus lässt sich schließen, dass nachhaltige Bedingungen nicht automatisch zu einer 
vermehrten Rückkehr in den Kosovo führen. Vermutlich ist es entscheidender, dass die 
Mitglieder ihrer Minderheit 
 nicht an den serbischen Kriegsverbrechen beteiligt waren, 
 die albanische Sprache sprechen und  
 gute Beziehungen zu den Albanern aufrechterhalten.  
Ein Grund, der Flüchtlinge von einer Rückkehr in den Kosovo abhalten kann, ist der Aufent-
halt in ihrem Patronagestaat
264
, der ihnen bessere Bedingungen für eine Integration in dessen 
Gesellschaft bietet. Dies betrifft vor allem die Bosniaken, die Serben und die Goranen. 
 
                                                 
264
  Als Patronagestaat wird der Staat bezeichnet, aus dem eine ethnische Minderheit ursprünglich hervorgegan-
gen ist. In den meisten Fällen bestehen nach wie vor kulturelle, historische und linguistische Beziehungen 
zwischen der Minderheit und dem Patronagestaat. In dem vorliegenden Beispiel ist Serbien der Patronage-
staat der Serben und Bosnien-Herzegowina der Bosniaken. 
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(4) Schlussendlich stellt sich hier eine Diskrepanz zwischen dem theoretisch entwickelten 
Konzept nachhaltiger Rückkehr und der Praxis dar. Es zeigte sich, dass nicht alle Kriterien 
zugleich und in vollem Ausmaß in Nachkriegsgesellschaften umgesetzt werden können. 
Vielmehr ist ein zweistufiges Konzept nachhaltiger Rückkehr anwendbar. Die erste Stufe 
beinhaltet die unabdingbaren Minimalkriterien. Diese sind physische Sicherheit, wirt-
schaftliche Sicherheit, Gesundheitsversorgung, Infrastruktur und Rechtssicherheit. Die 
zweite Stufe benennt zwei zusätzliche Bedingungen, die erfüllt werden können. Diese sind 
Entschädigung/Wohnraum sowie Bildung. 
 
Abschließend stellt sich die Frage, ob man die Rückkehrsituation im Kosovo als causa sui 
generis bezeichnen kann oder die hier präsentierten Ergebnisse auf andere Länder übertragen 
werden können. Diese Dissertation schließt daher mit drei Hypothesen, die zukünftig qualita-
tiv, wie auch quantitativ erforscht werden sollten, um das neue Konzept nachhaltiger Rück-
kehr systematisch und anhand anderer Konflikte zu untersuchen.  
Zusammenfassend zeigt diese Arbeit, dass Flüchtlingsrückkehr erfolgreicher ist und positiv 
zum Aufbau von Nachkriegsgesellschaften und Frieden beitragen kann, wenn das Konzept 
der nachhaltigen Rückkehr genauer definiert ist und die Kriterien im Heimatland den definier-
ten Standards entsprechen. 
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Lebenslauf 
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